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This dissertation interrogates the significance of Alain Badiou's traversal of the 
antiphilosophy of Jacques Lacan, and the implications of that traversal for Badiou's 
thinking on the preconditions for the subject and possibilities of radical change. It 
focuses on the function of sexual matters in Badiou's philosophical works. Its basic 
presupposition posits that thinking radical change depends on an appreciation of the 
relations between sexual matters and an ethics of the act of subjective constitution, in 
the continuation of how psychoanalysis thinks the subject. While the encounter with 
sexual matters constitutes a key point for the psychoanalytic conception of subjective 
constitution and the act, sexual matters are less pronounced in the case of Badiou's 
philosophical works. In order to come to terms with Badiou's traversal of Lacan, this 
dissertation thus proposes a closer interrogation of the function of sexual matters in 
Badiou's philosophy. Its main thesis claims that a key to the appreciation of the 
significance and implications of Badiou's traversal of Lacan is located at the junctions 
where Badiou's ethical thrust is motivated in seemingly unwarranted conjunction with 
sexual matters. It argues that a key to Badiou's thinking of radical change is found at 
the points where his works cannot avoid a certain 'tarrying with sexual matters'.  
 More precisely, the issue is the conceptualizations of truths and subjects as 
procedures of novelty within a situation that follows from Badiou's mathematical 
gesture, his elaborations of a materialist dialectic, and how these conceptualizations 
can be effective for thinking about the possibilities of change. This issue is addressed 
by way of the analysis of the points at which sexual matters intrude upon Badiou's 
argumentations. The thesis takes the psychoanalytic reference to sex as real and the 
definition of the real as the impasse to formalization literally, and states that the 
intrusions of sexual matters in Badiou's text mark especially dense and significant 
points in Badiou's confrontation with the Lacanian framework. Reading for the claim 
that 'sex marks the spot' is first and foremost a methodological thesis, where the 
analysis of the symptomal knots where sexual matters intrude becomes a method for 
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the elaboration of the consequences of Badiou's philosophical project for thinking the 
subject of politics and the possibilities for change. The overall question is what it 
signifies to proceed from the non-object of sexual matters to thinking the possibilities 
of change by way of a mathematical ontology of multiplicities and a materialist 
dialectic of universal truths produced in the continuous process of a subject as borne in 
the division of an evental rupture?  
 This disseration analyzes the mark of sexual matters as it resurges on three 
occasions in Badiou's work. Firstly, it analyzes the function of sexual matters and the 
feminine other in relation to Badiou's concept of the generic multiple in L'Être et 
l'événement, such as it is developed in critical dialogues with Lacan's feminine logic of 
the non-all. Badiou denotes the generic multiple by way of a reference to the feminine 
non-all, apparently, but my main claim is that this decision can only make sense if one 
recognizes the division of the concept of the generic multiple in two: an initial 
indiscernible of nothing that answers to the nomination of an event, and a consequent 
generic multiple proper that answers to an actual truth procedure. Secondly, this 
dissertation analyzes Badiou's conjoining of the real of sex and the real of class in 
Théorie du sujet, and proceeds to interrogate how Badiou turns to tragedy in order to 
elaborate on this conjunction. My main claim is that the figure of Prometheus the fire-
bearer communicates Badiou's notion of an ethics of confidence, as the process in 
which radical change can be carried out. Lastly, this dissertation analyzes the function 
of the feminine other in relation to Badiou's conceptualization of antiphilosophy in 
general, in the seminar series on L'Antiphilosophie from 1992-1996. Lacan is there 
posited as a double exception, as the one to bring contemporary antiphilosophy to its 
conclusion and as the one to avoid the distinctive criterion of misogyny. My main 
claim is that these two exceptions have to be read together in order to grasp how 
Badiou's philosophy proceeds to think radical change from the point of impossibility. 
 In conclusion, I argue that the mark of sexual matters in Badiou's traversal of 
Lacanian antiphilosophy can be read as nothing less than the mark of Badiou's 
traversal of Lacan as such. It is not the case merely that Lacanian antiphilosophy deals 
with sexual matters and that Badiou thus also deals with it, to the extent that he deals 
with Lacanian antiphilosophy. The moments at which sexual matters intrude upon 
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Badiou's argumentation are also the moments at which the decisive elements of 
Badiou's arguments meet up and where his elaborations on the subject, its ethical 
portents, and the possibilities for radical change beyond Lacan reach their climax. It is 
not simply the case that the Lacanian real of sexual difference necessarily marks the 
move from psychoanalysis to philosophy. Also Badiou's elaborations on the 
implications of this move, through the concept of the generic multiple through the 
ruminations on the status of tragedy to the misogyny of the antiphilosophical act are 
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Since the turn of the millennium the philosophy of Alain Badiou has received an 
increased amount of attention, especially for its contributions on the subject of politics 
and the possibilities of radical change. This dissertation addresses the philosophical 
project of Badiou in its relation to the psychoanalytic teachings of Jacques Lacan and 
its rewrite of Sigmund Freud. It addresses the significance of sexual matters in 
Badiou's so-called traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and its implications for 
thinking the preconditions and the possibilities for the subject and radical change 
today. It inquires into the manner in which Badiou's traversal of Lacanian 
antiphilosophy has approached the connection between sexual matters and ethics in his 
elaborations on the subject of politics and the possibilities for thinking change, or into 
the manner in which the subject of politics and the possibilities for thinking change 
can be approached through the interrelations of ethics and sexual matters in an 
appreciation of the traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy in Badiou's philosophical 
project.  
 The basic presupposition of this dissertation is formulated in the general terms 
of the issue of thinking radical change in and through the relations between sexual 
matters, an ethics of the act, and the subject of politics – in its double sense, as 
signifying both the subject matter of politics and the political subject, to the extent that 
these coincide. Actual politics or political sequences are first presumed to be the case 
in and with a political subject and a political act, as the preconditions for the 
possibilities of radical change and novelty. The issue of ethics is the issue is how such 
a subject of politics might be constituted. In psychoanalysis, sexual matters designates 
the material by which a subject comes to be, in the sense that an encounter with sexual 
matters demands an act of subjective constitution, potentially and at best as a radical 
act in and by which the subject constitutes itself as a subject of sex, or a sexuated 
subject. As such, sexual matters offers up the material of an ethics of the act, where 
ethics nominates precisely such a radical act in and by which the subject comes to 
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constitute itself and the field into which it intervenes. Hence, sexual matters offer a 
blueprint if not a foundation of ethics as a theory of subjective constitution, where the 
reciprocal clarification of ethics and sexual matters can in turn serve as a clarification 
on the subject of politics and the possibilities for change. 
 The basic presupposition of the relation between sexual matters, ethics, and the 
subject of politics is not an original contribution: the politics of a good or just 
disposition of sex and genders or the place of these in a good and just politics has been 
a preoccupation of feminist theory and practice from its first wave, if not of political 
philosophy in general from Plato and Aristotle onwards. In the world of today – 
increasingly characterized by impending ecological catastrophes, recurrent economic 
crises, mass migrations and xenophobic nationalisms, deficient democracies, 
technocratic rule, capitalizations of social life, increasing global and local 
polarizations – a rethinking or another interrogation of the subject of politics is 
pertinent. This dissertation intervenes into this conundrum by turning to Badiou's 
philosophical works and his traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy.  
 Badiou's work traverses themes that have occupied philosophy from 
philosophy's beginning, frequently in confrontation with philosophers preceding him. 
The more significant figures count Plato (insisting on truth against opinions, 
conceiving conditions, prioritizing mathematics), René Descartes (installing the 
specifically modern configuration of philosophy as a philosophy of being, truths, and 
the subject), Immanuel Kant (analyzing finitude, delimiting reason, rendering being as 
such inaccessible), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (totalizing yet historicizing being 
and truth as the process of their dialectical division and self-relation, thinking as 
infinite capacity), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ("die Philosophen haben die Welt 
nur verschieden interpretiert, es kömmt drauf an, sie zu verändern"), 1  Martin 
Heidegger and various post-Heideggerians (refocusing on the question of being, 
prioritizing poetry), Gilles Deleuze (multiplicity over and against the One), and, 







 The teachings of Lacan consummate the specifically modern conceptualizations 
of these themes of Western philosophy as far as Badiou is concerned. It is in Lacan 
that Badiou finds the determination of the real as the impasse of formalization, and 
mathematics or mathematized logic as the science of the real. It is also in Lacan that 
Badiou finds a radical assumption of the paradoxes inherent to language and a rigorous 
elaboration of the consequences of the truth underpinning the being of a speaking-
thinking subject, conceived as castrated and split by the signifier. It is in Lacan that 
Badiou finds an uncompromising confrontation with the implications of an encounter 
with the inaccessible Thing, addressed through the notions of the drive and the object-
cause of desire. It is also in Lacan that Badiou finds an advanced reapplication of the 
incompletion and inconsistency of totality following from the dialectic or the self-
division of the One, formalized in the non-all logic of the feminine and in an ethics of 
the radically subjective act. As read by Badiou, Lacan comes as close as one gets to 
ultimately taking leave of the theme of finitude and assuming the entire weight of the 
death of God, without properly doing so, without making the full leap. That is to say, 
Lacan comes as close as one gets to thinking the possibilities for radical change and 
true novelty, arriving at the core of the structures and states that impose themselves on 
the worlds of women and men, but without thinking it properly, without thinking it all 
the way. This is the context in which Badiou's call to traverse Lacanian antiphilosophy 
is made. 
 While the Lacanian framework is apt to account for the structural mechanisms 
of oppression as well as the inherent flaws of these mechanisms themselves that permit 
for their subversion, Badiou's thinking of the possibilities of radical change insists on 
another step into the actual processes of change. Badiou's philosophical works offers 
an elaborate apparatus by which to address the preconditions of the subject of politics 
and the possibilities of radical change that both incorporates and expands on the crux 
of the psychoanalytic teachings of Lacan. The philosophical project of Badiou is 
underscored by a decisive ethical portent or thrust in the sense just defined: the 





possibilities of a subject as an active movement of radical change. The ethical thrust of 
Badiou's project depends on the lessons of Lacan's psychoanalytic teaching, especially 
the latter's notions concerning sexual difference as real. Insofar as Badiou's ethical 
thrust is involved with the notions of sexual difference as real, his philosophical 
project shares in a broader trend in contemporary radical thinking where the lessons of 
Lacan are mustered in an attempt to elaborate on another ethics beyond the dogmatism 
of the traditional moral law and the scepticism of the law's evacuation.   
 However, contrary to the theoretical apparatus by which psychoanalysis 
elaborates on the subject and an ethics of the act, the philosophical works of Badiou is 
not constructed around a core of sexual matters. While Badiou's traversal of Lacan 
constitutes the decisive move through which Badiou conceives of the preconditions for 
the subject and the possibilities for radical change, the crucial element in the teachings 
of Lacan, sexual matters, is displaced as an operative concept in Badiou's work. In any 
case, the explicit term at the core of Badiou's philosophical edifice is not the term of 
sexual matters. This displacement of sexual matters calls for further interrogation. Can 
one assume that the displacement of sexual matters from being the central category in 
Badiou's philosophy leaves intact the remaining entanglement of subjective 
constitution through the ethics of the act, or must one rather assume that the 
displacement of one term effectuates an alteration in the constitution of the remaining 
terms and their interrelations as well – and if the latter is the case, how does the 
displacement of sexual matters from its crucial position in psychoanalysis effect the 
thinking of subjective constitution and the ethics of the act? In order to come to terms 
with the full significance of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and its 
implications for thinking the preconditions for the subject and the possibilities of 
radical change, a further analysis of how sexual matters are at work in the traversal in 
question is necessary. 
 
 
Reading Badiou Today 
In one of the earliest compilations of commentaries to appear on Badiou's work – 
Alain Badiou; Penser le multiple (2002) – Badiou himself makes an introductory 
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remark as to a possible categorization of his academic reception. Badiou suggests a 
division into two main trends or orientations:  
 
L'une prend son départ dans la théorie formelle de l'être, la mathématique comme 
ontologie, le difficile concept de situation. L'autre se soutient surtout de 
l'événement et de ses conséquences dans l'ordre de la vérité générique. Ou encore, 
la première trouve ses appuis critiques dans la logique, dans la théorie des 
ensembles, ou dans le rapport délicat entre la multiplicité inconsistante et sa 
présentation pensable comme multiplicité consistante. L'autre coupe vers le Sujet 
selon Lacan, ou vers la politique d'émancipation, ou encore vers la théorie des 
procédures artistiques.3 
 
Having first distinguished the orientation of the event from that of being, Badiou 
further distinguishes the orientation of the event into that of the event itself and that of 
its consequences in the order of generic truths. Two trends turn to three, grouped 
according to their orientation by way of the concepts of being, the event, or truths.  
 Admitting some denominational leverage, such a triple division has become a 
rule in the extensive amount of edited collections, special issue journals, introductions, 
and beginner's guides to Badiou.4 To read Badiou seems to be to read him for his 
conceptualizations of being (ontology), the event (the possibility for change and 






















politics), with the additional subject fluctuating back and forth somewhere between the 
latter two. Together with a growing number of studies on Badiou in relation to other 
figures in the history of Western thinking, these themes make up the overall scheme of 
Badiou's general reception. 
 The renown of Badiou's philosophy is first and foremost tied to his proposition 
from L'Être et l'événement (1988) that mathematics equals ontology.5 By proposing 
that mathematics thinks being-qua-being, Badiou's project opposes the predominant 
dependency on language in the wake of the linguistic turn, structuralism, and 
Heidegger's poetic ruminations on being. Badiou's equation of mathematics and 
ontology has been extensively debated, as have Badiou's elaborations on how set 
theory serves as the most adequate mode of thinking being-qua-being so far.6 The 
mathematics of set theory allows for an ontology of pure being as unbound 
multiplicity, as inconsistent multiplicities of multiplicities, to the jettison of the One 
(l'Un n'est pas). It allows for a subtractive ontology to be founded on the void or 
empty set alone.7 According to Ray Brassier, the decisive import of Badiou's work is 
its subtractive ontology, one that is not only dependent on but also on par with the 
propulsive unbinding of all things solid under capitalism.8 Badiou signals a final 
disenchantment of ontology, insofar as 'being' is insignificant, meaning literally 
nothing, and the question of the meaning of being is thus rendered an antiquated 
superstition.9 Badiou's equation of mathematics and ontology is an attempt at a 




















and a full evacuation of transcendence, one that affirms the existence of the infinite 
and endorses its simple banality.  
 To Badiou, however, his thesis on the multiplicities of being serves as a 
prolegomena to the interrogation of the relations between the concepts of truths and 
subjects in the wake of an event.10 In a so-called 'Platonic gesture' or a 'Platonism of 
the multiple', Badiou refuses the theme of an end of philosophy. He insists on 
salvaging the notions of universal truths and the subject from being dispersed at the 
hands of a self-perpetuating dissemination of opinions and cultures, on the one hand, 
and from disappearing under the operations of structure and representation, on the 
other.11 In the wake of an event and through the fidelity of a subject, universal truths 
may come to be through so-called generic procedures within the four conditions of 
science, art, love, and politics. There are attempts at comprehensive accounts of 
Badiou's philosophy as a system, at relating the tripartite knot of event, truths, and 
subjects back onto his ontological thesis. Bruno Bosteels argues that too strong a 
separation of being and event risks losing sight of the dialectic between the two, and 
thereby also of how novelty and change result from the articulation of a singular truth 
onto an existing state of things.12 Peter Hallward makes the case that Badiou's 
Platonism of the multiple avoids reintroducing the One at the level of the event by 
aligning the event with the resurgence in a situation of pure being as unbound and 
inconsistent multiplicities, otherwise subtracted from presentation.13 Badiou's Platonic 
gesture implies a reaffirmation of the death of God and the priority of the multiple, by 
proposing the notion of universal truths as singular processes of change that are 















 Truths nonetheless depend upon the fidelity of subjects, and Badiou's sketches 
for an ethics of truths have long been dominant in his reception, especially in the 
Anglophone world.14 Seized by an event, a subject forces a truth into existence 
through the process of deducing the event's consequences in and for the situation. The 
Platonic gesture continues to inform on Badiou's project insofar as the question is not 
so much how to avoid the evil of oppressions and subordinations, but rather how to 
face up to and affirm the ways in which a subject can do good by the truth testified to 
by an event. The overarching imperative reads 'un pas de plus!' or 'continuez!' or 
'never forget that which you have encountered!'15 Opposed to mere survival, the notion 
of a good life is to be living in and by and for an idea or a truth, in fidelity to which a 
subject can come to seize upon its proper immortality. As Ernesto Laclau observes, 
Badiou' ethics is an affirmative ethics articulated within an emancipatory project, and 
thus opposed to the widespread trend of a strictly defensive or reactive ethics of 
tolerance, responsiveness, and recognition of others.16 Others have criticized the 
miraculous undertones of the event and the religious connotations of fidelity and 
immortality in Badiou. 17  But the mathematical underpinnings of Badiou's work 
prevent its superposition with the religious domain. Badiou speaks of a logical 
resistance, or of being resistant by logic.18 The axiom trumps the miraculous as far as 
undecidability is concerned and, as Hallward points out, the fidelity in question for 
Badiou is first and foremost the fidelity of mathematical deduction.19 Stéphane Vinolo 
understands the notion of immortality to effectively denounce every reference to a 

















truth in the present.20 Ultimately, Badiou's ethics concerns the subjection or the 
subordination to singular truths. But insofar as truths are universal and true only 
insofar as they are true for all, it is an ethics of subordination that is inherently 
egalitarian. It is primarily as a polemic against the limitations of thinking and in 
defense of the capacity of thinking to break free of its restraints and to expand on its 
being. It is as a defense of the capacity for thinking as radical change and true novelty, 
and this is also where the significance of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy 




Badiou's recurrent objection to Lacan concerns the structural and/or punctual 
limitations his theory of the subject.21 Badiou's ethical imperative of continuation 
acquires its significance here, as a call to traverse or work through the framework of 
Lacanian antiphilosophy.22 Antiphilosophy constitutes the crux of several seminal 
readings of Badiou in relation to Lacan. In the main, these debates relate to how 
Lacan's teachings on the real as the impasse of formalization informs on Badiou's 
project to think the possibilities of radical change and true novelty. For Bosteels, the 
traversal provides a primary lesson in dialectical thinking and an emphasis on the 
continuous subjective engagement against the so-called speculative-leftist temptation 
of conceiving of change as the radical act of an absolute beginning, and against the 
temptations of religion. Against the temptation of religion, antiphilosophy makes the 
philosopher attentive to the dogmatic dangers involved in the assumption of a 
substantial truth, a fullness of meaning possible to pronounce completely, as if spoken 
or guaranteed by God. Against speculative leftism and the tendency to think the event 
in an antiphilosophical manner and to ignore the dialectic between the old and the 








character, by which it insists on the importance of attending to the consequences of an 
event in and for a situation.23 
 For Justin Clemens and Adam J. Bartlett, the traversal provides a lesson on 
philosophy's paradoxical relation to its conditions as one of simultaneous inclusion 
and exclusion, and thus an anti-totalitarian lesson on the impossibility of pronouncing 
the whole of truth. Badiou's conception of truths is indebted to Lacan's denigration of 
the truth of philosophy to the benefit of its obscure underside. Badiou's traversal 
performs a reversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy, Clemens and Bartlett argues, where 
truths are conceived to depend upon an operation of a pass through that which in a 
given situation constitutes its impossibility, its impasse, its non-relation, or its real, as 
it has been localized through the antiphilosophical act. Where antiphilosophy libels the 
philosopher for ignoring the non-relation by assuming the possibility of saying the 
whole of truth, Badiou's reconfiguration of truth through Lacan executes the 
impossibility of such a whole-saying and the non-relation that is its cause as the sine 
qua non and the very definition of the truth of philosophy.24  
 For Slavoj Žižek, the traversal provides a negative lesson on how Badiou's 
philosophical works are lacking the negativity of the death drive. On account of this 
lack, Žižek accuses Badiou of missing out on the psychoanalytic lessons for thinking 
the preconditions for political action altogether. Badiou does not acknowledge the 
radical implications of Lacanian theory to its fullest extent, and thereby partly plugs up 




















Badiou confuses the function of the One with "a secondary 'totalization' of a 
primordially dispersed and inconsistent field," instead of recognizing it as "the 
signifier of (self-)division, the ultimate supplement or excess: by way of re-marking 
the pre-existing real, the One divides it from itself, introduces its non-coincidence with 
itself." 25  Badiou thus finds himself at risk of endorsing an antiphilosophy of 
multiplicity (similar to Deleuze) rather than a proper Lacanian philosophy of the non-
coincidence of the One, the One as essential self-division – that is, instead of being a 
Hegelian. 
 My dissertation intervenes into these debates. Although these debates are well 
informed on the Lacanian premises of Badiou's philosophical works, and do offers 
longer extrapolations on the status of sexual matters within psychoanalytic theory, a 
focus on the function of sexual matters in Badiou's traversal of Lacanian 
antiphilosophy is nonetheless strangely absent. However, there is another trend in the 
reception of Badiou's Lacan reads Badiou's work for its propositions on matters 
sexual. Badiou builds his theory of love as a truth procedure and a condition for 
philosophy on Lacan's notion of the real as it is intricately bound to sexual matters, as 
the real of sexual difference. In the wake of Lacan, Badiou proposes a formula of 
sexuation of his own. The issue is still the possibilities of change and novelty as 
immanent breaks with the structures that be, but this time within the conditions of 
love. On that basis, Lilian Munk Rösing elaborates on how Badiou's conception of 
love as a truth procedure constitutes a visionary sexual philosophy beyond the 
normative impositions of social constructions and biological essences, an existential 
sex [et eksistensielt kön] as a process of creation occurring in and through love.26  
 But mine is not a dissertation on that which Badiou says about sexual matters. It 













masculinity add up to a potential theory of gender or sexuation. My thesis does not so 
much posit the question of the possible conceptualizations of sexual matters to be 
found in Badiou's philosophy, or of that which Badiou thinks of sex. Rather, it posits 
the question of that which sex makes Badiou think or, more precisely, of that which sex 
is the mark of in Badiou's thinking.  
 My thesis make the claim that the moments at which sexual matters intrude 
upon Badiou's argumentation are also the moments at which the decisive elements of 
Badiou's arguments meet up and where his elaborations on the subject, its ethical 
portents, and the possibilities for radical change beyond Lacan reach their climax. Its 
claim goes beyond the notion that an implicit entertainment of sexual matters in 
Badiou's work is in need of closer scrutiny. Alenka Zupančič has argued that the 
sexual constitutes a 'missed encounter' between psychoanalysis and philosophy, a 
missed encounter that is especially pronounced in the case of Badiou.27 My thesis 
involves an amplification of the implications of Zupančič's statement, to the extent that 
Zupančič's statement turns into the opposite claim, that sexual matters constitute the 
very crux of the encounter between the psychoanalytic teachings of Lacan and 
Badiou's philosophical works. My thesis highlights how sexual matters constitute 
something akin to the impossible proper, the impasse, or the real from the encounter of 
which the philosophy of Badiou spins its concepts of being, the event, truths, and the 
subject. It states that among the many lines of thought, traces of influence, and points 
of dissent that make up the intricate relations at work in Badiou's philosophical works 
and its traversal of the Lacanian framework, a key to the disentanglement of these 
lines of thought is to be located at the precise junctions where the ethical thrust of 
Badiou's work is inadvertently motivated and tangled up in seemingly unwarranted 
conjunction with sexual matters, at the moments where Badiou's project cannot avoid 
a certain 'tarrying with sexual matters'. 
 In not reading for the meaning of sexual matters but for its mark, the main 
thesis of this dissertation is thus of a methodological or strategic character. Sex marks 






real as the impasse of formalization, as a dense and productive gap or fault. My thesis 
thus relates back to my basic presupposition and inquires into the function of sexual 
matters in relation to ethics and the subject of politics, in thinking radical change. The 
displacement of sexual matters from its key position in psychoanalysis does not entail 
its absence. Sexual matters still insist in thinking radical change, and by a further 
interrogation of the points at which sexual matters reemerge in Badiou's arguments, a 
better comprehension of the significance of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian 
antiphilosophy and its implications can be achieved. The intrusions of sexual matters 
at places where sexual matters do not constitute the topic under discussion are taken to 
indicate points in Badiou's relation to Lacan that are especially dense, especially 
charged with significance and signifying possibilities. Sexual matters thus become the 
objective lens through which I approach, read, and analyze Badiou's work, not only as 
it depends on the teachings of Lacan but also as it struggles to move beyond the 
premises of the Lacanian model.  
 
 
Sexual Matters as Non-Object 
Sexual matters are not simply the objective lens through which I approach and analyze 
Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy, but also an element of psychoanalysis 
and the teachings of Lacan in its own right, as a crucial moment in the psychoanalytic 
theories of the subject, and in its potential for subversion and change. A clarification 
of the term 'sexual matters' is therefore required. The fundamental concern of the 
psychoanalytical orientation is not constituted by the categories of gender but rather by 
the questions of sex and the sexual. Psychoanalysis addresses the questions that the 
libido, the sexual drive, poses in and for human existence. As questions posed in and 
for human existence, the sexual that psychoanalysis refers to cannot be categorized in 
accordance with any too simple schematics of the sex/gender binary. Instead, the 
psychoanalytic notion of the sexual designates both the cause and the effect of the 
ultimate failure of too simple schematics, as it is not nature nor culture, nor both. 
Rather the sexual designates an excess of the bungled consummation of nature and 
culture. The psychoanalytic insight concerns its appreciation of sex and the sexual as 
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an insistent but all the more enigmatic entity, a recurrent question in lack of an answer, 
a strangely intrusive Thing that is itself subtracted from communication and that 
renders communication itself inherently problematic. Like the concept of the 
unconscious, the sexual problematic is an obstacle to its own conceptualization, and 
from the sexual reference of the bungled consummation of nature and culture swerves 
those bungled thoughts and actions that betray the presence of the unconscious.  
 The sexual names both the act and the fact in and by which the attempts at fixed 
and univocal categorizations and codifications of identities falter, especially but not 
exclusively those concerning sex and gender. This most radical aspect of 
psychoanalysis is often bypassed. Freud's denouncement of the capacities of biology 
and psychology to explain the enigma of femininity might have acquitted him from the 
accusations of biological determinism. On the other hand, Freud's proposition that the 
task of analysis is to address the question of the becoming of a woman rather than her 
being has been highlighted as an early contribution to the comprehension of gender as 
a social and cultural construction.28 Freud might thereby seem to mirror the sex-gender 
distinction proposed in the works of Margaret Mead.29 Gayle Rubin thus suggests that 
Freudian psychoanalysis provides the conceptual tools by which to (first) describe and 
(after Freud) criticize the so-called 'sex/gender system' that is responsible for the 
oppression of women.30 Freud does offer a description of such a system, but that is not 
all he does. Rubin leaves out how also feminine sexuality, like its masculine other, 




















of sexuality.31  Left out from Rubin's reading of psychoanalysis as a descriptive theory 
of the sex/gender system is the fact that the sexual to which psychoanalysis refers is 
something that does not work, that always leaves something out. Jacqueline Rose 
argues that Rubin and others with her construe psychoanalysis as without an 
unconscious. Rubin assumes that the internalizations of norms and constitutions of 
identities work, while the basic premise of Freud is the opposite, namely that they do 
not: "the unconscious constantly reveals the 'failure' of identity."32 At its most radical, 
psychoanalysis should be recognized for its subversion or disruption of the capacities 
of both nature and culture to provide a positive ground for the categories pertaining to 
sex and gender. Psychoanalysis is not alone in such subversions. Donna Haraway 
speaks of the cultural production of nature and the natural production of culture as 
'naturecultures'.33 Judith Butler topples the nature/culture distinction by setting up 
gender not only as the cultural meaning inscribed upon a pre-given natural sex but also 
as the very apparatus through which sex itself is established as a pre-given natural, 
with sex itself as a gendered category, a regulatory ideal or ideal construct.34 But 
beyond the coalescence of categories disturbing a too neat distinction of nature and 
culture, the psychoanalytic subversion recognizes at their intersection something in 
excess, something that does not fit in, a returning obstacle or failure inherent to the 
constitution of categories and formation of identities themselves. Lacan refers to this 
excess or failure with the names of surplus jouissance or the object petit a, or also the 
real of the drive, das Ding, and it is this excess that is the sexual in psychoanalysis. It 
is by its attentiveness to how the sexual poses an obstacle to categorizations and 
codifications of identities that psychoanalysis is still relevant for feminism and 












 When I choose the term 'sexual matters' – rather than those of sex, the sexual, 
sexuality, or the sexual drive – in talking of the preconditions for the subject and 
possibilities of change, I do so mainly for two reasons. First of all, it is to make as 
broad as possible a reference to the psychoanalytic take on the sexual as a recurrent 
question in and for the existence of speaking beings. It is so as to have access to a term 
that can indiscriminately be applied to equally address such relatively disparate 
phenomena as sexual organs and sexual acts, sexual practices and sexual preferences, 
sexual objects and sexual aims, sexual identifications and sexual difference, while still 
granting these phenomena their participation in the overall impasse or deadlock that is 
the sexual problematic psychoanalytically conceived.  
 Secondly, by gathering together the diversity of sexual phenomena under the 
overarching heading of 'matter', I seek to underscore the materialist underpinnings of 
the psychoanalytic stance on the sexual problematic. Obviously, it is not an issue of 
materialist underpinnings in the vulgar sense by which the sexual problematic would 
be reducible to some tangible hands-on objectivity of the physical world, i.e. the 
physical body, if such a materialism exists at all. It would run counter to that which 
has been said of the psychoanalytic perspective on the sexual as an excess at the 
intersection of nature and culture. Rather psychoanalysis musters its materialist 
strength in the simple yet precise sense to which Badiou has pinned materialism, 
namely as the primacy of being over thinking.35 Sexual matters do not depend upon 
thinking; a contrario, thinking depends upon sexual matters. Psychoanalysis musters 
its materialist strength in the sense that the sexual problematic constitutes both the 
source and aim of its orientation, a first and last point of reference whose obscure 
density continues to insist as that which both induces and eludes thinking, as its 
ultimate and ultimately exclusive condition, as an impenetrable obstacle productive of 
thought. To say it in punning shorthand: the sexual matters, period.   
 Psychoanalytically speaking, sexual matters matter as an excess beyond the 
sex/gender and nature/culture distinctions. Its materialist underpinnings are not those 
of a more orthodox historical-materialist concern for the material relations and forces 




positing a discursive challenge to the presumed irreducibility of materiality through 
evincing the materializing powers of discourse, as does Butler. 36  Nor is it the 
corporeality of the body that is raised as a question or point of inquiry, even if this 
corporeality is conceived of as a vibrant field of ever flowing forces or a surface of 
intensities and interacting affects, as is the case, in various ways, in the works of 
Elizabeth Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, and Jane Bennett.37 It is not an issue of a so-called 
new materialist appreciation of 'materiality as force.' 38  Already the doctrine of 
Marxism-Leninism determined the subjective dimensions of objectivity, as it situated 
objective truth within the antagonistic relations of class struggle. The theoretical 
contributions of Butler, Braidotti, and Bennett (inter alia) continue to displace the 
naive notion of objectivity, leaning on Adrienne Rich's 'politics of location'39 and 
Haraway's 'situated knowledges'.40 Nonetheless, matter, materiality, and processes of 
materialization still enter into their discussions in ways pertaining to the object: as the 
object of interrogation or the object of investigation, even as it is continually re-forged 
or re-negotiated in the process. Matter figures there in some sense of positivity, 
whereas the materialist underpinnings of psychoanalysis amount to the opposite: not 
so much materiality as force but rather force as materiality. The notion of sexual 
matters as an obdurate density or impenetrable obstacle productive of thinking should 
be grasped as a strict negativity. Joan Copjec notes how the sexual problematic in 






















manifest in negative phenomena exclusively: lapses, interruptions."41 Sexual matters 
designate a fault or hole in thinking, from which thinking emanates, and around which 
thinking swerves. Žižek has made the most out of this materialism, in his readings of 
Hegel and Lacan. He conceives of the negative tensions or antagonisms between a 
notion and reality as a tension immanent to the notion itself, from which the notion 
springs, or as the movement by which a thing emerges out of its own loss.42 My point 
is that the materialist underpinnings of psychoanalysis in this dissertation do not 
amount to a theory about sex or sexuality as such: psychoanalysis teaches, strictly 
speaking, nothing about sexual matters. Rather it marks the traces of sexual matters in 
speaking beings, their effects on the subject and their consequences in and for 
thinking.  
 Sexual matters constitute the non-object of psychoanalysis as well as the non-
object through which this dissertation approaches its subject matter, namely the 
question of how to read Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and its 
implications for thinking the subject of politics and the possibilities for radical change 
and true novelty. Like in psychoanalysis, my readings and analyses do not take the 
occurrence of sexual matters in Badiou's work as lessons on sexuality. Rather, the 
intrusions of sexual matters in Badiou's arguments are taken as indications of 
particular dense and obscure points, or symptomal knots, in his relation to Lacan. Like 
in psychoanalysis, my method consists in the analytical elaboration of these 
symptomal knots, nesting up the lines of thought and threads of influence that are in 
play there, in order to make sense of the seemingly senseless points. It is not a matter 
of reading for the blind spots in Badiou's argumentation. Rather, it is a matter of 
making the most out of these occurrences of sexual matters, and to read under the 
assumption that sexual matters serve as much to conceal as to disclose the key strands 
in and through which the ethical thrust of Badiou's work and his thinking of radical 
change after Lacan is knotted together. My thesis is first and foremost a 







sexual matters as real and the real as the impasse of formalization back into the 
readings it offers of Badiou's traversal of the Lacanian framework.  
 
 
Dialectic of the Subject and Politics of Change 
The overall question is how an analysis of the function of sexual matters in Badiou's 
traversal of Lacan can elucidate on how the Lacanian framework informs Badiou's 
philosophical project and its elaborations on another thinking of the subject of politics, 
the ethics of the act, and the possibilities for true novelty and radical change. It is an 
issue of the relevance of Badiou's thinking as an intervention into other theories of 
change and politics, at large and within the field of gender research. Ever since Marx' 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach claimed that the aim of philosophy is to change the 
world, questions of change and political action have occupied the minds of 
philosophers and theorists alike, and feminism is no exception in this regard. Since its 
origin in the women's movement's struggle for emancipation and the theorization of 
that struggle, questions relating to the subject of politics have occupied gender 
research from the start. Although there are more feminisms than one, a general trait 
can be recognized in the opposition to oppressive regimes and structures, on the one 
hand, and in the promotion of equality (even in difference) as a fundamental principle, 
on the other. While initially inclined to the question of women's status, feminism 
nonetheless tends towards a universal scope, where none should be politically, 
economically, or socially oppressed, no matter their particularities (of sex, gender, 
sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, creed, ability, class, etc.).43 In its universal scope, 















radical emancipatory project that this dissertation offers a contribution to feminism, 
that is, to a struggle against oppressive regimes and structures tout court. Badiou's 
work concerns feminism to the extent that both can be said to subscribe to the dictum 
that the emancipation of one goes by the emancipation of all. 
 Psychoanalysis is often accused of reproducing an oppressive sex/gender 
system, a phallogocentric economy, a hegemonic masculinity, or a normative 
heterosexual matrix. If Freud and Lacan are not strictly normative in their accounts of 
the subordination of women, their descriptions of the apparatuses and operations at 
work have been accused of failing to account for the historical preconditions of the 
established structures and, hence, for other possibilities. Luce Irigaray therefore seeks 
to tease out the hidden feminine repressed from the history of Western metaphysics in 
a critical mime,44 whereas Butler suggests a critical genealogy of power's legitimating 
practices and the categories of identity thereby engendered and installed as self-
explanatory.45 These attacks on psychoanalysis miss out on its radical core, and while 
there might be a need for critiques of the apparatuses and operations of oppression, I 
express some impatience in regard to the capacities of strictly critical endeavors to 
provide the opportunity for actual change to occur. If capitalism is the prime operator 
of subordination today, the question of emancipation has to somehow address the issue 
of how capitalism thrives by eating its own opposition, by continuously including the 
excluded others within itself. The critical endeavors of pointing out how various 
subjects of sex, gender, and desire are excluded by various practices of power and 
discourse run the risk of facilitating capitalism in its feast on such excluded others, by 
diligently pointing these others out. But how can anything but a displacement of 
subordinated subject-positions and oppression can take place by such a move, in 
contrast to the radical change and true novelty implied by an actual non-oppressive 
regime? An actual non-oppressive regime might be utopian, but that is no argument 
against the attempt to think its possibility. Badiou calls such attempts 'communism', 
and his philosophical works suggest an entrance into the conundrum of thinking 





intrude into the mix of bodies and languages otherwise recognized by the dominant 
ideology of so-called democratic materialism.46 The decisive point, as Bosteels points 
out, is precisely the status of truths as ruptures in established states of structures, 
where a strictly negative critique gives way to a subject's affirmation of the affirmative 
force of such ruptures. Badiou will find a first but not sufficient theorization of truths 
as ruptures in structure, as 'holes in knowledge', in Lacan's teachings on the subject of 
psychoanalysis.47  
 Badiou is not alone to appreciate the radical potential of psychoanalysis. As 
Lacanian psychoanalysis turns increasingly towards the notions of the real and the 
drive as the inherent limits of the symbolic, the law, and the structures of desire, it 
reveals a potential to serve as more than a mere description or diagnostics of the status 
quo. Žižek, for instance, will appropriate Lacan as a basis both of an advanced critique 
of the ideology of contemporary capitalism and as a radical theory of the act, of 
subjective destitution as an extreme subtraction from oppressive structures and 
subordination.48 Copjec makes a similar point, simultaneously criticizing that which 
she determines as Butler's discursive-deconstructive position on the sexual 
problematic as an incomplete meaning to be endlessly re-negotiated through 
performative reiterations. Sex as real designates the internal limits of language and 
installs the subject of sex at the same level as the law, neither above nor below, writes 
Copjec, claiming this to be the only way to secure the incalculability of the subject and 
a space for action.49 These examples underline a radical potential in the psychoanalytic 
conception of the subject beyond the mere plaything of a presumed ahistorical or 
irretrievable instance of the law. Subjective destitution does not designate the 
mechanical procedures of a more or less well-functioning symbolic structure or 
discursive regime, but a radical act in and by which a subject constitutes and 
determines both itself as a subject and the field into which it intervenes. The non-









the sense that the subject in question is as much the material as the agency by which 
changes in the political field proceed. At issue is the mark of sexual matters in 
Badiou's contributions to thinking such an ethics of the subjective act as a precondition 
for change.  
 Badiou celebrates the teachings of Lacan for its refusal to give up on a theory of 
the subject where his contemporaries preferred to let it disappear in the play of 
structures and powers (Claude Lévi-Strauss, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault), 
without regressing to the metaphysics of a pre-modern humanist notion of the 
individual self. The Lacanian subject is a void subject, ultimately meeting up in its 
ontological determination in a void object petit a, the real cause of desire, i.e. the non-
object of sexual matters.50 Against the metaphysics of the humanist individual, Badiou 
turns to Lacan to elaborate on a dialectics of the subject, the so-called black sheep of 
dialectical materialism, where dialectics is to be read quite simply as the priority of 
division over unity.51 Division is productive of change, whereas unity proffers nothing 
but static preservation and infinite repetition, and the Lacanian subject is nothing if not 
a split subject, or the split as subject. As Lacan ties his split subject to its ontological 
determination in the object petit a, Badiou sees the possibility of thinking another 
materialist dialectic, relating being (the non-object or void as productive of thinking) 
and division (the subject as productive of change). At the same time, Lacan is always 
the antiphilosopher to be traversed and worked through. As Hallward notes, Badiou's 
philosophical works are one continuous effort to move beyond the constraints of the 
Lacanian framework, which Badiou perceives as too caught up in the statics of 
structure. Lacan's theory of the subject is no exception, and against its punctual and 
void occurrence in Lacan, Badiou will strive to make un pas de plus and to think the 
subject as process, as continuation.52 My questions are how sexual matters mark 









thinking emancipation and the subject of politics as the possibility for radical change 
and true novelty.   
 The non-object of sexual matters serves to interrogate a universalized 
conception of the subject, in which the subject carries no particular specificity. Hence 
this dissertation does not concern the formulation of an ethics or a politics of sex and 
gender in the objective genitive, where sexual matters and gender issues would 
become the object of ethical deliberations or political administrations within a given 
body politic. On the contrary, it considers the formulation of a sexual politics or a 
politics of sexual matters in the subjective genitive, in a tradition that interrogates the 
mechanisms by which the political field can be said to be undercut by sexual matters 
and that appreciates a sexual politics in the subjective sense insofar as it is attentive to 
the mechanisms by which sexual matters is effective in the execution of politics and 
the failed articulations of a given body politic. For instance, James Penney argues for 
sexualizing politics rather than politicizing the sexual,53 and Žižek's analyses of anti-
Semitic and racist jouissance go to show how politics is already sexualized.54 Sexual 
matters signal an excess undercutting the political field, the bungled consummation of 
nature and culture, thwarting its trajectories and preventing its closure, betraying an 
obverse of so-called civilization, its discontents proper.  
 However, sexualizing the politics of emancipation in a subjective sense also 
means to conceptualize the subject of politics on the basis of a formalized cast that is 
sexually differentiated. In critiques of Western rationality as inherently 
phallogocentric and coterminous with patriarchy and heterosexual hegemony, the 
notions of masculinity and oppressive exclusion are often hard to differentiate. 
Masculinity is oppressive as oppression is masculine, insofar as both depend on the 
One, on the concept. The others of the One thus also conflate easily, and femininity 
often signal an alternative to oppressive mechanisms and a route to emancipation, as in 






Deleuze's processes of deterritorialization.55 French feminism has attempted to open a 
way out from under the binaries of masculine hegemony by conjoining femininity and 
vacillations of differences, movements and mobility, indiscernibility and the blurring 
of limits: e.g., Irigaray's fluids, Julia Kristeva's semiotic chora and cyclic 
temporalities, and Hélène Cixous' écriture féminine.56 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's 
strategic essentialism also allows femininity to be used as a critical starting point for 
change,57 whereas Braidotti's nomadic subjectivity applies an unfinished feminine 
materiality in an account of how becoming can produce a break with both universalism 
and dualism.58  Lacan's teachings on the real of sexual difference also offers a 
formalization of the subject of politics according to a sexually differentiated logic: the 
excess of sexual matters undercutting the political field can be inscribed within a 
subjective structure in one of two ways, masculine or feminine. Whereas a masculine 
logic denies and excludes the excess as a means to underpin and secure the 
consistency and continuity of the body politic, i.e. the Law, the inflection of the 
subject of politics by feminine parameters, as non-all, acknowledges the excess as the 
very point through which a transformation of the body politic and the political field 
can be facilitated. At issue is not only to what extent a notion of a feminine other 
informs Badiou's conceptualization of change, but also how an analysis of the function 
of sexual matters can underline the implications involved in the notion of the feminine.  
 While punctual and static in Lacan, the feminine non-all nonetheless 
underscores Badiou's own theory of the subject. Here the subject emanates from an 
undecidable event and proceeds through the indiscernibles of a situation to count its 
















and places. Badiou seemingly shares a terminology with feminist routes of 
emancipation. However, Badiou thinks the others of the One not as a vitalist flux or as 
the other of a monolithic language, but through mathematics. Caught in the 
mechanisms of its own object – language – deconstruction leaves out the problematic 
of the radical act as that by which a subject can come to constitute itself and the field 
into which it intervenes. Badiou's criticism of Deleuze's vitalism is similar, as it is 
conceived of as a disguised philosophy of the One, unable to account for radical 
change: if everything continuously changes in 'one great clamor of being', then change 
is a constant and hence no change at all.59 Badiou's mathematics is inclined towards 
the opposite, namely towards the division of One into two as productive of 
universality, of radical change as true novelty that is equally true in and for all. The 
choice of mathematics over vitalism as well as deconstruction is decisive for how 
Badiou comes to think the subject and the possibilities for radical change and novelty. 
The debates on the miraculous-religious or transcendentalist tendencies in thinking 
radical change return with the figure of the feminine other, where Badiou's 
mathematical gesture relieves his thinking of radical change from transcendence.60 My 
question is how the figure of the feminine other operate in Badiou's traversal of 
Lacanian antiphilosophy to escape transcendence and thus to effectuate actual change, 
in the present.  
 Against deconstruction and vitalism, Badiou's foundational gesture of equating 
mathematics with ontology – as the science of pure being as unbound and inconsistent 
multiplicities of multiplicities – prepares for a materialist dialectic, a philosophy of 
radical change and true novelty in which truths are conceived on the grounds of the 
axiomatic break of a subject's decision on the undecidable, a discernment of the 
indiscernible in a generic multiplicity that thinks the impossible. Lacan's formulations 
on the real of sexual difference and the logics of sexuation motivates the mathematical 
gesture of Badiou, as well as Badiou's elaborations of a materialist dialectic, but only 
in part. The materialist dialectic goes to affirm, Badiou writes, symptomatically 






before'.61 A Lacanian mantra claims precisely that a truth can only ever be half-spoken 
or half-said [mi-dit]. So if Badiou operates in a continuation of Lacan, the my overall 
questions are how sexual matters function in Badiou's elaboration on the Lacanian 
scheme and what these elaborations allow him to think, also beyond Lacan.  
   
  
Prospectives 
My inquiries concern the conceptualizations of truths and subjects that are entailed by 
the mathematical gesture of Badiou, his elaborations of a materialist dialectic, and how 
these conceptualizations can be effective for thinking about the possibilities of change. 
I recognize the key role played by Lacan, while I also recognize how Badiou's project 
is nothing if not a continuous struggle to traverse the premises of Lacan. My questions 
therefore concern how Badiou proceeds to think beyond Lacan through Lacan, and 
what the implications of his specific route through the Lacanian framework are for 
thinking the subject of politics, the possibilities of change, and the problematic of 
emancipation. It is to address these questions that I turn to the points at which sexual 
matters intrude upon Badiou's arguments. My thesis takes the psychoanalytic reference 
to sex as real and the definition of the real as the impasse to formalization literally, in 
the sense that the intrusions of sexual matters in Badiou's text mark especially dense 
and significant points in Badiou's confrontation with the Lacanian framework. 
Reading for the claim that 'sex marks the spot' thus becomes a methodological or 
strategic thesis, where the analysis of these points, these symptomal knots, becomes a 
method to elaborate on the consequences of Badiou's philosophical project for 
thinking the subject of politics and the possibilities for change: To proceed from the 
non-object of sexual matters to thinking the possibilities of change by way of a 
mathematical ontology of multiplicities and a materialist dialectic of universal truths 
produced in the continuation of a subjective process borne in the division of an evental 
rupture – what does this signify? 
 In addition to a first chapter, "Positing the Presupposition; In Want of an 




independent interventions into the field designated by the basic presupposition on the 
relations between sexual matters, ethics, and the subject of politics. They take place at 
three precise points where sexual matters resurge seemingly unmotivated in Badiou's 
texts. They do not present a teleological argument, no gradual evolution towards an 
ultimate conclusion. The initial chapter is therefore designed in part to serve as a 
replacement for such an argument. It presents a more extensive discussion of the 
stakes involved in the basic presupposition that sexual matters inform an ethics of the 
act in relation to a theory of the subject of politics. In so doing, it provides a more 
substantial presentation of the field into which my thesis and the three consequent 
chapters intervene. It also provides a more detailed discussion on the relevant research. 
It addresses the significance and implications of the dictum that the emancipation of 
one goes by the emancipation of all in Badiou's philosophy. I first look to the context 
for Badiou's philosophical works and inquire into how that context informs on 
Badiou's approach to the subject of politics. I then look to how the psychoanalytic 
reference to sexual matters and the notion of the drive provide an ethics of a radically 
subjective act, of subjective constitution at a remove from oppressive structures. 
Finally, I return to Badiou's work in order to sketch out how the Lacanian framework 
informs on Badiou's own elaboration on a theory of the subject. The overarching 
questions directing my inquires in this initial chapter concern the general issues and 
debates that make up the field in which Badiou's philosophical works have been, are, 
and will be situated.  
 My second chapter is entitled "The Infinite and the Feminine Non-All as 
Inaccessibility and Actuality". It is an issue not only to what extent a notion of a 
feminine other operates in Badiou's thinking of change, but also the analysis of the 
function of sexual matters can underline the implications involved in the notion of the 
feminine, and how the feminine other functions in Badiou's elaboration of actual 
change that escapes transcendence, so as to be effective in the present situation. It 
interrogates Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy in the context of Badiou's 
mature work from the end of the 80s, centered on L'Être et l'événement. My point of 
entry is the paradoxical denotation Badiou choses for his conceptualization of the 
generic multiple as the being of truth, which seemingly references Lacan's notion of 
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the feminine logic of the non-all. Badiou has designated the concept of the generic 
multiple as the emblem of his philosophical project, something that renders the 
reference to the feminine non-all of Lacan a curious choice all the time Lacan is the 
antiphilosopher to be traversed. The reference is all the more problematic insofar as 
Lacan's notion of the feminine non-all has been the object of severe criticism from 
Badiou. Badiou criticizes Lacan's notion of the feminine for relying on a romantic 
conception of the infinite, which renders the feminine inaccessible from within the 
perspective of the teachings of Lacan. The attempt to make sense out of Badiou's 
paradoxical denotation serves me to address more fundamental questions concerning 
the implications of Badiou's traversal of the Lacanian framework. Specifically, the 
questions concern how Badiou conceives of the problematic of modernity, the death of 
God, through the set theoretical notion of the actual infinite, and how this conception 
serves him to think the possibilities for infinite truths as immanent to a situation. 
Specifically, the questions concern how Badiou utilizes the notion of the actual infinite 
to think beyond the Lacanian framework and its tendency to reduce the possibilities of 
radical change to the punctual occurrences of a structural impasse, so as to think the 
possibilities of change as subjective processes. It is an issue of how Badiou considers 
the questions of the preconditions and possibilities for the subject of politics and 
radical change as dependent on the actual infinite in order to be posed at all. 
 My third chapter, "A Scission in Greek Tragedy Between Two Deaths and the 
Bringer of Fire", interrogates Badiou's traversal of Lacan within the context of 
Badiou's works from the 70s, notably Théorie du sujet (1982). Badiou's work signifies 
a shift from Sophocles to Aeschylus. It addresses the mark of sexual matters in 
Badiou's elaboration on the subject as process, and what its implications are for 
thinking emancipation, the subject of politics, and the possibility for change and 
novelty. Tragedy becomes a way to interrogate the relation between the real of sexual 
difference and class antagonism. The questions are how the real of sex and class 
provide a basis for a theory of the subject, how the supplementation of the 
psychoanalytic real of sexual difference with its Marxist other of class implicates 
another thinking of the subjective formations of radical change, and how the shift from 
Sophocles to Aeschylus communicates or elucidates on the differences involved. My 
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point of entry is a reference Badiou makes to a lost play of Aeschylus, Prometheus the 
Fire-Bearer (n.d.). I interrogate how the figure of Prometheus can inform on an 
understanding of the mechanisms of Badiou's conception of the subject between sex 
and class. The figure of Prometheus serves to highlight three significant features of 
Badiou's Aeschylean theory of the subject, namely the operation of division, the 
perspective of the future, and the imagery of fire as a subjective formation of the 
relation between courage and justice under the sign of confidence. Together, these 
three features go to the heart of Badiou's so-called Marxist ethics of confidence. They 
contrast with the three significant features that dominate in the Sophoclean conception 
of tragedy and the psychoanalytic theory of the subject, namely the operation of 
reversal, the perspective of the last judgment, and the notion of between two deaths. 
My questions are how a comparison of the two paradigms can clarify the implications 
of Badiou's barely made notion of a Marxist ethics of confidence, and how this ethics 
strives to think the subject of politics and the possibilities of radical change beyond the 
repetitions and contradictions of structures and the law. More generally, these 
questions relate to the problematic of how a revolt can foster a revolution, or where the 
demands on the subject of politics begin and end in a revolutionary sequence.  
 My fourth chapter is entitled "Paradoxes of Totality from Antiphilosophy to a 
Philosophy to Come". By reading for sexual matters, it focuses on the status of the 
feminine in Badiou's conceptualization of antiphilosophy. It interrogates the concept 
of antiphilosophy such as Badiou construes it in the early 90s, after the call to traverse 
Lacanian antiphilosophy has been made. The main focus of this chapter is the four-
year seminar from 1992 to 1996 where Badiou elaborated on an effective concept of 
antiphilosophy through readings of the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Lacan, and Saint Paul. My point of entry will be a double exception 
made of Lacan. Badiou determines misogyny as a distinctive criterion of 
antiphilosophy, while adding that Lacan is an exception from this trait. At the same 
time, Lacan is in exception insofar as he is considered to bring contemporary 
antiphilosophy to a conclusion, as the antiphilosopher to be traversed by another 
philosophy to come. My main questions concern how the two exception of Lacan 
relate to each other, and how the relation between them preconditions Lacan's capacity 
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for thinking about change and novelty, on the one hand, and how Badiou picks up on 
the double exception of Lacan in another philosophy to come, and how change and 
novelty is consequently conceived of there, on the other. The double exception of 
Lacan is formulated in relation to the notion of a feminine remainder accessible only 
through the antiphilosophical act, on the one hand, and the philosopher's education by 
science, or mathematics, by which the feminine remainder is foreclosed from the 
philosopher's thinking operations, on the other. But the misogyny intrinsic to the 
antiphilosophical formalization precludes the feminine remainder, by referring it to the 
other side of an absolute break. The scientific education of the philosopher refuses the 
notion of an inaccessible remainder, as mathematics thinks in and through the 
impossible. My question is how these two strands meet in Lacan's antiphilosophy, and 
more specifically in his recourse to the matheme. It is a question of how the matheme 
relieves Lacan from the misogynic preclusion of the absolute break, on the one hand, 
and allows him to mark the function of the remainder, the real, within knowledge, on 
the other. It is also a question of how the mark of the function of the real within 
knowledge becomes the mark from which Badiou conceives of the possibility to think 
radical change and true novelty, in another philosophy to come. Beyond the 
problematic of how contemporary antiphilosophy, Lacan, and Badiou think the 
preconditions and possibilities of change and novelty, the overall problematic concerns 
the preconditions and possibilities for thinking, and in particular for thinking as change 
and novelty. 
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This chapter does not so much speak to my main thesis as it addresses the basic 
presupposition on which my thesis rests and the field into which my thesis intervenes. 
My aim is to provide a more substantial exposition of the basic presupposition, which 
states that attempts at thinking the subject of politics and the possibility for radical 
change and true novelty require an initial inquiry into the relations of ethics and sexual 
matters. I inquire into how Badiou's philosophical project searches for an entry into the 
preconditions of a subject of politics and the possibilities for change through 
mobilizing the sexually informed ethics of Lacanian psychoanalysis, and how it 
implicates a universal and egalitarian politics of radical emancipation. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis proposes a sexually informed ethics of a radically subjective act, as an 
act constitutive of the subject as such. Badiou elaborates his own theory of the subject 
in close dialogue with Lacan, while insisting to maintain a minimal distance to the 
Lacanian framework. I contend that in-depth analyses of the precise points in Badiou's 
philosophical works where a certain 'tarrying with sexual matters' intrude upon his 
arguments, seemingly unwarranted, will accentuate the strands of Badiou's 
philosophical works that find their origin in the teachings of Lacan. Such analyses will 
also accentuate the strands that carry Badiou's attempts to think the preconditions and 
possibilities of a subject of politics and radical change beyond the Lacanian premises. 
In providing a more substantial exposition of my basic presupposition in this chapter, I 
seek to attain a firmer position by which to grasp the contents and implications of my 
main thesis. 
 This initial chapter is also an opportunity to bridge the dissertation's 
introduction and the following chapters. The introduction cannot help being too 
superficial to present the already extant research on Badiou's philosophical works and 
its relations to the Lacanian framework in a satisfying manner, while the following 
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chapters might come across as too technical and detailed to be appreciated by readers 
unfamiliar with Badiou, Lacan, or both. A more substantial inquiry into the main 
research on how the Lacanian premises inform on Badiou's philosophical works offers 
insight into the fundamental issues and debates that both their works have raised, and 
continue to raise today. It provides a foundation for the chapters to follow, by 
preparing the basic themes that constitute the field into which these chapters intervene. 
 Three general questions guide the trajectory by which I seek to address the 
relations of sexual matters, ethics, and the subject of politics in this chapter. First of 
all, I ask for the context of Badiou's philosophical work: what is the context in which 
his thinking takes place, and what does this context force upon Badiou's thinking? 
What are the problems that the situation imposes upon Badiou's philosophy, and what 
are the problems that Badiou's philosophy posits as especially incumbent for the 
present situation? As today's situation is dominated by a hegemonic and globalized 
capitalism, the overall problem directing Badiou's philosophical works is the want of 
an other politics: it is precisely the questions of the preconditions and the possibilities 
of a subject of politics and radical change that the current context and Badiou's project 
posits as imperative today.  
 Secondly, as it is primarily to Lacan that Badiou turns in his own theoretical 
elaborations on the preconditions of a subject, I ask for the contributions on offer by 
psychoanalysis. How does psychoanalysis think subjective constitution? How does 
psychoanalysis allow for a theory of radical change? The sexual drive implies a 
primary loss that renders speaking beings in want of an other sex: sexual relations are 
by definition defunct as complete fullness of being is impossible, but this impossibility 
also isolates the point at which the moral law undermines itself and gives way to 
another ethics of the act, of radical destitution as constitutive of the subject.  
 Thirdly, I ask for Badiou's appropriation of the Lacanian framework and the 
significance of his traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy. What does Lacan trigger in 
Badiou's work, or what do the lacks and limitations in Lacan's elaborations on an 
ethics of the act effectuate in Badiou's working through of the Lacanian theory of 
subjective constitution? My main focus is directed at how Badiou has been read to 
date, intimating a want of an other Badiou: while extant research on the concept of 
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love as a condition for philosophy has brought to the fore Badiou's Lacanian premises, 
and debates on Badiou's appropriation of the Lacanian real of sexual difference has 
stressed the limitations of Badiou's philosophical works, I stress the importance of 
reading the appropriation of sexual matters together with Badiou's mathematical 
gesture and materialist dialectic. I focus on how Badiou's mathematical gesture entails 
another theory of the subject, in which a dialectic of division renders the subject a 
process whose materialist underpinnings are provided by the event. I argue that 
Badiou's mathematical gesture and materialist dialectic entail a theory of the subject 
that is capable of responding to the predicament of globalized capitalism and of 
anchoring the possibilities for radical change and novelty in the concrete situation of 
today. In the remaining chapters I will seek to demonstrate how analyses of the 
intrusion of sexual matters in Badiou's texts can open another entrance into Badiou's 
philosophical works and serve to unravel the significance and implications of his 
approach for thinking the preconditions and possibilities of a subject of politics and 




In Want of an Other Politics; Communism as a Working Hypothesis 
In this section, I will address the fundamental problems behind Badiou's theory of the 
subject and the possibilities of radical change. I focus on the context in which his 
works are elaborated and to which his works speak, as I examine how the context can 
come to speak back to the comprehension of the mechanisms and operations of 
Badiou's philosophical works, to its preconditions and implications. Through a 
comparison with the last century and its projects for a radical emancipatory politics, I 
inquire into how Badiou's works address the predicament of today – where an 
emancipatory project is lacking, where alternative horizons, and thereby a subject of 
politics, is absent. Badiou offers an analysis into the causes of this specific 
predicament. He identifies them to be a fully globalized capitalism and the historical 
failure of communism. But the question remains how Badiou's concrete analyses can 
inform the more abstract mathematical-philosophical formulations of the subject that 
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Badiou's philosophical works provide. Through relating the concrete and the abstract, 
the practical and the theoretical, I seek to provide a first sketch or groundwork for 
further interrogation of the fundamentals of Badiou's philosophical works and its 
implications for thinking the subject of politics and radical change.  
 
 
No Horizon, No Subject 
On January 22, 1917, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin gave his lecture on the 1905 
revolution at Zürischer Volkshaus, to an ensemble of local working class youth. The 
final paragraph of his speech is well known: 
 
Wir, die Alten, werden vielleicht die entscheidenden Kämpfe dieser kommenden 
Revolution nicht erleben. Aber ich glaube mit großer Zuversicht die Hoffnung 
aussprechen zu dürfen, daß die Jugendlichen, die so ausgezeichnet in der 
sozialistischen Bewegung der Schweiz und der ganzen Welt arbeiten, daß sie das 
Glück haben werden, nicht nur zu kämpfen, sondern auch zu siegen in der 
kommenden proletarischen Revolution.62 
 
What strikes us about Lenin's conclusion is the apparently unquestioned precondition 
for his lecture. The indisputable necessity of the struggle itself is the common point of 
departure that binds the speaker and his audience together. As a demand imposed upon 
them by the concrete situation, regardless of its eventual victory or defeat, the coming 
revolution is coming, and when it finally dawns, the older and younger generations 
alike will come to answer its call, just as they have dutifully been preparing for its 









entails fiasco for the revolution, the struggle has no outside but is a matter of a forced 
choice, a choice without a choice.63  
 Among Lenin's contemporaries, both Clara Zetkin and Alexandra Kollontai 
answered the forced choice of the revolution by addressing the woman's question and 
the problematic of sexual relations as interdependent with the class struggle, if in 
different ways. Zetkin determined that the liberation of the proletarian woman is a 
joint struggle with the men of her class against capitalism's exploits and race for a 
cheaper labor force,64 whereas Kollontai offered a more intricate argument that tied 
crises in the historical modes of sexual relationships to crises in the material conditions 
of production and property relations. By criticizing the quality of sexual relationships 
today, she wrote, one would be doing more than rejecting an out-of-date form of 
behavior and moral code; one would be rejecting the material basis of these 
relationships and the notions of individual and private property.65 Hence sexual and 
gendered struggles also fell under a choice without a choice.  
 A hundred years have passed since Lenin gave his lecture, and the concrete 
situation has changed. It is as hard to fathom a congregation unified in a clearly 
defined conception of its struggle to which a Lenin of today could express his 
confident hopes as are such hopes themselves. After the disastrous results with which 
the last century's excursions into various forms of state socialism ended, the 
emancipatory projects of the so-called left and the worker's movement have been 
dispersed and broken, stranded without a consolidating project to even begin to foster 
hopes for a victorious other future. If the struggle for Lenin and his audience at 
Zürischer Volkshaus had no outside, the predicament now is that the struggle has lost 












 This is the context for Badiou's philosophical project today, and this is where I 
situate the problematic of the subject of politics and of emancipation in my 
interrogation of how Badiou's philosophy informs the possibilities for thinking change. 
Badiou identifies the current predicament of radical emancipatory politics as caused by 
the dominant ideology of our times, 'democratic materialism', crystalized in the motto 
of "Vis sans Idée!"66 Capitalism is hegemonic and the name of our status quo, but in 
fear of changing things for the worse, democratic materialism agrees to mistake 
hegemonic capitalism as not too bad and more than acceptable. Compared to the first 
decades of the last century, Badiou writes in L'Hypothèse Communiste (2006), the first 
decades of this century have seen an all-out capitulation to the demands of the market 
and the capitalist order. Ours is the time of a certain defeatism, discarding every notion 
of radical change as not only utopian and impossible but also disastrous and criminal 
by nature, especially the idea of communism that once motivated and moved people 
by the millions.67 If emancipatory politics designates an alternative to capitalism, 
emancipatory politics today is in abeyance, left without an idea in or by or for which to 
struggle. It is left without any idea of what to do. It has lost from view not only that 
which Jodi Dean defines as its 'communist horizon' but any horizon at all, every 
indication of a beyond the status quo.68 Without another horizon, without an idea of an 
alternative, there is no possible space in which a subject of politics can act or begin to 
materialize.  
 The possibility of such a space does not require a concrete alternative idea, a 
substantial Jérusalem Céleste painted on the horizon. The idea of an alternative, or 
even the idea of the non-necessity of the status quo suffices, according to Badiou, to 











operation rather than a notion.69 Badiou thereby echoes the definition of communism 
that Marx and Engels proposed in Die deutsche Ideologie (1846). They write that 
 
[d]er Kommunismus ist für uns nicht ein Zustand, der hergestellt werden soll, ein 
Ideal, wonach die Wirklichkeit sich zu richten haben (wird). Wir nennen 
Kommunismus die wirkliche Bewegung, welche den jetzigen Zustand aufhebt. Die 
Bedingungen dieser Bewegung ergeben sich aus der jetzt bestehenden 
Voraussetzung.70  
 
Communism is not conceived of as a notion or an ideal state to come, but as an 
operation or a movement by which the current state of affairs is abolished. In face of 
such a definition, the capitulation under the logic of the least of all evils cannot justify 
the evacuation of every opposition to the status quo. Dismissals of communism on the 
ground of its historical failures, as an ideal that has showed itself to be not working, 
are common across all specters of the political palate today. But the definition of 
communism as an effective movement would argue the exact contrary: communism is 
working – working for the abolishment of the established state, which is not working – 
or it is not at all. The question of its failures cannot be approached as a question 
internal to the notion itself. It must be grasped in its properly dialectical character, 
through its contradictory status vis-à-vis the concrete situation. The same goes for the 
question of its successes. The weight rests no more on the past than on the future, but 
on the here and now of the immediate present. As an effective movement working for 
the abolishment of the existing state, the only question of interest to communism is the 
following: even if there were to be no better hells than the present state, is the present 
state good enough, or are there not issues that warrant a call for change and a 
consolidation of an alternative horizon and another politics? As an effective 
movement, communism designates a radical emancipatory project that is likely never 









highlight is if incompletion implies continuous failure, or if it is sufficient for 
communism to be effectively at work to avoid such a conclusion.  
 Žižek positions himself within a similar perspective, taking his cue from Lenin's 
notion that the struggles of the revolution are defined as the struggles of beginning 
from the beginning over and over again, of continuously returning to the point of 
departure. Žižek then turns to "Marx's good old notion of communism not as an ideal, 
but as a movement which reacts to actual social antagonisms,"71 in order to hone in on 
the antagonisms by which such a movement can be reactivated today. He identifies 
four main antagonisms forceful enough to disrupt the reproduction of capitalism:  
 
the looming threat of ecological catastrophe, the inappropriateness of the notion of 
private property for so-called 'intellectual property', the socio-ethical implications 
of new techno-scientific developments (especially in biogenetics), and, last but not 
least, new forms of apartheid, new Walls and slums.72 
 
The term of communism is justified only by reference to the last antagonism, the one 
between excluded and included, Žižek continues. The point is not that it has a more 
pronounced class character than the other three, but that its class character provides a 
subversive edge to the others and prevents their reduction to matters of mere 
jurisprudence and legal regulation. Intellectual property and new technologies can be 
included in the situation's functioning state, whereas new walls and slums address the 
state at a fundamental level insofar as they address the mechanisms of exclusion and 
inclusion as such. They address the capitalist system at its roots, and can thereby 
activate a movement for radical change, towards the end of the mechanisms of 
exclusion and inclusion.  
 The current predicament cannot be that there are no reasons for change. It is not 
necessary to scratch the shining surface to reveal the dysfunctions underneath, as the 
surface is cracking by itself and betraying its true colors. Neither do Žižek's four 






the brink of several ecological disasters, from global warming and rising sea levels to 
mass extinction of species and large scale destruction of forests and farm land; a world 
where economic crises hit hard and steady, and austerity measures is the order of the 
day; where people are exploited and dispossessed, while big banks and big business 
are salvaged at any price; where differences are rising together with the obscure army 
of the unemployed excess population; where polarizations are taking hold socially as 
well as geographically; where the migration level is unprecedented, and xenophobia 
abound; where walls and fences are built faster than they can be torn down; where 
technocracies, oligarchies, and kakistocracies consolidate power, where parliamentary-
democratic institutions lose their legitimacy, their relevance, and their critical impact: 
in short, a world where capital rules and labor equals unnecessary exploitation. There 
is, in other words, ample cause for a movement working for the abolishment of the 
established state, for an effective communist movement. 
 The oppression and subordination under capitalism can be tackled from other 
perspectives, as does e.g. Robert McRuer with his concept of 'crip times',73 but the 
questions raised through Badiou's revitalization of the communist hypothesis is 
whether or not other notions than communism – as an axiomatic equality – is capable 
to address the fundamental mechanisms of capitalism as such. But if communism as a 
real and working movement is the best designation for addressing the issues of change 
and political action today, as Badiou and Žižek argue, it is a communism that is not 
and cannot be the same as the absolute and total struggle of Zetkin, Kollontai, and 
Lenin. If the necessity of addressing the issues of change and political action is as 
indisputable today as it was a century ago, the preconditions and points of departure 
differ. Whereas Lenin's address at Zürischer Volkshaus took for granted the space of 
its reverberation (the masses of the working class) as a self-evident common ground 
for the subject of politics (the proletariat and the party), such a space and ground are 







which subject is at stake, and where are the possibilities for such a subject to be found 
today; these questions constitute the context for Badiou's philosophical works.  
 
 
A Concrete Analysis of a Concrete Situation 
Badiou's philosophical works are conditioned by the questions of the possibilities and 
preconditions of a subject of radical change and true novelty in the political field today 
(as his works are conditioned by the questions of change and novelty in the fields of 
art, love, and science, as well), and these questions are the context to read Badiou's 
philosophical works through. His works deal extensively with the reality and the 
gravity of current circumstances, as well as with political action as a historical and a 
contemporary question. His works intervene on the scene of both theoretical and 
practical discussions on the state of Marxism and the possible revitalization of an 
alternative politics today. To Hallward and his now classic Badiou; A Subject to Truth 
(2003), "no philosopher is more urgently needed, in this particular moment, than 
Badiou,"74 precisely because Badiou's works have revitalized the discussions on a 
possible revitalization of an alternative politics themselves, by insisting on a politics of 
truths as a politics of generic equality, of singular and subjectively affirmed 
universality. Badiou sketches a politics against the dominant focus on the 
particularities of individuality, identities, rights, and the "post-modern doxa," in 
Žižek's words, which "renders politics a matter of phronesis, of strategic judgments 
and dialogue, not of applying fundamental cognitive insights."75 Badiou conceives of 
politics as a truth procedure originating in an unpredictable event and carried out 
through the fidelity of a militant subject. He thereby "forces us to think the emergence 
of a new and profoundly transformed situation as a result of the articulation of a 
singular truth onto an existing state of things," as Bosteels observes in his Badiou and 
Politics (2011).76 Badiou is often celebrated for having initiated a new theoretical 








political procedure can be.77 But Badiou does more. He also elaborates on the 
possibilities of political practices based on the concrete analysis of the situation in the 
world today.  
 It is in the intersection of theory and practice that Badiou's philosophical works 
must be situated, if the contributions to thinking the subject of politics and the 
possibilities of change that his works open for are to be grasped in the full significance 
of their implications. There are two main points in Badiou's concrete analysis of the 
concrete situation today: Firstly, capitalism is absolute and fully globalized. Secondly, 
the cause of this state is the historical failure of the communist hypothesis to hold up a 
viable alternative. How is one to understand the mechanisms that underpin his 
analyses and the operations of his attempts to think the possibilities of change today? 
My question is not how to save the world, but how to pose the question. In that regard, 
Badiou's analyses of the historical failure of the communist hypothesis, on the one 
hand, and the state in which this failure has left the contemporary situation, on the 
other, constitute a definitive moment.  
 The questions of the preconditions for the subject of politics and the 
possibilities of change have been a constant in Badiou's professional and personal life 
for at least half a century. Bosteels and others have argued that politics constitute the 
decisive condition of the entire philosophical practice of Badiou.78 Politics' dominant 
position in Badiou's life was consolidated in the wake of the events of May 68 and his 
early Maoist years, passing through the 80s and the rise of Chinese capitalism, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, up until the unrestrained hegemony of the globalized 
capitalism of today. His critical voice has not muted, and his confidence for another 
victorious future has not waned: as he writes in his Second manifeste pour la 
philosophie (2009), every night must end in the promise of a dawn, and he finds it 










and comprehensive analysis of the dominant structures of the contemporary world and 
the effects of these structures on the world populations, in a seminar responding to the 
November 13 killings in Paris, later published as a short pamphlet under the title of 
Notre mal vient de plus loin (2016).80 There are three interwoven themes in his 
analysis, namely the triumph of globalized capitalism, the widespread weakening of 
the state and state functions, and the emergence of new imperialist practices.  
 According to Badiou, our time is the time of an unrestrained and measureless 
capitalism. The logic of capital has been set free. Perhaps it is not the first time the 
logic of capital has been liberated, but now it is on a scale far greater than before. The 
logic of capital has a double modality, following the dialectical movement of 
expansion and concentration, of concentration in and by the fact of its expansion. On 
the one hand, capitalism expands on all levels and across the globe, as a truly 
globalized capitalism. On the other hand, in the very act of expanding, capital itself is 
increasingly privatized and concentrated into the hands of the lucky few of the so-
called 1 %. If neo-liberalism has meaning, it is as the liberated logic of capital, a 
liberated capitalism, Badiou writes. As a consequence of the double modality of 
capital, a change in the relation between capital and the state has occurred, namely a 
weakening of the state or state functions. It is not merely a matter of the state serving 
as a supportive ground for the power of capital, but of a discrepancy of the levels on 
which states and big business operate. "Too big to fail" is the catch phrase. Big 
business' influences and interests in industry, banking, and commerce cut across state 
levels, as big business grows both independent and executive of states and state 
functions. A final expression of the state function's subversion under globalized 
capitalism, so far, is found in the new imperialist practices that Badiou designates as 
'zoning'. Against the traditional colonial regime, liberated capitalism subscribes to 










state apparatuses encourages an unhindered exploitation, if not indefinitely, at least for 
a period of time. Badiou's exempli gratia are regions spanning the former nation states 
of Libya, Iraq, Mali, Congo, and the Central African Republic.   
 The concrete situation of the contemporary world effects the property relations 
of its populations. Badiou registers an unprecedented level of inequality, and provides 
some significant numbers: 
 
Nous avons donc une oligarchie de 10% [qui posséde 86% des ressources 
disponibles], et puis nous avons une masse démunie d'à peu près la moitié de la 
population mondiale [qui ne posséde rien], c'est la masse de la population démunie, 
la masse africaine, asiatique dans son écrasante majorité. Le total fait à peu près 
60%. Et il reste 40%. Ces 40%, c'est la classe moyenne. La classe moyenne qui se 
partage, péniblement, 14% des ressources mondiales.81 
 
The middle class is predominantly Western, and the call to protect Western values is 
taken literally by Badiou, as a call to protect Western wealth and secure the relatively 
small portion of it that still befalls its dwindling middle classes from being passed on 
to the masses of destitute others. But, Badiou continues, in a position even more 
precarious than the destitute half of the world population, there are a growing number 
of people 
 
dont on peut dire qu'ils sont comptés pour rien [...] par le capital, ce qui veut dire 
qu'au regard du développement structurel du monde, ils ne sont rien, et que donc, 
en toute rigueur, ils ne devraient pas exister. Ils ne devraient pas être là. Ce serait 















pas non plus écoliers, ou retraités, et, par voie de conséquence, ils n'ont pas accès 
au marché non plus. Du point de vue de la logique générale du monde, de 
l'impérieuse et satisfaite mondialisation capitaliste, ils sont comme s'ils n'existaient 
pas.82 
 
The status of such a growing number is more severe than a mere excess work force or 
reserve army of labor, as in classical Marx, Badiou suggests. The globalized system of 
capitalism encounters a limit intrinsic to its structure, a limit more definite, where 
there simply cannot be an accommodation of all women and men under the sign of 
continuous growth and surplus value. This number is the result of new imperialist 
zoning, but also its cause. The precarious status of a population counted for nothing 
and non-existent to the market is that which allows for the installation of unregulated 
and anarchic zones of exploitation. A population that does not exist is not in need of 
institutions of protection or recognition. It can easily be left to fend for itself in 
variously sized armed groups and marauding bands, or interned in variously sized 
humanitarian camps in the dusty rubble of Dabaab, on the rocky beaches of Southern 
Europe, or in the banlieues of the world's major cities.  
 If the reality of numbers such as these is the effect of the concrete situation of 
the contemporary world, the question in regard to that which is at fault in the concrete 
situation remains. What enables the extreme expansion and concentration of a 
liberated and globalized capitalism to affirm itself, unhindered, as it does? Badiou's 
answer is strikingly simple. Besides the objective victory of globalized capitalism in 
its expansion across the globe, there is a subjective side to the same victory, made 
manifest as an almost complete eradication of an alternative route. There is no idea of 
an alternative orientation of the global system and its organization of production and 











absence on a global scale of any politics that is truly detached from the interiority of 
capitalism. When Badiou confronts the November 13 killings by way of a concrete 
analysis of the concrete situation of the world today, it is not because the mass 
murders in Paris are perceived to pale in comparison to the daily sufferings occurring 
elsewhere. Rather, the occurrence of the November 13 killings is a symptom in the 
place of the real trauma, the real wound: the real wound comes from afar, Badiou 
writes, and more precisely, it comes from the historical failure of communism.83 
 The historical failure of communism constitutes a recurrent theme in Badiou's 
philosophical trajectory. Again and again he returns to interrogate the causes and 
constituents of this failure. Like the political awakening of Badiou in the events of 
May 68, his so-called Damascene moment,84 the theme of the historical failure of 
communism constitutes another foundational moment for Badiou's works. This 
moment is decisive for his approach to the question of the subject of politics today. 
Badiou identifies the beginning demise of the communist hypothesis at the historical 
point where the end of the 70s began to grow near. This point coincides with the death 
of Mao and the turn to capitalism under Deng Xiaoping in China. It is marked by the 
renegation of les nouveaux philosophes in France. With the rise to power of the 
Socialist party under the presidency of François Mitterrand in 1981, the so-called red 
years of the preceding decade had come to a definite end and receded into the regular 
customs of that which Badiou calls the parliamentary-capitalist order. The red years of 
the 70s had been a world wide phenomenon, characterized, e.g., by the struggles for 
national liberation in Vietnam and Palestine, a surge of student movements from 
Mexico to Japan, massive strikes and occupations of factories and work places in 
France and Italy, and, last but not least, the Cultural Revolution in China. Mitterrand, 
however, signified "un revenant fortement marqué par les stigmates de la pourriture 







France dans le capitalisme mondialisé le plus féroce."85 Finally, with the collapse of 
the corrupted and defunct Soviet Union a decade later, the last remnant of an 
alternative to globalized capitalism and its Western democracy pawns was gone. 
 On the other hand, Badiou continues, the violence and terror that characterized 
the last spasms of the Second world, state socialism and its associated armed struggles, 
certainly contributed to the disenchantment of communist hypothesis. Its 
disenchantment culminated, arguably, in the Khmer Rouge killing fields in Cambodia 
and the Shining Path in Peru. In attempting to solve every contradiction by way of 
brutality and death, the revolutionary process was cut short by a net of destruction. It 
was the failure of the extreme left, in opposition to the rightist failure of parliamentary 
democracy. The point is not to equate the failures on the right and on the left, but to 
see how to balance the narrow path between these failures is the impossible task of 
every radically emancipatory politics and its subject. To resist the fascination of both 
the powers that be and their blind destruction, both the peaceful continuation and the 
ultimate sacrifice, has been the conundrum facing revolutionaries since Maximilien 
Robespierre, Badiou writes, or even as far back as the apostolic Paul bat Peter.86 As 
the 80s turned to the 90s, the communist hypothesis had failed on both accounts, and 
our times, the times of absolute liberalism and a hegemonic conviction that "vouloir 
mieux, c'est vouloir pire"87 had become a reality. 
 At the same time, Badiou denies that the failure of the communist hypothesis 
has an absolute status. He refuses to accept the complete renunciation of the 
problematic of radical emancipation. Rather, he suggests that the failure of the 
communist hypothesis should be conceived as relative to its form – its particular 
manifestations – along the equivalent of a scientific hypothesis: centuries of failed 
solutions only prove fertile for its potential, consequent confirmation, and the 
historical failure of the hypothesis is only the history constituting its eventual 








globalized hegemony of capitalist logic today that the conditions are in place for a 
proper communist international,88 or even a communist transnational.89  
 My issue is not necessarily if such a communist transnational is the answer to 
the questions of the possible subject of politics at stake today. My point is rather that 
any answer to the questions of the preconditions and possibilities of a subject of 
politics and radical change today can only begin to be elaborated on the basis of such 
concrete analyses of the concrete situation. To Badiou, such an analysis entails 
interrogating a globalized capitalism and its effect on the world population, on the one 
hand, and the causalities behind the historical failures of the communist hypothesis, on 
the other. Such an analysis in itself does not secure an actual and effective communist 
movement, but it is a way to begin to answer the question of how a new horizon would 
possibly be opened and a new subject of politics installed in our times. It allows for a 




The Subject in Question 
Badiou's philosophy offers a theory of the subject, elaborated in highly abstract 
mathematical and philosophical terms that are themselves empty. Set theory itself does 
not speak directly to the dispossessed masses of globalized capitalism or to the lessons 
to be learned from the historical failures of the communist hypothesis. The question is 
not only how Badiou's philosophical works can speak to the concrete situation today, 
but also how Badiou's concrete analysis speaks to his philosophical works: by which 
means is a subject conceivable at this intersection? Bosteels identifies the rational 
kernel of Badiou's entire philosophical endeavor in how Badiou forces us to think 
radical change and novelty as the articulation of truth onto an existing state of things. 
He has argued for how the activist stance underlying Badiou's subject of politics 
distinguishes Badiou's project from fellow travellers in radical thinking today. He 





considered possible: a) the occurrence of an event and not only its foreclosed 
possibility; b) an active intervention and not only a halting structure; c) the positive 
fidelity of a subject and not only an interminable critique, and, finally; d) a forcing of 
the truth through a generic extension of the situation, and not only the recognition of 
the situation's immanent excess.90 Bosteels argues that Badiou thereby abides by the 
strictly political significance of Marxism, as opposed to its more philosophical and 
economical contributions. Badiou tends to "favor the more historical and 
interventionist writings such as Engels's The Peasant War in Germany, Lenin's What 
Is to Be Done?, or Mao's Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, in 
addition to the all too obvious choice of The Communist Manifesto,"91 all texts in 
which the core of Marxism comes across in the actualization of a revolutionary 
movement, in the subject of an actual political sequence.  
 The crucial thing, according to Badiou, is to refrain from giving up on the 
hypothesis in question, but continue to pursue its possible solution.   
 
Ce qui est premièrement décisif, c'est de maintenir l'hypothèse historique d'un 
monde délivré de la loi du profit et de l'intérêt privé. [...] C'est ce que j'ai proposé 
d'appeler l'hypothèse communiste. Elle est en réalité largement négative, car il est 
plus sûr et plus important de dire que le monde tel qu'il est n'est pas nécessaire que 






















The communist hypothesis is primarily negative, along the lines of Marx' definition of 
communism as an effective movement for the abolishment of the established state of 
affairs. This negativity is congruent with Badiou's early identification of the 
'communist invariants' of the struggle against property and the state, as well as the 
struggle for equality, insofar as equality is not the order of the day.93 Marx formulates 
a positive equivalent that affirms the absence of equality in his notion of "die 
Geschichte von Klassenkämpfen."94 Negatively defined, the communist hypothesis 
bears no specified predication or particular attribute, but works subtractively. It seeks 
first and foremost at punching a hole in existing power structures.  
 Punching a hole today demands different measures than in the days of Lenin, 
for example. But if ours is the time for a reformulation of emancipatory politics, the 
time for rethinking, Badiou nonetheless insists that our time is contemporaneous to 
that of May 68. Our predicament remains the same, namely to realize that the classical 
figuration of emancipatory politics is no longer operative, neither in the figurations of 
the party or the union. If another form of emancipatory politics is possible, it will not 
be one of organizing each and every one according to their place. On the contrary, it 
will be one of radical material and mental displacements. It will be a politics of justice, 
Badiou writes in his Théorie du sujet, that is, of justice as "le flou des places, le 
contraire donc, de la juste place."95 It will be a generic politics, as he will come to 
designate it in his L'Être et l'événement and onwards.96  
 Sexual politics illuminates the stakes involved: The sexual revolution was no 
doubt part of the May 68 events, but it was not its motor force, according to Badiou. 
The sexual revolution fell under the overarching symbol of the red flag, together with 












under the red flag, he writes, was the vision of another alternative politics beyond the 
classical parties and unions.97 With Kollontai's basic premise of the interconnections 
between material and sexual relations, one can say that the sexual revolution was one 
way to question the classic vision of politics, as the elaboration of a new vision of 
politics implied a sexual revolution. Kollontai's insights also appertain to the end of 
the red years. In parts of the so-called third wave feminism, the historical failure of the 
communist hypothesis coincides an increased attention to "the contradictions that 
constitute women's identities" and "a commitment to work inclusively with those 
particular differences." 98  Kollontai's criticism of bourgeois individuality and the 
radical emancipatory project as such are replaced with issues of representation and 
inclusion within capitalism, as a further globalization of the capitalist grasp.  
 Badiou's theory of the subject is at odds with such positions. Hallward 
celebrates Badiou as the philosopher most urgently needed today on account of 
Badiou's criticism of particularity and traditional politics of representation. This 
criticism is advanced through Badiou's conceptualization of a universal and generic 
equality. Politics is a matter of the generic multiple of a situation, Badiou writes, 
insofar as 'generic' designates that it is a matter of any multiple and does not say 
anything particular about the situation, except precisely about its multiple-being as 
such, its fundamental inconsistency.99 In Žižek's paraphrase, 	
 
Badiou defines as 'generic' the multiple within a situation that has no particular 
properties, the referent of which would enable us to classify it as its subspecies; the 
generic multiple belongs to the situation but is not properly included in it as its 
subspecies [...]. Generic is thus a multiple element/part of the situation that doesn't 
fit into it, that sticks out precisely insofar as it gives body (as it were) to the Being 










It is precisely the generic lack of predication that Hallward celebrates in Badiou, as it 
"provides the most compelling critique of the specified." The specified designates any 
particularity, property, or predicate, any attribute "defined by positive, intrinsic 
characteristics or essences (physical, cultural, personal, and so on). The specified is a 
matter of inherited 'instincts' as much as of acquired habits."101 Subtracted from the 
specified, the concept of the generic offers a corrective to the state of affairs in which 
the subject of politics is reduced to questions of the representation and inclusion of 
various differences and identities, across the intersectional palate. With identitarianism 
as a worst-case scenario, the reduction of politics to various 'identity politics of 
differences' can only hope for an appropriation under the capitalist-parliamentary 
machinery, as its best card. To Badiou, differences are not only that on which 
capitalism thrives, as they provide an ever new ground for expansion, but also that 
which simply is, the infinite and self-evident multiplicity of being, as obvious in the 
differences between you and me as in those between you and yourself.102 Elevated into 
either a philosophical or political principle, differences and variations over differences 
remain unable to account for the possibilities of change. 
 Sam Gillespie describes both sides of Badiou's generic politics rather concisely 
in The Mathematics of Novelty; Badiou's Minimalist Metaphysics (2008). As he writes,   
 
contemporary capitalism is rife with such examples of various groups putting forth 
identities and pleas for recognition, to which the free market can respond with 
varying degrees of accommodation. [...] For example, various disenfranchised 
groups (women, gay people, black people) can make themselves visible, establish 
communities or collective identities, and make various prescriptions against the 
state for legitimacy [...]. And, indeed, change could be said to follow from such 
examples, and be perfectly compatible with liberal democratic pluralism. But if the 







change can occur, it is surely inadequate to constitute a true politics for Badiou. 
And as such, it is not an arena for the new.103 
 
In other words, changes that are perfectly compatible with liberal democratic pluralism 
do not constitute a radical change, but an expansion of the old, Gillespie explains. A 
properly generic politics in Badiou's sense must always be an arena for the new. In 
such a politics, writes Gillespie,  
 
a claim for rights is made on the basis of belonging, yet such claims tell us nothing 
specific about the group for whom the prescriptions are being made, since 
belonging could be said to hold for all members of the situation [...]. In order to 
have truth, there must be a sharp distinction between what specifies each member 
of a given situation and what is general to all members of a given situation.104  
 
Of course, there is never a question of supporting regimes of oppression and 
discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, creed, 
abilities, class, etc., under such a generic politics. On the contrary, it is radically anti-
discriminatory, Gillespie writes, since "a truth [that is] true as such must be true for 
every member of the situation." 105  A generic politics claims that a radical 
emancipatory project cannot be based on a struggle to be included or represented on 
the basis of what its members are, but only on the simple fact that it members are, 
period. To struggle for inclusion based on the identities of its members would merely 
equal the reverse of the exclusion based on the identities of its members, and fall under 
the same discriminatory logic, in a manner similar to how Wendy Brown observes that 
the paradoxical notion of liberal tolerance both reproduces and reinforces the 
differentiating or 'othering' mechanisms it supposedly seeks to circumvent, since 











generic politics, on the other hand, names its members to be included simply as 
belonging, represented simply as presented.  
 Hallward notes that a generic politics posits equality as an axiom, as its starting 
point rather than its aim.107 It is a politics not of critical adumbrations to tease out an 
equality to be realized at the end of an oppressive regime, but a politics of the 
consequences that can be drawn from the hole in oppressive regimes that the actuality 
of equality punches here and now. It posits as its absolute ground of possibility the 
equality of the simple fact that all members of a situation simply are, indiscriminately, 
in in-difference to difference, as Badiou writes.108 Capitalism thrives on differences, as 
differences expand the market, but as Badiou's concrete analysis of the concrete 
situation today underlines, there is a growing number of radically dispossessed whose 
existence in the capitalist world is to not exist. This number signals a pure in-
difference that is radically subtracted from the capitalist flux of differences. It is in 
such a radically subtracted in-difference or equality that Badiou sees the possibilities 
of a new horizon and another subject of politics to be extracted today.  
 Badiou's philosophical works and his concrete analysis of the concrete situation 
today meet up in this point of the in-difference of the generic member. But it is not 
immediately evident how a subject of politics can be thought from this point. 
Kollontai's basic premise of connecting the sexual back onto material 
property/productive relations can help to plot out a path. It returns my reading of 
Badiou back unto Lacan. In the generic lack of the specified, Hallward sees a radical 

















grasped as inherited instincts or as acquired habits. Paul M. Livingston makes a similar 
observation in his The Politics of Logic; Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences 
of Formalism (2012). Badiou has begun the discernment of "a radical alternative to the 
debate between the (typically leftist or constructivist) politics of contingent historical 
conventions, on one hand, and the (typically rightist or onto-theological) politics of an 
assumed 'human nature' or a divine dispensation, on the other."109 Subtracted from 
inherited instincts and acquired habits alike, from constructivism and metaphysics 
both, a radical alternative to historical conventions as well as essential or divine 
dispensations – are these not just so many ways to say that Badiou's subject of generic 
politics is subtracted from the whole nature/culture conundrum, that the subject of 
politics is to be grasped as neither a thing of nature nor a thing of culture?  
 A third way to formulate the quandary in question is possible. It is the way of 
the psychoanalytical terminology mustered by Joan Copjec in her rebuttal of what she 
calls Butler's historicist-deconstructionist approach to the sex/gender problematic, or 
the problematic of identity tout court. It is possible to begin a delineation of Badiou's 
theory of the subject by saying that he poses an alternative position that 
simultaneously "shakes off all the remnants of sleepy dogmatism that continue to 
adhere to our thinking" without abandoning himself to the assertion of "it's binary 
opposite, if not of the 'despairing scepticism' about which Kant warned us, then of 
scepticism's sunny obverse: a confident voluntarism."110 Copjec's objection to the 
historicist-deconstructionist approach concerns how the latter refuses "the 
metaphysical notion that sex is a substance inscribed at the origin of our acts, our 
discourse" and thus "the fiction of innate or essential sex" only to jump to the other 
extreme of assuming that sex is "a 'performatively enacted signification'" and "a 
construct of historically variable discursive practices."111 The third option thus missed 









empty one – i.e. it is one to which no predicate can be attached."112 If not a 
straightforward analogy or isomorphism, there is at least a movement that is 
reminiscent of Copjec's in Badiou's conception of a generic politics, and vice versa, on 
account of which they mutually inform on each other. As Copjec writes, "we could put 
it in this way: male and female, like being, are not predicates." 113  A closer 
interrogation of the teachings of Lacan, or the psychoanalytic reference to sexual 
matters, is necessary in order to begin an interrogation of the ways in which a subject 




In Want of an Other Sex; 'Wo Es War, Soll Ich Werden' 
In this section, I interrogate the fundamentals of the psychoanalytic theory of the drive 
and the psychoanalytic reference to sexual matters as the basis of a theory of the 
subject. More precisely, I interrogate how the psychoanalytic reference to sexual 
matters entails a specific understanding of a possible ethics of a radical act, as an 
ethics of subjective destitution, on the one hand, in and through subjective 
constitution, on the other. I look at how psychoanalysis construes its concept of the 
drive as the concept of a problem, a question in lack of an answer, and how this 
problem has served as the basis for understanding the issues of morality and ethics 
from Freud to Lacan, and beyond. The psychoanalytic concept of the drive installs 
itself as a paradox at the heart of speaking being, at the heart of civilization and the 
moral law. While it provides the backup for the moral law, it also marks the point 
where the moral law comes into contradiction with itself. At this point, the drive opens 
for another ethics. The question is how this other ethics is conceived in psychoanalytic 
theory, and then how Badiou will utilize the psychoanalytic insights in his own 
elaborations on the preconditions and the possibilities of the subject of politics and 








In Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905), Sigmund Freud undertook to 
interrogate the significance of sexual life in all human capacities, tempting the 
expansion of the concept of sexuality beyond its everyday restriction as a matter of 
mere reproduction. These essays present the sexual drive – the libido – as a 'thing' 
omnipresent in human being. At the same time, the sexual drive is acknowledged as 
something of a wild card, an erratic matter, a capricious element. It is symptomatic 
that Freud concludes his three essays with the admission that his knowledge of the 
principal processes of sexuality is far too restricted to allow for an adequate sexual 
theory to be proposed. This dubious state is owed to the concept of the drive. As drive, 
Freud writes, 
 
können wir zunächts nichts anderes verstehen als die psychische Repräsentanz 
einer kontinuierlich fließenden, innersomatischen Reizquelle, zum Unterschiede 
vom 'Reiz', der durch vereinzelte und von außen kommenden Erregungen 
hergestellt wird. Trieb ist so einer der Begriffe der Abgrenzung des Seelischen vom 
Körperlichen. Die einfachste und nächstliegende Annahme über die Natur der 
Triebe wäre, daß sie an sich keine Qualität besitzen, sondern nur als Maße von 
Arbeitsanforderung für das Seelenleben in Betracht kommen. Was die Triebe 
voneinander unterscheidet und mit spezifischen Eigenschaften ausstattet, ist deren 
Beziehung zu ihren somatischen Quellen und ihren Zielen. Die Quelle des Triebes 
ist ein erregender Vorgang in einem Organ und das nächste Ziel des Triebes liegt in 















Due to its curious position somewhere between the outer surface and the inner 
procedures of the organism, the sexual drive, itself without quality, must accept its 
intransigent double status as both decisive and elusive. From his concept of the drive, 
Freud elaborates a theory of human being as teeming with paradoxes. These paradoxes 
and double binds do not define the subject only as subordinated to the established 
states, to the law, but also contain the seed to conceive of the subject ethically, at the 
point where the established states are undermined, or undermine themselves. At the 
end of this elaboration, the subject of politics in Badiou's philosophy returns.  
 On the one hand, Freud admits, it is possible that there is nothing of 
significance occurring in the organism that does not submit itself to the excitation of 
the sexual drive, just as the reverse, that there is no connectivity of other functions 
onto the sexual drive that cannot be returned from the sexual drive back onto other 
functions (e.g. the nutritional drive). On the other hand, the sexual drive maintains its 
elusive character as impossible to prove. The nature or being [Wesen] of sexual 
excitations remains to Freud an utterly unknown matter, an unsolvable riddle.115 The 
drive is, in all matters psychoanalytical, "selbst das wichtigste wie das dunkelste 
Element."116 No philosophy or psychological theory to date has been able to shed light 
on its significance.  
 The sexual drive is lacking a proper object, or it is lacking a proper outside. On 
that account, it is left to continuously swerve around its own source, founded in and 
through itself. The drive is defined by recourse to its source and to its aim – to an 
inner-somatic excitation in an organ and to its resolution or release [Aufhebung]. In 
other words, there is no proper place for the sexual object in the determination of the 
sexual drive as such. On the contrary, Freud explains, such an object will be whatever 
object in or through which the drive can achieve its aim. The object is in no way an 
original attribute, but serves its function according to its capabilities for realizing the 









background, while an unqualified something else [etwas anderes] comes to constitute 
the essential constant of the sexual drive.118 One object can be replaced with virtually 
any other, as virtually any object can take on a sexual accentuation. All the time it 
remains the strange fluctuating oscillation between its source and its aim, an excitation 
and its outlet, an inner-somatic stimulus and its resolution, the inside and the outside, 
which accounts for the peculiar being of the drive.  
 The Freudian approach to sexual matters renders sexual matters a decisive 
component of every human capacity. It sees sexual matters as coterminous with the 
faculty of culture or even with thought as such, morality and ethics included, in a 
curious double bind. Freud talks of psychical forces such as "der Ekel, das 
Schamgefühl, die ästhetischen und moralischen Idealanforderungen,"119 all functioning 
as restrictions to the sexual drive. But Freud immediately counters the supposition that 
these restrictions are the effect of external impositions of education and upbringing 
alone. While disgust, shame and morality impose restrictions on the sexual drive, and 
thus seem to be in opposition to it, Freud immediately underlines how these 
restrictions are nonetheless motivated by the drive itself, serving the facilitation of its 
outlet in other directions and fixing it onto other objects, as a reaction formation or 
compensation for its initial inaccessible or inacceptable aims. Exemplar of these 
restrictions is the prohibitions against incest and parricide, the moral law par 
excellence. On the ontogenetic level, the law is effectuated through the institution of 
the superego and the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, while the phylogenetic level 
sees the law installed by the murder of der Urvater, the father of the horde. 
 The movement involved in Freud's discussion of morality equals a 'perspectival 
shift'. It is the paradigmatic psychoanalytic gesture, its favorite trope, on the level of 
theory as well as on the level of the reality to which this theory is addressed. 
Psychoanalysis works to make a solution out of the problem and a problem out of the 
solution, to isolate at the bottom of things a paradox, a traumatic kernel, which then 
turns out to be productive both of itself and of the field in which it is lodged. Perhaps 





unconscious any more with the latent dream-thought than with the manifest dream, but 
rather as the dream-work itself, as it separates the latent dream-thought from its 
expression in the manifest dream.120 In a similar manner, Lacan will locate the subject 
in the gap or interval between signifiers rather than in any signifier per se.121 Even 
more telling, arguably cutting the disputes on the relations of truth and knowledge 
short, is how Lacan will elaborate on a notion of truth as that which produces a hole in 
knowledge.122  
	 From the perspective of psychoanalysis, the paradigmatic paradox bespeaking 
human being goes by the name of sexuality or the sexual drive. The drive is "the 
paradox of a 'free instinct',"123 to use Maire Jaanus words. The unqualified something 
else of the sexual drive names the paradox of paradoxes, the paradox from which all 
other paradoxes spring and to which they return. But sexuality does not thereby 
become the answer and solution to everything. On the contrary, the radical status of 
Freud's discovery and his so-called pan-sexualism rests on a notion of human sexuality 
as a persisting problem, a recurrent question forever in want of an answer. Rather than 
a universal solution or answer, Zupančič observes, sexuality is the name of a deadlock 
or impasse, "a paradox-ridden deviation from a norm that does not exist."124 The 
sexual drive posits the problem of subjectivity literally, Rose writes, as a problem.125 





















aphoristic statements on the lack of sexual relations [il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel] and 
sexual difference as real.126  
 To determine sexual difference as real and sexual relations as lacking is to say 
that there is no ratio by which to define the property of the sexual, whether it be in 
terms of aims, objects, or identities. In lack of definition, sexual aims, object, and 
identities proliferate. In other words, in lack of a proper delimitation of the field of the 
sexual as such, the sexual pervades into everything and becomes the ultimate limit of 
everything. To take but the most phallic example: a cigar might sometimes be simply a 
cigar, as Freud supposedly said, but it is due to the insistent question posed by the 
sexual drive that the significance of the cigar can become a question in the first place. 
Contrary to a vulgar reading of the psychoanalytic position, it is not the case that 
everything carries a sexual signification. Rather the question of the sexual marks, as 
Copjec writes, "the impossibility of completing meaning."127 Insofar as one does not 
know what the sexual is, where it begins and ends, the sexual is that by which each 
and every signification necessarily remains fundamentally uncertain.  
 The paradoxical gesture also underscores the decisive theoretical development 
in which Freud conceives of repression and the return of the repressed as more or less 
the same, as inseparable.128 Pairing up pleasure and displeasure, or pain, or the law and 
its transgression, also admits to a paradox. Psychoanalysis installs paradox at the very 
heart of the law, and thus also at the heart of morality.		
	 A standard young Oedipus faced with the threat of castration will internalize the 
paternal law and renounce his incestuous and parricidal desires. Such renunciation, as 
castration threatens to put an end to the possibility of pleasures altogether, is as much a 














be like the father and have a woman like the mother, rather than to be the father and 
have the mother). Paradoxically, renouncing on the sexual drive at one end becomes a 
means of satisfying the drive at another end, just like the neurotic discovers in 
displeasure a means of pleasure, and vice versa. Displeasure, Lacan notes, serves as 
much as a pretext for repression as it does to procure the format of the satisfaction 
brought about by the return of the repressed, just like pleasure is turned off by the law 
only to remerge again in the reaction-formations to satisfy the law's letter. 129 
Significantly, the law becomes a source of satisfaction in itself, both in dutifully 
abiding by it, but also insofar as the aggression towards the father, internalized as 
superego, now seeks satisfaction for itself by turning on the ego. The superego thrives 
on the ego's insufficiencies and sensations of guilt, reinforcing its sanctions at the first 
mention of illicit impulses, in a vicious spiral that feeds on itself. Similarly, the murder 
of der Urvater by his sons, the band of brothers, whose hate for the father is only 
matched by their love for him, only proves to secure his immortal life and re-buttress 
the reign of his authority. Once done away with in the flesh, the father, now 
internalized, returns in the word of the law, whose prohibitions become all the more 
powerful in that the internalized father offers no escape. He is omniscient, 
unforgetting, and unforgiving. To Freud, the moral law at the heart of civilization, die 
Kultur, thus bespeaks a paradox as its veritable discontent, the grain of sand that clogs 
up the machinery and by which civilization inadvertently undermines itself through the 
operations of its own reinforcements.130 If Freud's theory is normative of 20th century 
















normalizes and contains the seed of its own subversion. With Lacan, the full effect of 
that seed becomes theorized.  
 
 
Drive as One-Less 
When Lacan answers his own call to return to Freud, it is to emphasize the 
controversial implications of the Freudian discoveries otherwise ignored. This means 
that Lacan will emphasize the paradoxes and contradictions to be found in Freud's 
theory as that which determines and constitutes the Freudian field of psychoanalysis as 
such. The concept of the sexual drive is the epitome in that regard. As Lacan warns, in 
his seminar on Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse (1964), the 
concept of the sexual drive is a concept whose portrayal in Freud's texts is never as 
straightforward or natural as it might seem at first.131 The drive dissolves the very 
bonds it binds, and vice versa, binds that which it dissolves. This is the insight Freud is 
aiming at when he suggests that there is "außer dem Eros, einen Todestrieb," and, to 
follow, that "aus dem Zusammen- und Gegeneinanderwirken dieser beiden ließen sich 
die Phänomene des Lebens erklären."132 This is also the insight Lacan will appreciate 
in its full effect when he refuses Freud's bipartition so as to go on to unite the two of 
love and death under the single name of the drive, or libido, stating that every drive is 
virtually a death drive.133 Lacan's reformulation of the paradoxes of psychoanalysis 
into the single concept of the death drive goes through the myth of the lamella to the 
mathematical number of minus-one. A negative force to divide every concept from 
within, including itself, the drive crystalizes the notion of the real as the internal limit 
of the symbolic, as subtracted from differential structures, and thereby as reminiscent 
of Badiou's generic multiple or equality of in-difference. The question is how the 
drive, while isolating the points of subjective destitution where established states 









 In his exposition on the status of the drive, Lacan starts out with the living 
animal's naturally determined propensities and instincts. These find their execution in 
and through a momentary thrust. The force characteristic of the drive, on the other 
hand, is to be a constant force, eine konstante Kraft. The force of the drive is 
characterized as internally invested and not susceptible to discharge, an irrepressible 
something somewhere to which repression owes its cause.134 Yet the drive is not to be 
grasped as that which simply collides with the natural propensities of human being. 
Neither is it to be grasped as that which simply comes into conflict with the moral law 
or culture. In psychoanalysis, sexual matters are not reducible to matters of either 
natural or cultural constitution. With its theory of sex and of the drive, Copjec writes, 
"psychoanalysis universalizes human nature as that which has no nature or whose 
nature is radically plasticized."135 In her reading of Freud's variation on the Napoleonic 
notion of destiny, Toril Moi argues that Freud "thinks of the body in terms that 
undermine the opposition between natural causation and cultural meaning."136 Rather 
than politics, as with Napoleon, it is anatomy that is the subject of destiny in Freud, in 
the precise sense that anatomy carries but one single guarantee, namely that of psychic 
conflict. It spurs an ever-productive process of diversions and distortions, readable in 
the strangely effective but nonetheless indiscernible lesions incapacitating the 
organism of the hysteric.137 Jaanus suggests that the constant theme of Lacan is "the 
brokenness between us and nature,"138 but perhaps it is more precise to speak of a 
brokenness in us and nature both, if 'us' is taken to mean something along the lines of 
'beings of culture'. If 'we' are 'beings of culture', it is not because 'we' stand in 
opposition to nature. Rather it is because nature, at some point, comes into 














drive reemerges as the paradoxical unity of opposites – this should also be reversed: if 
'we' are somehow still 'beings of nature', it is because 'our' culture comes into 
contradiction with itself, first and foremost in the paradoxical status of the moral law. 
 Zupančič accentuates this radical twist when she explains how psychoanalysis 
conceives of culture not as the result of "a germ of mind or soul deposited in our 
bodies, but [as] something much closer to a biological dysfunction." 139  This 
dysfunction answers to the name of the drive. It is as a dysfunction that the drive is 
suggestible as the non-object of psychoanalysis, insofar as it operates a short circuit 
between nature and culture, as "an intersection that is generative of both sides that 
overlap in it."140 Rather than a problem with psychoanalysis, the failure to delimit 
nature and culture, body and mind, or the physical and the psychic is the very problem 
of psychoanalysis. Rather than serving as a point of criticism against psychoanalysis, 
this failure marks its critical point. Rather than amounting to an objection to 
psychoanalysis, it constitutes the non-object of psychoanalysis. It designates "a radical 
ontological impasse,"141 Zupančič writes, and as such it names a 'missed encounter' 
between psychoanalysis and philosophy. 
 Žižek describes the internal investment of the drive as "a palpitating opening, 
an organ which is at the same time the entire organism."142 He thus captures how the 
drive designates the inherent contradiction by which nature and culture, the physical 
and the psychic, come across not so much as distinct from each other but as divided 
within themselves. Žižek's formulation reverberates in Lacan's myth of the lamella, the 
symbolization of the libido and its fundamentally lost object, the ungraspable 
something somewhere to which the contradictions and paradoxes of the drive answer. 
The myth of the lamella will, eventually, lead us to the point of the act, from which a 











required to proceed along the drive's internal investment, step by step. I will start out 
from Freud's image of a mouth kissing itself.  
 The mouth kissing itself, Lacan claims, captures perfectly the internal 
investment of the drive, its circular structure and looped course, its bowlike trajectory 
and decisive reversal back upon itself.143 First of all, the image of a mouth kissing 
itself (a single pair of lips, an upper and a lower, re-enveloping themselves) is an 
image of a mouth productive of its own satisfaction.144 But the impossible smugness of 
these lips should not preclude the fact that they must necessarily depart from 
themselves in order to return back upon themselves. This movement constitutes the 
decisive trajectory of the drive, and underscores its processual status.145 It underscores 
the fact that if the Freudian mouth craves to re-envelop itself, it is because there is 
something wanting within this mouth in the first place, something wanting that 
separates the lips within themselves.146 The point of the Freudian mouth is not that 
there is a retrieval of that lost something, however. The point is that the 
circumnavigation of the lips' bowlike trajectory, by which they achieve their 
satisfaction, encircles the void poised in the middle, and thereby makes the lost 
something's absence present as an object:  
 
cet objet que nous confondons trop souvent avec ce sur quoi la pulsion se referme – 





















Freud, par n'importe quel objet, et dont nous ne connaissons l'instance que sous la 
forme de l'objet perdu petit a.147  
 
The bowlike trajectory of the drive constitutes its lost object. It constitutes it precisely 
as a loss. "To put it simply," Zupančič suggests, "object a will come to name the other 
(the real) object of the drive as 'independent of its object.'"148 Breasts, faeces, gazes, 
voices – all so many representatives or replacements of another, always-already lost 
something,149 a primordial loss. 
 Lacan suggests a tentative 'symbolization' of this something through his 'myth 
of the lamella', the refuse of sexual reproduction. Lacan imagines the lamella as 
 
[cette] large crêpe à se déplacer comme l'amibe, ultra-plate à passer sous les portes, 
omnisciente d'être menée par le pur instinct de la vie, immortelle d'être scissipare. 
Voilà quelque chose qu'il ne serait pas bon de sentir se couler sur votre visage, sans 
bruit pendant votre sommeil, pour le cacheter.150 
 
The lamella is a myth, but as a myth it communicates the essence of the libido as an 
inexistent organ that nonetheless persistently insists. It is the primordial Organ that 
Freud identifies as the source of the drive, and that Lacan identifies as identical to the 
drive's ultimate goal. The disturbing potential of the Freudian mouth culminates here, 
especially as reported by Žižek's reference to the alien in Ridley Scott's eponymous 
film (1979), where "this amoebalike, flattened creature, which envelops the subject's 

















the libido as an irrepressible and indestructible life immortal, insofar as pure life is the 
thing lost to the living through the living's submission to sexual reproduction.  
 The myth of the lamella symbolizes how life itself is lost to the living, at least 
that part of life that never dies. In sexual reproduction (meiosis), the life of the species 
is inseparable from the death of the individual. By way of the signifier, death comes to 
mark the individual as a subject to death. But the myth of the lamella also shows how 
any reunion with this immortal life would equal the death of the subject as such. Just 
like the species is all in the binary fission (mitosis) by which the amoebae replicate, so 
the slithering alien enveloping and sealing shut the subject's face erases all 
individuality, as does the self-satisfied mouth folded back upon itself. The libido, the 
drive, is nothing but this loss driven to circumnavigate its own loss. Lacan therefore 
refers to it as fundamentally a-sexual, and writes its mathematical number not as two 
(Freud's Eros and Thanatos) but as minus-one or one-less [une-à-moins].152 If the 
Freudian concept of the sexual drive is never as natural as it might seem, Lacan 
explains, it is because Freud is uncompromising on the fact that, for speaking beings, 
there is no ganze Sexualstrebung. There is no totality of sexual life to sum up its 
essence and function. The loss involved in the drive is not so much that of any 
complementary sexual other or other sex, but the loss of its own completeness, its own 
total being.153 While every drive is virtually a death drive, as symbolized by the 
lamella, every drive is therefore actually a partial drive, with a partial object, in the 

















representing but partially the function by which it is produced.154 As one-less, the 
drive is non-identical even to itself. It renders human sexuality non-all, and marks the 
impossibility of sexual relations and the real of sexual difference.  
 
 
The Act in Question 
Copjec writes of the real of sexual difference that "only the failure of its inscription is 
marked in the symbolic."155 To indicate the relevance of the real of sexual difference 
for the subject of politics in Badiou's philosophical works, a comment on the position 
of sexual matters in speaking beings can suffice. With Freud, it is possible to say that 
the sexual drive is universal, in that it cuts across every category of sex, gender, 
sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, creed, abilities, class, etc., even the asexual, insofar 
as the drive is itself without an inherent quality. But this universality should be read in 
a strictly literal sense: the sexual drive is that which cuts across every category in the 
sense that it undermines these categories as such, dividing them from within and, thus, 
marking their inherent non-identity. In that sense, the universality of the sexual drive is 
due to its generic being, as Badiou might say. It marks that which subtracts itself from 
marks, and names its members as subtracted from the predicates of identification, from 
the One. The question of ethics reemerges in full force as the one-less renders human 
sexuality non-all. But it is an ethics that differ from the moral law of the superego. It is 
an ethics at the underside of the moral law, reemerging at the point where the law 
comes into contradiction with and undermines itself from within itself.  
 The terminus of analysis can be described as the subject's arrival as one-less, 
coming face to face with the impossibility of sexual relations and complete or total 
being, assuming the constitutive loss implied by being sexual as such. This is the 
significance to be read into the Lacanian motto of psychoanalysis, namely, 'Wo Es 








Wo, où Es, sujet dépourvu d'aucun das ou autre article objectivant, war, était, c'est 
d'un lieu d'être qu'il s'agit, et qu'en ce lieu: soll, c'est un devoir au sens moral qui là 
s'annonce, [...] Ich, je, là dois-je (comme on annonçait: ce suis-je, avant qu'on dise: 
c'est moi), werden, devenir, c'est-à-dire non pas survenir, ni même advenir, mais 
venir au jour de ce lieu même en tant qu'il est lieu d'être.156  
 
To assume the loss constitutive of being sexual, arriving as a subject at the place of 
this loss, as one-less, is also the significance to be read into the Lacanian operation of 
'traversing the fantasy'. To traverse the fantasy does not simply signify the separation 
of the subject from its alienating identifications in and by a given signifier, from its 
position in the chain. To traverse the fantasy does not simply signify the subject's 
concurrence with the object petit a as the partial object by which it attains its share of 
jouissance and its determination, at a deeper level, of its primary identification.157 
More radically, to traverse the fantasy signifies the subject's identification with the 
partiality of all partial objects, in the sense that they are situated apart and off the 
mark. That is to say, it signifies the subject's identification with the primordial loss that 
all partial objects can only ever partially come to represent, in the sense that the 
primordial loss produces its own partial representational stand-ins. It signifies the 
subject's identification with the very phenomenon of the so-called 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz – or representational representative – as the process by 



















objects take place.158 If only the failure of its inscription is marked in the symbolic, as 
Copjec observes of sexual difference, at stake in the traversal of fantasy and the 'wo Es 
war' is not the subject's identification with any one failed inscription. At stake is the 
subject's identification with failure as such, precisely insofar as such failure never 
ends.  
 Such a dynamic point of view is communicated also in Zupančič's formulation 
of the drive as the intersection generative of both its overlapping sides, as the drive 
and its object coincide as ultimately coterminous with this division, with "the split, the 
gap itself as object."159 Žižek suggests a similar dynamic when he determines the 
traversal of fantasy as the operation by which "we identify with the work of our 
'imagination' [...] in all its inconsistency – that is to say, as prior to its transformation 
into the phantasmic frame that guarantees our access to reality."160 The word to 
underline here is that of 'work' as prior to any given outcome. This place of work is the 
place at which the subject must come, the place of the drive as non-identical to itself, 
as a paradoxical movement of double binds and dissolutions: "this 'zero level'," Žižek 
writes, is "the impossible moment of the 'birth of subjectivity'."161	
 The ethical weight of the 'wo Es war' is on the opposite scale of the moral law 
and the superego, the internalized authority of the father, in more ways than one. 
Firstly, the Freudian accounts of Oedipus and the father of the horde have a strictly 
masculine inflection. The law is passed on from father to sons and concerns an 
administration of their access to women. Freud is infamous for his suggestion that girls 
would be less disposed towards the veritable destruction of the Oedipus complex that 
the threat of castration is due to cause in the case of boys on account of an anatomical 
factor, the girl's lack of a penis. Not coerced as strongly as boys to give up their 













continue to maintain their Oedipal desires throughout life, that is, also into adulthood. 
In want of a decisive reason to refrain from their parental objects and leave the 
Oedipus complex behind, the formation of the superego and the introjection of the 
paternal authority must also, in consequence, suffer: women's superego will never be 
as inexorable, impersonal, and independent of its affective sources as man's. In that 
way, the accusations that have been pinned on women through the ages – accusations 
according to which women have an inferior sense of justice and interest in social 
questions, poorer abilities for sublimation, and weaker inclinations to endure the toils 
of life's great necessities – would find their explanation in women's anatomical 
predispositions.162 
 The second point is related to the first point. The paternal law of the superego 
does not assume the constitutive loss of being sexual and the impossibility of sexual 
relations. With all its prohibitions and proscriptions, the paternal law relegates the 
possession of the phallus and the privilege of definition to the authority of the father, 
internalized as dead or still alive. The authority of the father is pedestalled as the 
exception to confirm the rule, to confirm the law. Whereas all his subjects are 
castrated, the father is not, or, in Lacanian parlance, in accordance with the masculine 
logic of sexuation, whereas all men are submitted to the phallic function (∀𝑥.Φ𝑥), 
there is at least one to whom the phallic function does not apply (∃𝑥.~Φ𝑥).163 The 
father of the horde is the paradigm of such an exceptional figure, the at-least-one or 
l'hommoinzun. Only for the father are sexual relations to be fully consummated and 
immediate satisfaction accessible. Neither the impossibility of sexual relations nor the 
constitutive loss of being sexual is assumed. The failures of being sexual are explained 
instead on the grounds of the impotence of the castrated subjects, their shortcomings 
and insufficiencies.  
 There is another mode of dealing with the impossibility of sexual relations, 
another logic of sexuation, namely the feminine one. It reads where there is no one that 








functions is not-all (~∀𝑥.Φ𝑥), all the time there remains something en plus of 
castration.164 As non-all under the phallic function and thus refusing the function of 
totality, the feminine logic remains more attuned to an appreciation of the inherent 
non-identity and paradoxical 'one-less' of the drive. It remains open for the point where 
the law comes into contradiction with itself, where the law undermines its own 
operations. The feminine logic drives for the point where the inconsistency of the law 
reveals itself, where the law's lack of support becomes evident. There is no Other of 
the Other, Lacan will say, denoting it as the signifier of the barred Other, S(A).165 
Arriving at this point does not equal the rejection of the law tout court. Instead of the 
plunge into psychotic ravings, the feminine drive to the inconsistency of the law 
signifies an acceptance of its contingent status. Consequently, it signifies an 
acceptance of the subject's responsibility for its own subjective constitution and works 
as the founding instance of another law of the drive: in a world where a fundamental 
loss determines nature and culture, etc., only the radically subjective act can account 
for one's position and function within these fields.  
 Copjec has commented on the weight of fully acknowledging the real status of 
sexual matters for thinking of ethics as a radically subjective act, an act in which the 
subject constitutes itself, an act in which the subject alters the field into which it 
enters. She writes that 
  
[i]t is only when we begin to define the subject as self-governing, as subject to its 
own laws, that we cease to consider her as calculable, as subject to laws already 
known, and thus manipulable. It is only when the sovereign incalculability of the 
subject is acknowledged that perceptions of difference will no longer nourish 
demands for the surrender of difference to processes of 'homogenization', 
'purification' or any of the other crimes against otherness which the rise of racism 
has begun to acquaint us.166 
 







To claim that the subject is at the same level as the law is not equivalent to 
claiming that she is the law, since any conflation of subject with law only reduces 
her, subjects her absolutely to the law. At the same level as and yet not the law, the 
subject can only be conceived as the failure of the law, of language. In language 
and yet more than language, the subject is a cause for which no signifier can 
account. Not because she transcends the signifier, but because she inhabits it as 
limit. This subject, radically unknowable, radically incalculable, is the only 
guarantee we have against racism. This is a guarantee that slips from us whenever 
we disregard the non-transparency of subject to signifier, whenever we make the 
subject coincide with the signifier rather than with its misfire.167 
 
At this mark, where the subject is to be identified with the misfire of the signifier, the 
contradictions of the law, as the productive intersection generative of both its 




In Want of an Other Badiou; the Insistence of Sexual Matters 
In the following, I seek to draw up the fundamentals of how Badiou picks up on 
Lacan's teachings on the drive as a ground for subjective constitution. The question is 
what Lacanian psychoanalysis allows Badiou to think concerning the preconditions of 
the subject and the possibilities of change. While providing an overall presentation of 
Badiou's traversal of the Lacanian framework, my aim is to sketch out the basic trends 
that dominate the already existing research on this traversal, and to situate my thesis 
on that basis. I look to the concept of love as paradigmatic of Lacan's influence on 
Badiou, as well as a paradigm for Badiou's theory of conditions, as the processes of 
truths on which philosophy depends. The crucial point is how Badiou strives to think 
truths and subjects, dialectically, as a process of continuation from the instantaneous 
occurrences of an event. I look to a few select criticisms against the subject that arises 
from Badiou's traversal of Lacan. This allows me to pinpoint the materialist strand in 




and the previous section to the contextualization from which I began, the question is 
how working through Lacan allows Badiou to elaborate on the preconditions and 
possibilities of a subject of politics and radical change that also speaks to the concrete 
situation of globalized capitalism today.  
 
 
Thinking au-delà Lacan 
In the final chapter of L'Être et l'événement, after having brought his long 
extrapolation on the mathematical ontology of being, events, and truths to conclusion, 
Badiou considers its implications for a theory of the subject – au-delà Lacan. Badiou 
posits a rhetorical question:  
 
Oui ou non, est-ce de l'être, en tant que l'être, que l'ensemble vide est le nom 
propre? Ou faut-il penser que c'est au sujet que convient adéquatement ce nom, 
comme si son épuration de toute épaisseur qu'on puisse savoir ne délivrait la vérité, 
qui parle, qu'en excentrant le point nul en éclipse dans l'intervalle des multiples de 
ce qui, sous le vocable de 'signifiant', garantit le présence matérielle?168  
 
Lacan had opted for the second option, and conceived of the empty set as the name of 
the subject. The first option of conferring the empty set as the designation of being-
qua-being will remain Badiou's preferred hypothesis: 
 
Le choix est ici entre une récurrence structurale, qui pense l'effet-sujet comme 
ensemble vide, donc décelable aux réseaux uniformes de l'expérience, et une 
hypothèse sur la rareté du sujet, qui en suspend l'occurrence à l'événement, à 
l'intervention, et aux chemins génériques de la fidélité, renvoyant et réassurant le 












The gist of Badiou's contention with the Lacanian framework is played out within 
these parameters, insofar as it is precisely a theory of the subject that is rendered both 
problematic and practically available to Badiou through Lacan's reworking of Freud.  
 Badiou's re-elaboration on the Lacanian scheme underlines the rarity and 
singularity of the subject, as part of Badiou's effort to conceive of the subject as an 
occurrence whose very occurrence alters the field in which it occurs, whose very 
coming into being alters the preconditions of its being. This is true especially but not 
exclusively for his elaborations on the subject of politics. It is not for nothing that 
Žižek refers to Badiou as the paradigmatic theorist of the radically subjective act.170 
The question is how Badiou deserves this designation. If Badiou's philosophical works 
occur in the context of a globalized capitalism and the historical failure of the 
communist hypothesis, and if it is from Lacan and the psychoanalytic concept of the 
drive that a possible theory of the subject can be reformulated today, the question is 
how Badiou utilizes the Lacanian framework to address the predicaments posed on 
him by the context of his concrete situation.  
 If Badiou is the paradigmatic theorist of the act today, Žižek still propagates the 
need "to instigate a new wave of Lacanian paranoia: to push readers to engage in 
work of their own, and start to discern Lacanian themes everywhere."171 But he 
suggests that "among contemporary philosophers, Lacan's only true 'silent partner' is 
Alain Badiou: although he is critical of (what he perceives as) Lacan's 'anti-
philosophy', his entire work is marked by a deep fidelity to and incessant dialogue 
with Lacan."172 Žižek echoes an appeal made by Badiou himself, directed at anyone 














necessary for a 'traversal without weakening' [traverser sans faiblir] of the 
antiphilosophy of Lacan.173 Badiou entertains upon an incessant dialogue with Lacan, 
wielding the latter's teaching to the benefit and development of his own philosophical 
aims. But where Žižek discerns an opposition between criticism and approval, I would 
argue that it is precisely the tensions between the critical attitude in Badiou's own 
philosophical endeavors and the antiphilosophy of Lacan that turns Badiou's deep 
fidelity to Lacan into a productive transaction.  
 Badiou's question is how to use Lacan in order to pass through and beyond 
Lacan. It is a question of utilizing Lacan in order to expand upon Lacan's reach, much 
like how the fidelity of Lenin to the Marxist tradition resided in his ability to surpass 
the dogmatic abiding by the letter of Marx' texts and to pass on to the practical 
development of Marxist thought according to concrete analyses of his own concrete 
situation. A similar operation underscores Lacan's return to Freud as a move beyond 
Freud. Jacques-Alain Miller observes that this is not 
 
a beyond Freud which leaves Freud behind; it is a beyond Freud which is 
nevertheless in Freud. Lacan is looking for something in Freud's work of which 
Freud himself was unaware. Something which we may call extimate, as it is so 
very intimate that Freud himself was not aware of it. So very intimate that this 
intimacy is extimate. It is an internal beyond.174 
 
Similarly, Badiou's philosophy adheres to the teaching of Lacan up to the point where, 
in order to stay true to his teaching, it becomes necessary to pass beyond Lacan.175 
Insofar as Badiou takes another step beyond Lacan, he does so not by retracting or 
abjuring Lacan but by accepting and integrating the fundamentals of his teaching. He 
does so by rendering its limits and impasses pressing, and by demanding the pass 
beyond these impasses. It is a question neither of an outright rejection nor of an 







 I argue that there is an ethical thrust in Badiou's philosophy. With the notion of 
an ethical thrust, I am thinking of how Badiou's philosophy is determined by the 
question of the subject – the preconditions of a subject, the possibilities of a subject – 
precisely as the possibility for radical change and true novelty. The question of the 
subject is the question of how actual change can occur, and this question is the guiding 
light of Badiou's philosophical contributions. Badiou's renown as a philosopher might 
still weigh on his equation, in L'Être et l'événement, between mathematics and 
ontology. The real interest of Badiou's work, however, is not to be found in the first 
term of this title but in its last: while the question of being-qua-being is not 
insubstantial, the real interest is directed at that-which-is-not-being-qua-being, and that 
finds its fons et origo in the event. The equation of mathematics and ontology serves 
as a preparation for his elaboration on the concepts of truths and subjects in the wake 
of an event.176 Ed Pluth suggests that Badiou's L'Éthique; Essai sur la conscience du 
mal (1993) concludes the project of L'Être et l'événement.177 I suggest that the ethical 
thrust is there from the start, and that it is there still. The question is how the general 
movement of Badiou's ethical thrust – as it proceeds from the ontological framework 
through the doctrine of events and truths on to the theory of the subject – takes place 
as inseparable from the trajectory of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy. In 
the main, the movement of Badiou's philosophical works is played out in the Lacanian 
operation of de-relating the couple of knowledge and truth, to be followed by the 
operations of their re-relating, through the forcing of a generic procedure in which the 
subject is realized as a subject to truth.178 
 Badiou mobilizes the Lacanian framework already in his first major book, 
Théorie du sujet. The Lacanian framework is introduced to supplement the dialectical 
materialism of Marxism with its conceptual 'black sheep', a theory of the subject.179 
The project is given another punctuation in L'Être et l'événement. Badiou observes in 









of how a subject can be thought as compatible with that which is possible to 
pronounce in regard to being. The problematic of relating being and the subject, 
Badiou writes, will lead him to reverse the Kantian proposition in which the 
transcendental subject is the ground of possibility for pure mathematics. The question 
Badiou poses is how a subject is possible insofar as pure mathematics is the science of 
being. This reversal was triggered by Miller's question concerning the ontology of 
Lacan, as well as by Lacan's conception of the real as an impasse to formalization and 
pure logic as the science of the real. By way of a decision to conceive of the Multiple 
as the impasse of mathematics, its point of the real touching being, the inherent 
impossibility of mathematical formalization rather than one of its transparent concepts, 
Badiou turns mathematics into ontology, the science of being-qua-being. 
Simultaneously, he relieves the concept of the real from its purely subjective confines 
in Lacan.180 In short, Badiou performs a transposition of the real. No longer a purely 
subjective category as in Lacan, it becomes predominantly a category of being, in an 
operation that sanctions the reintroduction of a doctrine of truths while requiring a 
reworking of the category of the subject, at the same time. An event is the 
supplementation of the void in a situation, the momentary appearance of the real of 
being as pure and inconsistent multiplicity within the consistencies of structure. A 
truth depends on an event, and is conceived as the processes where "l'être, ce qui 
s'appelle l'être, fonde le lieu fini d'un sujet."181 If the Lacanian framework presented a 
theory of the subject as void, Badiou's transposition of the real from the subject to 
being forces him to reverse also the Lacanian proposition: the question becomes how, 
if being is void, a subject is to proceed therefrom? Badiou delivers the most precise 
formulation of his relation to Lacan in Logiques des Mondes (2006): "Lacan fait 
structure de ce que je crois séquence, ou devenir contingent."182 Badiou's subject is not 
a matter of substance, a transcendental function, or a seat of experience, nor is it a void 









and excessive configuration that casts itself from the hazardous tissues of truths, in the 
wake of an event.183 Lacan remains caught up in an essentially Cartesian conception of 
the subject as always-already there, no matter how eccentric or empty or split it is.184 
The ethical thrust of Badiou's philosophy, on the other hand, drives Badiou into a 
dimension beyond Lacan by its insistence on the post-evental status of the subject, 
understood as the finite modality of infinite procedures of truths.  
 Badiou's confrontation with the Lacanian framework is both fundamental and 
pervasive, and Badiou willingly admits that the relation of Lacan to philosophy has 
always been and continues to be the key element that underpins his philosophical 
project. 185 But if Badiou is continuously involved in dialogues with Lacan, the 
exchanges taking place are not always explicit. Žižek is justified in choosing the 
phrase of 'silent partner' in designating the transactions between Badiou and Lacan, 
insofar as these transactions passes at times unpronounced, but nonetheless articulated 
or articulable. This is where my main thesis intervenes to interrogate the mark of 
sexual matters in Badiou's traversal of Lacan. Zupančič has observed how Badiou 
remains "utterly unyielding in his stance as regards refusing to associate subjectivity, 
in its emergence, with anything like 'sexuation',"186 and this is a point in itself: the 
encounters with sexual matters are not necessarily made explicit and directly, in 
Badiou. There is an implicit and indirect entertainment of sexual matters taking place 
in his work, which – precisely as it remains to a large extent unpronounced, but extant 
nonetheless – calls for further investigation and closer scrutiny, if the signification and 
implications of Badiou's ethical thrust beyond Lacan are to be understood. But I argue 
that the sexual matters of the so-called missed encounter between psychoanalysis and 
philosophy can be accentuated into its opposite, as the crux of Badiou's relation to 













philosophy, its impasse proper, the real from the non-encounter of which philosophy 
will spin its concepts of being, truths, and the subject. "Toute vérité fait passe d'une 
impasse," Badiou insists, "l'impasse de l'être [...] est en vérité la passe du Sujet."187 My 
thesis turns this insistence of Badiou back upon his own philosophical dissemination. 
At the crossroads of philosophy and psychoanalysis, sexual matters marks the 
impasses from which the decisive constituents of Badiou's elaborations on the subject 
can be drawn. My remaining chapters will interrogate these marks in greater detail. 
For now, the question concerns what threads have been disentangled so far, by Badiou 
himself, or by his readers. 
 
 
Truths of Love 
A common approach to Badiou and his Lacanian/sexual liaisons has been by way of 
the status of love in Badiou's philosophy. The question is how the status of love in 
Badiou can illuminate his relationship to Lacan, his immanent exceeding of the 
Lacanian framework, and where that leaves Badiou's reformulation of the subject. The 
concept of love makes the similarities between Badiou and Lacan especially 
pronounced, as many have remarked, while the differences it highlights might have 
been less ascertained. Love figures as a generic truth procedure, as one of the four 
conditions of philosophy (along with science, art and politics). The choice of love in 
approaching the issue of the Badiou-Lacan relation comes as no surprise. Love is the 
concept in Badiou's works that is most heavily intoned in sexual colors and Lacanian 
parlance. Love is where the truth of sexual difference and sexual non-relation appears, 
the truth of the sexual disjunction as a 'scene of Two' or 'immanent Two'.188 
Furthermore, love figures as privileged condition, a super-condition or condition of 
conditions. With its concept of an immanent Two, or as "le statut événementiel du 
Deux,"189 love provides a formal scheme for every other truth procedure (of science, 








wisdom, on the other. Because love makes a truth out of the disjunction or non-
relation as such, Badiou writes, it secures the generic as that which carries no attribute 
or predicate, as subtracted from every particular disjunctive position. Love thereby 
serves as "le gardien de l'universalité du vrai."190 Hence Copjec will argue that love is 
the basic and central condition underlying Badiou's project as a whole,191 while Žižek 
will note how that which "is encompassed by this fourth procedure is not just the 
miracle of love, but also psychoanalysis, theology, and philosophy itself." Žižek will 
even propose that love is "Badiou's 'Asiatic mode of production – the category into 
which he throws all truth procedures which do not fit the other three modes," while it 
simultaneously figures "as a kind of underlying formal principle or matrix of all of 
them."192 But love is not so much an answer or off-hand solution to unpredicted 
problems in Badiou's philosophy, as the term 'Asiatic mode' would imply. Rather love 
assumes the question or the paradox as such, and makes the obstacle to the formation 
of an answer – the tension within the answer itself – into a truth. 	
 Love ties to the event as the event also figures in a figure of Two. The event 
figures in the ultra-one poised between the void and itself, where it is counted twice as 
a self-belonging element, an element presented in and presenting its own presentation. 
Furthermore, Badiou writes, 
 
[l]'événement qu'épingle à l'être-présenté la capacité intervenante reste suturé à 
l'imprésentable. C'est que l'essence de l'ultra-un est le Deux. Considéré, non dans 



















intervalle plutôt qu'un terme, il s'établit, dans la rétroaction intervenante, entre 
l'anonymat vide que borde le site et l'en-plus d'un nom. Le mathème [de 
l'événement: ex = x ∈ X, ex] inscrit du reste cette scission originaire, puisqu'il ne 
déterminé la composition-une de l'événement ex qu'en y distinguant de lui-même 
les éléments représentés du site, d'où provient par ailleurs le nom. [/] L'événement 
est ultra-un, outre qu'il s'interpose entre le vide et lui-même, parce qu'il est ce dont 
se fonde la maxime 'il y a du Deux'. Le Deux ainsi allégué n'est pas la réduplication 
de l'un du compte, la répétition des effets de la loi. Il est un Deux originaire, un 
intervalle de suspens, l'effet scindé d'une décision.193 
 
The event as an originating Two – an inherent or immanent Two – mimics the 
operations of the Lacanian drive: divided within itself as well as dividing the law into 
which it intervenes, designating the failure of the law as the law's inherent scission. 
Like the drive, the Two is located at the exact point where the law comes into 
contradiction with itself. In Badiou's terminology of the event, the drive designates a 
supernumerary supplement or excess by which the real of being as pure and 
inconsistent multiplicity intrudes momentarily in consistent representation, in a 
consistent count. But besides the similarities of love, the event, and the drive, the 
question is also how love can highlight Badiou's differences from Lacan. If love is 
paradigmatic of Badiou's philosophy, it must be paradigmatic also of Badiou's 
traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy.  
 Zupančič elaborates on the relations between love, the event, and the drive. To 
her, Badiou's concept of an immanent Two constitutes "one of [contemporary 
philosophy's] most precious concepts which, although it comes from a singular generic 















suggests that Lacanian psychoanalysis serves Badiou as an unpronounced and 'fifth 
condition', in a move by which the condition of love is counted twice. At stake in the 
fifth condition is nothing less than the possibility of philosophy tout court, insofar as 
philosophy depends on a paradoxical relation of proximity and distance, inclusion and 
exclusion, vis-à-vis its four conditions (science, art, love, and politics). In Lacanian 
parlance, the relation is one of extimacy, where "philosophy has to pull itself away 
from the immediate grip of its conditions, while nevertheless remaining under the 
effect of these conditions."195 The crux of the problem concerns philosophy's need to 
avoid the classical mode of representation and its stone-cut determinations, denoted by 
Badiou as the state of the situation or meta-structure, the presentation of presentation, 
the count of the count. Lacanian psychoanalysis offers an alternative mode of 
representation, Zupančič argues, as Lacan defines the signifier as that which comes to 
represent the subject for another signifier. In Lacan's definition of the signifier, 
representation is conceived as a presentation within presentation: 
 
Here, representation as such is a wandering excess over itself; representation is the 
infinite tarrying with the excess that springs not simply from what is or is not 
represented (its 'object'), but from this act of representation itself, from its own 
inherent 'crack' or inconsistency. The Real is not something outside or beyond 
representation, but is the very crack of representation.196 
 
Representation comes about as neither above nor below that which is presented, but at 
the same level, as a dislocation within presentation itself, as its inherent division. 
Zupančič recognizes such a "possibility for the 'counting the count itself' to be situated 
on the same level as the count" to be the stake involved in Badiou's concept of the 
immanent Two of love.  
 A Lacanian lens on love and the event is productive. Besides philosophy's 
relation of proximity and distance vis-à-vis its conditions, the concept of the immanent 
Two of love covers the truths of love itself, obviously, as the relation of the two lovers 





event as such. The event depends on a similar relation of the situation to its inherent 
non-relation. The event is an occurrence of the internal exclusion within a situation, 
the point where the situation's inside and outside meet in an intersection potentially 
productive of both its overlapping sides. As in the drive and its simultaneous binding 
and dissolving of its own dissolved bonds, the event occurs as an originating scission.  
 However, one should take care not to miss out on the precarious status of the 
event. Its being in a situation is to disappear in its appearance and appear in its 
disappearing. The event is but as a fleeting glimpse, and its actual occurrence in any 
situation is essentially undecidable. If the event carries more than a mere superficial 
similarity to the drive, one should not ignore how Badiou refuses every equation of 
event and truths, of event and subject. A truth comes to be as a procedure of fidelity to 
the event, carried out in and by a subject. The refusal to think truths and subjects as 
punctual occurrences, insisting instead on thinking them as procedures and 
continuations, comprises the principle movement in Badiou's immanent exceeding or 
traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy. In other words, when Badiou sets himself to task 
with the question of how, if being is void, a subject is to proceed therefrom, his answer 
is already contained in the question: it is by proceeding from the occurrence of the 
void of being, and not as the void itself, that subjective constitution is to be realized.  
 To Badiou, the subject first appears in and by a nominating intervention by 
which the undecidable occurrence of the event in the situation is decided upon, 
positively, as actual. The nominating intervention designates a foundational ethical act. 
The decision on the undecidable institutes the decision as a scission in the situation, 
but also a scission in the essence of the law. The nominating intervention is an act 
where the subject constitutes itself in and by an alteration of the situation into which 
its nomination intervenes. It is an act where the subject's constitution is coterminous 
with the alteration of the situation into which its nomination intervenes.197 In the field 
of love, the nominating intervention may come in the form of a declaration of love, as 





encounter between the two in love. 198  In the field of politics, the nominating 
intervention may come in the form of a revolutionary declaration, as in the Bolshevik 
'all power to the soviets' or Marx' call to proletarian unity. They bear witness to how 
the revolution, despite appearances, has already begun. A call to proletarian unity or 
power to the soviets may shake the foundations of the powers that be, and thereby alter 
the situation by pointing to a new and previously unforeseen element of the situation. 
The real question, however, is how to make such a momentary intrusion of alterity into 
a durable alteration of the situation. The real question is how to make change last, a 
lasting change.  
 The foundational act of the nominating intervention must find its other in the 
notion of fidelity, Badiou suggests. After an initial decision on the undecidable has 
testified to the actual occurrence of an event, a truth is produced through a procedure 
of fidelity, where a subject faithful of the event persists in a laborious process of 
deducing the consequences of the event's occurrence in and for the situation. The 
condition of love is again paradigmatic, but not in the most obvious way. It is not so 
much the case that the notion of fidelity refers to love, Badiou explains, but rather the 
reverse. It is love that calls on the notion of fidelity so as to make love a persistent and 
continuous realization of the disjunctive non-relation of the Two, expanding its 
duration beyond its brief glimpse in the momentary encounter.199 While love depends 
on an encounter and the event of falling in love, true love is also characterized by a 
certain continuation. Love is not a one-time fling, but a continuous affair. In other 
words, love is paradigmatic insofar as it underlines the status of the ethical act in 
Badiou to be an act of duration, for a subject of love as well as for the subject of 
science, art, or politics. The constitution of the subject is a process of continuous 
alteration of the situation in which the subject intervenes. The ethical act par 
excellence is therefore that of un pas de plus, the ethical imperative that of 
continuation: to continue thinking, or, amounting to the same, to continue exceeding 
one's own being.200 The subject may originate in a punctual encounter with the void, 






process of elaborating the consequences of such an encounter that the subject 
materializes in a situation.  
 
 
Too Much and Too Little 
Besides the focus on love and its precarious status in Badiou's philosophy, the route of 
the real as a means of entering upon the relations of Badiou and Lacan is a common 
alternative among Badiou's commentators. As a rule, the presence of sexual matters is 
less pronounced in these instances, despite the debt to sexual matters that the concept 
of the real owes in Lacan. The questions concern the differences in which the concept 
of the real operates in Badiou's philosophical works compared to in Lacan's 
psychoanalytic theories. The contentions among the commentators can be summed up 
as follows, namely that either Lacan or Badiou's real admits either too much or too 
little of the subject: either too much depends upon the subject, or too little is made of 
the subject's dependencies; either too much is decided by the subject, or too little is 
said of the subject's decision. I will briefly sketch out the main lines of demarcation in 
these debates, so as to indicate that which might have been left out and prepare for my 
interventions to follow.  
 Bosteels identifies the rational kernel of Badiou's philosophical endeavor to be 
its concept of forcing, the forcing of a truth at the hands of the subject. Bosteels thus 
underlines Badiou's truly activist stance on the subject, insofar as every truth 
procedure ultimately depends on the active intervention and positive fidelity of a 
subject. A subject actively forces a truth into existence. In short, Bosteels writes, the 
psychoanalytic interpretation of truth as  
 
a brief traumatic encounter, or illuminating shock, in the midst of everyday reality 
[...] fails to understand the procedure whereby a truth is not something on which 
we chance in a fleeting change of perspective but something that is actively 







Hallward agrees with Bosteels' reading and his emphasis on the subjective 
preconditions of the possibility of radical change. Compared to the too little of the 
Lacanian model, Badiou's theory admits more of the subject:  
 
The essential thing to understand is that this making possible is always an 
exceptional process. This is what distinguishes Badiou's subjective or activist 
conception of the real from Lacan's ultimately more structural or passive 
conception. As Bruno Bosteels points out with particular force, it is only the 
subject who, by affirming the apparently impossible consequences of an event that 
the situation cannot recognize, can truly act on the level of the real. Such is 
Badiou's most basic article of faith: truly autonomous subjective action, if founded 
only on an event, can indeed touch its own real – which is to say, can achieve the 
impossible.202 
 
A certain paradox becomes apparent in Badiou's transposition of the real from the 
category of the subject to that of being. Such a transposition simultaneously enacts a 
transformation or revaluation of one's relation to the real. While transposed from the 
subject to being, the real is transformed from a passive encounter with a structural real 
to a properly activist-subjective affirmation of a procedural real.  
 Hallward is less content with such a too-much-ness of the subject than Bosteels. 
Hallward perceives the singular subject in Badiou's philosophy to rail too far off into 
its own non-relation. Celebrating Badiou for his critique of the specified, as 
mentioned, Hallward nonetheless challenges Badiou and his concept of the generic to 
provide "a more properly specific understanding of individuals and situations as 
conditioned by the relations that both enable and constrain their existence."203 There is 
nothing in Badiou to explain the specificity of a given truth procedure and its specific 
subject in relation to its specific situation, Hallward argues, insofar as Badiou 






an inaccessible moment of decision: 'The evental nomination has always already 
taken place..., and this 'already' is our only guarantee. The rest is a matter of 
faith....' The process of a subsequent coming to resolution figures, then, as a more 
or less instantaneous conversion: an event takes place; an undecidable is decided; 
an axiom comes into effect.204 
 
By granting too much to the subject, Badiou simultaneously grants it too little, 
Hallward contends. Badiou's subject is too radically subjective, insofar as the decision 
on the undecidable relieves the subject of every relation to its specific situation, to its 
specific historical site. To Hallward, there is a step wanting in Badiou's account of the 
process of subjective constitution. 
 Gillespie's critical remarks on Badiou are similar to Hallward's. He notes a 
tautological argument in Badiou's theory of the event. The subject comes to constitute 
the event in the same move by which the nomination of the event comes to constitute 
the subject. Gillespie argues for the need of a third term, a theory of affect, which is 
wanting in Badiou's philosophical adumbrations. Only such a third term will be able to 
account for the coextensive relation of event and subject. More precisely, Gillespie is 
searching for a third term to account for how the subject can be taken, engrossed, and 
carried away by an event in the first place. He finds such a third term, a theory of 
affect, in the Lacanian notion of anxiety.205 If the nominating intervention and the 
undecidable decision constitute the subject, the question for Gillespie concerns the 
grounds on which such a decision is decided upon, the instance or agency that choses 
to intervene and comes to pick out a name. In short, the question is how a mere human 
animal opts to become a subject of truth.  
 In the final analysis, yet the same contention underlies Žižek's accusation of a 
'hidden Kantianism' in Badiou's work. The distinction between being and event, 







phenomena and noumenon, constitutive principles and regulative ideas.206 All in all, 
Žižek reverses back upon Badiou the complaint raised by Bosteels on Badiou's behalf 
against Lacan. Bosteels claims that Badiou succeeds where Lacan comes up short, 
namely in thinking the possibility of fully embracing the consequences of an encounter 
with the real by way of the subject and its post-evental fidelity. Žižek argues that 
Badiou fails in precisely this matter. Badiou, according to Žižek, precludes that which 
Lacan had enabled through the notion of the analyst's discourse and his casting of the 
death drive, namely "the possibility of devising a discourse that has as its structuring 
principle the unnamable 'indivisible remainder’ that eludes a discursive grasp."207 
Badiou thereby misses out on the radical conception of the subject that follows from 
the teachings of Lacan, a conception true to the properly Hegelian move by which the 
limit of nomination is transposed from the exterior to the interior, where the subject is 
conceived as the inherent obstacle to its own subjective constitution.208  
 Žižek's anti-Kantian attack on Badiou has been countered on many occasions, 
mainly on account of its failure to appreciate the status of the infinite in Badiou's 
philosophy. 209  But the underlying contention is not necessarily rebuffed. The 
underlying contention says that a mediate instance able to account for the occurrence 
of the subject within the process of subjective constitution is lacking from Badiou's 
account of being, events, and truths. Adrian Johnston elaborates on this. According to 
Johnston,  
 
Žižek insightfully identifies Badiou's failure to specify precisely what, in the very 
moment that gives birth to both the truth-event and its subject, makes possible the 
founding negative withdrawal from the positive order of given, extant situations 











'what there is' in favor of an unconditional fidelity to an 'x' internally excluded 
within a situational field?210  
 
Badiou is lacking a properly developed separation between two distinct forms of void: 
"Incarnate voids within human nature (for example, voids as internal to the libidinal 
economy) should be distinguished from an inhuman, structural void as a universal 
feature of ontology,"211 Johnston argues. To him, and to Žižek, the former void within 
human nature, internal to the libidinal economy, holds priority over the latter structural 
void. That is to say, the death drive must be acknowledged in its function of an initial 
negation or destruction, the precondition for any later subjective engagement or 
identification with a cause.  
 Badiou is reluctant to accept the Freudian death drive to be more than a nihilist 
will to nothing, an absence of any positive drive to the good.212 Žižek thus flings his 
criticism that Badiou misses the crux of the psychoanalytic stance on the death drive, 
in which it serves as a "negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean'." Such a gesture is 
the necessary precondition before any consequent elaboration of new truths can 
become a possibility, Žižek writes.213 In equating the Freudian death drive with a mere 
'morbid obsession with death', as another expression of human finitude, instead of 
appreciating its infinite and immortal qualities, Badiou misses out on the point that 
"this death drive is a sort of 'vanishing mediator'," as Johnston reformulates it, "a 
transitional factor/moment intervening between and conjoining Badiou's central non-
dialecticized conceptual pairs, such as both being and event as well as individual and 
subject."214 The death drive designates a zero-point of subjectivity that is necessary for 
an individual's detachment from its situation and its possible consequent decision to 













 Bosteels proffers the most ardent defense of Badiou in face of criticisms like the 
above. He argues for the necessity to counter the demands for vanishing mediators and 
specific or affective relationality, and makes the case for a dialectical appreciation of 
Badiou's major concepts. Despite its apparent disappearance towards the end of the 
80s and the mathematical turn, the dialectic is already present and even ubiquitous in 
Badiou's works, from beginning to end. The presence of the dialectic renders the gist 
of Badiou's work to be more than a simple opposition between being and event. The 
dialectic works by installing a division in two internal to each term. Being is divided in 
two, as presentation and representation, and the non-coincidence of being with itself 
gives place to the event. The event itself is divided in two, between the void and the 
situation, in whose split the subject and truths are borne.215 Whether or not Bosteels' 
argument fully counters the criticisms against which it is raised (e.g., does it account 
for the mechanisms by which a human animal decides to become a subject?), it does 
make an important point by bringing the dialectic to the fore.  
 First of all, the presence of the dialectic raises the question of what radical 
change and true novelty can be. Does it come in the form of an absolute beginning, a 
rupture that divides the history of the world in two? Or is it a gradual and laborious 
process of deducing the consequences of an event in and for a situation, torn between 
the old and the new? Badiou opts for the latter, whereas Lacanian antiphilosophy 
delineates the implications of the former. Secondly, the dialectic goes hand in hand 
with Badiou's materialism, defined simply as the priority of being over thinking. Frank 
Ruda suggests that Badiou's materialism constitutes 'an idealism without idealism'.216 
My point is similar, namely that if ideas are the motor force of change, these ideas are 
materially occasioned. If the death drive designates a zero-point of subjectivity as the 













Badiou's materialism will adamantly insist that such a precondition is provided 
through being, not through thinking or the subject itself: it is the established state and 
the structures of the concrete situation that provide the preconditions for a subject of 
truth and for another thinking, insofar as it provides the preconditions for an event. It 
is being-qua-being that occasions the resurgence of that-which-is-not-being-qua-
being. It answers to the dictum that the emancipation of one goes by the emancipation 
of all, as it addresses the very mechanism of exclusion as such. In the present situation, 
Badiou's concrete analysis identifies the growing number of the ultimately 
dispossessed masses as the zero-point or void of globalized capitalism. These numbers 
count the ones whose existence is to not exist within the established states of today, 
whose differential position is in-difference and whose 'slate is already wiped clean'. A 
hazardous resurgence of the presence of these numbers within globalized capitalism 
today would constitute an event, and in that manner provide the material 
underpinnings for a possible subject of politics, a possible radical change. The 
question for a possible subject of politics today is whether or not an intervention to 
nominate such an event has occurred, and if it has, if there remains a subject to carry 




My main thesis is that it is in the very junctions where the ethical thrust of Badiou's 
work intersect with sexual matters that a key to disentangle the still silent threads of 
his work can be found; that the points where his disseminations do not escape the 
presence of sexual matters mark especially dense and significant knots in his 
arguments. I do not claim that my contention will bring the debates sketched out above 
to a close with a last word on Badiou's elaborations on the event, truths, and the 
subject, the subject of politics and the possibilities of radical change and true novelty. 
Rather I believe my contention can contribute to maintain the spaces of dispute open. I 
underscore the presence of the theme of sexual matters also in the discussions of 
Badiou that seem to derail from this theme, even if they hinge on the question of the 
real, the non-relation, and its place and function in human being. The issue of whether 
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or not Badiou mobilizes sexual matters sufficiently, or if he lets the full radical 
potential of psychoanalysis pass him by, is highlighted. Yet I do not to claim that 
Badiou is talking of sex when and where he does not, nor vice versa. In the chapters to 
follow, my point is to analyze the junctions in Badiou's work where sexual matters 
intrude, and utilize these junctions to accentuate how his project shares in and is to be 
distinguished from its Lacanian premises. On the basis of this foundational chapter, 
however, a preliminary conclusion can be cast on the relations between Badiou and 
Lacan, and how they facilitate a thinking of the subject of change and novelty.  
 Badiou's philosophical project is situated in the context of a globalized 
capitalism, in want of another politics, confronted by the conundrum of the 
preconditions and possibilities for the communist hypothesis as another horizon in 
which a subject of politics can materialize. Psychoanalysis, and especially the 
Lacanian rewrite of the Freudian drive as one-less, offers a theory or an ethics of the 
act as a subjective constitution in and through subjective destitution. It identifies the 
occasions on which a given structure faces its own inherent contradictions, the points 
at which the law undermines itself, and it posits these points as the opportunities for 
radical change. Lacan's teachings on the subject and the drive are not sufficient for 
Badiou to think the possibilities of change through, so Badiou makes the call for a 
traversal or immanent exceeding of the Lacanian framework. The basic step in 
Badiou's traversal is the transposition of the real, or the void, from the category of the 
subject to the category of being. This basic step bears some decisive consequences by 
which Badiou reformulates a doctrine of truths and a theory of the subject of his own. 
First of all, by the transposition of the real from the subject to being, Badiou 
simultaneously transforms the category of the real from being an issue of an 
instantaneous encounter to becoming an issue of a properly activist-subjective 
affirmation of continuation. The subject is no more the void of structure but the 
fidelity procedure of truths. Badiou's ethics of the act is an ethics of a continuous 
alteration of the situation, not its instantaneous overturning. With Bosteels, I would 
designate this aspect of continuation over instants as the dialectical aspect of Badiou's 
traversal: division creates movement, change, and novelty. Secondly, there is the 
materialist aspect of Badiou's traversal, whose weight rests on the differentiation of the 
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philosophical concept of the event from the antiphilosophical act. By relocating the 
real to being, and by conceiving of the event as the resurgence of being as void in a 
situation, Badiou is able propose a fully materialist theory of the subject that responds 
to the predicament of globalized capitalism, and that anchors the possibilities for 
radical change and novelty in the concrete situation of today. It is to further elaborate 
on the significance of the Lacanian framework on the mathematical gesture and the 
materialist dialectic in Badiou's philosophical works that I turn to question the function 









This chapter addresses the significance of the traversal of the Lacanian edifice that 
Badiou designates as necessary for the philosopher today, and its implications for 
Badiou's thinking of radical change. As Badiou explains in L'Être et l'événement, his 
philosophy confronts the difficulty of the compatibility between a subject as process 
and that which it is possible to express concerning being. Spurred by Miller's 
interrogation, Lacan determined his ontology to be an ontology of non-being. Not 
entirely satisfied by Lacan's response, but intrigued by Lacan's notion of the real as an 
impasse to formalization and pure logic as the science of the real, Badiou set the task 
upon himself to radically rethink the relation between being, truths, and the subject. 
Badiou considers these themes to be the triad at the core of modernity.217 Badiou's 
rethinking of this triad is based on the premise that the real is no longer to be 
conceived of as a category of the subject as such, as in Lacan, but rather as a category 
of being. Badiou discovers that the Multiple, or Number, as he will name it in Le 
Nombre et les nombres (1990), is not a transparent concept in mathematics but, a 
contrario, the impasse of mathematical formalization. The multiple is the point of the 
real by which mathematics touches the pure inconsistency of being as such.218 This 
discovery does not only lay the foundations for a new understanding of ontology. It 
alters the field of that which can be said and thought of truths and, consequently, of the 
subject. 	
 My course through this matter is determined by the question of the feminine 
and how an analysis of the function of sexual matters in Badiou's traversal of Lacan 






is a question of how the figure of the feminine operates in Badiou's elaborations of 
actual change after Lacan. I start out from the generally accepted notion that Badiou's 
denomination of the generic multiple – designating the being of truth – is a badly 
hidden reference to the Lacanian conception of the feminine logic of the non-all. I do 
not argue to the contrary, but I cannot avoid the question of whether or not that is all 
there is to it. Interrogating the generic from the side of the feminine non-all proposes a 
wider discussion on the nature of the relationship between Lacan and Badiou. How 
does Badiou's application of the teaching of Lacan distinguish itself from the 
elaborations on a Lacanian ethics found in Copjec and Zupančič, among others? Much 
of the contention Badiou raises concerning the limitations of the Lacanian framework 
concerns Lacan's conception of the feminine logic of the non-all in its presumed 
credentials of infinity. An investigation of Badiou's relation vis-à-vis Lacan's 
conceptualization of the feminine cannot be reduced to a fringe survey. It directs itself 
inadvertently towards the rethinking of being, truths, and the subject occurring at the 
intersection of their thinking.  
 The motivation behind the denotation of the generic multiple as feminine is 
further problematized by Badiou's criticism of Lacan's conceptualizations of the 
feminine and the infinite, found in several of Badiou's interventions in the aftermath of 
L'Être et l'événement. According to Badiou, Lacan does not fully realize the modernity 
of the secularized infinite introduced through Georg Cantor and set theory. In want of 
a modern concept of the infinite, Badiou argues, the Lacanian edifice falters. Its phallic 
function needs the supplement of the generic multiple. This argument exposes the 
backbone in Badiou's philosophical endeavor, the radical indeterminacy of the 
itinerant excess of representation over presentation, where the inconsistency of being 
continues to insists. It pinpoints the dangers that lurk upon anyone traveling such 
waters, as constructivism and transcendentalism threaten to evacuate all truths from 
actual existence, according to Badiou. Constructivism reduces truth to knowledge, 
while transcendentalism transposes truth to a mystical beyond. The generic, on the 
other hand, thinks the being of truth through the indiscernibility of the itinerant excess, 
and posits infinite yet immanent truths in and as holes in knowledge. 
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 Badiou's contention with Lacan peaks at this moment. Lacan conceives of truth 
as a hole in knowledge, but his antiphilosophy tends towards the transcendentalist 
temptation where the hole of truth remains merely indicative of a grand beyond and 
thus not susceptible to thinking. The generic supplement to the phallic function 
designates not only the hole of truth but also the procedure by which a truth gains 
actual existence. The generic thinks the realization of truths. A more nuanced 
appreciation of the presumed feminine character of the generic in Badiou's philosophy 
depends on a thorough extrapolation of the criticism Badiou raises in the aftermath of 
L'Être et l'événement. This criticism is anchored in an insistent trust in the modernity 
of the Cantorian discovery of the actual infinite and its implications. Badiou's criticism 
boils down to the opposition of structure and process. Lacan, in Badiou's view, does 
not escape the confines of structure, by which no real novelty is allowed to unfold, 
insofar as he locates the void in the subject as eclipsed in the signifying chain. Rather 
than thinking the subject as the void in structure, Badiou proffers the rare status of the 
subject in the wake of an event, and consigns to the subject the task of making the hole 
in knowledge that the event procures consist through the gradual deduction of its 
consequences in a continuous procedure of fidelity. The status of the feminine in 
Lacan and Badiou's works holds a key to the disentanglement of Badiou's traversal of 
Lacanian antiphilosophy and its implications for thinking the preconditions and 
possibilities of the subject of politics and radical change. 
 
 
A Paradoxical Denotation 
In L'Être et l'événement, Badiou denotes the generic set by the ancient astrological 
sign for Venus, ♀. Badiou does not say why he decides on that denotation, but leaves 
the question to his readers. Despite the widespread acknowledgement that it is Lacan's 
feminine logic of the non-all that is the reference here,219 the decision for this 




monumental.220 He hails it as the token of Badiou's recognition of the necessity to 
address the question of the universal from a feminine and feminist perspective. The 
choice in character signals that Badiou recognizes the necessity to give universalism 
its sexual mooring, Saldanha argues. He thus grieves its disappearance from the works 
of Badiou that follow after L'Être et l'événement.221 Monumental is a big word, but one 
does not have to disagree with Saldanha on these points. However, a closer reading of 
the construal of the feminine logic of the non-all and the generic set is required, as 
their relations are crucial in Lacan and Badiou's thinking, respectively, while not all 
clear. Saldanha is probably well aware that it is never the signifier in itself that renders 
the signifier monumental or not, but the so-called differential relations in which the 
signifier is poised, the position of the signifier in relation to the remaining structure. In 
the case of the character in question, ♀, the differential structure is stratified. First, 
there is the signifier within Badiou's meta-ontological edification of mathematics as 
ontology, where it denotes the generic multiple. Secondly, there is the meta-
ontological signifier with respect to its Lacanian forerunner, the feminine logic of the 
non-all.  
 My primary agenda concerns the ethical dimensions at stake in Badiou's 
traversal of the Lacanian framework. How does Badiou's traversal of the teachings of 
Lacan result in a reformulation of a theory of the subject and the possibilities of radical 
change? Badiou's decision to denote the generic set by the character ♀ is astonishing, 
perhaps, but it is not necessarily the feminine dress of the decision that is most 
striking. I aim to show that the signification of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian 
antiphilosophy and its implications for thinking radical change can be extracted from 
this single character. 
 Badiou informs his readers that if any category constitutes the emblem of his 
enterprise, it is neither the pure multiplicity nor the void – nor even the event – but the 
category of the generic.222 Beyond Marx' generic human being, Badiou extracts the 







continuum hypothesis is independent of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic. Cohen 
showed that not only the affirmation but also the negation of the continuum hypothesis 
would be coherent with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. According to Badiou, the 
category of the generic instigates not merely an intellectual topos, but a veritable 
intellectual revolution that renders truths and the subject accessible to thinking.223 As 
the emblem of Badiou's philosophical adventure in L'Être et l'événement, the generic is 
the principal concept allowing Badiou to elaborate his specific concepts of truths and 
the subject as post-evental occurrences of change and novelty.  
 It is not out of lack of an established tradition for denotation that Badiou 
decides to introduce the character ♀ to designate the generic multiple. In mathematical 
literature, Badiou remarks, the generic multiple is usually denoted as 'G' (for generic). 
The introduction of the old astrological sign in its place is made on a predilection that 
Badiou leaves his readers to discern.224 If it is true that Badiou's decision finds its 
recourse in Lacan's notion of the feminine logic of the non-all, then Badiou's decision 
is made in order to indicate a relation of similarity or even direct equivalence between 
his own conceptualization of the generic multiple and Lacan's feminine logic. The 
striking feature of his decision is its status of a double paradox. The emblem of 
Badiou's accomplishment, the sign of his breakthrough as an independent philosopher 
and his singular contribution to thinking modernity, is represented to his readers 
through however a subtle reference to the very theory that supposedly should have 
been traversed, whose traversal was supposed to constitute precisely the crucial 
movement of Badiou's accomplishment, the theory of Lacan. If Badiou's reformulation 
of truths and the subject goes beyond the Lacanian framework, au-delà Lacan, as 
Badiou claims they do, the most striking feature is precisely Badiou's decision to 
introduce the crucial moment in his reformulation of these concepts through an 
indication of convergence with one of Lacan's most renowned theoretical postulates, 
the feminine logic of the non-all.  
 Certainly, this paradox calls for interrogation, not only for its own sake or for 






antiphilosophy that it encompasses. Interrogation is also called for insofar as coming 
to terms with the traversal is prompt for anyone who aspires, as I do here, to an 
appreciation of the operations, conditions, and consequences involved in Badiou's 
interrogations into the preconditions and possibilities for thinking the subject of 
politics and radical change. To fathom how Badiou's philosophical works can be 
effective for thinking about these questions today, this paradox is decisive, as it goes 
to the heart of the relation between Badiou and Lacan. It constitutes a crux in Badiou's 
traversal of Lacan. 
 Badiou's thinking is no exception to the rule that nothing occurs in a vacuum, 
and also Copjec and Zupančič work in the continuation of Lacan. They argue 
concisely for how the Lacanian framework construes the specific problematic of 
modernity, where modernity is characterized by the decline of the master or the death 
of God, the fall of the instance of authority traditionally assigned to the father. This 
fall has repercussion for the ethical field, not only through the disappearance of 
traditional authorities and structures of oppression, but also through that which 
emerges in the unfilled space left behind after the evacuation of authority. Badiou, 
Copjec, and Zupančič are all critical of contemporary discourses of ethics that reduce 
the ethical question to the inviolable sanctity of the individual body, under the signs of 
human rights, the post-modern, or bare life. Contemporary discourses of ethics are the 
laissez-faire relativism of democratic materialism, to use Badiou's words, construed to 
secure the privileged of the status quo, servant to the continuation of a Western-
colonial-imperialist hegemony. Badiou, Copjec, and Zupančič alike consider the 
contemporary discourses as both unable and unwilling to address the possibilities of 
change and novelty.  
 Copjec and Zupančič's readings of Lacan highlight the position of sexual 
matters in the ethical question, as the foundations for another ethics that escapes the 
nostalgic return to the traditional authorities of old and sees beyond the vulnerabilities 
of the individual body. My interrogations discuss how Copjec and Zupančič have 
applied the feminine logic of the non-all to found another ethics, in order to see what 
the concept of the feminine non-all contains. I then turn to Badiou's criticism of 
Lacan's conceptualization of infinity and the feminine in the aftermath of L'Être et 
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l'événement, showing that Badiou's ethical thrust is also dependent on a confrontation 
with sexual matters. From Badiou's criticism, I return to the apparent paradox of the 
meta-ontological denotation for the generic set. A closer analysis of the significations 
surrounding the feminine denotation will bring to the fore both similarities and 
differences in how Lacan and Badiou conceive of being, truths, and the subject and, 
hence, of the preconditions and possibilities of radical change and true novelty. 
Lacan's notion of the feminine logic of the non-all is decisive for every attempt at a 
Lacanian ethics. The generic multiple is paramount in Badiou's dialectical conception 
of truths and the subject. It is the concept to provide their materialist underpinnings. 
My contention is that thinking the subject of politics and the possibilities of radical 
change requires an apprehension of the paradoxical confrontation between the 




Towards an Ethics of the Feminine; Against the Rights of Man 
In this section, I address the specificities of the feminine logic of the non-all in the 
teachings of Lacan, before turning to Badiou's concept of the generic and a 
comparison between the two. The issue in focus is how the feminine non-all can be 
utilized to think anew the preconditions of a subject and the possibilities of radical 
change. In psychoanalytic terms, the issue concerns how the feminine non-all provides 
a route to think beyond the oppressive structures of the phallus and the moral law of 
superego, as another ethics of the feminine, or another ethics of the real. The works of 
Copjec and Zupančič reformulate such another ethics on the basis of the feminine 
logic of the non-all. Their works present the essentials of Lacan's notion of the 
feminine non-all, but they also draw out the principal implications of the feminine 
non-all for thinking the preconditions of the subject and the possibilities of change 
anew. The main tenets of the feminine logic of the non-all in Lacan and its 
implications for another ethics reveal the shared ground of Lacan, Copjec, Zupančič, 
and Badiou. They are critical to the dominant trends in contemporary discourses on 
ethics focused on the rights of man and the rights of life. Their shared ground would 
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explain the reasons of Badiou's decision to denote the generic as feminine. But 
presenting the similarities of these projects also prepares for a closer interrogation of 
their dissimilarities, where Badiou raises a critical voice against the limitations of the 




Hole in the Other 
In her article "Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason", Copjec juxtaposes the Kantian 
antinomies of reason with the formulations of sexuation found in Lacan's twentieth 
seminar, Encore (1972-1973). Copjec's argument is directed against the modern 
sceptics that refuse sex to be anything but a bridled series of interpretations and 
negotiations enacted and repeated. Towards the end of her article, Copjec finally 
makes use of the opportunity to attack "the notorious argument that presents woman as 
constitutionally indisposed to developing a superego and thus susceptible to an ethical 
laxity."225 The notorious argument is known from Freud, where an anatomical factor, 
the lack of a penis, renders the young girl less disposed towards the veritable 
shattering of the Oedipus complex that the threat of castration occasions in the case of 
boys. Hence the adult woman is less disposed to the institution of a superego as 
inexorable, impersonal, and independent of its affective sources than men are. In her 
readings psychoanalysis, Copjec argues that the logic of exclusion as the cornerstone 
of the dynamic antinomies in Kant and the masculine logic of sexuation in Lacan. The 
logic of exclusion is formative also of the superego and the moral law, and Copjec 
suggests that the time to think the ethical anew, in other ways than through the 
definitions of the masculine logic of the superego, is ripe: "It is now time to devote 
some thought to developing an ethics of inclusion or of the unlimited, that is, an ethics 
proper to the woman."226 Copjec argues that the logic of the non-all is defining of the 
mathematical antinomies in Kant and the feminine logic of sexuation in Lacan. The 





she performs the initiatory steps towards such an ethics in her later book, Imagine 
there's no Woman; Ethics and Sublimation (2002). Her main operation is again that of 
a juxtaposition, but this time a juxtaposition that is internal to Lacan: Lacan's twentieth 
seminar, Encore, is interpreted as the reformulation of his seventh seminar, L'Éthique 
de la psychanalyse (1959-1960), and the feminine non-all of the twentieth seminar is 
reread through the lens that the figure of Antigone offers in the seventh.  
 There is a strong line running from Antigone as 'the guardian of criminal being' 
of the earlier seminar to the feminine as the guardian of the non-all of being of the 
later seminar, Copjec argues. 227  Antigone and the feminine non-all should be 
perceived as two versions of the same notion, namely, the satisfaction of the drive in 
and through sublimation. The concept of sublimation is central to Copjec's 
demonstration. Sublimation is wrested from its underdeveloped status in Freudian 
theory and given a new direction through Lacan. In Lacan, Copjec writes, 
"sublimation does not separate thought from sex, but rather from the supposed subject 
of knowledge, that is, from the Other. For, the satisfaction of the drive by sublimation 
testifies to the autonomy of the subject, her independence from the Other."228 Antigone 
is an exemplar of such an operation. By way of her unheard-of burial of her brother, 
the traitor-criminal Polyneices, Antigone "gives herself her own law and does not seek 
validation from any other authority."229 There are two points to be made in this regard. 
Firstly, Antigone's act separates her from the Other, here in the form of Creon's civil 
law. Creon's law is a paradigmatic demonstration of the function of the superego, 
desperately trying to impose and enforce a limitation and restriction on Antigone's 
ways and means of enjoyment. Secondly, Antigone's act testifies to the nonexistence 
of the Other, the fundamental lack of an ultimate foundation for the law, its radical 
inconsistency, its inherent contradiction and non-identity with itself. Antigone's act 









implications of Antigone's act can be seen in Suzanne Barnard's rendition of the 
feminine non-all. Barnard writes that the feminine non-all 
 
has a view to the contingency of the signifier of the Other in its anchoring function. 
This means that she has a relation to the Other such that she 'knows' that neither 
she nor it knows – in other words, she 'knows' that the signifier of phallic power 
merely lends a certain mysterious presence to the Law that veils its real 
impotence.231  
 
Contrary to Freud's description of women, the figure of Antigone and the feminine 
logic of the non-all do not come up short in face of the moral law. Rather, they come 
in excess, testifying to another jouissance besides the phallic one imposed by the 
superego and the masculine logic of exclusion and the exception.  
 Copjec is not alone in her pursuit of an ethics of the feminine. She follows in 
the line of Lacan, obviously, a Lacan that can be said to have opened for that which 
Saldanha has characterized as a distinct feminist strategy. The strategy is founded on 
the supposition that if a feminine subject formation does not enjoy a special let alone 
an exclusive access to the ethical domain, then there is at least another ethics that is to 
be conceived of as formally feminine. Saldanha mentions Zupančič and her Ethics of 
the Real; Kant and Lacan (2000) as another proponent of such a strategy. Zupančič 
does not thematize her contribution explicitly as an intervention into a specifically 
feminist corpus, as Copjec does. Saldanha nonetheless argues for Zupančič's feminist 
relevance insofar as she, in her reading of Kant and Lacan, discovers an uncanny Kant 
where an immeasurable feminine excess haunts the subject of freedom and forces its 














limitations and constraints of an ethics caught under the logic of the superegoic law, 
on the one hand, and how the plume of psychoanalysis functions to subvert traditional 
moral philosophy, on the other. The question is what the preconditions are for a shift 
from a masculine moral of the superego to another ethics of the feminine, or ethics of 
the real, and what such a shift implies for thinking about subjective constitution and 
radical change.  
 Freud was the first to equate the categorical imperative of Kant's moral law 
with his own superego, Zupančič observes. First of all, Freud's equation questions the 
attempt to base an ethics on non-pathological foundations. Secondly, it positions the 
ethical at the heart of civilization's discontents, potentially causing more harm than 
actual well-being or happiness.233 Through a dialectical interrogation of Kant's moral 
law, Zupančič shows how the moral law actually divides into two; the pure moral law 
of the categorical imperative splits into two different conceptual figures. On the one 
hand, there is the old law of the superego. On the other hand, there is "a law of the 
unknown,"234 as she designates it, borrowing a reference from Badiou.  
 Zupančič's crucial insight concerns how the categorical imperative itself is but a 
half-law, a mi-dire in Lacanian parlance. Formulated by the command to act as if the 
maxim of one's action should be willed as universal law, the imperative imposes itself 
in the form of an enigma as far as the contents of the act in question is concerned. It 
leaves the questions of which act and how to perform it unanswered. The categorical 
imperative will take on the form of an a-temporal or completed law only through the 
supplement of the subject's response to this enigma. In Lacanian parlance, the Other of 
the law is always already at lack, and to this lack there are two basic forms of 
response. A real ethics of the unknown would accept this predicament and 
acknowledge the subjective destitution it implies. A real ethics would accept that the 
subject decides "the destiny of its desire" in and through its response to the lack in the 
Other, "that it is only with his act that the subject creates what the Other (the Law) 








have been born"235 and thereby founds his family's ατὴ. Antigone, in her turn, shall all 
too willingly embrace this fate. The superego, on the contrary, imposes itself precisely 
in order for the subject to be relieved of having to respond at all. The superego leaves 
the response, the defining act of the subject, to another, namely to an Absolute Other 
that wants to know of no lack except the lack on the side of the subject. In the figure of 
the superego, the moral law is represented as already defined and completed. To the 
superego, the answer to the imperative enigma is already presented, if only negatively, 
in the proscriptive 'no' or the dismissive 'that's not it'. Through this negative certainty, 
the "subject finds in the superego a sort of 'practical guide' that at least gives her the 
clue that the best of all possible actions is always the one that makes you suffer the 
most."236 
 In its negative certainty, the superego can only inflict suffering upon its subject. 
The subject will never be able to live up to the superego's standards, precisely because 
of their strictly negative form. Zupančič suggests the names of "a heroism of the lack" 
or "a fidelity to a lost enjoyment" to designate the ethical aspects involved under the 
moral law.237 This is the conundrum that also Copjec inquires into when she refers to 
how "the superego renders something unsayable and undoable, to be sure, but it does 
not say what we should not say or do; it merely imposes a limit which makes 
everything we do and say seem as naught compared to what we cannot."238 As she 
observes of Creon, the external limits to his world that he in his superegoic character 
erects, "decompletes, empties out, all his endeavors, all his satisfactions, causing him 
to strive fruitlessly toward a goal he will never achieve."239 However, compared to the 
anxieties that haunt the destitute subject having to continuously decide on and define 
its own fate, the suffering under the yoke of the superego and its unrealizable 
commands, the tremors of fear and humility of never being neither all nor enough, 
comes as a relief. To reject the negative certainty offered through the moral law of the 
superego and to accept with certainty that the Other does not exists, is also, Zupančič 








structures that make the subject. To be relieved of the imposition to act is pacifying,240 
or, as Lacan notes of the psychoanalytic discovery, it is more convenient to suffer the 
interdiction than to incur castration.241 Jelica Šumič explains: 
 
the inexistence of the Other, contrary to what might be expected or hoped for, is 
not in and of itself a liberating factor for the subject, it is not experienced by the 
subject as liberation from the capture which the Other effects upon him/her. Quite 
the contrary: in the absence of the master signifier which would render a given 
situation 'readable', the subject remains a prisoner, not of the Other that exists, but 
of the inexistent Other, better put perhaps, of the inexistence of the Other.242 
 
While Creon might be frustrated in his failure to uphold the civil laws of Thebes, 
Antigone is ravaged by a painful madness of another kind, Copjec writes, "a wild 
tearing away from herself" that the audience are left only to imagine, at the beginning 
of the play, through a "messenger's report of [her] screeching, birdlike cries."243 It is 
the madness of the unconditional liberty of the subject's absolute destitution. 
 
 
Managing the Void 
Even if the figure of Antigone serves as a paradigm of the ethical act, Zupančič argues 
that Antigone's act nonetheless belongs to a period that has now been left behind: 
Antigone belongs to the era of classical ethics and not that of modernity. In order to 
grapple with the problem of a modern ethics, Zupančič therefore turns to another 
feminine figure, the heroine Sygne de Coûfontaine of Paul Claudel's L'Ôtage (1911), 
whom Lacan elaborates on in his eighth seminar, Le Transfert (1960-1961). Zupančič 
suggests that Antigone, in contrast to Coûfontaine, incarnates the symbolic phallus, 










not entirely escape the logic of exclusion. In Antigone, it is her own Thing that is 
turned into the exception that supports her existence. Coûfontaine, on the contrary, is a 
child of the modern insight of 'God is dead (the Other does not exist) and He knows it 
too'. She cannot sustain the position of exception. Rather, Zupančič argues, the figure 
of Coûfontaine displays the real of desire, the penis as real: "Not the φ which belongs 
to the imaginary, but the 'piece of meat' [...] as the real residue of castration [...], the 
small 'palpitating corpse' which is the Real of the Cause of desire."244 As a real 'piece 
of meat', Coûfontaine is reduced to refuse of her sexual being and subtracted from the 
symbolic structures of signification and imaginary evaluations. In Badiou's terms, 
Coûfontaine identifies with the in-difference of her simple belonging, the speck of 
flesh that is her indeterminable generic being. 
 On the surface, Zupančič's Coûfontaine might seem incompatible with Copjec's 
Antigone, but Copjec's conceptualization of sublimation points in a direction similar to 
that of the real of desire showcased by Zupančič. Lacan's definition of sublimation as 
the elevation of an ordinary object to the dignity of the Thing, Copjec argues, does not 
so much describe the idealization of the object pedestalled in the position of ultimate 
gratification. Sublimation rather concerns seeking "satisfaction from an ordinary 
object instead of waiting vainly for the arrival of the Thing."245 In sublimation, she 
writes, the object "becomes lovable precisely in its capacity to be other than it is," but 
this change cannot come about without a simultaneous change occurring in the subject 
as well, "by naming the obstacle that prevents her from coinciding with herself [...], 
that is, with her own capacity to be other than she is or, to put it differently, with the 
lack of any determining cause of her being or actions." 246  The transformation 
occurring in sublimation is to be found in the status of the Thing rather than in the 
object. It is the inaccessible Thing that loses some of its substantial allure rather than 
the ordinary object, perfectly attainable, that gains in mystique.  
 A parable might communicate the matters more clearly: sublimation as it is 
usually misunderstood, as a form of idealization of an ordinary object, follows the 






consequentially in property as an indication of the proletariat being the progressive 
class, would be viable to exclaim: 'Look, property relations are changing, I am also a 
share holder now!' True sublimation and the properly ethical stance of psychoanalysis 
would equal the realization that only a universalized lack of property can possibly ever 
be the destiny of the proletariat as the progressive class. That destiny can never be a 
question of a simple changing of the guards, a transaction of wealth and power from 
capitalist to socialist rule or from one phallic signifier to another (as in an 'anything-
he-can-do,-she-can-do-better' logic). It can only concern a leveling of the institutions 
of wealth and power as such.247 Zupančič writes of the drive that it is found at the 
moment when desire encounters its own cause among its other objects, when the very 
condition of desire turns out as just another product of the process that it conditions.248 
This is Coûfontaine's position when her only option for staying true to her desire is to 
give up on the very cause of her desire, the family or aristocratic honor that makes up 
her being. The encounter with the cause of desire as yet another object of desire goes 
for Copjec's sublimation as the satisfaction of the drive as well. The proletarian's 
predicament is similar if not strictly the same: to stay true to its cause, the progression 
of its class, the proletarian must sacrifice this cause, insofar as the only real victory of 
the proletariat is its own eradication as a class, the eradication of each and every class 
as such, through the realization of a classless society of radical equality under 
communism. The progression of the proletariat equals the realization of its proletariat 
identifications as nothing. 
 I do not insist on Copjec's Antigone and Zupančič's Coûfontaine as two 
representations of the same figure. To do so, would force their similarities to too great 
an extent, perhaps. I limit my commentary to the observation that both Copjec and 
Zupančič find a second coming of ethics necessary, and that they both turn to Lacan 
and his elaboration of the feminine as the frame in which such an ethics can be 









of the drive: the movement D'un Autre à l'autre as Lacan's sixteenth seminar (1968-
1969) is entitled; the movement de l'impuissance à l'impossible as it is rephrased in his 
seventeenth, L'Envers de la psychanalyse (1969-1970). 249  The movement from 
impotence (or inability) to impossibility is usually read as a communication of how 
one, instead of lamenting one's failure to fulfill the Other and its unceasing demands, 
should realize it as impossible. But it is precisely the equivocality of the word 'realize' 
that bespeaks the full significance of this movement. It is always a question of the 
movement from the regulations imposed by the phallic law, castration, and the reign of 
the superego to that of that other satisfaction that both must and cannot be, as Lacan 
formulates it in Encore. 250  It is always a question of the movement from the 
continuous search for an inaccessible satisfaction in the face of which the subject can 
only display its fundamental impotence or inability, to that other satisfaction in and by 
the impossible, the drive. Lacan's theorization of a feminine logic that comes to 
supplement the masculine one renders possible the venture to conceive of another 
ethical act. This other ethics is opposed to the moral law that, to quote Saldanha, "is in 
itself masculine not only because it is spoken by the father(s) but because it replays the 
traumatic separation from the maternal flesh."251 According to Zupančič, the main 
operation involved for both Antigone and Coûfontaine is the one through which the 
limits of desire itself is reached and finally breached. It is the moment of pure desire as 
"the limit where desire finds itself confronted with its own support, its own cause."252 
Upon the traversal of the cause of desire, one finds oneself surrounded by the drive, in 
proximity to the real Thing. This moment remains the same, even if Antigone 
sacrifices everything to this cause and Coûfontaine goes as far as sacrificing even this 
cause itself, and thereby instantiates the law on the same level, face to face, with that 
speck of dead flesh that is her. 
 The real question, however, is not of the hows and whats, but of the whys: Why 
has it become an urgent matter to develop a new ethics in this particular space and 







that offer themselves as viable solutions? In the formulation of these questions one can 
easily discern the implication that a simple gender balancing, a fifty-fifty division of 
the ethical faculty, does not constitute the main issue. It is not primarily a criticism of 
Freud's misogyny. The ante is upped, the stakes higher, the bets raised. Why is the 
contribution that the Lacanian framework brings to the ethical discourses of today 
perceived to be so precious?  
 After the decline of the master, modernity witnesses the reduction of the ethical 
to the feeble maxim that the worst thing one can lose is one's own life, Zupančič 
argues. She underlines that the problem with the contemporary elevation of life into 
the causa sui of the ethical is that it "lacks conceptual force and the power to 
mobilize."253 Copjec also targets the tendency of reducing the ethical to a question of 
"bare, bodily – or bestial – life."254 She observes this tendency in the ubiquitous 
proliferation of bio-politics and the 'modern life sciences', and argues that it 
contributes to the depletion of the value of life rather than its augmentation. Copjec 
does not so much target Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, say, for having 
identified the dominant states of the game; their work reveals important features of our 
contemporary situation. But she does question the ability of a critical assessment of the 
status quo to implement a call for change. The quandary of the current situation and 
the cause that necessitates a reformulation of the question of ethics and the ethical 
domain is not simply that the old morals of the masters and the paternal superego are 
unable to address these difficulties. More than that, these difficulties are due to the 
decline of the old masters and the evacuation of the moral space their disappearance 
has left behind. As Šumič formulates it, "the new regime of [modern] mastery, 
knowing no limit, no outside and therefore no exception, seems to annihilate the very 
possibility of a way out that would articulate the negation of the present with the 
creation of an alternative to that which exists."255 The problem was pressing already to 
Kant, to whom, as Lacan notes, Newtonian physics and the Enlightenment attack on 






domain.256 Another ethics is warranted, in order for modernity to manage this void left 
behind after the evacuation of God – manage it, that is, rather than filling it up or 
simply evading it. 
 Copjec and Zupančič argue that none has offered a more lengthy, elaborate, and 
rich an analysis of the modern conundrum than Lacan has. First, they claim, Lacan 
pinpointed the function of the master and the master discourse with precision, and 
then, at the master's fall, he delineated the topologies of the void that surfaced thereby, 
as well as the implications of the resurfaced void in and for the subject. Thus, to 
Copjec, the psychoanalytic teachings of Lacan constitutes "the mother tongue of our 
modernity,"257 the only language through which the important issues of our time can 
be articulated and affronted. The clause of the finite body that dominates 
contemporary discourses of ethics effectuates an eradication of the proper ethical 
space, the space of the radically subjective act, and, Copjec insists, it is only the 
revolutionary rethinking of the body that psychoanalysis has to offer in its definition of 
sexual being as non-all that is capable of advancing an exit from this contemporary 
predicament.  
 It is in the psychoanalytical rethinking of the body and sexual being Copjec 
discovers that which she designates, with a formulation borrowed from Badiou, as a 
"secularized notion of infinity."258 Only a secularized infinity can break the barrier of 
transcendence that death now imposes upon life, she claims. For Zupančič, the concept 
of the real of jouissance is that which allows for an escape from the contemporary 
quagmire. She sees an equivalent to the real of jouissance in Badiou's concept of the 
event.259 Zupančič also borrows the concept of 'a law of the unknown' from Badiou in 
order to indicate an alternative to the law of the superego. References to Badiou 
reappear again at crucial points in her elaboration of the ethical act of Coûfontaine, 










where the subject creates itself through the act in question, "there is no 'hero' of the 
act." 260  The recurrence of Badiou's name at decisive moments in Copjec and 
Zupančič's reasoning is no more intriguing than it is accidental. Badiou's philosophical 
works constitute an on-going confrontation with a similar complex of problems as the 
one Zupančič and Copjec wrestle with, a continuous effort to make "un pas de plus" 
into modernity.261 Badiou has argued extensively against the pervasiveness of a certain 
ethics of human rights or the rights of man, most notably is his L'Éthique. Isolating the 
core of such an ethics as the rights of the living against offenses and maltreatments to 
their lives and bodies, where a human is conceived as one that is able to recognize 
itself as a victim, Badiou first identifies its underlying colonialist and imperialist 
credentials. Badiou then goes on to analyze how its very structure impedes and 
opposes the mobilization for a positive idea or cause: every mobilization for a positive 
good will potentially threaten the material safety of the status quo, by which threat 
such a mobilization is automatically perceived as revelatory of an inherent evil 
propensity. He concludes that an ethics of the rights of man comes at the price of a 
strict conservatism, imposed in order to secure the foundation in basically racialist 
biologism (life) and no less colonialist Occidentalism (wealth) on which the rights in 
question rest: in the end, it is for the conservation of the life of the white man and the 
protection of Western values that the discourse of contemporary ethics is construed.262 
As such, Badiou argues, there is never an issue of an ethics in any real sense of the 
term at stake in the discourses on human rights and the rights of the living. Rather it is 
a matter of a complacent nihilism, an eu-oudenousis,263 at the hands of which an 
evacuation of all proper ethical thinking – or all thinking proper tout court – is 
ventured, if not accomplished. But if Badiou shares with Copjec and Zupančič a basic 
concern for the status of ethics today, he does not share in their celebration of Lacan 
and the feminine logic of the non-all as already holding the key. Badiou shares their 








father, the evacuation of the One. But if Lacan does not fill up or avoid the void, there 




Along the Circuit of the Drive; In View of the Cantorian Paradise 
The last section sketched up the main tenets of the Lacanian approach to another ethics 
beyond the confines of the law, tenets shared to some extent by Badiou. In this section, 
I focus on the differences between the Lacanian approach and Badiou's project, in 
order to interrogate how Badiou construes the shortcomings of the Lacanian 
framework and how Badiou conceives of the implications of Lacan's shortcomings as 
impeding the possibilities for thinking about change. The feminine logic of the non-all 
constitutes the crux of the Lacanian approach to modernity's predicament in ethics, 
and thereby also to the questions of change. Badiou criticizes Lacan's notion of the 
feminine non-all on account of its shortcomings in face of modernity, where Lacan 
fails to assume the full lessons of Cantor's actual infinite. Lacan conceives of the non-
all through a romantic notion of the infinite that subjects the infinite to finitude, and 
the feminine to the phallus. Badiou's criticism of Lacan underscores the paradox of his 
decision to denote the generic multiple by reference to the feminine non-all. An 
interrogation of Badiou's criticism thereby prepares for a further analysis of the 
possible routes to a resolution of the paradox and of how Badiou, through the 
denotation of the generic multiple, proceeds to think the preconditions and possibilities 
of radical change beyond Lacan, in a materialist dialectic tying being, truths, and the 




Copjec makes mention of Badiou in her treatise on an ethics of the feminine. She 
wishes to extract from Badiou's call for a secularized and modern notion of infinity a 
possible support for the reformulation of the body that Lacan's notion of the feminine 
logic of the non-all, as another name of being, in her view institutes. However, it is on 
	 115	
this precise point that Badiou has raised a decisive objection against Lacan, through 
several of his interventions in Conditions (1992). The infinite that Lacan refers to in 
his elaborations on the feminine logic of the non-all is neither truly modern nor truly 
secularized, Badiou contends. It remains caught up in the romantic heritage of finitude 
that still lay hold on contemporary thought and binds it in a bias of an essentially 
religious or mythical character. Badiou's objection might come as a surprise, all the 
time the feminine logic of the non-all is considered as not only the crown of Lacan's 
conceptual creations – one if not the high peak of his 25 years of seminars – but also at 
forefront in the theoretical elaborations of and on our times in general.   
 Similarly, Zupančič elaborates on how the beyond of the superegoic 'heroism of 
the lack' makes up the true gist of Lacan's teachings. When Zupančič argues that the 
last words on Lacan are not found in the readings where "the accent is placed on the 
lack and in which the impossible is identified with the inaccessible," the readings that 
insist on "the primordial act of renunciation, enjoyment as impossible, and the end of 
analysis as the moment when the analysand must assume symbolic castration and 
accept a fundamental or constitutive lack (or loss),"264 she proposes an alternative 
reading of Lacan to which Badiou remains more reluctant to give in to. Badiou is 
hesitant as to whether or not Lacan in fact evades the strictly inaccessible status of the 
infinite. Zupančič formulates the ethics of psychoanalysis as the problem of the 
infinite, not in the sense that it is unattainable and inaccessible, but rather because "it 
is impossible for us to escape it completely," because "the infinite ceaselessly 
'parasitizes' the finite," and, under the name of jouissance, constitutes "a stain that 
ceaselessly pursues us."265 Badiou does not only question Lacan's ability to break free 
from the notion of the infinite's inaccessibility. He also questions Lacan's ability to 
fully realize the stain of the infinite, its itinerant excess, as something not to be 
refused.  
 Copjec readily perceives Lacanian psychoanalysis as the only discursive 
apparatus to date that is able to address the challenges posed by modernity. She 





Badiou's objection could at first glance seem to state the opposite, as if the non-all 
were to be of no avail, as if the non-all was that which prevented a proper grasp of the 
pressing issues of the times, but that would be a too hasty conclusion. Rather, the 
feminine non-all is more like a Moses catching his first and last glimpse of Palestine: it 
will carry only so far and not further, but the Nile delta and the forty years of deserts 
have been left behind, all the same. The difference between Copjec and Badiou's take 
on Lacan's conceptualization of the feminine logic of the non-all rests more in a 
perspectival shift than a categorical opposition. Copjec sees the feminine logic of the 
non-all as a solution to the conundrums of thinking modernity. Badiou sees it as a 
problem thereto, but a problem precisely because it is located at the crux of the 
conundrum in question, because it knots together the threads of which any thinking 
modernity proper must be spun, once its threads have been unknotted. To Badiou, the 
Lacanian notion of the feminine non-all presents a paradigmatic framework for 
thinking modernity, but one that fails to properly realize the full potential of this 
thinking itself.  
 This is Badiou's point in "La Vérité: forçage et innommable." He proposes that 
the tortuous dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Lacan constitutes the limit, and 
thus the real, of psychoanalytic thought. The tortuous dialectic of the finite and the 
infinite is at the limit of that which psychoanalysis is capable to think. In "Sujet et 
Infini", Badiou admits that he is willing to follow his master Lacan only to the point – 
indicated by the latter – where the exceeding of the teachings of Lacan becomes 
expedient.266 At this point, the generic multiple returns in Badiou's objections. In 
contrast to its formulation in L'Être et l'événement, where the generic multiple is 
denoted with the astrological sign of the feminine, the generic is now inscribed as a 
function at a certain distance from the feminine non-all. Badiou's criticism of Lacan is 
lodged in this no-man's-land between the generic and the feminine non-all, and a brief 
recuperation of its main moments is required in order to appreciate the paradox behind 
Badiou's denotation of the generic set as feminine. It is necessary, also, in order to 





implications for thinking the predicaments of the subject and change under Cantorian 
modernity.  
 Lacan remains pre-Cantorian, Badiou argues in "Sujet et Infini", insofar as the 
Lacanian edifice lacks a proper appreciation of the actual infinite.267 In Lacan, the 
infinite is not admitted an existential affirmation. It remains in the function of an 
imaginary object, a myth or a fiction that serves merely as an inaccessible limit for the 
indefinite succession of the finite field. As Oliver Feltham has observed, "[w]e know 
from Badiou's own exegesis of the axiom of infinity that an endless succession of 
finite ordinal sets is not sufficient to constitute an infinite set: one must declare the 
existence of an infinite set within which that succession unfolds."268 One must declare 
the existence of a first limit ordinal, ω, itself not an immediate successor. A second 
existential signet is thus needed, as Badiou formulates it.269 A first limit ordinal does 
not immediately follow on any successor ordinal, but is equally far from each and 
every preceding number in the natural numbers series. The first limit ordinal 
constitutes, by decision, the first infinite number: It functions as the space in which the 
indefinite succession of finite natural numbers is lodged. But such a decision, Badiou 
claims, is lacking in Lacan. In Lacan, there is only a concept of the infinite inasmuch 
as it is considered as an operational inaccessibility, considered, that is to say, from 
within the succession of the finite numbers.270 The accusation is severe. The crux of it 
concerns a reduction of the infinite to a mere mode of the finite at the hands of Lacan, 
as if he were to evoke the infinite only to immediately revoke it again. Lacan's 
invocations of Cantor and the actual infinite never amount to more than a detour in 
order to return again to the theme of finitude, Badiou contends. He raises the same 
accusation against Hegel's spurious infinite. Whence the exceeding of a limit is 













being than the interior of this limit itself. Rather than 'infinitizing' the finite, it is the 
infinite that becomes 'finitized'. More precisely, in a description that Badiou finds 
effective, "l'infini n'est que le vide où opère la répétition du fini."271 As far as Lacan's 
notion of the feminine logic of the non-all is concerned, Badiou writes, it is dressed up 
as infinite only to serve as a beneficial fiction to limit and prop up a finite conception 
of the subject and its phallic jouissance.272  
 The same objection against Lacan underscores the crucial movement in "La 
Vérité: forçage et innommable." Badiou addresses the infinite yet immanent status of 
truths, and pauses at Lacan's reluctance to qualify non-denumerable transfinite 
cardinals as anything but mystical. He identifies Lacan's reluctance as one among 
several expressions of a hesitation on Lacan's part to definitely break with the resigned 
contemplation that characterize the contemporary hermeneutics of finitude.273 Without 
the decision for an existing limit ordinal, there is no way to arrive at the multiple 
infinities of infinities of the so-called Cantorian paradise. Lacan's temptation of 
knotting together the feminine, the infinite, and the unsayable under the figure of the 
ecstatic mystic expresses a purely cultural theme that have yet to undergo the radical 
test of the ideal of the matheme, Badiou writes.274 In "Sujet et Infini", Badiou rebukes 
the assumption of a privileged connection between the feminine and the divine as a 
misconception caused by the mythical status ascribed to the inaccessibility of the 
infinite.275 
 The mythical status of the infinite in Lacan deprives the infinite of its existence. 
Against its mythical status, Badiou recognizes the real status of non-denumerable 
cardinal numbers as the only way to proceed into the field of infinite truths, into the 















affirmation of its existence constitute the true albeit hidden countercurrent of 
modernity, a countercurrent it is high time to acclaim conscientiously as one's own. 
The full affirmative force contained in the axiomatic decision on the existence of the 
infinite remains to be uncovered by Lacan. To fully endorse the modernity of Cantor's 
discovery, Badiou concludes, it is necessary to modify the Lacanian dispositive in two 
fundamental ways: first by way of supplementing the phallic function with a generic 
function of humanity, and secondly – intricately entwined with the notion of the 
generic – by way of another conception of the Two, where the Two, as he writes, 
"surgit par effraction de l'Un, effraction qui porte aussitôt, sans médiation, à 
l'infini."276 Combined, the two modifications of Lacan by the generic multiple and the 
Two as the fracture of the One add up to a conception of truths as infinite yet 
immanent to a situation. An event divides a situation and its hole provides the material 
underpinnings for a truth as an infinite generic procedure under the fidelity of a 
subject. The generic will be addressed in due time. But to see how Lacan and the 
feminine non-all come up short of the generic and the Two, one must see how Lacan's 


























 "Sujet et infini" is the text in which Badiou elaborates most extensively on the 
faults that render Lacan's conceptualization of the feminine logic of the non-all 
problematic in regard to the infinite. Badiou turns to a passage from Encore where 
Lacan is stressing the peculiarity of the negation at stake in the feminine non-all 
(~∀𝑥.Φ𝑥, or, non-all is under the phallic function). The non-all negation is not to be 
read extensively and in accordance with a classical Aristotelian logic, so as to imply an 
affirmation of a particular negative existence (∃𝑥.~Φ𝑥, or, there exists at least one 
that is not under the phallic function). Rather it reads as the designation of an 
undetermined existence that is neither fully affirmed nor fully denied by the phallic 
function. The feminine non-all neither fully affirms nor fully denies the operation of 
castration. The notion of the infinite enables Lacan to wrest himself from the confines 
of classical logic and the particularizing effects of the negated universal. The 
introduction of an infinite set, Lacan argues, will render the implication of existence as 
following on a universal negation untenable.277 As Badiou explains, 
 
la jouissance phallique, circonscrite et finie, se soutient du pour-tout, il y a le 
pourtour de son pour-tout. Mais le supplément féminin n'est pas fini, il ne 
complémente pas la première jouissance comme un ensemble déterminé. Il est sans 
pourtour: il n'y a pas de pourtour de pas-tout. Et voilà pourquoi il n'inclut aucune 
existence qui procéderait de la négation de la première jouissance.278 
 
And, he continues, 
 
l'infini est ici une puissance de dissymétrie. Le rapport impossible du pour-tout de 
l'homme et du pas-tout féminin s'inscrit dans la division de la jouissance: aucune ne 
peut se réaliser comme négation de l'autre, parce qu'en vérité l'infini n'est 









jouissance du pas-tout féminin est proprement l'infinité inaccessible où se 
détermine la jouissance castrée.279 
 
Everything depends on the inaccessible status of the infinite, but to Lacan, Badiou 
insists, there is no need for an inaccessible infinite actually existing. For Lacan's 
conceptualization of the feminine logic of the non-all, it suffices that the infinite is 
operative merely as an inaccessible point, a virtual point subtracted from the 
operations and actions of the finite series.280   
 Badiou criticizes Lacan for juggling contradictory mathematical practices in his 
conceptualization of the feminine non-all, but it is mainly to Lacan's reformulation of 
the function of inaccessibility that he directs his attention. In this connection, he quotes 
at length from Lacan's seminar XIX, ...ou pire (1971-1972), and its dispositions on 
inaccessibility and the conception of the Two: 
 
Définissons-la [l'accessibilité] de ceci qu'un nombre est accessible de pouvoir être 
produit, soit comme somme, soit comme exponentiation des nombres qui sont plus 
petits que lui. A ce titre, le début des nombres se confirme de n'être pas accessible 
et très précisément jusqu'à 2. La chose nous intéresse tout spécialement quant à ce 
2, puisque le rapport de l'1 à 0, j'ai suffisamment souligné que l'1 s'engendre de ce 
que le 0 marque le manque. Avec 0 et 1, que vous les additionniez ou que vous les 
mettiez l'un à l'autre, voire l'un à lui-même, dans une relation exponentielle, jamais 
le 2 ne s'atteint. Le nombre 2, au sens où je viens de le poser, qu'il puisse d'une 
sommation ou d'une exponentiation s'engendrer des nombres plus petits, ce test 
s'avère négatif: il n'y a pas de 2 qui s'engendre au moyen du 1 et du 0. [/] Une 
remarque de Gödel est ici éclairante, c'est très précisément que l'aleph zéro, ω, à 
savoir l'infini actuel, est ce qui se trouve réaliser le même cas alors que pout tout ce 
qu'il en est des nombres entiers à partir de 2 – commencez à 3: 3 se fait avec 1 et 2, 












un nombre qui ne puisse se réaliser par une de ces deux opérations à partir des 
nombres plus petits que lui. C'est précisément ce qui fait défaut et ce en quoi, au 
niveau de l'aleph 0, se reproduit cette faille que j'appelle de l'inaccessibilité.281 
 
Badiou's objections are reducible to two points. Firstly, Lacan misconstrues the 
function of inaccessibility and the actual infinite as a fault within the operations of 
addition and exponentiation. Lacan construes inaccessibility and the infinite as caused 
by a fault in the operational law rather than as a exceeding of the law and, thus, 
dependent upon the explicit decision of an axiom. Secondly, there is a curious short 
circuit on Lacan's part as far as the status of the number 2 is concerned. Lacan 
conceives of the number 2 as inaccessible, and thereby also as infinite by definition. 
Badiou is willing to grant him neither, referring simply to the basic operation of 
arithmetic, the operation of 1+1. In general, Lacan's lapsus in conceiving of the 
infinite entails an effective refusal of its status as actual. It refers the infinite to a mode 
of the finite, as its point of inaccessibility. The infinite is only ever approached from 
within the finite domain, as a fault therein. The question concerns the implications of 
Lacan's lapsus for how the Lacanian framework also comes up short in conceiving of 

























It is as symptoms that the misprisions of the inaccessible and actual infinite on Lacan's 
part are of interest to Badiou. Badiou is quick to identify the real motivation behind 
Lacan's lapsus in the subject split by the signifier, eclipsed in the gap between S1 and 
S2 and the metonymic chain of desire, on the one hand, and the bipartition of sexual 
difference in human being, on the other. If the inaccessible were to be encountered 
already in the number 2, it would have the structure of a fault in the law, as the point 
where the law undermines itself. It would also provide the mathematical formulation 
of the sexual non-relation and the inaccessibility of the other jouissance. Besides the 
fact that the number 2 is neither infinite nor inaccessible, there is only one problem, 
Badiou writes: If it were to be the case that the gap between the signifiers in the 
signifying chain provided an inaccessible infinite, the signifying chain and castration 
would be as constitutive of the other jouissance indicated by the feminine logic of the 
non-all as it already is of phallic jouissance. Thus there would be no real distinction to 
mark the movement between drive and desire, and "la jouissance féminine reste[rait] 
homogène à la structuration primordiale du désir."282 In this way, the infinite evoked to 
indicate sexual difference would remain commensurable to the finite and phallic 
structure of desire and of the subject, such as these are articulated in the signifying 
chain.  
 An objection against Badiou's analysis could potentially be raised at this point. 
Might not Badiou be too tied up in the purely mathematical conditions of his 
arguments, to the extent that he lets a mistake in the dissemination of the number 
series determine the outcome of a discourse that is strictly speaking not a discourse on 
mathematical calculus? In focusing exclusively on the mathematical aspects of Lacan's 
conceptualization of the feminine logic of the non-all, does Badiou not risk losing 
sight of Lacan's aim, an aim to which the recourse to mathematics is but one among 
several supportive measures? Even if Badiou is correct in identifying a fault in Lacan's 
mathematical reasoning that renders the infinite a mere mode of the finite, does not the 





and the signifying chain of the phallic one, which Badiou concludes to be the 
necessary implication of this fault, amount to an unacceptably coarse and willed 
misreading of what Lacan is aiming at? The difference between Badiou and Copjec's 
appreciation of the status of the feminine non-all concerns the presumed infinite 
character of the drive. Badiou rejects that is carries an infinite character, whereas 
Copjec endorses that it does. But surely the move from a rejection of this infinity on 
the basis of its pre-Cantorian and spurious conception in Lacan to the direct reduction 
of the drive to desire is too quick a move. Does Badiou not fail to appreciate the 
context in which the question of infinity is raised in Lacan?  
 Badiou's willed misreading might not be as coarse as it first appears. A 
memorable consequence follows from Lacan's mathematical mishap, Badiou suggests, 
the consequence by which 
 
la seconde jouissance, la jouissance féminine, ne se supposant que de l'infini 
comme inaccessible, serait jouissance du sujet pur, du sujet clivé comme tel, 
puisque c'est au point de la faille entre ses signifiants primordiaux que s'établit 
l'inaccessible. Le caractère indicible de cette jouissance ne serait rien d'autre que la 
toujours tacite éclipse du sujet dans l'intervalle de ce qui le représente. A la 
question lancinante 'que veut une femme?' on pourrait répondre: jouir de la forme 
pure, de la forme nue de ce sujet qu'elle est.283 
 
This passage can be read both as a mocking pastiche and as a sincere extrapolation on 
a consequence of Lacan's mathematical mishap. Either way, the definition of feminine 
jouissance thus provided shares in several similarities with the operations described by 
Copjec and Zupančič concerning the drive and its satisfaction in sublimation. It is by 
the repetitive nature of the drive, "only between the first and the second time, or, 










between these two movements that psychoanalysis locates the subject,"284 Copjec 
notes. Two questions should be posed at this point: First, does not the statement that a 
woman wants to enjoy the pure and naked form of the divided subject that she is 
comprise but another formulation of the drive understood as the moment when desire 
encounters its own cause, the moment of pure desire as desire's own limit? And 
second, does not a subject poised in its pure division, enjoying its own eclipse in the 
signifying chain, equal a subject to whom the nonexistence or lack in and of the Other 
never stops imposing itself, a subject to whom its own constitution as a subject must 
continuously be repeated, and to whom its own constitutive determinant, in Lacanian 
parlance, does not stop not writing itself?285 In short, does not the pure subject of 
Badiou's willed misreading comprise the destitute subjects of the ethical act in Copjec 
and Zupančič? 
 An affirmative response to this question (yes, the pure subject in Badiou's 
misreading comprise the destitute subjects of Copjec and Zupančič) does not 
invalidate Badiou's conclusion that the supposed inaccessibility of the number 2 
implies a commensurability of the signifying chain and the other jouissance, a 
conflation of desire and the drive. A contrario, Badiou's conclusion is very much 
confirmed by such a response, with the small revision that it is confirmed in the 
reverse. Rather than the drive becoming desire, it is desire that turns to drive, at the 
point where desire comes face to face with itself. This is also the definition of 
sublimation Copjec defends, where it is not so much a question of the regular object 
elevated into a Thing as the Thing turning to a regular object. By targeting a 
mathematical mishap in Lacan's reasoning, Badiou, apparently unbeknown and against 
himself, provides an exact representation of that moment when desire encounters its 
own cause among its other objects, an exact representation of the movements involved 
in the Lacanian ethics of the act.  
 To give this reading its proper paranoid-hallucinatory twist, one could even 
argue that Badiou himself repeats the same movement in question, insofar as he 






the very same: at the point where the fault in the Lacanian argument was supposed to 
reveal the inconsistencies of this argument, as its full consequences was to be 
unleashed, the inconsistencies of the argument instead reveal themselves to be the very 
apogee of the argument as such – that is to say, but in the negative, that the condition 
turns out as just another product of the process that it conditions. 
 The extremes of this last twist are not required, however. It is perfectly possible 
to argue that the point that escapes Badiou in his biased focus on the mathematical 
conditions of Lacan's late teaching is the Other side, l'Envers, of this teaching itself: 
the analyst and the master are distinguished by a mere half turn of the squared wheel 
of discourses, and to any one position there is always a flip side to be rendered through 
another turn of the screw. There is always an inverse or obverse, so that if castration 
and phallic desire reign supreme in the chain of signifiers, it is still through this very 
reign itself that its own overturning is offered. The drive and the other jouissance may 
find an opening to intervene at the moment the phallic reign is made to close back in 
on itself. Lacan's many recourses to the topological properties of the Möbius strip, the 
Klein bottle, the Bishop's hat or the cross-cap – the so-called first chapter of Lacanian 
topology – all concern such spaces of involution. 286  Penney writes of Lacan's 
distinction of desire and drive, by way of the Möbius strip, that each concept refers to 
one of the strip's two sides. While blending into each other, desire and drive never 
meet in their pure form. Pure desire nonetheless corresponds to an experience of the 
drive, and vice versa.287  The drive and desire are not the simple reverse of each other, 
as if the drive was the end of desire or desire the well of the drive. Rather, there are 
operations of involution involved in these movements from desire to drive, from 
impotence to impossibility, from an Other to the other, through which a failure in 
satisfaction transforms into a satisfaction in failure. However, if one does propose that 
Badiou, in his mathematical bias, misses out on the full extent of such an Other side of 
Lacan's teaching, one should also be careful not to miss out on Badiou's own and 
proper point. Hallward formulates this point as the question of "the liberation of truth 






pursuit of inarticulate jouissance."288 The turns of the analytical screws of discourses 
do not solve the dispute concerning the mythical-imaginary versus real status of the 
infinite in Lacan on which Badiou and Copjec disagree.  
 In view of the Cantorian invention, Badiou objects, the Möbius topologies 
cannot suffice to counter the accusation of a 'finitization' of the infinite directed at 
Lacan. The recurrent gestures of reversal and the operations of involution in the 
Lacanian edifice do not amount to so many acts of 'infinitizing' the finite. Badiou's 
discussions on the good and bad infinities of Hegel presents a number of striking 
similarities with the Lacanian notions of the drive and desire respectively, although 
Badiou does not make the comparisons himself. The Hegel/Lacan comparison is 
common in Žižek, however. Žižek equates the move from Kant to Hegel, as the move 
from a fault in our subjective faculties to an objective fault as such, with the move 
from desire to the drive, as the move from "lost object to loss itself as an object," as 
the move "to directly enact the 'loss' – the gap, cut, distance – itself."289 If desire is 
characterized by its metonymic movement towards an inaccessible limit, and thereby 
follows the logic of Hegel's bad or spurious infinite, the twisted circuit of the drive 
could be argued to constitute but another repetition of the Hegelian position, namely 
the so-called good infinite, whose fundamental characteristic is identified by Badiou as 
"le répétitionnel de la répétition."290 But any indefinite series of failed satisfactions in 
desire does not turn infinite by way of an endless circulation of satisfactory failures in 
the drive. No more than Hegel will Lacan be able to escape the demand for a second 
existential signet, the axiomatic break of a decision, to be in place before any infinity 
can be granted actual existence. The notion of a fundamental unity of being, of a 
certain continuity between the finite and the infinite, where the one evolves more or 
less smoothly into the other, is at the root of the romanticism of which both Hegel and 










the decisive 'pure disjunction' of the axiom that alone can grant the infinite existence. 
If that is the case, then Badiou's decision to utilize a Lacanian reference to denote the 
generic multiple as the being of infinite truths is more than strange. In order to come to 
terms with the full significance of the character ♀, and how it fits in Badiou's call for a 
traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and its implications for thinking the 
preconditions of the subject and the possibilities of radical change, an analysis of the 
meta-ontological context of L'Être et l'événement, in which the generic multiple's 




Thinking Modernity; How to Posit a Generic Egg 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have interrogated the paradox behind 
Badiou's denotation of the generic multiple by first elaborating on how Lacan's notion 
of the feminine non-all provides the framework for another ethics beyond the 
oppressive moral law, and then how Badiou criticizes Lacan's notion of the feminine 
for its failure to assume the modernity implied in Cantor's actual infinite. Badiou calls 
for a supplementation of Lacan with the function of the generic and a concept of the 
immanent Two. In this section, I will bring Lacan and Badiou together in addressing 
the paradoxical denotation in its own terms, as it is presented in L'Être et l'événement. 
In coming to terms with the mechanisms behind the denotation, a better understanding 
of how Badiou conceives of the preconditions and possibilities for the subject and 
radical change after Lacan is possible. The questions are how Lacan's failure to grasp 
the infinite precludes an apprehension of how change and novelty might come about, 
and how Badiou conceives of the actual infinite to prepare a notion of truths as 
processes of radical change. How does the Cantorian discovery of the actual infinite 








does Badiou conceive of his own philosophical works as a continuation from the point 
where the Lacanian framework comes up short in addressing these challenges? To 
Badiou, thinking modernity is thinking infinite yet immanent truths through the 
itinerant excess of representation over presentation. Lacan's notion of the inaccessible 
infinite precludes the immanence of truths, and tends towards a transcendentalist 
fixation of the itinerant excess in a transcendent other, whereas the generic assumes 
the itinerant excess and admits an immanent truth as the indiscernible of a situation. 
An analysis of the paradoxical denotation of the generic as feminine illuminates the 
significance of the itinerant excess, I argue, insofar as the generic multiple itself 
divides into two. The feminine reference is reserved for a primary indiscernible as the 
non-designation of an event, whereas Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy is 
captured by a secondary effective indiscernible as the generic multiple proper of a 
generic extension, a truth process of subjective fidelity. Through my reading for the 
paradoxical denotation of the generic, in light of Badiou's criticism of Lacan's notion 
of an inaccessible infinite, I argue that Badiou's divided conception of the generic 
multiple reveals a continuous strand of criticism directed at Lacan, even where this 
criticism is not articulated as such. The fundamental questions concern the function of 
the feminine other in Badiou's elaborations of the possibilities of actual change to 
occur within a concrete situation, and also for the significance of Badiou's ethics of 
continuation, of truths as subjective processes of continuous change. 
 
 
Scylla and Charybdis 
The crux of Badiou's contention with Lacan is not to be found in his correctional 
advance on Lacan's mathematical mishap as such. It is as symptoms of another cause 
that Lacan's mishap is addressed. It concerns the immanent yet infinite status of truths, 
and, as such, it concerns the corner stone of Badiou's philosophical edifice. To Badiou, 
a truth is always a truth in and of a situation, while all the same remaining infinite.292 





question in critical philosophy today, the question of transmission, as it raised in and 
by the encounter between the infinite and the finite.293 It is the question of establishing 
a genuine connection between the infinite and the finite, Hallward notes.294 A different 
intonation can highlight the topological aspects of the problematic: a truth is that 
which must be homogeneous to a situation while simultaneously remaining 
heterogeneous to the same. Thus the crucial question to confront Badiou's philosophy 
and the traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy with is how to maintain the infinite yet 
immanent status of truths without falling into either of two traps, neither 
constructivism nor transcendentalism. In other words, how is it possible to affirm the 
infinite yet immanent status of truths, while neither reducing truths to just another 
subset of knowledge, the encyclopedia of the situation, nor giving up truths as a 
transcendental and unutterable mystery? In Badiou's meta-ontology of being and 
event, the concept of the generic designates the narrow path to avoid both pitfalls.  
 That a truth should be infinite, Badiou explains, is only objectionable to a 
meditation on finitude to the extent that truths should also remain immanent. The 
infinite status of truths is only objectionable from the side through which a truth 
touches on the real, as the impasse of formalization. An infinite truth is precluded from 
the constructivist plot insofar as it cannot be constructed; it remains inaccessible from 
within the initial, finite domain. But were an infinite truth to be thought of as 
transcendent or 'supra-real', Badiou writes, the thought of truths could just as easily 
dispose of the entire question of its subjective integration onto another sphere, the 
finite one, as eternally separated from infinite truth itself.295 Truths would rest easy in 
the name of God or some equivalent figure of an absolute Other, and not be of concern 
to subjects of the finite world.  
 The immanence of truths touches upon the real, in opposition to the 
transcendence of the supra-real, in which no such touching is implied. What is 'real' 
here? It is the real of being that is brought to the fore. It is the real of pure and 
unbound being as inconsistent multiplicities of multiplicities. If inconsistent 






inconsistent multiplicity all the same returns, as an insistent existence, in the 
immeasurable excess of subsets over sets, inclusion over belonging, representation 
over presentation, state over situation. Pure and unbound being as inconsistent 
multiplicity returns as the itinerant excess that separates the first infinite number, ω0, 
the domain of finite numbers, from the set of its subsets, its power set, p(ω0).296 To this 
itinerant excess separating the first infinite number (the first limit ordinal) from the 
other infinities of possible configurations of its members in the power set, there is and 
can be no measure. The itinerant excess of subsets over sets is the radical implication 
of Cantor's discovery of the actual infinite, and Cantor's consequent infinite infinities. 
The entire weight of the generic as the emblem of Badiou's enterprise, his 
mathematical gesture, and his reformulation of truths and the subject as post-evental 
occurrences rests upon the notion and implications of the itinerant excess.  
 A brief exposition of the problematic is required in order to see the implications 
for Badiou's thinking. In the case of a finite set, such as a set of 2 elements, there is no 
obstacle to the determination of the surplus of subsets over initial elements, of 
inclusion over belonging. The set of subsets of 2, its power set, p(2), is 2 to the power 
of 2, 22. The set of subsets of 2 is 4. With an infinite set, there is no such 
determination, except the necessity that the set of subsets is of a greater cardinality, a 
greater number, than the initial set. There is no way to determine the exact ratio 
between the presentation of an infinite set and the representation of its parts. Cantor 
was convinced that the power set of the infinite number of natural numbers, the power 
set of the first limit ordinal p(ω0), equaled the first infinite successor, ω1. Cantor's 
conviction is also known as the continuum hypothesis. Cantor never saw this 
hypothesis proven. Kurt Gödel would later demonstrate it as consistent with Zermelo-













consistent with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The continuum hypothesis is, in other 
words, an undecidable statement of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic of set theory. As a 
consequence of Cantor's opening up onto his so-called paradise of infinite infinities, 
Badiou is able to designate the immeasurable ratio of subsets over an initial infinite set 
– despite Cantor's conviction to the contrary – as the real cause of every orientation of 
thinking, from the origins of philosophy to its future destinies. Badiou determines the 
impasse of formalization from which thinking swerve to be the provocation to the 
concept that the non-relation between sets and subsets, presentation and 
representation, presents.297 Set theory as ontology establishes the itinerant being of the 
excess of representation over presentation. Badiou's own meta-ontological 
contribution seeks to determine its effective spell. Thinking as such is determinable as 
the desire to be done with this indeterminable excess. Thinking aims at taking measure 
of how the representations of the state exceeds the immediate presentation of a 
situation, even if and precisely because it is an impossible task whose aim will never 
be obtained. It is to this itinerant excess that the real as the inconsistent multiplicities 
of being answers.  
 The constructivist and transcendentalist traps designate two orientations around 
this real, as they address it by avoiding it, each in its manner. The ancient imagery of 
Scylla and Charybdis fits almost too well to capture the characteristics of the pitfalls of 
constructivism and transcendentalism. Scylla eliminates all excessive parts of ship and 
crew, whereas the vortex of Charybdis serves as a point of no return that is impossible 
to manoeuver, swallowing ship and crew whole. Scylla the constructivist rests on the 
principle, after Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, that only that which can be clearly and 
distinctly discerned through a well-made language and a controlled progression from 
that which is presented, is granted a safe passage to be included in the state of 
representation. The operation is two-faced. Constructivism, Badiou explains, restricts 
the power of the state by reducing its representations to only those subsets that can be 
discerned and constructed. Simultaneously, constructivism grants the state an absolute 





constructed. Scylla the constructivist thereby keeps the excess of the state contained at 
a minimal level, within the dimension of a knowledge that restrains it through the 
gradual construction of connections expanding from the already known.298 As to the 
vortex of the transcendentalist Charybdis, words fail, except to state that she is to be of 
such a gigantic infinite magnitude that she encompasses situation and its state, 
presentation and representation, alike. The extent of her grandeur sets the measure of 
the representative excess by providing the law of the multiple-excess as such, as a 
vertiginous closure of the thinkable. While several have survived the biting strikes of 
Scylla, though severely reduced, none has yet reported back from beyond the mouth of 
Charybdis, except as mutes. In plainer words, while several have produced well-made 
languages to address or deal with the questions of the real, none has yet been able to 
pinpoint that grand cardinal or virtual being of a God or absolute Other onto which the 
transcendentalists hang their creed.299 
 Badiou credits Lacan for his avoidance of the constructivist trap of reducing 
truth to knowledge by eliminating all excessive parts. Lacan does not merely 
distinguish truth from knowledge; he even introduces an absolute separation or 'gap 
without concept' between them, with his notion of truth as a hole in knowledge.300 But 
as in the ancient myth, the avoidance of one danger comes at the cost of its 
counterpart. From the gaping mouth of the transcendentalist trap, where truths rebound 
into the beyond of an ineffable assumption, Lacan exhibits a hesitance as to whether or 
not he really wants to escape, as far as Badiou is concerned. Lacan insists that access 
to truth is never granted through donation of any kind, neither from above nor below. 
Truth finds its origin in a hole or a disappearance (e.g. the lapsus), as that momentary 














only willing to grant Lacan his adherence to the immanence of truths to a certain 
degree, "pour l'essentiel",301 as he formulates it.  
 Feltham observes how religion has answered the question posed by the 
encounter of the infinite and the finite through "its scenes of immortal–mortal 
interaction, in prophecy, divine dreams, incarnation or even the ritual of the 
Eucharist."302 Bartlett, Clemens, and Roffe note how transmission in psychoanalysis is 
always assumed to be flawed and to falter.303 Bosteels points out how one of the main 
struggles of Badiou against psychoanalysis has been Badiou's "reinforcing [of] the 
mathematical paradigm in order to resist the temptation to let oneself be seduced" by 
psychoanalysis' tendency to project "the real of enjoyment into a properly religious or 
mystical beyond, insofar as it resists all symbolization."304 Miller, on his part, warns 
against how an abandonment of the matheme will lead analytic practice into "nothing 
more than a fascination with the unsayable." 305  I have mentioned how Badiou 
conceives of Lacan's triangulation of the feminine, the infinite, and the unsayable as a 
cultural theme yet to be solidified by the hard proof of the matheme. At this point 
Badiou's contention with Lacan reaches a climax: on the other side of truth's hole in 
knowledge, there tends to remain for Lacan's part a transcendent beyond of an 






















If Lacan falls short of the hard proof of the matheme in his encounter with the 
triangulation of the feminine, the infinite, and the unsayable, it is not because Lacan 
has been failing to experiment with the matheme in the face of this triangulation. If 
Badiou's contention with Lacan reaches a climax at this point, a more detailed 
interrogation of Lacan's position according to Badiou is required in order to see the 
full significance of Badiou's own move to pass beyond the Lacanian framework. The 
question is how Lacan encounters the cultural theme of the feminine, the infinite, and 
the unsayable, and how that encounter does not prevent Lacan from falling for the 
transcendentalist trap, the Charybdian vortex in which infinite truth is effectively 
separated from its situation. The next question is how Badiou returns to the hard proof 
of the matheme in search of a pass beyond Lacan. 
 The drive, the feminine non-all, and the other jouissance are not synonyms, 
even if they do share in a fair intersection. Barnard draws attention to how Lacan, in 
Encore, introduces a perspectival shift, in a move away from the structure of the drive 
and towards the structure of sexual difference. As she writes, Lacan moves towards a 
beyond "inscribed not in the repetitive circuit of the drive but in what Lacan calls the 
en-corps, an 'enjoying substance' which insists in the body beyond its sexual being."306 
To evoke that which is at issue in this en-corps, Lacan makes recourse to the strange 
being of the angel [l'être-ange], Barnard continues, insofar as "[t]he angel – neither a 
'being' nor of Being – is an asexual creature who inhabits the space between life and 
death and who is outside of time and hence immortal."307 With a denotation from 
Bruce Fink, Barnard suggests that such a strange angel-being might just provide a 
signifier of the real, written S(a), as "the materialization across the gap between 
symbolic and real,"308 through which feminine jouissance is considered to tap into that 










 Badiou is aware of Lacan's evocation of the notion of such a strange being. But 
contrary to Barnard, Badiou is not convinced that its presence is actually established in 
the teachings of Lacan. Badiou considers the strange being of an angel as a tendency 
that Lacan is failing to ward off, despite Lacan's insistent effort to do so. Lacan 
struggles to affirm the function of his notion of the feminine logic of the non-all as 
non-extensive, as not opening for the implication of a particular negative existential 
affirmation (if not all, then at least one to the contrary). Badiou regards this struggle as 
an effort to avoid every notion of an angel, insofar as an angel would be that one being 
fully exempt from the phallic function. Such a being, Badiou explains, would not only 
be sexless but also speechless and, hence, thoughtless. The angelic cogito is 
formulated as "si je pense, je ne suis pas".309 In a short aside, Badiou entertains on the 
idea by which the question of the sex of angels could be solved by the simple answer 
of phallus is angel: angels do not have a sex because they are sex as such.310 The 
strange being of an angel would designate "the purely asexual enjoyment of the body 
as One, fictitiously situated outside of the Other (or before/after it),"311 as Lorenzo 
Chieza has formulated it. It would designate a strictly pre- or extra-discursive reality. 
In the capacity of a pre- or extra-discursive reality, an angel would deserve the 
denomination of a mythical being in the Lacanian pandemonium, insofar as Lacan 
insists that there is no such thing as a pre-discursive reality. To the speaking beings of 
Lacan's universe, every reality is per definition discursively constituted.312 Badiou is 
quick to add that Lacan's aim is not in the direction of affirming the mythical being of 
an angel. Nonetheless, Badiou does not believe that Lacan manages to avoid that 
conclusion entirely. Lacan's notion of an other jouissance maintains a taste of the a-













by the phallus either positively or negatively, insofar as it encompasses the phallic 
economy as that in which both the phallus and its other are lodged.  
 When Barnard identifies in Lacan the possibility of a signifier of the real by 
which the gap between the symbolic and the real would materialize through the notion 
of the angel, she merely sums up that which would be the full effect of such a strange 
being. The effect of an angel would be the fixation of the sexual non-rapport in a ratio 
that exceeds and encompasses the sexual as such. Its effect would be that of "the 
mythical end of sexual difference," to quote Chieza's equivocal words, "the epitome of 
the male-phallic fantasy of overcoming sexual difference in an asexual being as being 
One."313 The end of sexual matters under the apex of the One is the ultimate 
significance of a signifier of the real. Such an effect is the direct equivalent of the 
fixation of the itinerant excess, the errant gap without concept between representation 
and presentation, through which pure being as inconsistent multiplicity would insist, if 
it was not for the fact that it is now conceived of as caught up in a transcendent and 
otherworldly being-beyond-being. Badiou brings to the fore the tendency of fixation in 
Lacan's notion of the infinite as underlying that other jouissance by which the 
feminine logic of the non-all becomes a mere prop for the finitude of the phallic 
subject, as a point of inaccessibility without an actual existence. It is the immanence of 
truths that makes the infinite status of truths a challenge to think through. To 
underscore this fact, Badiou's accusation against Lacan can be reformulated so as to 
say that Lacan falls into the trap of the transcendentalist position due to a failure on his 
part to sufficiently produce a solid answer to the question of how a hole can ever be 
infinite without butting against some final frontier or limit of the thinkable. If phallus 
is angel, then angel is Charybdis, and the cogito of truths in the mouth of Charybdis is 
still 'si je pense, je ne suis pas'. If Lacan launches a conceptualization of truth as that 
which comes to punch a hole in knowledge, at the bottom of this hole there still awaits 
the notion of an ineffable beyond that encompasses hole and knowledge both.  
 None of the criticisms concerning Lacan's pre-Cantorian conception of the 
infinite and his transcendentalist solution to the excess of representation over 




his commonality with Lacan as dependent on the status of truths as generic holes in 
knowledge, so as to proceed immediately to isolate their point of contention to be the 
exact placement of the void – the empty set – as appertaining either to the subject or to 
being.314 Recall the apparent paradox from which this chapter started out, where the 
concept of the generic is presumed to be referenced through the Lacanian notion of the 
feminine logic of the non-all. Badiou presents the emblem of his philosophical project 
by reference to the theory his project was supposed to surpass. Insofar as Badiou also 
conveys the generic hole of truth as a common trait of Lacan and himself, it is harder 
to perceive the distinctive marks that would render Badiou's project, by his own 
words, a traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy. In L'Être et l'événement, it is mainly to 
the rarity of the subject that his traversal of the Lacanian framework is conferred. The 
time has come to address the matter of the generic itself and its relationship to the 
feminine logic of the non-all as Badiou presents it to his readers at this point, in L'Être 




When confronted with quandary of the inconsistency of being or the impasse of the 
itinerant excess of representation over presentation, the concept of the generic offers a 
solution similar to the solutions of the Gordian Knot and the Columbi Egg. The 
constructivists and transcendentalists avoid the issue rather than facing it, by 
attempting to control or contain the itinerant excess. The generic adherents, on the 
other hand, graciously maneuver the strait of modern Messina by accepting the 
itinerant being of being as such. The solution is as simple as it is solid. An adherent of 
the generic orientation in thinking, Badiou writes,  
 
tient que l'excès de l'état n'est impensable que parce qu'on exige le discernement 
des parties. On se propose cette fois, par une doctrine déployée des indiscernables, 
de montrer que ce sont eux qui composent l'essentiel du champ où opère l'état, et 
que toute pensée authentique doit d'abord forger les moyens de l'appréhension du 




du côté de ce qu'elle nombre sans jamais le discerner, des parties sans bord, des 
conglomérats hasardeux. On tient que ce qui est représentatif d'une situation n'est 
pas ce qui y appartient distinctement, mais ce qui y est évasivement inclus. Tout 
l'effort rationnel est de disposer d'un mathème de l'indiscernable, qui fasse advenir 
à la pensée ces parties innombrables que rien ne permet de nommer dans leur 
séparation d'avec la foule de celles qui leur sont, aux yeux myopes de la langue, 
absolument identiques. Dans cette voie, le mystère de l'excès sera non pas réduit, 
mais rejoint. On connaîtra son origine, qui est que l'anonymat des parties est 
forcément au-delà de la distinction des appartenances.315 
 
The generic approach to the itinerant excess rests upon a multiple by which the being 
of a truth is rendered thinkable. The generic approach attempts to address the 
representative excess from within, in opposition to its reduction from either below or 
above, as it is found in the discernible multiples of constructed knowledge and the 
transcendental multiple of a God or an absolute and ineffable Other.  
 The Columbi move is a recurrent operation in set theory and psychoanalysis 
alike. A paradox is transformed into a concept, a problem into a solution. In Freud one 
encounters the peculiar redoubling of the drive as a force that operates in two 
contradictory directions, simultaneously binding together and dissolving. Thus the 
paradoxical status of the sexual is transformed into its concept. Cantor performed a 
similar move when he turned the consternation of Galileo Galilei concerning the 
correspondence between whole and square numbers into the simple affirmation of 
their identical quantity. Cantor simply confirmed that there are as many square as 
















numbers.316 The same consternation of Galileo served Richard Dedekind to propose a 
positive definition of infinite sets, as those that are alike to one of its own subsets. An 
infinite set exhibits a bi-univocal correspondence between itself and one of its parts. 
Dedekind's definition at the same time determined the finite negatively, as the sets in 
which such a bi-univocal correspondence is not the case.317 Instead of tempting the 
construction of the infinite on the basis of the finite, which is impossible, Dedekind 
reversed the stakes, so that the finite is constructed as taking place within the infinite. 
Thus the problem of the infinite became its solution.  
 Cantor and Dedekind's view to the conceptual force of the paradox does not go 
to say that either of them were adherents to the generic fairway, however. Cantor 
entertained the hope of hitting upon that grand transcendental cardinal that would fix 
the ratio of the continuum, the relation between the first limit ordinal and its power set. 
But the continuum hypothesis is undecidable, and the itinerant excess undeterminable. 
As Hallward explains, "attempts to establish a clear limitation of size fails, it seems, 
for the same reason that the continuum hypothesis itself cannot be confirmed: it has 
not proved possible to put effective limits on the (impredicative) operation of the 
power set axiom."318 It was first at the hands of Cohen that a conceptualization of the 
generic surfaced. Cohen provided evidence for the independence of the continuum 
hypothesis in regard to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, demonstrating the consistency of 
its negation to supplement Gödel's demonstration of the consistency of its affirmation. 
With the concept of the generic, Cohen posited his own Columbi Egg. He transformed 
the failure of an effective limitation of the itinerant excess of multiplicity into its 
principal force and determining trait, as multiplicity's inherent indetermination.  
 When Badiou introduces the ancient character of Venus, ♀, in L'Être et 
l'événement, it is in order to denote such an indiscernible anonymity. It is to denote the 
generic multiple as the indiscernible being of truth. But what is involved in the concept 
of the generic multiple, so as to cause its denotation in and through a character 
indicative of the feminine non-all of Lacan? Addressing this question is necessary 






supplementing the phallic function with a concept of the generic, and go on to address 
the question of the full significance of the apparent paradox of the generic multiple in 
the context of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and its implications for 
thinking the subject and radical change.  
 Let me recapitulate the basics of the feminine logic of sexuation. The crux of 
Lacan's struggle to formalize the feminine logic of the non-all is found in the difficult 
escape from the grips of classical logic that would leave behind the Aristotelian 
specification by which the negated universal necessarily implies an affirmation of a 
negative existence. The feminine as non-all under the phallic function (~∀𝑥.Φ𝑥) is 
not to be taken as an extensive negation that would imply an existent under a non-
phallic function (∃𝑥.~Φ𝑥), a hommoinzune fully outside the phallic field of language 
as such. With the non-all, it is not the case that a speaking being, e.g. a woman, is not 
at all under the phallic function. On the contrary, she is there in full, Lacan explains. 
But there is also something more, something in excess [quelque chose en plus].319 The 
formalization of the feminine as non-all is meant to capture the situation in which a 
speaking being is not fully determined by the phallic function, the situation in which a 
speaking being finds castration to be not omnipresent and absolute, not all there is. 
Badiou explains this point as follows: while the masculine position and its universal 
for-all (∀𝑥.Φ𝑥) also implies that the phallic function dominates everything and 
everywhere, the feminine non-all indicates not a complete separation from phallic 
domination tout court but a special mode of the phallic function, one in which it 
functions somewhere and not everywhere. Such a 'not everywhere' is written as non-
all.320 As in the post-Freudian or post-Oedipal conception of an ethics of the feminine 
beyond the moral law, the case is not that the feminine comes up short but that it 
comes in excess. There is something somewhere in the feminine that evades 
determination at the point of the phallus, an uncertain beyond the phallus.321 There is 
something somewhere in the feminine that is also beyond castration, desire, language, 






 Badiou introduces the denotation of the generic through the character ♀ to 
designate an evasion from language and knowledge. The character ♀ is an ontological 
transcription of the supernumerary nomination of the event, Badiou writes, and it is 
introduced into the formal matrix of meta-ontology in order to designate the 
indiscernible, the nondescript and undifferentiated multiple that falls outside 
nomination as such, having but the properties that is shared by all multiples in a given 
situation, their simple being.322 The properties of a generic multiple are simply those 
strictly required for its pure existence as a multiple. The generic has no other property 
than that of consisting as a pure multiple of being. Just like the feminine is non-all due 
to an excess the phallic function fails to capture, so the generic multiple is non-all to 
the extent that it evades every discrete description due to an excessive un peu de tout. 
The generic multiple designates a predicative superabundance that escapes capture by 
the constructions of language and the encyclopedia of the situation, which fails to fix 
its being to a unitary concept of evaluation. François Wahl defines the stakes of this 
excessive being designated by character ♀ as  
 
le théorème crucial du multiple – sa loi et son impasse: ce qui lui donne statut du 
Réel – qui pose l'excès inassignable des parties d'un ensemble à ses éléments: soit 
le principe de l'excès errant. Ainsi le générique n'est-il pas autre chose que le mise 
en œuvre consistante de l'excès, l'enquête fidèle sur ce par quoi l'être supplémente 
'évasivement' toutes les déterminations encyclopédiques du savoir d'une situation: 
la procédure a hauteur d'être.323 
 
The generic designates, in other words, a superabundance of being that evades the 
grips of language, insofar as an excess of determinations provides the multiple in 














la langue échoue à en construire le contour ou le rassemblement. Le sous-ensemble 
générique est un multiple pur de l'univers, évasif et incernable par quelque 
construction langagière que ce soit. Il indique que la puissance d'être du multiple 
excède ce que de telles constructions sont en état d'en fixer sous l'unité d'une 
évaluation. Le générique est proprement ce qui, de l'être-multiple, se soustrait au 
pouvoir de l'Un tel que la langue en dispose la ressource.324  
 
The generic multiple is an anonymous representative of the being of a situation. It 
would seem to keep a distance imperceptible to the position Copjec describes as hers, 
as well as that of Lacan. In Copjec's rendition, the feminine non-all is perceived as the 
guardian of being, as Antigone had been the guardian of criminal being. The feminine 
logic of the non-all designates being besides the law and language alike. Paul 
Verhaege defines Lacanian jouissance as by definition indefinable, 325  whereas 
Zupančič quotes Žižek on how jouissance is the stain of the infinite that forever eludes 
our grasp but nonetheless is impossible to get rid of.326 But if the Lacanian notions of 
the feminine non-all and jouissance seem to be mimicked in Badiou's conception of 
the generic multiple, the paradox of the denotation of the generic multiple by the 
feminine character is by that no less unresolved. The questions as to the significance of 
the traversal and where the contention that dominates Badiou's interventions just a 
couple of years after L'Être et l'événement has gone, are no less unanswered.  
 It would, however, be imprecise to conclude that the generic multiple earns its 
feminine denotation due to its qualification as an indeterminate and evasive being, by 
which it collects under its mark a little bit of everything. The devil is in the details, as 
the saying goes, and, as Lacan indicates by his reference to Jacques Cazotte's Le 












questions (che voui?) are raised.327 The event itself is foreclosed from ontology. 
Ontology restricts itself to the question of being-qua-being. The event, on the other 
hand, is the epitome of that-which-is-not-being-qua-being. This is the background on 
which the character ♀ is introduced, and the motivation underlying its choice left to 
the reader's own discernment. As Badiou writes, it is coherent to say that his feminine 
denotation is nothing but an ontological transcription of the supernumerary name of 
the event, and therefore it does not designate anything.328 The event is a question of an 
interval more than a term, seen from the perspective of the situation.329 Badiou's 
dialectic of division divides the event in two, and with it, the concept of the generic 
multiple. The generic poses as a twofaced being, as a determined indeterminacy and an 
indeterminable determination. The concept of the generic multiple is divided into a 
multiple not designating anything, on the one hand, and, on the other, the same 
multiple designating the indiscernible of the situation. Feltham aims for this dialectical 
movement of the generic when he underlines its twin traits of division and synthesis, 
where the generic must be grasped as a multiple "both inclusive – given any property, 
some of its elements possess it – and yet indiscernible – no property serves to classify 
it as a whole."330 Bosteels has underlined the importance of the dialectic in Badiou's 
philosophy, and to further insist on the dialectical division of the concepts of the event 
and the generic is not a pedantic gesture. The dialectical division in two procures 
movement where the metaphysical One secures only stasis. Furthermore, the 
dialectical division of the generic multiple provides the misconstrued notion of an 
inaccessible Two in Lacan with its necessary correction through another conception of 
the Two – an immanent Two, as Badiou suggests, emerging through the fracturing of 
the One. Thus the dialectical division of the generic multiple allows for a conception 
of truth as processes of change and novelty: It allows for Badiou's philosophical works 
to respond to the devil's question with the ethical imperative of continuation and un 











Holes and Extensions 
The generic multiple's division into two is decisive in Badiou's traversal of Lacanian 
antiphilosophy. The dialectic of division constitutes a principal operation for how 
Badiou conceives of the preconditions and possibilities for the subject and radical 
change. I suggest that the division between a primary indiscernible of non-designation 
and an effective indiscernible, a generic multiple proper, holds the key to come to 
terms with the paradox of Badiou's decision to denote the generic by a reference to the 
feminine logic of the non-all. According to the division of the generic, the evocation of 
the feminine non-all would be restricted in its reference to the primary indiscernible of 
non-designation, as Badiou himself underscores when he writes that "♀ n'est qu'un 
symbole formel désignant une transcendance inconnue."331 The effects of such a 
primary non-designation have been discussed through the Lacanian non-all, but the 
question of its other, the effective indiscernible of the generic multiple proper remains 
to be addressed. The generic multiple proper holds the key to how Badiou conceives of 
the possibilities of infinite yet immanent truths, as actual truths that are effective in 
and for a situation.  
 The meta-ontological status of Badiou's formalizations in L'Être et l'événement 
is important to keep in mind, since his meta-ontological formalizations have the 
function of designating the ontological operations of set theoretical mathematics. The 
generic is introduced specifically in order to think the being of truth, such as Cohen 
has thought it. Later it is conjoined with Cohen's concept of forcing, in order to think 
the being of the subject. Both truths and subjects are subtracted from being-qua-being, 
as they depend upon the occurrence of that-which-is-not-being-qua-being, the event. 
Their being can nonetheless be thought, as generic multiples and as forcing, as the 
event can be thought as the division implied by an immanent Two. Just like the initial 
intervention nominating an event is to be distinguished from the consecutive process 
of fidelity elaborating on its consequences by being the cause of the process of fidelity, 




indiscernible of the generic multiple proper. The initial indiscernible is written ♀. But 
the actual existence of the indiscernible is first accounted for in and through its so-
called generic extension, written S(♀). Only the latter designates a fully immanent and 
infinite truth. A generic multiple, as the being of truth, does not start out as a collection 
of a little bit of everything; it starts out as a collection of nothing or, more precisely, as 
an indication of nothing. It marks the being of the event whose being is not to be, 
whose being is to disappear in its appearance. A generic multiple, as the being of truth, 
does not start out as an effective indiscernible presented and existing in a situation; it 
starts out as an anonymous and excrescent representation, a hole of pure 
transcendence. Only through the generic procedure of a process of fidelity, in the 
aftermath of an event and its nominating intervention, does an indiscernible multiple 
pass from being nothing but an anonymous transcendence to being an actually existing 
truth intrinsic to a situation, a generic multiple proper.  
 The conception of the generic is possible only through the clear distinction 
between a first intervention through the choice of a name to designate the primary 
indiscernible and a secondary procedure of fidelity as the ordered inquiry into the 
continued persistence of such an initial indiscernible, as it is discerned within the 
initial situation. Wahl makes the case clear: between intervention and fidelity, writes 
Wahl, is found the resurgence of the Two, as the discernment of the indiscernible as 
indiscernible.332 Johnston also calls for as clear as possible a distinction between 
"Truth-as-place and truths-as-veridicalities-to-come (i.e. Truth versus truths), with 
Badiou's notion of 'forcing' (forçage) explaining the link between these two poles," 
and thereby also as a "tripartite distinction between Truth-as-place, truths-as-
veridicalities-to-come, and truth processes," with "the third conjoining the first two as 
the locale of their intersection."333 Badiou elaborates on truths as the transformations 
of a transcendent representation into an immanent presentation. A truth is the process 
of transformation by which an excessive inconsistency is made to consist as intrinsic 






sans concept) qui avère dans la situation l'inconsistance qui en fait l'être."334 To the 
extent that Lacan is lacking a concept of an effective indiscernible, "un multiple 
effectivement présenté dans une situation, mais radicalement soustrait à la langue de la 
situation,"335 Badiou's contention with the Lacanian framework is located in this 
moment of transformation. I identify three levels: firstly, Badiou's mathematical 
gesture turns upon transposing the real from the subject to being, providing the 
material underpinnings of truths and subjects in the event; secondly, in the process of 
transposing the real from subject to being, or as an effect of this transposal, the status 
of truths is transformed from punctual to procedural being; thirdly, the transformation 
of truths from punctual to procedural being allows Badiou to think the radical 
transformation of a situation from within. 
 In order to delineate the distinction of the indiscernible as hole and as 
extension, it is helpful to reintroduce Lacan's circumvention of classical Aristotelian 
logic at this point. While ruminating the battery of signifiers to find a fitting suit for 
the feminine, Lacan proposes that it is insofar as there is none to occupy the position 
from which one would enjoy all women that woman is non-all. In ...ou pire, Lacan 
states that 
 
le pas-tout ne résulte pas de ce que rien ne le limite, car la limite y est autrement 
située. Contrairement à l'inclusion dans ∃𝑥.~Φ𝑥 de l'existence du Père dont le dire 
que non le situe par rapport à la fonction phallique, c'est en tant que, dans 
~∃𝑥.~Φ𝑥, il y a le vide, le manque, l'absence de quoi que ce soit qui dénie la 
fonction phallique, que, inversement, il n'y a rien d'autre que le pas-tout dans la 
















The feminine non-all does not follow from a lack of limits, but from lack as limit. 
There is something of the void denying the phallic function, and that is the reason why 
there is nothing but the non-all of the phallic function in the feminine position. 
Translated into Freudian terms, this point reads that the fall of der Urvater is the cause 
by which the feminine falls outside every attempt at universal collection.337 The 
mythical father of the horde was the castrating one himself un-castrated, the one to 
whom belonged all women, and at his dethronement there is no longer a representative 
instance under which all women can be categorized.  
 In other words, there is no hommoinzune on the feminine side. It is from a hole 
in the Other that the feminine comes up as non-all and that Woman, universalized, 
does not exist. The masculine logic is clearly discernible through its anchorage in the 
exception, the One-father. It represents an absolute Other to whom belong the rights 
and means of judgments, both morally and epistemologically. The One-father figures 
as the instance that props up the symbolic structures through which knowledge is 
induced. The feminine has another bond to the Other, Lacan explains. The feminine 
bond is a bond taking place "au signifiant de cet Autre, en tant que, comme Autre, il ne 
peut rester que toujours Autre," and on account of which "il n'y a pas d'Autre de 
l'Autre."338 The feminine bond is a bond to the signifier of the hole in the Other, S(A). 
This is the occasion for Lacan's reply that nothing can be said of Woman: "Rien ne 
peut se dire de la femme. La femme a rapport à S(A) et c'est en cela déjà qu'elle se 
dédouble, qu'elle n'est pas toute, puisque, d'autre part, elle peut avoir rapport avec 
Φ."339 An obvious temptation would be to equate Badiou's two denotations of the 















indiscernible of the generic extension, S(♀), with Lacan's formalized notions of the 
hole in the Other, A, and its signifier, S(A). The first couple (♀, A) would thus 
designate an event as the hole in the Other, whereas the latter couple (S(♀), S(A)), 
would designate a truth procedure as marking this hole within the signifying structure. 
However, these equations are overhasty. 
 Three remarks must be made in this connection: first of all, the hole in the 
Other is the hole that allows of no knowledge. The phallus and the masculine logic 
will ascertain at least a negative certainty. The phallus enables an elaboration of a grid 
by which to make sense of the world. The subject confronted by the hole in the Other, 
on the other hand, witnesses the disintegration of all coordinates, and thus the 
symbolic structures that serve to underpin knowledge fall apart. The hole in the Other 
is where knowledge goes to die. Secondly, the splitting of Woman manages a return to 
the moment of the drive, as discussed by Copjec and Zupančič. Divided between the 
hole in the Other (S(A)) and the phallus (Φ), the feminine takes up the precise position 
where the law reveals its inherent contradiction. On one side stand the phallus and the 
law of the superego, on the other side, the constituent absence of the law or the law of 
the unknown. Finally, that nothing can be said of Woman finds its cause in the scission 
between phallus and the hole in the Other, between Φ and S(A). As an argument of the 
phallic function, a woman is only discernible insofar as she is reduced to her being 
quoad matrem, as a mother. Reduced to a mother, nothing is said as to her being per 
se, says Lacan.340 Her question is concentrated beyond the phallus, but then as an 
inarticulate hole in the Other that cannot be spoken. It can be experienced but never 
cognized as such. At best, it can be indicated, as it is through Gian Lorenzo Bernini's 
sculpture of Santa Theresa in gaudensis. In short, Woman does not exist! Beyond the 
phallus, the being of woman becomes the prerogative of the ineffable mystical 
experience, given to "[c]ette jouissance qu'on éprouve et dont on ne sait rien".341 This 





accessible only through the act constitutes the antiphilosophical crux of Lacan's 
teachings.342	
 These remarks facilitate two observations or preliminary conclusions to follow 
from my analysis of the function of the feminine other in Badiou's traversal of 
Lacanian antiphilosophy. First of all, if Woman is that of which nothing can be said, 
my suggestion that the character ♀ is introduced to designate the primary quality of 
the indiscernible as non-designation becomes a plausible approach to the paradox of 
the Lacanian reference behind Badiou's generic multiple. A first and perhaps 
unexpected equation is thus demonstrated: ♀ = S(A). As a primary indiscernible of a 
non-designation, the nominating intervention designates the occurrence of an event. In 
Lacanian parlance, it marks the hole in the Other; it proffers a name or a signifier. Due 
to the division of the generic multiple, the demonstration of the first equation 
implicates the next: S(♀) ≠ S(A). Badiou's recurrent remark on Lacan concerns his 
lack of a proper notion of an effective indiscernible. While Lacan provides an 
unparalleled appreciation of radical subtraction from language – the other jouissance 
beyond the phallus – he lacks a satisfying conception of how the radically subtracted 
other can be present and existing within the situation from which language it is 
subtracted. Lacan lacks an appreciation of how a primary indiscernible is not yet the 
effective generic multiple of the generic extension, and he lacks a conception of the 




















 The second point is more intricate, perhaps, and concerns how the generic 
extension offers a hidden criticism of Lacan. Badiou's explicit criticism of Lacan 
concerns Lacan's mythical-imaginary conception of the infinite and his 
transcendentalist tendencies. This contention crystalizes in Badiou calling out the 
absence of the actual infinite in Lacan's teachings. As a consequence of the infinite's 
absence in Lacan, truths are sacrificed on the altar of mystical ecstasy. Badiou's 
project for the revitalization of the concept of truths requires the supplementation of 
the phallic function with a concept of the generic multiple. The destitution of the hole 
in the Other and the moment of the drive of Lacanian ethics find an ultimate 
designation in the testimonies of the mystics, as an absolute sublimation. These 
ultimate moments underscore Badiou's most explicit criticism, insofar as his willed 
misreading of Lacan's inaccessible and infinite number 2 accurately pinpointed the 
involution of the drive through a rendition of the feminine as the pure subject enjoying 
its own naked division, its own eclipse in the signifying interval, at the point of pure 
desire. But if the concept of the generic divides into two – as a primary indiscernible 
of non-designation and the effective indiscernible of the generic multiple proper in the 
generic extension – the point I argue is that this division implies that Badiou's criticism 
of Lacan's lacking appreciation of the actual infinite is effectively present within the 
argument of L'Être et l'événement as well, even if only implicit. Badiou's criticism of 
Lacan's pre-Cantorian notion of the infinite and the limitations it imposes on Lacan's 
conception of the preconditions and possibilities of radical change and true novelty, is 
hidden in Badiou's conception of the generic extension, S(♀). It is this effective 


















Repetition and Novelty 
Let me recapitulate the main points of my analysis. Badiou criticizes Lacan for still 
entertaining the cultural theme that conceives of the feminine in threesome with the 
unsayable and the infinite. Lacan's shortcomings are due to his pre-Cantorian notion of 
the infinite, where the infinite is accorded nothing but its status as operationally 
inaccessible. The infinite serves merely as the limit for the perpetuation of the finite 
series, and is not granted actual existence. As a consequence of its dependency on the 
infinite, Lacan's logic of the non-all reduces the feminine to a similar screen for the 
determination of the phallic subject. As if by accident, Badiou demonstrates how 
Lacan's conception of the infinite comes to represent the basic structure of the drive, 
moving from a first indefinite series in the metonymic chain of desire to a second 
reduplication through the involution of the chain upon itself in the drive. This 
movement from a continuous failure of satisfaction to a satisfaction in continuous 
failure is similar to the movement from abstract succession to concrete and self-related 
circulation in the Hegelian dialectic.  
 In want of the decisive break of the axiom of the infinite, Badiou contends, the 
Lacanian drive is just as unable to realize an actual infinite as the Hegelian dialectic is. 
If Lacan wants to maintain an appreciation of truth as a hole in knowledge, he is left 
with no choice but to endure in a stalemate battle with the temptation to posit the being 
of truth in the transcendence of a strange being-beyond-being. Badiou observes a 
tendency towards the transcendentalist trap of fixing the itinerant excess of 
representation over presentation in Lacan's notion of an other jouissance 
encompassing the field of phallic knowledge and its hole, where the drive and its 
feminine guardian of the non-all enjoy their status as the absolute outpost of subjective 
finitude. The problem for Lacan is that he keeps butting against a barrier of the 
ineffable, as the limit of thinking. To remain pre-Cantorian in regard to the infinite 






series of numbers serves as the point of departure. In other words, the infinite is 
inaccessible only from within the initial situation.  
 At last, I suggested that the decision to apply the character ♀ was less 
concerned with the actual procedure of elaborating on a truth, deducing the 
consequences in the aftermath of an event, and more concerned with the initial starting 
point of such a procedure, the intervening nomination of an event. The character ♀ is 
the meta-ontological equivalent of the nominating intervention that testifies to the 
event's occurrence. The nominating intervention designates the first recognition of the 
evental status of the event, as an interruption in the everyday run of things, a fault in 
the smooth operations of the count, of the status quo, a crack in the structures of the 
established state.  
 However, in L'Être et l'événement, Badiou isolates the main difference between 
Lacan and himself in the single point of the localization of the void. Is the void a 
category of the subject or of being? The choice is one between a structural recurrence 
that thinks the subject-effect as an empty set and as relegated to the uniform networks 
of experience, on the one hand, and, on the other, a hypothesis of the rarity of the 
subject, a hypothesis by which the subject is suspended to the occurrence of an event, 
a nominating intervention, and the generic paths of a procedure of fidelity, Badiou 
explains.344 Lacan does not take his leave of the former, identifying the subject as void, 
whereas Badiou opts for the alternative, assuring the void as the proper name of being. 
Lacan's Cartesian credentials cause him to posit the subject as inseparable from its 
enunciating position, even if it is decentered – eccentric – always at a remove from 
reflection and transparency. Accordingly, thinking is given up as the prerogative of 
language alone, in which it is quick to disappear in the intervals of the signifying 
chain. By implication, truth remains caught up in the category of cause. Truth as cause 
is the truth of neurotic suffering, Badiou quotes Lacan saying.345 The cause of desire 
pinpoints the moment of the ethical act, where the subject determines its own truth of 






Badiou's choice. Instead, Badiou identifies truth as the fabric or material of the subject, 
and isolates its cause in the event.346  
 When Badiou names the difference between his own and Lacan's orientation to 
be primarily a disagreement on the localization of the void, he does not stray from the 
arguments of his criticism against the Lacanian rendition of the infinite, despite 
appearances. My point is that these are two strands of the same contention, entwined 
in the same traversal. Hallward has characterized Badiou's traversal of Lacan as the 
liberation of truth from the drive, insofar as the drive is conceived as the ineffable 
domain in which truth retreats when it is no longer reducible to matters of mere 
correspondences and exactitudes in the field of knowledge. 347  To highlight the 
structural aspects targeted in Badiou's criticism, I would reformulate this liberating 
operation so as to underscore how Badiou conceives of the generic multiple as 
traversing the punctuality or momentary character that defines truth as cause. Badiou's 
traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy is a traversal of the punctuality involved in the 
notion of truth as cause. An analysis of the function of the feminine in Badiou's meta-
ontological edifice serves to accentuate this difference. 
 Within the confines of structure, there can be no truths, strictly speaking, 
Badiou insists. Structure, as the place where nothing takes place but place, offers 
nothing but repetition.348 As Verhaege writes, "the signifier can only refer to another 
signifier, while the thing-in-itself [also das Ding] insists outside the chain of 
signifiers."349 Structure recedes relentlessly into knowledge, even if it is as its reverse 
or obverse, even as there remains a blind spot and a hole at its core. The point to stress 
while reading Badiou is that insofar as the cause to puncture and open up a hole in 
structure never moves beyond the status of a mere point, however 'extimate', the actual 
existence of truths in Badiou's sense remains an impossibility. It does not matter 
whether the hole in question answers to the call of the inaccessible infinite, the 
feminine, the drive, or the eclipse of the subject itself. A note by Žižek enables the 







as a void within structure and constitutive of the latter, whereas hole designates more 
radically the point at which this structure itself breaks down. As he writes, "desire is 
grounded in its constitutive lack, while the drive circulates around a hole, a gap in the 
order of being."350 This differentiation is useful, if only to retort that it is not sufficient 
to encircle the hole as the point of a structural breakdown in order to affirm, with 
Badiou, the existence of an actual truth. The obvious question to be directed at Žižek, 
and similar Lacanian orientations addressing the possibilities of radical change through 
notions of the hole, is how one could possible encircle disintegration, if it was not 
precisely because the disintegration at stake remained in the form of a point.  
 The target of Badiou's objection to Lacan's transcendentalist tendency is the 
notion of truth as a structural puncture. The infinite as inaccessible transcendence 
serves as a structural puncture the function of which is merely to indicate the limit-
points whose breaching and beyond shall remain unconceivable and otherworldly 
inexistent. The generic being of truth is never realized as punctuality, but always as a 
multiplicity – that is, as a process – or not at all, Badiou writes.351 "Une vérité," 
Badiou insists, "est le résultat infini d'une supplémentation hasardeuse. Toute vérité est 
post-événementielle."352 As limit-points, the inaccessible infinite of Lacan can at best, 
upon encounter, serve to indicate the possible point of departure for the process of a 
generic truth.  
 In a universe made up of only one function, the phallic, as is the universe of 
speaking beings in Lacan, all that is not-all under the phallic function, the feminine, 
can only remain as an un-probed hole, indicating an inaccessible beyond. There is no 
function besides the phallic to ensure its continuation and account for the fidelity by 
which its consequences can be offered to thinking as immanent to a situation. The 
generic function does so, and hence the need for the generic to supplement the phallic 








[c]e qui a manqué à Lacan, quoique ce manque ne soit lisible que d'avoir d'abord lu 
ce qui, dans ses textes, loin de manquer, fondait la possibilité d'un régime moderne 
du vrai, est de suspendre radicalement la vérité à la supplémentation d'un être-en-
situation par un événement séparateur du vide.353  
 
The modern regime of the true is the regime of truth as hole, or truth as real. Badiou's 
philosophical works interrogate whether it is the status of the real to be cause only, or 
also to be continuation. Insufficiently developed in Lacan, Badiou argues, is a proper 
thinking of the next step following on the encounter with the real, the next step of the 
pass through the impasse.354 The question concerns the difference between the act and 
the event, where, to hammer the difference into a single sentence, the subject of Lacan 
acts where the event of Badiou subjects.  
 The importance of the Cantorian discovery of the actual infinite expands 
beyond the incessant proliferation of infinite infinities. An equally important 
implication for Badiou's philosophical project is the banality of the infinite after its 
omnipresence has been established. Žižek opposes his own Lacanian position to 
Badiou's conceptualization of truths by portraying Badiou's position to be that of 
prioritizing pure presence over and above representation.355 Žižek's portrayal, which 
sums up as something like the equation of S(♀) = A, is imprecise. At stake in Badiou's 
decision on the axiom of the infinite, whereby it is decided that there exists an actual 
infinite (and more), the infinite obviously loses its air of an inaccessible mystique. The 
insistent question of the infinite is transposed from the question of its presence as such 
to the impossible question of the ratio of its representative excess and indeterminable 
succession. The limit ordinal as the first infinite number is easily defined as a non-
successive number, transforming that which once was an impending limit for thinking 










Badiou's works – is rather to be found in the question of succession itself. In Le 
Nombre et les nombres, Badiou writes that  
 
ce que nous enseigne l'ontologie du multiple [...] est [...] que la difficulté réside 
dans la succession, et qu'y réside aussi la résistance. Toute véritable épreuve pour 
la pensée s'origine dans la nécessité localisable d'un pas supplémentaire, d'un 
commencement inentamable, qui n'est pas soudé par l'infini remplissage de ce qui 
précède, ni identique à sa dissémination. Apprendre et endurer l'épreuve du pas 
supplémentaire, telle est la véritable nécessité du temps. La limite est une 
récapitulation de ce qui la compose, sa 'profondeur' est fallacieuse, car c'est de 
n'avoir nul trou que l'ordinal limite, ou toute multiplicité 'aux limites', tire sa 
puissance évocatrice [...]. L'écart vide du successeur est plus redoutable, il est 
véritablement profond. Il n'y a rien de plus à penser dans la limite que dans ce qui 
la précède. Mais, dans le successeur, il y a un franchissement. L'audace de la 
pensée n'est pas de redire 'aux limites' ce qui est entièrement détenu dans la 
situation dont la limite est limite. L'audace de la pensée est de franchir un écart où 
rien n'est disposé. Nous devons réapprendre à succéder.356  
 
The question of succession founds the problem of the continuum hypothesis and the 
itinerant excess of representation over presentation. The continuum hypothesis posits 
the first infinite successor ordinal, ω1, as equal in cardinality to the power set of the 
first limit ordinal, p(ω). The itinerant excess of the power set is later demonstrated as 
independent of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic of set theory, as a 'choice without 
concept'.357 It is rather the question of succession than that of limitation that is at the 

















the succession in question depends upon the decision of the actual existence of the 
infinite for its being posited at all. The question concerns thinking one more step, un 
pas de plus. How can a subject come to transform the transcendent representation of 
nothing indicated through the nominating intervention's primary non-designation into 
an immanent presentation of the effective indiscernible of a generic multiple proper, in 
the generic extension elaborated through a process of fidelity? There is a proper ethical 
content to this question, as it is the only question asked by the ethics of truth, 
according to Badiou. It is the question of the hows of continuation, how to continue 
exceeding one's being, how to continue thinking, in a movement by which the two, 
being and thinking, become one and the same. Badiou's philosophical works realize 
how the effect of the Cantorian discovery on the thinking of the ethical and the 
preconditions and possibilities of the subject, processes of radical change and true 





A Scission in Greek Tragedy Between Two 




The present chapter continues to interrogate the mark of sexual matters in Badiou's 
traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and its implications for thinking modernity and 
thinking change. Having made some headway concerning the question of the ethical 
status of the subject in fidelity to a truth procedure by piercing into the heavy 
mathematics that characterizes Badiou's thinking in the 1990s, this chapter proceeds 
through the topicalities of ancient Greek tragedy. Badiou frames much of his 
contention with Lacan during the so-called red years of the 70s – i.e., his Maoist 
period – through Greek tragedy. Badiou's contention with Lacan during the red years 
culminates in Théorie du sujet. Whereas the previous chapter focused on the 
opposition between a romantic and a modern conception of the infinite, conceived of 
as either inaccessible or actual, the present chapter focuses on the opposition between 
the tragic modes of Sophocles and Aeschylus, where Badiou opts unequivocally for 
Aeschylus and levels his criticism of Lacan's position on the basis of the limitations 
inherent to its Sophoclean tendencies. 
 The gap between Badiou's work in the 70s and his more mature production in 
the 80s and 90s is not a definite rupture. Abundant threads tie these periods together. 
The names of mathematicians such as Cantor, Gödel, and Cohen permeate Théorie du 
sujet just like the problematic of the revolution is frequently addressed in L’Être et 
l'événement. If the names of Marx, Lenin, and Mao are more pronounced in the earlier 
work than in the later, the materialist dialectic, as Bosteels has shown, remains 







mathematics and materialism go hand in hand. Théorie du sujet is often referred to as 
Badiou's most Lacanian book,359 and Badiou's discussions of Greek tragedy occur in a 
confrontation with the Lacanian real of sexual difference. Badiou posits that the real 
that is ours depends on the fact that there are two sexes and two classes.360 He argues 
that if the real of psychoanalysis is the impossibility of the sexual relation, then the 
real of Marxism is the impossibility of class relations, i.e., antagonism.361 Lacan's 
logics of sexuation are already mathematically conceived. The crucial knot of Badiou's 
elaborations on the subject in the 70s is still made up of a psychoanalytic notion of 
sexual difference, mathematics, and radical politics, even if this knot might be more 
pronounced in Badiou's work from the 90s.  
 My point of entry is tragedy; tragedy is implicated in my basic presupposition 
relating sexual matters, ethics, and the subject of politics. Badiou frames the thematics 
of tragedy within the question of sex and class, where to read Greek tragedy becomes a 
move to address the question of the relation between sex and class, focusing in on a 
conceptualization of that which is involved in a radical ethical act of subjective 
constitution. I interrogate the shift in the status of the tragic involved in Badiou's turn 
to Aeschylus, as it expands on the Sophoclean framework of Lacan, in order to answer 
the questions concerning what happens to tragedy and the status of the tragic the 
moment its decisive factor is no longer death and the experience of the limit as such, 
but that of continuation and succession, of un pas de plus? How does Badiou's turn to 
Aeschylus inform his attempt to reformulate the subject of politics and the possibilities 
of radical change and true novelty after Lacan? Badiou's recourse to tragedy is usually 
read through his elaborations on the Sophoclean couple of Antigone and Creon and the 
Aeschylean couple of Orestes and Athena. Instead, I start out from the figure of 
Prometheus the fire-bearer, briefly mentioned by Badiou as an exemplar of the 











the significance of the shift in the status of the tragic, especially in relation to Badiou's 
Maoism and the principle that there is reason in revolting, insofar as it accentuates the 
distinction between Lacan and Badiou's appreciation of tragedy on three points. 
Firstly, the principal operation of Prometheus is the division of speech and silence, of 
the symbolic and the real, whereas the Sophoclean paradigm and psychoanalysis is 
dominated by the operation of reversal. Secondly, the perspective of Prometheus is of 
the future, whereas Lacan and the Oedipal family await the perspective of the last 
judgment. Thirdly, Prometheus is a titan and thus immortal, a fact that problematizes 
the Lacanian notions of between two deaths and the death drive. Prometheus thereby 
intervenes directly into the core of Lacan's ethics of psychoanalysis. Against the death 
drive, Prometheus refuses the limitations of finitude and suggests an exceeding of 
mortal being, awarded by the immortal titan to humanity through the imagery of fire. 
What significance does the imagery of fire carry for thinking the subject of politics, 
radical change, and true novelty? The imagery of fire represents burning desire, 
commitment to a cause, and the capacities to manipulate and recreate the world. But in 
order to gain a fuller comprehension of Badiou's revolutionary ethics of confidence, a 
closer analysis of how Badiou maneuvers the Maoist dialectic, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Aeschylean tragedy, the figure of Prometheus, and the imagery of fire 
is required.  
 
 
An Impossible Reference 
Tragedy is a question of the ethical, and Eleanor Kaufman attacks Badiou on the 
grounds that his ethics is missing the uncompromising confrontation or "encounter 
with the unsurpassable limit"362 that is found in Lacan. Kaufman argues that Badiou's 
system lacks an appreciation of the messiness of things, of "ethics as the function that 
witnesses to extreme states."363 Her argument is somewhat displaced. It might be 
possible to make a good case against the systematic aspirations in Badiou's work, but 






those moments where the problematic of the limit no longer makes up the decisive 
issue. Badiou's philosophy addresses the moments when the said problematic of the 
limit has to yield to that of succession or continuation. To deplore the absence of an 
unsurpassable limit and extreme states in Badiou's work is thus to kick in an open 
door. To Badiou, messiness is but the beginning of things, and instead of the 
confrontation or even the breaching of the limit, the decisive moment is determined 
explicitly to be the work of continuation and the elaboration of consequences. 
 An early programmatic statement from Théorie du sujet, introduced along with 
the first mention of Lacan's name, underscores Badiou's shift in focus from the limit to 
continuation. Badiou writes:  
 
Si, comme dit Lacan, le réel est l'impasse de la formalisation, il faudra de ce point 
risquer que la formalisation est l'im-passe du réel. [...] Il nous faut une théorie de la 
passe du réel, en trouée de la formalisation. Ici le réel n'est plus seulement ce qui peut 
manquer à sa place, mais ce qui passe en force.364  
 
This statement is mirrored in the concluding remarks from L'Être et l'événement that I 
quoted towards the end of my previous chapter. Lacking in Lacan, Badiou claimed, 
was the suspension of truth to the supplementation of the event, the suspension from 
which the pass of the subject through the impasse of being were to be granted, and the 
punctual notion of truth as cause traversed through a notion of truth as process. As 
Bosteels have argued, the just quoted statement form Théorie du sujet makes an early 
argument for how a theory of the subject is possible only by way of a traversal of the 
Lacanian scheme.365 It calls for a traversal that reconfigures the concept of the real not 
only as limit but also according to the notion of un pas de plus, as continuation or 
succession. At best, Badiou claims, Lacan merely indicates the direction of such a 










Badiou's confrontation with the Lacanian framework in Théorie du sujet as elsewhere, 
namely the ethical premise of the imperative to continue exceeding one's being.  
 The imperative of continuation is tied to the philosophical refusal to accept 
death as the ultimate limit of life. The philosopher refuses to abandon the concepts of 
immortality, the eternal, and the infinite. The presumption that death is the only thing 
that truly intrudes upon life reduces the old philosophical motif of the good life to a 
question of the administration of death. It implies a nihilist will-to-nothing, Badiou 
claims, equally present in contemporary discourses on the ethics of human rights as in 
the Freudian notion of the death drive.367 Žižek accuses Badiou for being "at his 
weakest, succumbing to the temptation of the non-thought" when he, Badiou, opposes 
his notion of post-evental truths to the Freudian death drive as "the morbid obsession 
with death."368 Žižek has a point. Badiou misses out on how the death drive might 
serve as a "negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean'," and hence as a precondition for 
consequent elaborations of new truths.369 But the underlying premise of Badiou's 
position is his refusal to accept death as the ultimate limit to life. Lacan identified the 
domain between two deaths as the ground for his ethics of psychoanalysis on the basis 
of the Sophoclean trilogy on the Oedipal family's destiny. But does the domain 
between two deaths provide sufficient leeway in order to escape the confines of death, 
secure the actual infinite, and thus found the imperative of continuation? Badiou 
answers in the negative, and when he goes all the way back to Aeschylus in his return 
to tragedy in Théorie du sujet, it is because he finds the Sophoclean paradigm of 
psychoanalysis unable to think the pass of the subject beyond finitude. More than a 
morbid obsession with death, it is the failure of the Oedipal family and the Sophoclean 
paradigm to think beyond the limits of death and the blind repetitions of structure that 
motivates Badiou to turn towards the earlier paradigm of Aeschylus. The questions 
concern how the Aeschylean paradigm moves beyond Sophocles, and what this 








 Badiou's turn to Aeschylus has not gone unnoticed. When Bosteels and Žižek 
debate whether Badiou escapes being un Kantien cache, or whether the forcing of 
truths trumps the death drive in creative and affirmative potential, they return again 
and again to tragedy, and to Badiou's proposal to supplement the Sophoclean pair of 
Antigone and Creon, as figures of anxiety and the superego, with the Aeschylean pair 
of Orestes and Athena, as figures of courage and justice.370 While these debates are 
interesting, they might be somewhat displaced. The matter in question is the general 
status of tragedy or the tragic mode of Sophocles contra Aeschylus, on the one hand, 
and the significance of the shifts in the status of tragedy that Badiou's turn to 
Aeschylus testifies to, on the other. It is a question of the status of tragedy as a 
touchstone for ethics the moment its decisive factor ceases to be the problematic of the 
limit, so as to depend instead on the problematic of continuation. Instead of entering 
into the finer details of what the tragic figures (Antigone, Creon, Orestes, and Athena) 
might convey or not, I propose another entrance into this matter.  
 More precisely, I propose that the crux of Aeschylean tragedy is found neither 
in Orestes nor in Athena, but in Prometheus and in the notion of rebellious discipline 
and confidence that this figure offers.371 It is a working hypothesis, in the sense that it 
provides an entrance into the cluster of questions on limits and continuations, passes 
and impasses. Compared to the Lacanian lessons of Copjec and Zupančič, Badiou's 
ethics of continuation is less determined by the language of loss and abdication; it is 
also less directed towards the sacrifices to be made by the tragic heroine in the 
realization of her impossible desire. I claim that the differences here are best 














insists throughout Théorie du sujet,372 and he is familiar with how an Aeschylean 
tragedy, Prometheus the Fire-Bearer, addresses the fate of the original bringer of 
fire.373 Having first made the connection between Prometheus and the notion of 
confidence, Badiou goes on to state that confidence, the fundamental concept of his 
'ethics of Marxism,' organizes the entire ethical field.374 My point is not necessarily 
that the figure of Prometheus will reveal an entirely new conception of the Aeschylean 
paradigm of tragedy, but that it will clarify the mechanisms involved in Badiou's turn 
to Aeschylus by underscoring the notion of an ethics of confidence as a subjective 
formation between courage and justice. 
 But Badiou never reads Prometheus and his tragedy systematically, as he does 
with Sophocles' Antigone (441 BC) and Aeschylus' The Eumenides (458 BC). To 
interrogate the function of Prometheus within Badiou's thinking, one must recur to a 
reconstructive reading of a play that, furthermore, never made it through the annals of 
time in the first place. Prometheus the Fire-Bearer is a lost play, of which only a 
single fragment remains. Badiou's mention of the play is a reference that both must 
and cannot be, as Lacan would say. Prometheus the Fire-Bearer is, in other words, an 
impossible reference. I suggest that the apparent impasse of reconstructing Badiou's 
absent reading of Aeschylus' lost play provides an entrance into the shift in the status 
of tragedy and, consequently, in the status of the ethical. An analysis of the figure of 
Prometheus the fire-bearer might clarify the stakes involved in Badiou's pitting of sex 
and class against each other in an ethics of continuation. From Hegel to Lacan, the 
ethical reference has been Sophoclean in character and centered on the question of the 
















question must rather concern the being of Prometheus. The question is, to vary on a 




Articulations of Pieces; Providing a Place for Prometheus 
In this section, I advance a basic reconstruction of the figure of Prometheus. The 
questions concern how Prometheus the fire-bearer can be reconstructed as a figure of 
tragedy, how to make sense of this figure, and how to begin to grasp it as a subjective 
and, hence, political formation in the context of Badiou's traversal of Lacan. I proceed 
in two stages. First I analyze the traces that are left of Prometheus in the works of 
Aeschylus, and then I supplement these traces with relevant concepts from Badiou's 
red-years-philosophy. I focus on two traces in this section; the name of Prometheus, 
signifying forethought, and the Promethean motto, communicating a division of 
silence and speech. Through Badiou's Maoism, the Promethean motto comes to signify 
a rebellious reason that divides the concrete situation of the reign of Zeus in which 
Prometheus finds himself. Dividing the situation, Prometheus breaks free from the old 
and determined sequence of Zeus' reign and opens for another and undetermined 
sequence under the perspective of the future. A recurrent issue is how the figure of 
Prometheus comes to inform an understanding of Badiou's Maoist philosophy of 
politics, and vice versa. My elaborations on the name and motto of Prometheus in this 
section will lay the ground for the next section's comparison with the Sophoclean 
paradigm and psychoanalysis, which will, in its turn, prepare for my final discussions 




A question is how to read. Marc de Kesel has made an observation of Lacan's so-called 





discursive analysis of the plot must cede to an examination of each scene in its 
capacity as a signifier, to "a study that focuses individually on each scene to see how 
they successfully conjure up that central image"377 of Antigone in her unbearable 
splendor, Antigone between two deaths, Antigone as guardian of the being of the 
criminal. Lacan grounds his perception of Antigone by refocusing onto the single 
signifier of ἂτη. Usually translated as bane or ruin, ἂτη becomes for Lacan the 
designation of the limit of human life. As such, it serves Lacan as the axial term 
around which the entire drama of Antigone turns.378 Similarly, in reading Hamlet, 
Lacan structures his analysis around a few significant terms, or fibers.379 Obviously, in 
turning to the lost play of Aeschylus, the axial term must already be a given. There is 
nothing but two scattered traces left of this play. First of all, there is the name of 
Prometheus, which, according to Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (1889), 
derives from προµηθής and translates as forethought or providence.380 Secondly, there 
is a single fragment, catalogued as number 208 in Augustus Nauck's Tragicorum 
Graecorum Fragmenta (1889). It reads "σιγῶν θ᾽ ὃπου δεῖ καὶ λέγων τὰ καίρια". It is 
translated by Herbert Weir Smyth, in Loeb's Classical Library of Greek works, as 
"[b]oth silent, when there is need, and speaking in season."381 Alternatively, the 
accusative inflection of τὰ καίρια could be read as more concerned with content than 
with time, that is to say, as more concerned with 'speaking to the point.' In any case, 
the fragment professes a calculated disposition of silence and speech, or, more 
precisely, a division internal to both silence and speech. Add to that the later half of 
the title of the lost play, the Fire-Bearer, and two thus make three. There are three 
fibers on which to focus: the division of silence and speech, the perspective of the 












 The fragment 208 constitutes a Promethean motto, I would argue. It makes up 
the axial term of the only surviving play of Aeschylus' Prometheia trilogy, Prometheus 
Bound (n.d.).382 Even if the wording of the fragment is not repeated verbatim as it is in 
other plays by Aeschylus,383 its basic proposition of a calculated disposition between 
silence and speech constitutes a recurrent theme in this play and the central 
problematic for its hero. Although chained to a crag in the far-off region of Scythia as 
punishment for having gone against the bid of Zeus in awarding fire – the prerogative 
of the gods – to humanity, and thus bound to suffer the exposure of the elements and 
time, the proper quandary of Prometheus is not made up of his physical torments. The 
real predicament for Prometheus remains the fatal foresight that his name conveys. 
Prometheus is in possession of a secret knowledge that would hinder the foredoomed 
downfall of Zeus himself, if only communicated in due time to the god in question. 
But lest he is unbounded, Prometheus refuses to disclose his secret knowledge, to Zeus 
or anyone else. Therefore, in the closing scene of the play, Zeus, in a final cataclysm 
of thunder and lightning, hurls Prometheus to Tartarus and to tortures even more 
excessive than before. Some remarks on this surviving play is warranted in order to 
better come to terms with the figure of Prometheus, and thereby also with the status of 
tragedy in Badiou's philosophical reformulation of the preconditions and possibilities 
of radical change.  
 Throughout the play, in each scene, with each new character introduced on 
stage, the question of a proper balance between speech and silence is brought to the 
fore: whether it is Hephaestus who is scorned by Kratos for pitying the Prometheus he 















Zeus?");384 Prometheus who retells his story to the chorus, the daughters of Oceanus 
("Yet to be silent or not silent about this my fate is beyond my powers," "Painful is it 
to me even to tell the tale, painful to keep it silent");385 Oceanus who brings 
Prometheus some well-intended advice ("such plight as thine, Prometheus, is but the 
wages of too vaunting speech," "chastisement is inflicted on a froward tongue");386 Io 
who implores Prometheus to predict her fate in full ("Why then this thy reluctance to 
tell me all?", "tell me, if there be no harm in telling");387 or, finally, Hermes, the 
messenger of Zeus, who fails to obtain the secret knowledge that Prometheus 
possesses ("Methinks with my much speaking I but speak in vain").388 Prometheus is 
scorned equally for speaking too much and too little. He is chastised for being too 
insolent in regard to his tormentor, and for being too reticent in regard to his 
absolvance. But Prometheus remains unwavering in regard to the principal 
contradiction of silence and speech within the play: as to the injustice of his sufferings, 
he cannot keep his silence, even if his flaunting speech will further harm him; while 
concerning the prospective downfall of Zeus, he cannot divulge a word, even if his 
silence will cause him a well of further pains – "for 'tis no wise meet time to discourse 
of this. At every hazard this must be concealed; for 'tis by safeguarding it that I am to 
escape my ignominious bonds and outrage."389 Prometheus never retreats from this 
defiant position. When Hermes begs him to impart the truth of his sovereign's future 
demise in the closing scene, Prometheus will continue to dismiss Hermes' proxy 
commands and threats ("thou shall learn naught whereof thou questionest me", "there 
is no torment or devise by which Zeus shall induce me to utter this until these injurious 
fetters be loosed")390 until the curtain falls. 
 The announcement of the principal contradiction of Prometheus' decisive 












and not merely by chance. It captures the climactic moment of the play. In Aristotelian 
terms, this moment of disclosure would be designated as the play's turning point and 
moment of recognition.391 It is truly a moment of revelation, where Prometheus reveals 
to both himself and his crowds his true colors. It is the moment when Prometheus 
affirms himself in his refusal to remain beaten and in his renewed intention to continue 
his rebellion against Zeus in full force. But in terms of Aristotle's classical theory of 
tragedy, it is a curious climactic moment. It does not incur a closure or denouement in 
the traditional sense. Rather the disclosure of the principal contradiction incurs a re-
nouement, a reknotting and further thickening of the plot. The struggle commences 
again. Whereas the first half of the play is characterized primarily by a despairing 
Prometheus that laments his unjust suffering for having stolen fire from the gods and 
bestowed it on mankind, the second half of the play brings about a shift in character as 
well as in perspective. As the perspective shifts from the past as cause of his current 
suffering to the future, Prometheus gains in confidence that he will one day be freed 
and Zeus one day dethroned. As Prometheus explains, he has already seen two tyrants 
overthrown (i.e., Uranus and Cronus), and will surely live to see the downfall of the 
third and present one.392 Prometheus is at first wont to recognize his initial theft of fire 
as an error [ἁµαρτὶα], albeit an error made deliberately [ἑκὼν ἣµαρτον].393 But the 
disclosure of the principal contradiction between silence and speech designate the 
climactic moment of recognition as nothing less than the repetition and effective 
reinforcement of his initial error. Prometheus recognizes that he, in his initial 
rebellious act against Zeus, was in the right. His rebellion was justified, or reasonable. 















first, is made. Prometheus will continue his rebellion in full force, as he decides to 
persist in error, [ἐξαµαρτάνειν], as the chorus formulates it.394  
 In Aristotle's view, the finest tragedies are those in which the turn from 
happiness to unhappiness coincides with the moment of recognition, the 
acknowledgement of the tragic error that brings about the hero's demise.395 Obviously, 
one can hardly speak of a turn from happiness to unhappiness in the case of 
Prometheus qua bound, as he is hardly content with his extreme bondage to begin 
with. No more can one speak of any ignorance on his part in regard to his initial error 
as the root cause of his current malaise.396 But is it not precisely as a reverse or 
negative of the one advocated in the Aristotelian model that it is possible to speak of a 
coincidence in the climactic moment of Prometheus Bound – a curious coincidence, 
admittedly, but a coincidence nonetheless? The acknowledgement at stake in 
Prometheus' moment of recognition does not so much concern the erroneous status of 
his initial act of rebellion as such, a status of which he is already well aware, but rather 
the validity and legitimacy of this error, that it was not wrong to err. Furthermore, the 
acknowledgement and consolidation of this legitimacy, insofar as it promotes the 
repetition of the initial error in the continuation of his rebellion, effectuates not so 
much a reversal of the initial situation of Prometheus, for either better or worse, but 
rather a further endorsement and reinforcement of his quandary – as in another and 
willful turn of the screw.  
 The play begins with its own denouement, insofar as it begins with the 
punishment of Prometheus. The play begins as already resolved and unknotted, while 
the climactic moment where Prometheus reveals his decisive silence functions as a 
reknotting and further complication of the plot. The climactic moment marks the point 
at which the rebellion of Prometheus reconstitutes itself to begin again, with renewed 
determination. This new resolve does not find its discharge within the extant text. At 









crag at the far confines of the earth, where nothing awaits him but an eternity of woe, 
cursedly blessed – as he as a titan is – with the dubious privilege of immortality. 
Prometheus appears to have been permanently disposed of at the outmost limits of the 
world, geographically and symbolically, as he is excluded from the community of gods 
and mortals alike, with no respite in view. His crime has been called on, and the 
execution of his punishment leaves little room for further action and intrigue. At a 
second glance, however, the climactic moment reveals the opposite. Despite 
appearances, Prometheus is not a figure utterly lost and beaten at the end of his line. 
Despite appearances, Prometheus is not a figure of the beginning of the end. 
Prometheus is the figure of the end of the beginning, as the moment by which a path is 
cleared for a further continuation, a new strand in the fabric of history. The decision to 
persist in error is not the obstinate refusal on Prometheus' part to accept his defeat or 
assume his guilt, even if there is more than a little obstinacy in him. The proper quality 
of his decision is underscored by Io's entrance on stage. She appears immediately after 
the climactic moment, and her appearance gives way to an extrapolation of her and 
Prometheus' interlocked futures to come. It is Io's descendant Heracles who will 
eventually liberate Prometheus from his chains. Io's entrance underscores the quality 
of Prometheus' decision to persist in error in its negative and affirmative aspects, as the 
interruption of the sequence supposedly determined, on the one hand, and the 
institution of another and open sequence, on the other.397 Prometheus is, sticking to 





















The lesson to be drawn from Prometheus' decisive silence concerns how an apparent 
deadlock can prove to hold within itself its own key. It teaches that a situation 
seemingly at an impasse can hold the possibility of its own resolution, its own passing. 
In other words, the lesson of Prometheus is a lesson on truth as radical change and 
novelty. For the Badiou of the 70s, such a lesson is more than anything a lesson in 
revolutionary politics. In this sense, Prometheus has nothing to lose but his chains, as 
Marx observed of the proletarian,398 and reflects the truth inherent to a politics proper 
to the proletariat. The truth proper to the proletariat is, Badiou claims, revolt. The 
underlying principle is the principle found in Mao's crystallization of Marxism into the 
single proposition usually translated as 'it is right to rebel' or 'to rebel is justified' 
[zaofan youli]. To capture its somewhat idiosyncratic rendition in Badiou, however, a 
better translation would read that 'there is reason in revolting' [on a raison de se 
révolter].399 Briefly put, the reason proper to revolt is a matter not only of the 
recognition that there are reasons to revolt and that revolt will thus be justified. It is 
also a matter of revolt itself as productive or constitutive of reason as such. Reason is 
in essence contradictory, founded in opposition, and realized through struggles against 
the powers that be, whether these powers be the bourgeoisie within or without the 
Party or the reign of Zeus, proletarian or Promethean. Revolts think, as thinking 
revolts. In the words of another and by Badiou oft-quoted phrase that captures the crux 
















interrogation of the logic of Prometheus' decision will serve to clarify further the 
mechanisms of the principle of reason's division and the operations of its politics – a 
politics designated by Badiou as the art of the impossible.401 
 On a formal level, the Promethean motto conveys a division internal to both 
speech and silence. It divides speech and silence according to their right time and 
place, according to what can and cannot be said when and where. This first formal 
division effectuates a further division internal to the situation at large and the current 
discursive universe. The division of speech and silence thus reveals a fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of that which was previously presumed to be a harmonious 
and unified whole. It reveals a fundamental contradiction as constitutive of the identity 
of the situation. In the case of Prometheus, the identity of the situation is the all of 
gods and mortals under the reign of Zeus. By the decision to speak that which the 
current discourse demands to be silenced, the injustice of his bonds, and to silence that 
which the current discourse demands to be spoken, the knowledge to prevent the 
downfall of Zeus, Prometheus demonstrates another reason, a reason of his own, 
constituted in and through its contradiction with the dominant reason of Zeus. From 
the perspective of the latter, the decision of Prometheus can only appear as senseless 
and devoid of meaning, as an erroneous judgment on all accounts. It goes against all 
that the dominant reason conceives of as reasonable. The dominant reason of Zeus is 
reducible to an absolute compliance with the commands of the father, if for no other 
reason than his superior power. The logic of Zeus is, in essence, the logic of the 
thunderbolt. It is in that sense paradigmatic of the superegoic logic of the naked and 
violent injunction.402 
 The most pronounced expression of the dominant reason of Zeus is found in the 












command of Zeus – explicitly referred to as the father – is even possible.403 But a 
similar bewilderment makes up a recurrent theme in all those who come to face 
Prometheus, also in those who are most inclined towards his position. Io is baffled at 
the prospect of an overthrown Zeus,404 and the chorus is at a loss of what to make of 
the persistent error it conceives to be at stake in the decisive silence of Prometheus. In 
sum, these expressions of incomprehension as to Prometheus' decision underscore how 
his position is unthinkable, an impossibility, within the current discursive universe. 
They underscore how his position is reasonable to none but himself. But they also 
underscore how his reason manifests itself as a negative of the reason of Zeus, and 
through the negation of Zeus' reason. The stance of Prometheus only comes across as 
erroneous from the perspective of Zeus, while it is to the perspective of Zeus that the 
error and the misjudgment is ascribed by the stance of Prometheus.  
 As Peter Wessel Zapffe observes in his grand opus on the concept of the tragic, 
Om det tragiske (1941), Prometheus is driven by the knowledge that his perpetrator 
will receive his punishment, to the extent that the play itself approaches the status of 
"the most elementary polemic play."405 But beyond the mere dissent of two opposing 
views, I claim, the case of Prometheus is a matter of an antagonistic contradiction. In 
an antagonistic contradiction, the affirmation of each term is possible only through the 
destruction of the other in both its manifestation and its support. As Badiou writes of 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the proletariat's affirmation entails not only the 
suspension of bourgeois rule and the destruction of the bourgeoisie in its 
manifestation, like a true statement would exclude a false statement. It also entails the 
destruction of the bourgeoisie in its support, and thereby the destruction of the 
proletariat itself. The affirmation of the proletariat demands the destruction of class 
society and systematic exploitation, destroying the classes of the bourgeoisie and the 










destruction of the dominant reason of Zeus. In a certain sense, the reign of the latter is 
destroyed by the simple refusal to follow its command, insofar as the reign of Zeus is 
nothing if not absolute. Initially excluded from the world of gods and mortals, 
reasonable to none but himself, Prometheus returns with a vengeance, quite literally, 
and by refusing to abide by the reign of Zeus, Prometheus forces the reign of Zeus to 
define itself in relation to the rebellious opposition of Prometheus. Prometheus forces 
the reign of Zeus to define itself as much through the terms of its opposite, the 
rebellion, as through its own terms, the established state. In and through his decisive 
silence, Prometheus manifests another reason, and in and through his other reason, 
Prometheus realizes a division within the situation. On the one hand, there is the old 
sequence determined by Zeus, on the other, the new sequence, undetermined except in 
its prospective destruction of the old. The division is not simply between the old and 
the new. More precisely, it is a division between the old and the new that remains 
internal to the present, a division between the past of the present and a present future.  
 Prometheus finds the means to interrupt the seemingly determined sequence of 
his exceptional detention through the repetition and augmentation of his initial error, 
and not through the intrusion of some external pressure. Prometheus declines the aid of 
Oceanus, for instance, which offers himself to negotiate with Zeus.407 There is a point 
to be made of this active repetition on Prometheus' part, insofar as it allows him to 
isolate the possibility of passing beyond the reign of Zeus at the exact point of the 
impossibility of passing. It is the logic of the drive, dissolving and binding the bonds it 
dissolves, at the point where the law contradicts and undermines itself. It is the logic of 
revolting reason as the political art of the impossible. The active repetition of 
Prometheus' initial error underscores how it is by the cause of his bondage that he 
finds the measure to intervene into the same bondage and procure its termination. The 
weakness of his position, his chains, becomes his strength, as it is the strength of Zeus 
that becomes Zeus' weakness. Because he is nothing under the reign of Zeus, he can 
reduce the reign of Zeus to nothing. By fully assuming the conditions of his 
predicament, Prometheus retrieves his own rebellious motor force, and by fully 




interrupt the smooth functioning of its established order. At this point, in the context of 
making sense of Badiou, it is important to underline that the climactic moment in 
Prometheus Bound designates the institution of a new and open sequence, not the 
conclusion of an old. As my discussions progress to Lacan's readings of tragedy, this 
point is important to keep in mind. 
 Force is to be opposed to place. It is probably the central concept in Théorie du 
sujet. The concepts of force and place are roughly equivalent to the Lacanian concepts 
of the real and the symbolic. Because force is such a central concept in Théorie du 
sujet, it undergoes numerous modulations and inflections.408 Notably, it carries the 
main distinction between that which Badiou designates as the structural and the 
historical strand of the dialectic. The structural strand of the dialectic comprises the 
placement of force, the subordination of force to place, whereas the historical dialectic 
pursues the forcing of place, the transformation of place by force. Badiou's wager to 
turn from the Lacanian stance on the real as impasse to an appreciation of the pass of 
the real depends upon the function of force within these two strands of the dialectic. 
Badiou perceives Lacan to be too tied up with the structural strand. He therefore seeks 
to supplement the structural dialectic in Lacan with the historical dialectic provided 
through Marxism. By supplementing the structural dialectic and the placement of force 
with its historical other and the forcing of place, Badiou aims to account for 
preconditions and possibilities of the subject of politics, of radical change and true 
novelty. 
 Badiou expounds on the bifurcation of the dialectic by recourse to the 
distinction between the fundamental and the principal contradiction of capitalist 
society. The fundamental contradiction between productive forces and relations of 
production provides an exposition only of the basis, the disposition of places. The 
principal contradiction of class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat 
provides an exposition of the motor of historical change. It designates the so-called 







unity of their place, insofar as the affirmation of the proletariat and the proletarian 
project of communism are unthinkable, an impossibility, within the bourgeoisie. 
Economy and the opposition of places define the fundamental contradiction of the 
structural dialectic, whereas the political proper of the opposition of forces defines the 
principal contradiction of the historical dialectic.409 The key point of the historical 
dialectic and the concept of force is the insistent question of how to envisage reality 
not only from the point of view of the state of things, of structure, but also from the 
point of view of the future, Badiou writes. This question is the question of the political 
proper. It effectuates a division of primacy, where the primary force within a given 
situation reveals itself to be nothing less than the overthrowing of the primacy of 
place, with the exploited classes putting an end to their exploitation, and to 
exploitation as such.410 The stakes of the division of primacy are perhaps best captured 
in colonial terms, as in Franz Fanon's recourse to Matthew 20:16, stating that "the last 
shall be first and the first last."411  Badiou often refers to the same logic through the 
famous verse from L'Internationale, "nous ne sommes rien, soyons tout!"412  	
 Prometheus incarnates the gist of the logic of the division of primacy. Badiou 
writes of the so-called history of force that "la force n'est que ce qui, concentrant sur 
soi-même hors-lieu un terme assigné à répétition, coince la répétition, enclenchant 
ainsi de quoi détruire sa loi." He adds that "là où la cohérence ancienne prescrivait un 





















Badiou thereby provides a close to perfect description of the climactic moment of 
Prometheus Bound. Displaced onto his Scythian crag, Prometheus interrupts the 
perpetual repetition of his punishment under the law through a refocus onto himself in 
his exclusion, through a purification of his illegal status. His active repetition amounts 
to an augmentation of his position that goes beyond the limited place afforded to the 
world of gods and mortals under the reign of Zeus. If Prometheus' decisive silence and 
the active repetition of his initial error open for the possibility of passing in and by the 
exact point of its impossibility, it cannot be a matter of an arbitrary point of exit or line 
of flight any more than it can be a matter of an external imposition. Rather the 
possibility of passing must be found in and through the most dense obstacle to such a 
passing. In Badiou's own terms, the possibility of passing must be found in and 
through "l'occupation forcée de la place inoccupable" or "l'existence forcée de 
l'inexistant."414 If the last shall become the first, the last must first make their being 
last, and if the ones that are nothing are to become everything, their nothingness must 
first come to intervene in everything as something, making something of nothing, quite 
literally. When Prometheus acknowledges his initial error as legitimate, endorsing the 
cause of his extreme bondage, a curious reduplication of the cause is effectuated in 
him. The initial cause, the error of his theft of fire, cancels its original effect, his being 
bound within an apparently determined sequence of inevitable oppression. The initial 
cause thus gives way to its effective contradiction, as the cause of the interruption that 
is his continued rebellion. Through its curious reduplication, the initial cause becomes 
constitutive of another reason that opens for another sequence and an unsettled future.  
 A preliminary summary of my reconstruction of Badiou's lost reading and its 
Promethean ethics of confidence can be made. I have dealt with the name and the 
motto of Prometheus, that is, with the perspective of the future and the division of 
silence and speech. Prometheus effectuates a division of silence and speech through 
his decision to keep silent on the crucial details of the prophesied downfall of Zeus. 







sequence to which Zeus has condemned Prometheus, and institutes another sequence 
for an unsettled future. The questions of the imagery of fire and the significations that 
imagery produces remain. However, these questions cannot be dealt with 
independently of the decisive silence already discussed and the new perspective it 
entails. The name and motto of Prometheus might seem like meager traces on which to 
build an understanding of an ethics of confidence, or an ethics of Marxism. It might 
seem like meager traces to come to terms with how Badiou strives to think radical 
change and true novelty beyond Lacan. A proceeding via negativa, through the 
comparison of these two traces to that which they do not communicate, to the 
Sophoclean paradigm of tragedy and to psychoanalysis, will uncover more of their 
significance. It will allow for a more elaborate articulation, which also includes the 




Via Negativa; 'Would I Were Not...' 
In this section, I address the fundamentals of the Sophoclean paradigm and the 
psychoanalytic conception of tragedy. How has the Sophoclean paradigm allowed 
psychoanalysis to develop a conception of the subject and the ethical act, but also, and 
more importantly, how can Sophocles and psychoanalysis serve as a contrast to the 
basic traits of the figure of Prometheus? Against the operation of division and the 
perspective of the future, the Sophoclean paradigm is determined by the operation of 
reversal and the perspective of the last judgment. The dictum of Oedipus the Beggar 
articulates the desire to never have been. This dictum functions as the axial term of 
how psychoanalysis reads the Sophoclean paradigm. It expresses how the Oedipal 
family pursues speech until it turns into its opposite, the dead silence of the real. It 
expresses the crux of Lacan's concept of the domain between two deaths, the 
impossible point of the real by which to value the life of the Oedipal hero as already 
lost. But it also expresses how the point of the real is essentially unrepresentable 
within the Sophoclean paradigm. The question is how Prometheus comes to represent 
the point of the real by fully assuming his position in its place, and how he thereby 
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comes to instigate a new and undetermined sequence through the division of the old. 
An analysis of these operations of Prometheus opens for a further investigation into 




Is there a motto more opposed to psychoanalysis than the Promethean motto of the 
Aeschylean fragment 208, imposing a calculated disposition between silence and 
speech? Psychoanalysis was famously tagged the talking cure by Anna O.,415 yet I am 
not referring to the basic principle of free association here. I do not have in mind the 
analysand's injunction to say anything, whatever comes to mind at whatever moment. 
Rather I aim at the function of desire in psychoanalysis. Desire is bound to speech. As 
Juliet Flower MacCannell formulates it, Lacanian psychoanalysis confirmed Freud's 
thesis that the unconscious is linked to language, to what can be said and what cannot 
be said.416 Desire follows a metonymic movement, an incessant gliding from object to 
object and from signifier to signifier. In Lacanian parlance, desire is that which does 
not stop writing itself, or that which does not stop speaking itself. But there is an 
ultimate limit to desire. Desire does not stop speaking itself until it reaches a certain 
point, the impossible point that does not stop not writing itself, the point of the real 
cause of desire. The Sophoclean paradigm in tragedy represents this determination of 
desire.  
 What caused the downfall of Oedipus the King, if not the fact that he could not 
manage his tongue but continued, despite all advise to the contrary, to demand the 
truth to be spoken ("Oh speak, withhold not", "For heavens sake, tell me all", "If thou 
lack'st the grace to speak, I'll loose thy tongue")?417 Oedipus the King demanded the 











monstrous Mutter-Ding, as his outmost disaster. At the point of das Ding, his desire 
becomes a truth that bursts in his eyes and leaves him blind. Lacan never tired from 
saying that Oedipus never suffered from the complex bearing his name. Oedipus' 
suffered from an unrelenting desire to know more, to know the truth and the last word 
of desire.418 It was Oedipus' relentless pursuit of this desire that finally brought about 
his tragedy, bringing him too close to his real. Furthermore, what was the cause of 
Antigone's doom, if not the fact that she could not suffer in silence her brother's 
desecration by Creon's edict, but demanded her brother's proper burial and followed up 
on her demand by doing it herself? Antigone never stopped demanding her brother's 
burial, and that led her to her own living grave, in stark contrast to her sister, Ismene, 
whose dumbness and vagueness of the will Antigone deplored the most ("O tell it, 
sister; I shall hate thee more, if thou proclaim it not to all the town"419)? The fate of 
Antigone is made in her extreme and inhuman inflexibility, as she is inclined 
completely to her own end. It is here Lacan designates Antigone's unbearable splendor, 
the beauty of her captivating image: in her obstinate inclination to go beyond the limits 
of life and death, to the domain between two deaths, and to the realization of her 
familial ἂτη, Antigone serves as an illustration of the death drive. She becomes the 
incarnation of her desire as a pure desire, and renders visible her pure desire as a desire 
for death.420  
 Zupančič writes that the tragic heroine or hero is precisely someone who risks 
the path of abolishing the split between the symbolic and the metonymic character of 
desire, on the one hand, and its ultimate aim in the real of das Ding, on the other.421 
The risk of the path to abolition characterizes the essential tragic traits of the 
Sophoclean paradigm. The tragic examples of Oedipus and Antigone consist in their 
mutual insistence to go beyond the limits of language and the symbolic, into the grips 










Oedipus finds the cause of his downfall in his blind ignorance of the limits of desire, 
of that which does not lend itself to communication. Antigone finds the cause of her 
doom in her blatant disregard for the same limit, for that which does not stop not 
writing itself.  
 Lacan makes a point of how Antigone breaks into a lament for her life at the 
moment when she is carried away to her living death. At this moment, Antigone 
realizes herself between two deaths, as symbolically dead but not really dead, excluded 
from the living while still alive. Antigone laments how her living entombment will 
deny her the bonds of hymen, the marital bed, the birth of her children, and so on. 
Lacan designates it as her κοµµὸς. Her seemingly exaggerated proclamations of 
emotion should not be perceived as going counter to her otherwise sober and 
calculative determination, as if she were suddenly to regret her act, Lacan argues. 
Rather her lament ensues at that specific moment for the specific reason that her life is 
only possible to approach from the position where life is already lost to her. Antigone 
can only look back and evaluate her life after having left life behind and passed into 
the realm of death. She can appreciate life only as lost.422 In other words, Antigone's 
lament attests to the epistemological merit involved for the figures of the Sophoclean 
paradigm. The insistence to go beyond the limits of language and life, to push the 
indeterminate movement of desire to its end in das Ding, lethal in any case, provides 
the necessary condition by which the question of the realization of desire can be 
posited at all. Like any signifying chain, desire demands for its signification to be 
determined and ascertained retroactively. The realization of desire demands the 
perspective of that which Lacan designates as the last judgment: "Essayez de vous 
demander," he asks his audience, "ce que peut vouloir dire avoir réalisé son désir – si 
ce n'est de l'avoir réalisé, si l'on peut dire, à sa fin. C'est cet empiétement de la mort sur 
la vie qui donne son dynamisme à toute question quand elle essaie de se formuler sur 









 The risk of the path of abolition culminates in Sophocles' last play, Oedipus at 
Colonus (406 BC). It portrays Oedipus the Beggar at the end of his life. The play 
provides a dictum that confirms the full effect of the necessary yet impossible 
requirement of the perspective of the last judgment in regard to the realization of 
desire. It is the dictum of µὴ φῦναι, the dictum of would I were not or would I were not 
born, often repeated by Lacan.424 The dictum of Oedipus the Beggar shows us, Lacan 
says, how, in every human experience, the interior limit zone of desire is always 
disposed unto the realm beyond death.425  
 The dictum of Oedipus the Beggar designates the axial term of psychoanalysis 
itself, I argue. The desire to never have been, to never have been born, is the desire to 
never have been separated from the Mutter-Ding in the first place. It is the desire to 
never have suffered castration, and thus the desire to never have been neither a subject 
of the signifier nor a subject of desire. As the paradoxical desire not to desire, it is the 
impossible real of desire par excellence. In a case more striking that the case of 
Antigone's splendor, Oedipus the Beggar's desire to never have been illustrates the 
death drive, the drive to return to an inanimate and inorganic state, as Freud 
formulated it in Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920).426 Lacan defines the desire to never 
have been as Oedipus' consenting malediction, his nuptial with annihilation, the true 
and invisible extinction that is his.427 Lacan emphasizes how the case of Oedipus at 
Colonus is not concerned with the question of just any old death, the accidental death 















his very own being.428 The questions are how the dictum of Oedipus allows for a 
thinking of ethics and the subject, and how this thinking relates to the subjective 
formations represented through the figure of Prometheus.  
 De Kesel argues that it is not so much the content of this dictum that interests 
Lacan as its form, and the fact that Oedipus – at the end of his life and reduced to the 
bare minimum of his desire to not have been – is still and irreducibly nothing but "a 
lump of flaming desire."429 I contend that it is precisely the coincidence of form and 
content that is paramount in the dictum of Oedipus the Beggar. Lacan interprets the 
negative µὴ as corresponding to the French ne discordantiel (e.g., 'je crains qu'il ne 
vienne'), the seemingly meaningless negation that Lacan nonetheless perceives to be 
the trace or place of the subject in the statement. Lacan perceives the ne discordantiel 
to be "la pointe du désir [comme] le sujet où s'origine l'énonciation,"430 or "la négation 
identique à l'entrée du sujet, sur le support du signifiant."431 According to de Kesel, 
Oedipus testifies to "how the 'no one' that he is stems ultimately from a desire and this 
desire, in the final analysis, is borne by that 'no one', that is, by the one who – to put it 
in Lacanese – exists only insofar as he is represented by signifiers."432 Insufficiently 
underscored in this portrayal, however, is how the no-one that Oedipus as a subject is, 
his desire or lack-in-being [manque-à-être] as that which a signifier represents to 
another signifier, finds itself redoubled in his desire, the pure desire to be no-one or 
nothing. The negation (µὴ) by which his desire enters the signifying chain is not only a 
representative of the subject or of desire as lack, but also that which this same desire 
aims at. Reading the form and the content of the dictum together underscores that the 
desire to never have been is nothing but the desire to never have been a subject even in 













 Is there another meaning to the notion of a beyond even of the second death, the 
symbolic death? If Oedipus' aim is not merely the accidental death that anyone can die, 
but the eradication of his very being, and if that being is nothing but the gaping 
nothing between signifiers, must it not be towards the eradication of this nothing that 
his last gesture is directed? In other words, it is not merely the nothing that he is that 
he longs to assume, but a more radical nothing, a nothing beyond that which he has 
ever been. Oedipus longs to vanish in the hole in the Other, in a move beyond the 
dimensions of the old negation of negation. In a certain sense, Oedipus at Colonus 
provides a representation of such an ultimate eradication or nuptial with annihilation, 
despite the impossibility of representing it. At the end of the play, Oedipus simply 
disappears, as if he had dissolved in thin air. He has "gone, evanished from our eyes," 
the messenger reports.433 Behind him, Oedipus leaves nothing, not even a grave, and 
thus no trace or mark, no signifier, to bear witness to his existence, his ever having 
been.  
 One of Samuel Beckett's titles, Oh les beaux jours (1961), could serve to 
characterize this end of Oedipus. 'Oh les beaux jours' is a conclusion to be made only 
at the end, retroactively. As such, it reintroduces Lacan's notion of the perspective of 
the last judgment. Lacan defines a certain triumph of being-for-death as the 
fundamental trait of all tragic action. Such a triumph provides the necessary 
perspective by which the relation between action and its inherent desire can be 
addressed, Lacan says.434 A judgment can be passed on the life and death of Oedipus 
only when the chain of signifiers under which his nothing has kept insisting has been 
brought to a close. Only then can a judgment be made on whether or not he achieved 
his life's purpose in the making of his own death and thus, finally, whether or not he 
realized his desire. Both the chorus and his daughter-sister, Antigone, cast a positive 
judgment. "He did as he desired [ἒπραξεν οἳον ἢθελεν]," Antigone can state only after 
he has gone,435 whereas the chorus, in the last verse of the play, will placidly observe 







As in the case of Prometheus, the reduplication that takes place in the case of 
Oedipus is remarkable. There is a manifest exaggeration to the final stance of his 
being-for-death. First of all, Oedipus doubles the nothing that he is, as far as he is his 
desire, in his desire to be nothing and to never have been. Furthermore, as the other 
side of this doubling, the last judgment on his acts concerns precisely the act of his last 
judgment. To have answered the question of whether or not Oedipus acted in 
conformity with the desire that sustained him is to have answered the question of 
whether or not Oedipus finally fulfilled the preconditions by which such a realization 
of his desire can be evaluated, whether or not he realized the perspective of the last 
judgment, the end point from which to retroactively determine his insistence under the 
signifying chain. The reduplication of the stance of Oedipus underscores how the 
conclusion of one's desire is to desire no more, and thus to be no more, just like the 
desire to not desire is, in the last analysis, nothing but another formulation of the desire 
to have one's desire finally concluded upon.  
 If Oedipus the Beggar and his dictum can be conceived of as representatives of 
the fundamental trait of all tragic action according to Lacan and the Sophoclean 
paradigm, it is on account of an excessive redoubling of the stakes. Oedipus showcases 
an exaggerated triumph of being-for-death and an exaggerated race to the limits (of 
life and death, desire and knowledge), as if the aim of Oedipus were to become the 
very measure of human action as such.437 The final stance of Oedipus displays a 
perseverance similar to the one Copjec observes in the position of Antigone.438 


















less than her father-brother is Antigone inclined to ever bend on her desire. Both insist 
on following through on their desire, beyond life and beyond death. At the same time, 
their perseverances to go beyond the limits of life and death, and even beyond the 
second death, are still oriented by the limits beyond which they aim. The limit is the 
defining feature of the Sophoclean character, Lacan argues. All major Sophoclean 
characters find themselves alive but not living, dead but still alive. Their determining 
trait is to be positioned à-bout-de-course, at the end of the line.439 In the Sophoclean 
tragedy, as read through psychoanalysis, there is no succession and no continuation to 
follow in line after the end of desire has been met and realized. There is nothing but 
the steadfast elaboration of its already determined sequences, i.e. nothing but death 
and misery, as no subject can ever be sustained in the beyond of the real. The question 




The Sophoclean paradigm differs from the Aeschylean paradigm. Badiou characterizes 
the operation of reversal [retournement], of native reversal or reversal of the native 
form, as the privileged designation of the Sophoclean subject-effect as a whole.440 Is 
there an example of this operation more striking than Oedipus the Beggar? Badiou 
does not discuss the play of Oedipus at Colonus, but he has already made the case that 
Oedipus the King incarnates the operation of reversal with all the clarity of his 
blinding act. But is there a more fundamental recuperation of the operation of reversal 
than the one encountered in the µὴ φῦναι of Oedipus the Beggar? The essence of the 
Sophoclean paradigm of tragedy, Badiou writes, rests in its backwards movement 
towards an origin. This backwards movement involves an oscillation between the two 
notions of anxiety and the superego, between a formless blaze (Antigone's 'birdlike 
cries' of absolute destitution, the unbearable encounter of Oedipus with the truth of his 
desire) and a formal excess (Creon's entombment of Antigone, the blinding reaction of 





where the subject pursues the involution of the symbolic space, the involution of the 
law (to which one could add the involution of desire and its signifying chain), until 
death.441 The symbolic space collapses on itself. The essence of the Sophoclean 
paradigm is found in the reciprocity between the notions involved – between the 
Oedipus of the desire for truth and the Oedipus of the truth of desire – as they 
constitute each other's undersides. In sum, the motion between anxiety and the 
superego in the Sophoclean paradigm constitutes a closed-off dialectic from which 
there is offered no issue, no alternative path but a return to the beginning, to the old 
order of things, as in the spherical revolutions of a planetarium.442 In his blinding self-
mutilation, Oedipus exerts upon himself an excessive demand of superegoic character. 
The superegoic demand is an attempt to contain the ravaging anxiety induced through 
his encounter with his truth, the moment when the symbolic space collapses on itself. 
But Oedipus' self-mutilating demand only serves to re-exclude this truth, to drive it 
back into a position from which it can only return as ravaging anxiety yet again. The 
contradiction of anxiety and the superego follows the logic of a self-perpetuating 
deadlock or stalemate. It is a contradiction that is tragic, Badiou writes, insofar as it 
offers no other issue than death.443 
 Oedipus the Beggar, as he seeks his last refuge at Colonus, illustrates the gist of 
the stalemate involved in the Sophoclean paradigm. The backwards movement 
towards an origin, pursued through the involution of the symbolic space and desire 



















his so-called nuptial with annihilation, his own true extinction, by which he disappears 
even as a signifier. The second-degree death that Oedipus suffers and that erases his 
being as desire is precisely the realization of the move in which his whole life and fate 
suffer their ultimate reversal. The death of Oedipus effaces his being as if he had never 
been born. To reformulate this point in adherence to the terminology of the 
Promethean motto, I would say that the name of Oedipus the Beggar designates the 
heedless pursuit of speech to its limit, and its consequent reversal into its opposite, the 
absolute silence of das Ding.  
 The effect of the death of Oedipus, I argue, is to confirm the operation of 
reversal as the principal name of his game. Oedipus ends up as incarnating the truth of 
desire, once having followed his desire for truth to the end. Having first encountered 
his monstrous Mutter-Ding, Oedipus himself takes on the function of such an 
unbearable real. As Zupančič observes, he becomes a live and walking Ding.444 
Oedipus the King incarnated as a living Ding in Oedipus the Beggar: that is the reason 
why he is banished from Thebes, why he seeks his last refuge at Colonus. That is also 
the reason why Creon again pursues him with the intention of having him reinstalled in 
Thebes, but not within the city limits. Creon intends to install Oedipus at the city 
fringes, as the constitutive outside of the symbolic space of the community, the absent 
guarantee that is to secure the prosperity of the city, as the oracle had predicted. 
Oedipus never returns to Thebes, as Antigone and his other children-siblings do. 
However, that does not prevent Oedipus from serving the same function in regard to 
the city of Athens, at the outskirts of which Colonus is located. When Oedipus is gone, 
when the blind and monstrous Ding is returned to its void outside the symbolic space, 
as nothing, all is ordered for the best, as the chorus concludes. The community can 
return to its usual order, the same old run of things, the same old service des biens. 
 The problematic of Antigone's living entombment and the refused burial of her 
brother, Polyneices, is similar. Polyneices' refused burial reveals that which Antigone's 
living entombment desperately tries to re-conceal, namely the constitutive outside that 
props up the consistency of the symbolic space, i.e. of Creon's civil law. Lacan 




law, a law without remainder, is a possibility. Polyneices and Antigone bear testimony 
to the fatality of Creon's error.445  Jean Bollack has read the entire Cadmos family as 
determined by the error of presuming a possible absolute state: from the marriage of 
Cadmos and his god-granted wife Harmonia, the Cadmos family has remained a 
family closed in upon itself, a self-sufficient entity excluding every foreign element 
from its midst. The tragedy of Oedipus and his offspring testifies to the necessary 
rupture of fullness.446 There can be no absolute law without remainder, no all without 
an exception. Prometheus' displacement onto the Scythian crag also marks the function 
of such an exception, as the position of the unoccupiable place that buttresses the reign 
of Zeus as absolute.  
 The difference in perspective between Sophocles and Aeschylus is brought to 
bear on this point of the unoccupiable place. It underscores the lesson of Prometheus' 
decisive silence and his active repetition of holding the unoccupiable place. Sophocles' 
perspective is of the last judgment, whereas Aeschylus' perspective is of the future. 
The fact that Prometheus Bound opens with the restraints of Prometheus being 
fastened, with Hephaestus bolting in place the chains, is significant. It supports the 
insistent presence of Prometheus bound on stage throughout the play, and underscores 
the very unoccupiable place as that on which the progression of the play depends. The 
initial shackling of the hero comes close to a violation of the Aristotelian principle of 
non-violence on-stage.447 It closes in on a representation of the unrepresentable, as if 
the entire play was to be one lasting scene of torture. In any case, I argue that the crag 
to which Prometheus is bound in the opening sequence of his play is comparable to the 
living entombment into which Antigone is brought in the closing sequence of her play. 
The Aeschylean play commences there where the Sophoclean play draws to a stop. 
Equally important, the Aeschylean crag parades that which the Sophoclean tomb 
obscures. Prometheus allows his spectators into the space of the living tomb, in which 








 Lacan makes a passing and seemingly insignificant note of how the spectator's 
insight is precluded from Antigone's tomb. The case is the same with Ophelia's fresh-
dug grave, into which Hamlet leaps in order to rise again with newlywon resolve, as it 
is also with the burial site at which Oedipus the Beggar vanishes. Lacan's point is 
precisely that the entombment of Antigone at the limits of her ἂτη is beyond 
cognition.448 The spectator cannot know of that which takes place inside this tomb. 
Lacan's seemingly insignificant note is an important remark on how the domain 
between two deaths, the realization of the death drive and das Ding, remains 
unrepresentable within the Sophoclean paradigm of psychoanalysis, as its impossible 
proper. This impossibility is the ultimate point of Lacan's anamorphotic elaborations 
on the unbearable splendor of Antigone, insofar as he conceives of beauty to have a 
certain blinding effect. Beauty is as confusing as it is clarifying. It functions as a 
screen that forbids access to the very field it opens up to, that is, the field of das Ding 
and the pure desire of the death drive.449 De Kesel writes that 
 
tragedy, which keeps us under the spell of Antigone's radiant beauty, carries us 
away from ordinary, recognizable reality. It takes us beyond the limits of the 
normal – beyond what Lacan, with Sophocles, calls 'até' – to a point that will never 
enter the picture but to which everything in that image refers. [...] That 'thing' itself 
never enters the picture, although everything in the image points in this direction. It 
is in this sense, it [sic] can provide an image of my transgressive, 'thing'-directed 
desire.450 
 
The beyond of the unsurpassable limit towards which the Sophoclean tragedy aims 
stays unrepresentable within its mode of tragic representation. There is a paradox in 
this fact, a paradox that is even more articulate in the case of Oedipus the Beggar and 
his unknown grave.  
 The perspective the last judgment and the operation of reversal in Sophoclean 
tragedy allows for some comments to be made on the status of Prometheus. 






unrepresentable of between two deaths, I claim. This play takes its spectators inside an 
equivalent of Antigone's living entombment from the start. As I remarked in the 
previous section, the climactic moment in Prometheus Bound designates the institution 
of a new and indeterminate sequence, and not the conclusion of an old. It designates a 
re-knotting rather than an unknotting of the plot. In Prometheus' case, the crag as the 
point of the real does not function as the end point from which his life and death can 
be retroactively determined, but rather as the point of departure for another sequence 
to topple the old, a sequence perceived from the perspective of the future. In this new 
sequence, there is no determination of life and death. Prometheus' very presence as 
bound on stage underscores the forced occupation of the unoccupiable place or the 
forced existence of the inexistent. Effectuated through his decisive silence and the 
augmentation of his initial error, the presence of Prometheus bound expresses the 
refusal on his part to accept his extreme confinement. Prometheus refuses to remain as 
the constitutive outside that buttresses the reign of Zeus. In one of his few references 
to Prometheus' persona, Badiou notes how the rebel Prometheus, far from being held 
in the exclusion of the absent cause, is the immediate actor on the route of insurrection 
in the Aeschylean play.451 Forcing the existence of his inexistence and thus giving 
flesh to the void, courageously assuming the real, and naming the absent cause in and 
as himself, Prometheus, like an ancient revolutionary, demonstrates that the principle 
of the symbolic space is not one but two.452 Prometheus demonstrates the reason of 
revolt, as contradictory or antagonistic.  
 Another preliminary summary of my discussions can be made. The Sophoclean 
paradigm of psychoanalysis finds its epitome in the µὴ φῦναι of Oedipus the Beggar. 
Its principal operation is the blind pursuit of speech until the point where speech ends 
and collapses on itself. This operation is opposed to the paradigm of Aeschylus and the 
Promethean motto imposing a division internal to speech and silence both. However, 
the opposition in question is not one of mutual exclusion. The Aeschylean paradigm 





Badiou.453 If the Sophoclean paradigm elaborates on the consequences of having 
followed desire to its end and realization in the death drive, the Aeschylean paradigm 
does not overlook these consequences. Rather, Aeschylus subjects the impossible 
tombs where the symbolic order breaks down in Sophocles to the operation of division 
and the contradictory reason of revolt. By dividing the Sophoclean space, its 
impossible tombs open up as the point of possibility for another order in Aeschylus. 
From the soundless darkness of the impossible tombs in Sophocles, a Promethean fire 
comes to the fore, indicating the recomposition of another world under the reign not of 
the authority of law but of justice. The question is how the third and last trace left of 
Aeschylus' lost play, the imagery of fire, illuminates the significance of the concept of 
justice in Badiou's philosophical works. The concept of justice is key to Badiou's grasp 
of how the subject of politics can effectuate radical change in the concrete situation of 
today. It is in tying courage to justice that the figure of Prometheus becomes a figure 




The Imagery of Fire; Confidence between Courage and Justice 
In this section, I address the imagery of fire and the significance of Badiou's 
Promethean ethics of confidence. Badiou integrates Greek tragedy, the dialectic, the 
psychoanalytic conception of the real of sexual difference, and the Marxist conception 
of class antagonism in an attempt at a comprehensive theory that can think the 
preconditions and possibilities for a subject of politics and radical change today. The 
question is how the mechanisms at stake in this conundrum can be elucidated through 
the imagery of fire and the figure of Prometheus. More precisely, the questions 
concerns the tragic status of Prometheus and how to make sense of his immortality in 
relation to mortal women and men; how the dialectical status of the imagery of fire 
operates in the conjunction between the problematic of the limit and the problematic of 
succession; how the rebellious Prometheus designates a division of the space of action 




conception of a processual and contradictory consistency; and, lastly, how the imagery 
of fire can explicate the significance of a Promethean ethics of confidence as a 
subjective formation of courage and justice. Badiou's notion of justice as the blurring 
of places is not only crucial for how he thinks the possibilities of radical change and 
the problematic of emancipation. It is also easily misconstrued as a legal, affective, or 
essentialist category. The question is how an analysis of the figure of Prometheus can 
serve to avoid such misconstruals, and accentuate the significations and implications 
of how Badiou's red-years-philosophy pits together sex and class in thinking an ethics 




The tragic status of Prometheus is ambivalent. Zapffe finds the Prometheia trilogy 
problematic in terms of the tragic on account of its heavily mythical contents, i.e. the 
fact that its characters and contexts are those of gods and titans rather than those of 
mortal women and men.454 Prometheus confesses that his immortality is key to his 
obstinate rebellion ("Why should I fear whose fate is not to die?", "do what he will, me 
he shall never bring to death").455 His immortality questions the relevance of his 
stance, from his decisive silence to the perspective of the future, as far as matters of 
being human are concerned: if he cannot die and thus wager on his life, how can his 
life be said to be meaningful at all? Yet such a questioning is on mark only as long as 
mortality is conceived of as the decisive feature of human being, whether as that 
ultimate evil that should never be transgressed, as in the discourse of human rights, or 
as that ultimate concession that defines its ethical propensity, as when Freud suggests 
that death is the aim of life tout court.456 Such a questioning is only relevant if one, 
like Lacan and Hegel, accepts death as the ultimate master.457 Lacan asserts that death 
should be appreciated as the unsurpassable limit whose certainty gives sustenance to 








vous avez bien raison de croire que vous allez mourir bien sûr: ça vous soutient. Si 
vous n'y croyez pas, est-ce que vous pourriez supporter la vie que vous avez? Si on 
n'était pas solidement appuyée sur cette certitude que ça finira, est-ce que vous 
pourriez supporter cette histoire?458 
 
To Lacan, human being is tragic to the extent that it is determinable by the moment of 
the last judgment, intimated only by death. To opt for this evaluation of mortality, and 
consequently to a questioning of the relevance of Prometheus, would be to disregard 
that which the figure of Prometheus communicates as well as the underlying premise 
of Badiou's position. Prometheus and Badiou testify to the refusal to accept death as 
the ultimate limit of life, or rather the refusal to accept life's finitude and the 
unsurpassable limit as the defining feature of human being.  
 In "A Plea for Prometheus", Alberto Toscano has argued that the crux of the 
Promethean act is found in "the refusal of the articulation between divine (or political) 
authority and human mortality." This refusal makes up the emblem of his revolting 
reason. Toscano continues: 
 
to the extent that domination is still based on the exploitation of our mortality – and 
especially of the cares and fears that so often prevent political mobilisation – the 
figure of Prometheus is not, as so many critiques of Marxism have argued, the 
herald of some kind of disastrous hubris; Prometheus is the bearer of the open 
question of how we, creatures that draw their breath in gasps, can manage not be 


















The significance of the imagery of fire is indicated in Toscano's argument. Prometheus 
is not only the bearer of the open question posed by his refusal of sovereign mortality 
and mortal sovereignty but also the bearer of fire. More precisely, Prometheus is the 
subjective formation where the open question of the refusal of authority coincides with 
the figuration of the bearer of fire. The imagery of fire captures the point at which 
tragedy takes its leave from the sovereignty of death. It communicates that which 
Toscano has named Prometheus' "unconditional demand for emancipation."460 As an 
unconditional demand for emancipation, the imagery of fire encompasses the 
Promethean figuration of both the revolting reason and the perspective of the future.  
 There are two key passages to quote in order to grasp how far-reaching Badiou's 
Promethean ethics of confidence conceives of the unconditional demand for 
emancipation to be. Both passages appear in the seminar of 4 Mai, 1979. The first 
concerns the notion of courage: "Franchir la menace de mort, laquelle n'a jamais 
d'autre sens que le 'n'être-plus-à-sa-place', devient la nouvelle loi, qui fait vie de la 
mort même."461 The second concerns the notion of justice, which is defined as "le flou 
des places, le contraire, donc, de la juste place."462 As the bringer of fire, Prometheus 
should be recognized as a figuration between courage and justice. Prometheus 
designates a subjective formation of the relations of courage and justice, and not the 
figure of another notion that operates on the same level. The two quotes provide the 
essential signification of the imagery of fire as a relational term: a flame is never still, 
and fire is the elusive and always flickering element that cannot be contained within a 
proper place. Fire does not only cross over the lines of demarcation between places, it 
crosses out and erases them. In tying courage to justice, Prometheus signals the move 
in which death is made life, and the non-law the new law. If the old law demands 
everyone to be in their proper place, and death signifies that one is no longer in one's 
proper place, the imagery of fire signifies the operation in which the absence from 








places. Badiou's Promethean ethics calls for a radical demand of emancipation. It is 
not a matter of a simple reversal. Neither does Badiou's Promethean ethics simply 
ignore or dismiss the question of death. On the contrary, it confronts the impossible 
issue of how to render life from death. It is construed on the basis of a serious 
consideration of the dialectic between life and death, and Badiou's reticence against 
the so-called 'morbid obsession with death' in psychoanalysis concerns the latter's 
failure to sufficiently procure an issue from under death's sovereignty. 
 Prometheus underscores the emancipatory signification of the imagery of fire 
and its implications in relation to the question of death when he, in Prometheus Bound, 
recapitulates his conferral of fire to the human race. Prometheus explains how this act 
is to blame not only for "every art possessed by mortals [πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν]," 
from metallurgy and music to mathematics and medicine, but also and more 
importantly for having caused "blind hopes to dwell within their breasts." Once filled 
with blind hopes, these same mortals [θνητοὺς] were no longer "to foresee their doom 
of death [προδέρκεσθαι µορὸν]."463 The essential lesson of this initial Promethean error 
concerns the 'undestination' of human being. It renders human being as undestined 
mortals (ἀµοροὶ θνητοί), if not strictly immortal mortals (ἀθάνατοι θνητοί), as in 
Heraclites. Prometheus' emphasis on the interruptive force contained in blind hope 
underscores this lesson: after fire, it is no longer the definite sequence of death as the 
limit of life that determines and sustains human being, but a sequence open to an 
inherently indeterminable future. Fire had been the prerogative of the immortal gods, 
but Prometheus awarded it to the mortal human race. The result of his conferral of fire 
to human mortals is nothing less than the paradoxical set comprising a multiplicity of 
mortal creatures no longer defined by their mortality. Instead, these mortal creatures 
are defined by their capacity to exceed their being, as is underscored by the 
coincidence of the conferral of fire and the institution of every art and faculty 
possessed by mortals ("they were witless erst and I made them to have sense and be 





understood not").464 At stake in the new configuration of undestined mortals are the 
capacities to reformulate the world and one's position therein. The Promethean ethics 
of confidence is an ethics that, under the imagery of fire, posits that the world is to be 
remodeled through the works of a subject. As Badiou formulates it, between the 
blatant appraisal of the world and its equally blatant dismissal, between the imagery of 
day and night, there remains the case where the world is considered as in its essence 
neither good not bad, but rather as that which a subject comes to recompose through 
the fire of justiciary excess.465 The notion of justiciary excess carries the significant 




Another look to psychoanalysis can serve to pinpoint a few distinctions that allow for a 
better grasp of the imagery of fire in Badiou. The questions concern the different ways 
the imagery of fire functions within the structural and the historical strand of the 
dialectic, as point and process, and how the imagery of fire relates to the problematic 
of the limit and that of succession. Of course, the imagery of fire is not unfamiliar to 
psychoanalysis. Freud let the dream of the burning son consolidate his theory of 
dreams as the realizations of wishes. In this dream, the burning son, already dead, 
approached his sleeping father and, grasping him by the arm, uttered the famous words 
of "Vater, siehst du denn nicht, daß ich verbrenne?"466 To Lacan, this dream testifies 
to the dream's status as another reality. The reality of the dream is the reality of desire. 
Ultimately, the burning son signals the real of desire, the reality of the drive. The 













encounter the father cannot but awake to another sleep, the sleep of waking life.467 
However, from the perspective of Badiou's Théorie du sujet, the mode in which the 
imagery of fire is addressed by psychoanalysis, through the dream, risks the 
representation of fire as a mere punctual occurrence within a structural repetition. The 
burning son grasping the father's arm designates the point of the real as a 'hitherto, but 
no further'. Lacan's analytic position reveals its proximity to that of Stéphane 
Mallarmé, as read by Badiou. Mallarmé's solution to the so-called torchbearer 
problematic [le problème lampadophore] is also structural. The poems of Mallarmé 
often end up in a futile reference to some remote and fixed star, either solitary or in 
constellation. The star is a burning point that is already there from the beginning, and 
signals how nothing has taken place but place itself.468 As the point of a traumatic 
encounter with the real of desire, the imagery of fire also recedes to a mere hole, 
indicative, perhaps, of an inaccessible beyond. As the remote and fixed point of a 
structural dialectic, the imagery of fire is rendered more as a glowing ember than a 
living blaze, and its full transformative potential thus remains to be exploited.  
 I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that Badiou's criticism of the 
Lacanian framework and his call to surpass the menace of death and finitude has been 
criticized in return. In the previous section, I referred to the exaggerated death of 
Oedipus the Beggar and his over-the-top realization of the death drive, and I concluded 
that these heralded nothing essentially new. They returned to the status quo and 
buttressed Athenian prosperity. My conclusion can be criticized as well. First of all, 
Lacan himself never stopped to be astonished by the utter lack of conciliation in the 
last stance of Oedipus.469 Secondly, as already mentioned, Žižek accuses Badiou for 
succumbing to non-thought and for being unable to appreciate the fundamentally 
creative potential of the death drive when he, Badiou, conflates the death drive and the 
service des biens of contemporary ethics under the single heading of the 'morbid 









distinctive traits of Badiou's position vis-à-vis psychoanalysis. It can facilitate a better 
grasp of why and how Badiou refuses death as the determining characteristic of human 
being. It can also illuminate how Badiou's refusal relates to Badiou's own solution to 
the so-called torchbearer problematic, and how the historical strand of the dialectic 
strives to go beyond the punctual determination of this problematic in the structural 
dialectic.  
 In contradistinction to Badiou, Žižek explains, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
 
does not already posit a 'new harmony', a new Truth-Event; it – as it were – merely 
wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation 
marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the 
slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the 
arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan, negativity, a negative gesture of 
withdrawal, precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identification with a 
Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic 
identification – that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it, but is 
simultaneously obfuscated by it and undermines it.470 
 
Žižek continues, observing that 
 
Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favor of 
Death: what 'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of 
earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute 
contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' – this is the 
'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning 
[and] whose Freudian name is death drive.471 
 
There are many bones to pick within these lines. Badiou's works do not request a 'new 
harmony'. Badiou' Maoist credentials consistently prevent every divergence from the 
principle of division, and his processual conception of truths is opposed to any simple 







whether or not Žižek actually misses the very point he, Žižek, is trying to address here. 
While Žižek insists on the gap to be maintained between the initial negative gesture of 
withdrawal and the prospective arrival of the new, between the preconditions for 
change and its effective realization, between event and truth,472 I wonder whether or 
not he himself ends up closing up this gap.	
 Žižek's surprisingly explicit and all the more unwarranted contraction of truth 
and event in and through his capitalized notion of 'Truth-Event' is the most blatant 
indication that Žižek misses out on the gap between event and truth that he insists to 
maintain open. As Bosteels have argued, the contraction of event and truth as Truth-
Event, to the extent that it is supposed to address the philosophy of Badiou, disregards 
Badiou's insistence on truths as always post-evental.473 Kaufman performs the full 
conflation of the gap in question. Finding support for her claims predominantly 
through Žižek, Kaufman writes that the stake in Lacan "is the potential for abandoning 
the system, for confronting one's desire at its limits and thereby transforming 
everything, including the system."474 Žižek's own insistence on the negativity of the 
death drive as the psychoanalytic concept desperately lacking in Badiou must itself be 
situated as the elimination of the gap between event and truth, insofar as it is Žižek's 
own recapitulation of the death drive that defines the so-called 'wiping clean of the 
slate' as effectively and always-already sutured to the arrival of the new. The limit 
experience is represented as if the limit experience itself was already transformative of 



















or a 'symbolic New Beginning' immediately and without recognizing the necessity of a 
negative withdrawal as the precondition for such a positing. But Žižek's accusation 
returns upon Žižek himself, as his recapitulation of the negativity of the death drive 
falls under the reverse mistake of presuming the negative gesture of wiping the slate 
clean as procuring automatically and immediately a symbolic new beginning, a 
transformation of the system as such. To Badiou, however, the problematic of the limit 
cannot surpass the problematic of that which is already contained within the limit, of 
that which the limit delimits.  	
 Žižek misses out on the materialist dialectic of Badiou's philosophical and 
political projects, and how Badiou's materialist dialectic construes the problematic of 
succession as the crux of the subject of change. Badiou does not see a realization of 
change and novelty inherent to the pure gesture of negativity, neither in Antigone nor 
in Oedipus the Beggar. Antigone and Oedipus might open and obfuscate the space of 
action, as Žižek formulates it, or radiate the beauty that both grant and obstruct access 
to the real, as in Lacan's own readings of tragedy, but Badiou does not accept these 
positions or subject-formations as the last words on the subject nor as sufficient words 
to account for change. That does not mean that the negative gesture or the limit 
experience is absent from Badiou's edifice. As Bosteels argues, Badiou's move is 
rather to absent the inherent capacity for change from the negative gesture as such.475 
As Hallward writes, in Badiou, "truth is sparked by an event, but bursts into flames 
only through a literally endless subjective effort."476 The insufficiency of the negative 
gesture to procure an extensive theory of the subject and to account for change is the 
precise reason why Badiou finds it necessary to include the dialectical integration of 
the Sophoclean paradigm within its Aeschylean precursor. The problematic of the limit 
experience is not sufficient to think the succession of radical change, and that is why 











justice. Through an integrated notion of tragedy, Badiou aims for a theory of the real 
not only as the impasse of formalization but also as the passing in force of the subject, 
as noted by Bosteels.477 Badiou supplements the structural dialectic with its historical 
other, psychoanalysis with Marxism, aiming to expand the conceptualization of the 
real that is ours beyond the real of sexual difference, so as to also comprise the real of 
class antagonism. Integrating tragedy, the dialectic, sexual difference, and class 
struggle in the figure of a Prometheus and an ethics of confidence, Badiou aims for a 
comprehensive theory of the subject that will be able to account for processes of 
radical change and true novelty.  
 
 
Sex and Class 
Reading tragedy is a way to address the real of sexual difference and class antagonism. 
Bosteels notes that Badiou's alignment of sex and class as real precedes by several 
years similar appropriations where the Lacanian edifice is conceived as key to thinking 
radical politics, such as Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(1985) and Žižek's The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989).478 Lacan prefigures such 
appropriations in his own seminars when he compares his relation to Freud with that of 
Lenin to Marx,479 or when he elaborates on the theory of discourses to encompass a 
nascent notion of the capitalist's discourse.480 My questions concern how Badiou's 
elaboration of the real as pertaining to both sex and class differs from other 
elaborations of the same (Žižek, Zupančič, and Copjec), as far as its effects on the 
















how "truth, in order to be effective in a situation, must be forced,"481 which enables 
him to pinpoint the singularity of Badiou's position vis-à-vis the late master Lacan and 
fellow travellers in contemporary radical thinking. The concept of forcing opposes the 
tendency to identify truth with the structural impasse of the situation, as its constitutive 
outside. Identified with a structural impasse, truth is quenched before it even begins to 
see the light of day, Bosteels writes. The notion of truth as a structural impasse equals 
"the suspension of all truth as an effective process," and evacuates "the idea of a 
situation that is historical and not purely structural or statelike."482 The questions are 
how the introduction of a historical dialectic in pair with its structural other affects the 
notion of the real, and how this bifurcated dialectic operates in Badiou's refusal of the 
determining functions of death and mortality.  
 Copjec reserves the status of the real for sex alone. To Copjec, sexual difference 
is to be distinguished from other differences inscribed in the symbolic, such as race, 
ethnicity and class, insofar as only the failure of its inscription is inscribed in the 
symbolic.483 Copjec appears to be an exception. In contrast, the premise of Žižek's 
work is a basic homology between sexual difference and class antagonism. The 
interpretative procedures of Marx and Freud are considered as not merely similar but 
formally the same, as he repeatedly writes. 484  Zupančič makes the point more 
succinctly. She observes in Lacan a resolute adherence to "the sexual as the concept of 
a radical ontological impasse." 485  The sexual as real becomes the name of an 
ontological impasse, and designates a purely empty meaning. The sexual as real is 
purely formal, and in want of proper delimitation. An indefinite expansion of the field 
of the sexual is only to be expected from that moment on, as an indefinite expansion is 
inherent to the very definition of the sexual as lacking in delimitation. As one with the 
discursive order, the non-relation of the sexual provides "a conceptual model for 











social ties."486 On the basis of the conceptual model of the sexual non-relation, the 
notion of the proletariat as not just another class among classes can be elaborated on, 
so as to make of the proletariat the symptomatic point at which the non-relation 
underpinning capitalist production is realized, in a manner similar to how feminine 
jouissance pinpoints the non-all character of the Other, as its symptomatic or 
constitutive lack. The contrast of Žižek and Zupančič to Copjec is superficial. Copjec 
admits the ontological portents of the Freudian discovery and how its theory of the 
drive replaces "the conceptual categories that define being, for example, in Kant."487 In 
any case, the crucial and shared point is their recognition of how the non-relation does 
not constitute an underlying obstacle to the formations of the many failed concrete 
relations in reality but, on the contrary, as the guarantee that maintains the space in 
which the negotiations of relations are made possible in the first place. The crucial 
point for Žižek, Zupančič, and Copjec remains the appreciation of the real of the non-
relation as "that which takes place and holds open the space of human action,"488 
regardless of whether the non-relation is explicitly designated as appertaining to sex or 
class, or both.  
 Copjec and Žižek's joint attack on Butler is underpinned by the real as the 
guarantee for the space of action. Their joint attack is fixed on Butler's misreading of 
the Lacanian real as "an ahistorical, frozen opposition, fixed as a non-negotiable 
framework,"489 and the limitations of Butler's consequent historicist-deconstructive 
construal of the possibility of ethical and political interventions. Insofar as sex is real, 
Copjec writes, sex is not so much to be grasped as an incomplete or unstable meaning, 
perpetually in motion, as Butler suggests. Rather sex designates the impossibility of 
completing meaning, the structural incompleteness of language, and the contradictions 
of the logic of the signifier itself. Sex as real thus testifies to the fundamental 
incalculability of the subject that alone can guarantee its space of action.490 To Žižek, 









sexual difference is the traumatic cause which sets their contingent proliferation in 
motion."491 The real becomes the precondition for hegemonic negotiations rather than 
a specific hegemonic expression, whether absolute or consolidated through use and 
time. Failing to appreciate the real in such a sense, Copjec and Žižek argue, Butler 
risks the subordination of the subject to the whims of the symbolic order and the 
categories already in operation within any given discourse. Butler risks, in other 
words, the closure of the space of action.  
 If Butler tends to misread the Lacanian real, the criticism concerning how she 
thus closes up the space of action can be applied upon Copjec and Žižek's criticisms in 
return. Their more nuanced readings of Lacan that conceive of the impossible real as 
the precondition for ethical and political interventions might be an improvement, but 
they nonetheless leave the question of the intervention as such in abeyance. These 
criticisms of Butler tend to reduce truth to its evental precondition, presuming that the 
negative gesture of wiping the slate clean is already providing the immediate 
transformation of the system and a new beginning. Butler raises a similar objection 
against Žižek. She admits that  
 
what remains less clear to me is how one moves beyond such a dialectical reversal 
or impasse [that is the impossible real] to something new. How would the new be 
produced from an analysis of the social field that remains restricted to inversions, 
aporias and reversals that work regardless of time and place? Do these reversals 
produce something other than their own structurally identical repetitions?492 
 
Žižek's reply to Butler's criticism is mainly made by pointing to the Lacanian act as 
"the radical transformation of the very universal structuring 'principle' of the existing 












that which is the crux of Butler's objection. Butler's questions are not dissimilar in their 
content and aim to the objections that Badiou raises in his call to traverse the Lacanian 
framework. Badiou's objections can be reduced to the following, namely that a 
guarantee for a space of action does not in and by itself guarantee action, or, more 
precisely, that a theoretical adumbration of such a space does not in and by itself add 
up to a theory of action as such. As Bosteels notes, an event is not yet a truth.494 
Badiou intervenes into this conundrum when he elaborates on the contradiction that 
pits space and action, or place and force, against each other. Badiou's question is how 
to articulate the logic of places with the logic of forces.495 In Badiou's red-years-
philosophy, the problematic of the space of action is exposed to the operation of 
division, and the contradiction of place and force composes the decisive problem of 
the dialectic. 	
 At this point, the singularity of Badiou's position on the real of sex and class is 
possible to isolate vis-à-vis his fellow travellers of radical thinking. Žižek operates 
according to the definite homology between sex and class. He conceives of the 
mechanisms underlying both sets of differences as formally the same, where sex 
functions in the same manner as class, as the non-relation that defines its own space of 
definition, as "the difference [that] paradoxically precedes the two terms whose 
difference it is."496 In Žižek's case, it is difficult to surmise whether his propositions on 
sex are contributions to the clarification of class issues, or vice versa. In Badiou's case, 
on the other hand, the strict reliance on a homology or isomorphism between sex and 
class, between Freud and Marx or between Lacan and Lenin and Mao, is denied. To 
















same or just like that of the cure, even if certain similarities are acknowledged. Rather, 
sex and class are brought together in a double-edged provocation. When Badiou 
conjoins sex and class as the real that is ours, it is to address equally the need to 
ameliorate the current state of revolutionary theory through the teachings of Lacan as 
well as the inverse, the need to overcome the shortcomings and deadlocks of the 
Lacanian framework so as to develop an effective revolutionary practice.  
 It is a question, Badiou writes, of perceiving that in Lacan which Lacan himself 
has failed to perceive. Lacan has failed to perceive the full effect of the 
supplementation of a lack-in-being [manque-à-être] with the being of lack [l'être-du-
manque].497 As Bosteels explains, Lacan has failed to perceive the full effect of the 
supplementation of "the thought of the causal efficiency of lack with the consistent 
recomposition of the being of this lack."498 In one of the relatively few crystalline 
formulations of the stakes involved in his confrontation with the Lacanian edifice to be 
found in Théorie du sujet, Badiou provides a clarification of his own materialist 
dialectic. The materialist dialectic, he writes, is the attempt to think together the two 
definitions of the subject as "une répétition consistante où le réel ex-siste" and as "une 
consistance destructrice, où le réel ex-cède." 499  In the structural dialectic, the 
impossible real is first perceived as the difference that paradoxically precedes the two 
terms whose difference it is, holding open the space of action and the placement of 
force. Badiou's stance supplements the structural dialectic with its historical other, in a 
materialist dialectic that expands on the first impossible real so as to also comprise the 
difference that exceeds the differences of the terms it defines, as a consequent 
destruction of space or a forcing of place.  
 These operations underscoring Badiou's materialist dialectic make sense in light 
of the reason of revolt already discussed, that is, in the sense of the qualitative 
heterogeneity of the antagonistic contradiction. The one term (the proletariat) can only 
be affirmed in and through the destruction of its other (the bourgeoisie), in both its 







(the proletariat as class). Whereas Žižek tends to refer the impossible object of the 
non-relation to either the figure of the Jew or the Lumpenproletariat, as phantasmatic 
objects carrying the weight of class antagonism,500  Badiou writes that the only 
historical mode of existence for class relations as antagonistic is the mode of existence 
that answers to the name of revolution. The only mode in which class antagonism 
comes to exist is by way of "la destruction de ce qui n'était pas,"501 or, again, "la 
mesure de sujet exige que la stricte logique du horlieu, régie [...] par la causalité du 
manque, s'excède dans la destruction du lieu."502 More precisely, the only mode of 
existence for class antagonism is a revolution as the destruction of the unity of place or 
the symbolic order, insofar as such a unity is that which has never been the case in the 
first place. Prometheus, like an ancient revolutionary, returns at this point. His 
persistent error demonstrates the principle of the symbolic space as not one but two. 
 The psychoanalytic take on sexual matters can only contribute up to a certain 
point, namely that of the lack-in-being of the structural dialectic, after which 
psychoanalysis maroons and ethics takes over,503 Badiou writes in Théorie du sujet. 
Decades later, in Conditions, Badiou will refuse the phallic function as alone sufficient 
to account for the full affirmative force of the actual infinite.504 In Conditions, Badiou 
calls for the supplementation of the phallic function with a generic multiple. In Théorie 
du sujet, he will call for the supplementation of class to sex, of Marx and Mao to Freud 
and Lacan, in order to account for the historical strand of the dialectic and for the 
requirements needed for the real destruction of the unity of place. "Historiquement," 
he writes, "là où advient un sujet [...] se tient véritablement ce dont Lacan nie 
l'existence: un autre de l'Autre, d'où ce qui valait comme premier Autre n'est plus 
qu'un mode inéclairé du Même."505 The gist of Badiou's Maoist credentials concerns 












two'. This significance culminate in the notion of an other of the Other, a Trans-Other. 
By the principles of the Maoist dialectic, the subject is conceived of 
 
comme division, selon l'excès, de l'ordre symbolique – de l'esplace – où cet excès 
s'implace. D'où s'éclaire qu'un sujet politique n'advient qu'en nouant à la révolte 
une consistance de révolution, [...] faisant procès réel de ce que tout ordre, tout 
principe de commandement légal, si stable qu'il paraisse, a pour devenir de se 
diviser. L'Autre doit laisser venir sa propre scission en cet Autre inouï qu'il n'était 
pas, et ce Même dont il n'avait jamais prescrit l'identité.506 
 
Whereas Lacan isolated the hole in the Other and thus denied the Other's consistency, 
Badiou's notion of a Trans-Other affirms the only possible consistency to be the 
consistency of contradictions.507 Bosteels refers it to "the force of non-law."508 The 
crucial point is that the Trans-Other does not plug up the hole in the Other so as to 
guarantee the unity of its space. On the contrary, it denies the unity of its space by 
affirming another Other in opposition to the first. The notion of the Trans-Other 
designates the moment where the unity of place becomes subject to division and the 
subject comes to be through the division of the unity of place. The full signification of 
the Promethean imagery of fire is found in the realization of the divisions in question, 
in the consistency of contradictions under the emblem of the Trans-Other. It ties 




















The question is how to read the imagery of fire in Badiou's Promethean ethics of 
confidence. Miller's choice for the frontispiece of Lacan's L'Éthique de la 
psychanalyse provides an entry into this matter. Miller's choice is Man Ray's Portrait 
du marquis de Sade (1938), an image that depicts an obese and brick-worked de Sade 
in profile, contemplating a burning Bastille in the background.509 Man Ray's painting 
seems to unwittingly reproduce Badiou's contention with the limitations of the 
Lacanian framework. The image of a burning Bastille is, of course, the prototypical 
image of how (to again borrow Hallward's formulation) the spark of an event quite 
literally bursts into the flames of an all-out revolutionary sequence. A burning Bastille 
is an exemplar of Revolution as such, of the shattering transformations of the 
fundamental relations constitutive of a society. But the significations of this image can 
be pursued further, giving the image its full poetical weight. The Bastille does not only 
serve as an epitome of the brutality and terror suffered under the naked 
commandments of a sovereign monarchy. It also serves as an epitome of the sovereign 
monarchy's constitutive outside. The inside of the walls of the Bastille holds nothing 
but inexistents and remainders, the elements excluded from the symbolic order and 
confined to the unoccupiable place of no-place or out-place [hors-lieu]. Like so many 
modern day versions of Antigone entombed, disposed between two deaths, the 
exclusion of the living dead inside the walls of the Bastille serves as the guarantee of 
order in L'Ancien Régime.  
 But come Prometheus the fire-bearer to set the Bastille ablaze, and no longer 
will it be the Bastille of L'Ancien Régime that consumes its subjects but rather its 
subjects that consume L'Ancien Régime and the Bastille. Come Prometheus the fire-
bearer, and – in line with Badiou's first attempt at a formalized definition of the 
distinction between the tragic paradigms of Sophocles and Aeschylus – no longer will 







rather the truth, the castrating instance, divided at the hands of the subject (S/V).510 To 
get at the crux of that which these formalizations convey, yet another effort to 
appreciate the image of the burning Bastille should be made. The image of the burning 
Bastille testifies to the basic quality of fire as impossible to contain within a proper 
place, just as Badiou defines justice to be essentially a blurring of places and the exact 
opposite of the proper place, to which the superego strives to confine its unruly excess. 
Having first set the Bastille ablaze, the rest is history, as the saying goes. Soon all 
France would find itself in flames, an inferno from which another France would 
present and manifest itself.  
 The remarkable point is that it is the Bastille, i.e. the unoccupiable place, which 
is torched. In the same manner, Prometheus makes his predicament the means to 
escape his bondage, his chains his way to freedom. Both acts reintroduce within the 
old unified totality the remainder whose exclusion had guaranteed the same old unified 
totality; the forced existence of the inexistent element that disrupts and destroys the 
structures that depended on its inexistence. The real, which formerly ex-sisted in 
consistent repetition, is reintroduced, by the occupation of the unoccupiable place, to 
ex-ceed in and as destructive consistency: Forcing the existence of the inexistent, 
occupying the unoccupiable place, setting the Bastille ablaze, these are all so many 
operations to name the spark of an event as it bursts into the flames of a revolutionary 
sequence. The flames thus lit cannot be contained but exceed (as fires do) the initial 
place of no-place, the out-place, and intrude into the neighboring places, ultimately 
erasing every proper place as such in an all-out blurring of places. The imagery of fire 
is a less abstract way of thinking the mathematical concept of a generic multiple: 
uncontained, unrestrained, a little bit of everything, a little bit of every place – 
demonstratively installing, as Badiou reflects another saying of Mao's, disorder on 
earth.511	 
 As the bringer of fire, Prometheus should be recognized as a subjective 
formation of the relations between courage and justice. A Promethean ethics of 





place to the new law of the non-law, as a lasting absence of proper places or the 
blurring of places. Prometheus' call for radical emancipation implies such a move. But 
a notion of justice as the blurring of places is a somewhat counter-intuitive notion. It is 
easily misconstrued. For instance, Žižek admits that he is confused by Badiou's 
grouping of justice as one of the four fundamental concepts of the subject (anxiety, 
superego, courage, and justice). Žižek suggests the notion of enthusiasm in its place, 
arguing that enthusiasm is a better fit for that which he perceives as 'the emotional 
responses' or 'affects' caused by an evental encounter.512 In bringing this chapter to a 
close, I will therefore try to clear up some of the confusions and misconstruals too 
easily affixed to the notion of justice in Badiou's work – namely justice's assumed 
sentimental, legal and, lastly, terminal status.  
 Already in his appreciation of Badiou's four fundamental concepts of the 
subject as affects or emotional responses to an evental encounter does Žižek show his 
misconceptions. Here is how Žižek represents the notions of courage and justice, 
referring to Aeschylus' play The Suppliants (n.d.): 
 
The 'suppliants' are the fifty daughters of Danaus; they arrive at Argos fleeing the 
fifty sons of King Aegyptus [...]. The king of Argos is reluctant to accept them, 
fearing the wrath of Aegyptus and war with Egypt; however, the popular assembly 
of the city overrules him and the suppliants are given shelter. What the people 
display here is courage (risking war with Egypt) and a sense of justice (protecting 
the 'suppliants' from their brutal fate).513  
 
It is precisely not as 'a sense' or 'a feeling' that justice is operative in Théorie du sujet, 
if such a sense implies an intuitive compassion or affective sentiment for protecting 
the innocent from slaughter, just as little as courage concerns the simple risk of war 
and death. Rather, the popular assembly of Argos displays courage and justice by 
overruling the king and including the excluded in the midst of their city. The popular 





the same precarious position as the suppliant maiden refugees, assuming and holding 
the no-place or out-place into a lasting blurring of places.  
 Žižek seems to have failed to do his homework properly, but his misprisions 
offer an opportunity for further clarification of the blurring of places involved here. In 
a footnote, Žižek writes that 
 
Badiou sometimes proposes 'justice' as the Master-Signifier that should replace all-
too-heavily ideological invested notions like 'freedom' or 'democracy' – but do we 
not encounter the same problem with justice? Plato (Badiou's main reference) 
determines justice as the state in which every particular determination occupies its 
proper place within its totality, within the global social order. Is this not the 
corporatist, anti-egalitarian motto par excellence? A lot of additional explanation is 
thus needed if 'justice' is to be elevated into the Master-Signifier of radical 
emancipatory politics."514 
 
An affirmative answers to the rhetorical question raised here (yes, justice is 
corporatist) is possible only by ignoring the already comprehensive amount of extant 
'additional explanation' that prevents the notion of justice as it is operative in Badiou's 
work to be even remotely like a corporatist, anti-egalitarian determination of 
everything according to its proper place. A similar short-cut underscores Žižek's 
ruminations on whether "this new Law imposed by Athena [is not] the patriarchal Law 
based on the repression of what then returns as obscene superego fury."515 Also with 
this question does Žižek simply ignore how Badiou's Théorie du sujet elaborates on 
the justice figured by Athena as nothing less than the radical emancipation from the 












 Badiou's notion of justice is, in other words, the negative of the Law and the 
imposition of proper places. As the negative of the Law, I argue, Badiou's notion of 
justice also escapes reduction to a mere affective sentiment. In other words, it is the 
too lawlike interpretation of justice that causes its affective or intuitive misconstrual as 
'a sense of justice'. The underlying principle of both the too lawlike or juridical notion 
of justice and the intuitive sense of justice is the principle of a 'to each, her or his own'. 
It is the principle of rights, and of the proper disposition of right and wrong. In 
contradistinction to such a legal definition, the principle underlying the illegal, 
revolting notion of justice found in Badiou is a 'nothing shall be all'. It is not a 
principle of rights and of the proper disposition of right and wrong, but of reason as a 
scission in the principle of rights, and of an indistinction in every proper disposition.   
 In any case, Athena's figuration of justice is not rendered in the content of her 
decision, but in its structure or formal quality. As the story goes, Agamemnon 
sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia to secure good winds on his way to Troy; thus his 
wife Clytemnestra murders Agamemnon upon his return; thus their son Orestes 
murders Clytemnestra; thus the Erinnyes are to murder Orestes. But Athena 
intervenes, installs a tribunal, and casts the decisive vote in favor of Orestes. She 
thereby absolves him of his matricidal guilt and delivers him from certain death at the 
hands of the bloodthirsty goddesses of vengeance. The crux of Athena's decision is not 
whether or not Orestes was in the right and his absolution thus juridically sound. 
Instead, Athena's decision concerns the absence of any parameters by which to affirm 
or deny the legal justification of her decision: as the vote of the Athenian tribunal 
comes out square, the distribution of proper places and the delimitation of right and 
wrong, good and evil, disintegrates. An inherent undecidability, the absolute equity of 
numbers renders the crux of Athena's decision to be its radical redefinition of that 
which a decision can be, Badiou writes, namely as a scission in the essence of the Law 
[le Droit].516 Read solely for the contents of her decision, Athena would simply signal 
the operation of a reversal of places, a simple break with the old laws of blood and 
vengeance through the installation of a new law that privileges the rights of the father 




of justice at stake in her figuration, I claim, is comprised by the redefinition of her 
decision as a scission in the essence of the Law. That is to say, the formal quality of 
Athena's decision comprises a blurring of places as caused by a scission in the very 
order and property of any ordered and proper distribution of places as such. 
 Perhaps the confusions and misconstruals that stick to Badiou's notion of justice 
have their cause in the assumption that justice designates, as Žižek reports of the 
Platonist reference above, a state, or a state of being. But Badiou's notion of justice 
does not designate a state, a terminus. It is not the end result of a laborious struggle 
finally brought to conclusion, not a popular army conquering the capital after 20 years 
of revolutionary war and installing a new harmony to last for a 1000 years, as in 
another Jérusalem Céleste. In Badiou's terminology, justice designates a so-called 
subjective process, as does the superego, to be differentiated from the subjectivizations 
involved in anxiety and courage. In other words, justice is one moment in the double 
dialectic of the subject, whose forced divisions and redivisions under and over the 
structures of places are continuous. 
 The notion of justice might remain elusive in its metaphorical figuration 
through Athena as well as in its abstract conceptualization as the scission in the 
essence of the Law. Here justice can be indicated only by the dissolution of the lines of 
demarcation and the disposition of values such as right and wrong, good and evil. But 
justice also carries a more concrete and practical signification in the field of politics, 
for the subject of politics itself. In its practical mode of expression, the notion of 
justice as the blurring of places is easy and straightforward. It can be understood on the 
basis of Badiou's recollection of his own experiences in the wake of May 68. The 
proper lesson of Badiou's Damascene moment, as recalled in L'Hypothèse communiste, 
is not the student rebellions, the general strikes, or the sexual liberations, but the 
elaboration of a new vision of politics, Badiou writes. It was a lesson first intimated to 
Badiou at the gates of the Chausson factory: 
 
Ce qui se passait là, à la porte de l'usine Chausson, était tout à fait invraisemblable, 
inimaginable une semaine avant. Le solide dispositif syndical et partidaire tenait en 
général les ouvriers, les jeunes, les intellectuels, fermement enfermés dans leurs 
organisations respectives. [...] Dans la situation du moment, ce dispositif se 
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fissurait sous nos yeux. [...] Nous comprenons à ce moment, sans tout à fait encore 
le comprendre, là, devant l'usine Chausson, que si une politique d'émancipation 
nouvelle est possible, elle sera un bouleversement des classifications sociales, elle 
ne consistera pas à organiser chacun à sa place, elle organisera au contraire des 
déplacements, matériels et mentaux, foudroyants.517 
 
In its concrete expression as the practice of the subject of politics, justice designates 
the simple yet significant displacement of material and mental forces, across all 
positions and classifications. Sparked by the unprecedented and evental encounter of 
workers, students, and intellectuals meeting up beyond their traditionally determined 
places at the factory gates, the subjective figuration of Prometheus ties the 
momentuous courage of stepping out and crossing over beyond one's place, of taking 
up position in the no-place or out-place, onto the continued process of dissolutions and 














Paradoxes of Totality from  




Having gone through Badiou's red years philosophy and his mathematical gesture of 
the late 80s, the question is still how an analysis of the mark of sexual matters can 
illuminate the significance of the traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy in and for 
Badiou's thinking the subject of politics and the possibilities of change. In this chapter, 
I interrogate how the function of the feminine other is operative in Badiou's 
conception of antiphilosophy in greater detail. In L'Être et l'événement, there is only a 
brief reference to antiphilosophy. Here Badiou refers to Lacan's conferral of the 
philosopher's attempt at speculative totalization to the imaginary domain,518 whereas 
antiphilosophy would avoid such speculative totalization. Antiphilosophy first 
becomes an operative concept for Badiou in Conditions. His interrogations of the 
concept culminate in a four-year seminar, from 1992 to 1994, dedicated to the 
antiphilosophy of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Lacan, and Saint Paul.519 Here Badiou 
develops a conceptualization of antiphilosophy of his own, expanding beyond the 
term's particular Lacanian references. There are many others who have elaborated on 
Lacan's revitalization of antiphilosophy, notably Jean-Claude Milner, François 
Regnault, and Colette Soler,520 but there are few substantial indications for a definition 














in "Peut-être à Vincennes" and the brief text of "Monsieur A". 521  Lacan lists 
antiphilosophy together with the study of linguistics, logic, and topology, as required 
components in any training of psychoanalysts, while he affirms that he, as an 
antiphilosopher, rebels against philosophy.522 Regnault suggests that Lacan's rebellion 
is aimed at the anti-Oedipal philosophy of Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in particular, as 
well as at traditional systematic ontologies as theories of everything.523 Soler shows 
how the term originates within the catholic-conservative reaction to the reason of les 
philosophes des Lumières. Against the liberated reason of Jean-Baptiste Voltaire's 
Dictionaire philosophie (1764), the abbot Louis Mayeul Chaudon would celebrate the 
revelatory truths of religious authority in his own Dictionaire antiphilosophique 
(1767).524 Soler accentuates how antiphilosophy entails a devaluation of thinking, 
affirmed in Lacan's attention to the automatism of the signifier as well as in his 
recourse to mathematics, as the science without consciousness. Similarly, Milner 
conceives of antiphilosophy as another name for the matheme, the epitome of Lacan's 
late teachings.525 With Badiou, however, the term gains in momentum as a matter 
confronting the philosopher, as a matter to be traversed by philosophy.  
 My point of entry will be a curious passage where Badiou determines misogyny 
as a distinctive criterion of antiphilosophy. The antiphilosopher points to a feminine 
remainder of the philosophical projects, accessible only through a radical act. Badiou 
effectively posits Lacan as a double exception: as one excepted from the distinctive 
criterion of misogyny, and as the one exception that brings contemporary 
antiphilosophy to a close. I suggest a closer reading of this curious passage as a means 
to clarify the mechanisms involved in Badiou's conceptualization of antiphilosophy. 
Specifically, my questions concern the significance of misogyny in Badiou's 
conception of antiphilosophy and its philosophical other, as well as the significance of 











questions leads through Badiou's conceptions of the antiphilosophies of Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein, to Lacan, but the overall problematic concerns speculative totalizations 
and delimitations of thinking, from which the feminine remainder is construed. The 
problematic of totalization and delimitation also determine the phenomena-noumenon 
distinction and the antinomies of reason in the critical philosophy of Kant, and the 
incompleteness theorem of Gödel's meta-mathematical logic. If the construction of a 
One-All is an impossibility and the possibilities of radical change depend upon such an 
impossibility – as Badiou and the antiphilosophers agree – the question is how the 
antiphilosophical and the philosopher's approach to such an impossibility differ. 
Badiou's mathematical gesture is decisive in this regard, as it allows Badiou to 
challenge the antiphilosopher's key moment of an inaccessible or unthinkable 
remainder. Overall, it is not merely an issue of how a traversal of antiphilosophy 
allows Badiou's philosophical works to think the preconditions and the possibilities of 
radical change and true novelty anew, but the more fundamental question of the 
preconditions and possibilities for thinking change and novelty – or for thinking as 
change and novelty. The crucial dispute between Badiou and his antiphilosophical 
others is whether or not change can be thought, philosophically, or if it is granted 
solely in and through the radical, antiphilosophical act. 
 
 
A Double Exception 
How does Badiou posit Lacan as a double exception in relation to contemporary 
antiphilosophy? Bosteels comes close to this question. In "Radical Antiphilosophy", 
Bosteels enumerates on the four invariant traits of contemporary antiphilosophy in 
Badiou's conception. The four invariant traits answer to the labels of nominalism, 
sophistry or 'sophistics', mysticism, and radicalism: firstly, the antiphilosopher 
assumes that being is coextensive with language or that ontology equals grammar; 
secondly, truth is considered the product of linguistic constructions, as a simple 
rhetorical effect; thirdly, the antiphilosopher subscribes to the idea of a beyond-of-
language, a remainder that escapes the grasp of words, and; fourthly, the remainder is 
considered to be accessible only through a radical act and never through thinking or 
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language alone. The act is the only recourse to the real. Antiphilosophy performs its 
part in the tension between these four invariants. A fifth wheel is supplemented to this 
four-wheeled vehicle, namely the antiphilosopher's subjective investment. It is exigent 
for the antiphilosopher to be personally involved in his enunciations, and to vouch for 
his project through his own existence.526 The antiphilosopher shares the first two traits 
of nominalism and sophistics with the sophist. The latter traits of the mystical 
remainder, the radical act, and the subjective investment are proper to the 
antiphilosopher. As Bosteels notes, it was the insistence of these latter traits in the 
teachings of Lacan that pressed Badiou to develop a concept of antiphilosophy.527 The 
question is how the concept of antiphilosophy is effective in Badiou's attempt to think 
the preconditions and possibilities of change and novelty.  
 Bosteels observes another so-called 'derivatory' feature that follows from the 
third invariant trait of the mysticist remainder, namely the misogynist tendency of 
antiphilosophy. The antiphilosopher addresses the remainder beyond language in 
misogynist terms. In that regard, Bosteels quotes at length from Badiou's 
L'Antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein (2009):  
 
Reste à savoir si, de ce réel, l'antiphilosophie nous donne autre chose qu'un 
évanouissement sidéré, si son acte n'est pas, comme la femme pour Claudel, une 
promesse qui ne peut pas être tenue. À moins qu'il ne s'agisse dans toute cette 
histoire de la femme, précisément, dont on conviendra aussitôt que la philosophie 
n'a nulle ambition de parler, mais dont on doutera qu'à ce jour, disposée dans la 
série nominale (la foi, l'angoisse, la vie, le silence, la jouissance...) où 
l'antiphilosophie – sauf Lacan – l'épingle sans l'identifier, elle ait fait mieux que 
disparaître. L'Antiphilosophe agiterait devant le philosophe, qui loyalement, 
éduqué sur ce point par la science, le forclôt de sa manœuvre pensante, le fantôme 
du féminin. Ce qui n'est pas sans expliquer quelque peu la très frappante misogynie 
de tous les antiphilosophes: la femme inconsciente ne leur sert qu'à placer des 
banderilles sur le cou épais du philosophe. Ce qui est, après tout, une explication 
'entre hommes'. A-t-on jamais vu gens plus détestables, dans leur déclarations 






Rousseau (la Sophie de Émile!), Kierkegaard (la névrose du mariage!), Nietzsche 
(n'en parlons même pas) ou Wittgenstein (avec sur ce point la demi-franchise d'une 
demi-homosexualité)? À supposer que le reste réel des théories philosophiques soit 
à chercher, du point de vue du désir, du côté du féminin, le sort fait à ce reste est 
certes plus enviable quand on s'appelle Platon, Descartes ou Hegel. Au point qu'on 
pourrait faire, du rapport aux femmes, un critère distinctif: plus la misogynie est 
flagrante, plus on est aux parages de l'antiphilosophie.528 
 
Bosteels refrains from accentuating anything in this long quote, besides referring to the 
misogynist tendency as a 'derivatory feature'. Badiou himself designates it as a 
'distinctive criterion'. The fact that Bosteels lets this passage stand its own ground 
without commentary is almost as striking as the passage itself. The quoted passage 
produces more questions than answers.  
 The passage is untypical of Badiou's manner of presentation. The accurate 
reasoning that is customary of his style gives here way to another style of insinuations 
and conjecture. It is almost as if Badiou abandons his philosophy to sophistics or even 
antiphilosophy. After all, the passage in its totality is posited in the form of an 
unanswered question or a non-argued hypothesis. Badiou first posits the doubt as to 

























follows up on this doubt with the question of whether it might not be an issue of 
woman all along. To the first doubt, concerning the act's ability to deliver according to 
its promise, an answer will be found at the end of the book. At least in the case of 
Wittgenstein, the answer is a definite 'no': of that which was supposed to surpass 
thinking, only the thought remains to be passed on, and Wittgenstein the 
antiphilosopher is delivered over to philosophy.529 The latter question, concerning 
whether or not the remainder is reducible to a question of woman throughout the 
history of antiphilosophy, is left hanging – only to determine misogyny as a distinctive 
criterion.  
 My question is how to read this curious passage. It can be divided into a series 
of sub-questions concerned with the status of woman, science, and Lacan. First of all, 
how is one to read this woman, unconscious at that, as she is employed by the 
antiphilosopher in the attempt to subdue the philosophical bull? Secondly, how is one 
to read the philosopher's loyalty to this so-called scientific education, on account of 
which the feminine spectre is foreclosed from the operations of philosophy? Lastly, 
how is one to read the fact that Badiou includes Lacanian jouissance in the series of 
nouns by which the antiphilosophers have pinned down woman without identifying 
her (Pascalian faith, Kierkegaardian anxiety, Nietzschean life, Wittgensteinian 
silence), while he simultaneously insists that Lacan is in exception to this act? Badiou 
represents Lacan as a double exception: with the exception of Lacan, antiphilosophers 
have always pinned down woman in some inexplicable noun, only for her to disappear 
there. Badiou also acknowledges Lacan as the antiphilosopher to be traversed by 
anyone aspiring to be a philosopher today, i.e. the one to bring contemporary 
antiphilosophy after Nietzsche and Wittgenstein to its closure and thereby open up for 
another philosophy to come.530  
 How is the connection between these two exceptions of Lacan to be 
understood? Is it a mere coincidence that the antiphilosophy of Lacan both prepares 
the ground for a new philosophy and avoids pinning down woman in an unflattering 





pinning of woman that Lacan is able to bring contemporary antiphilosophy to a 
conclusion, or is it, vice versa, with his closure of contemporary antiphilosophy that he 
can avoid her pinning-down? Through a closer reading of the misogyny of the 
antiphilosopher's act and the scientific education of the philosopher, I will argue that 
the correct answer to the latter questions is neither: it is by pinning down the feminine 
remainder as disappearance that Lacan brings contemporary antiphilosophy to its end, 
insofar as his act amounts to the demonstration of the feminine remainder in its 
absence and the function of that absence within the extant field of knowledge. He thus 
marks the function of the remainder within science, from which another philosophy to 
come will see its initial intervention: the philosophy to come will proceed to think 




The Promise of Woman; What is in an Act? 
This section concerns how Badiou conceives of antiphilosophy, and how the feminine 
remainder functions to necessitate the radically subjective act. The antiphilosopher 
confronts the philosopher's speculative totalizations and delusions of truth by pointing 
to a remainder that escapes capture in theoretical adumbrations. The remainder is 
accessible only through the act, but I interrogate the question of how the remainder is 
to be conceived of as feminine, specifically, and how the feminine inflection of the 
remainder involves the antiphilosopher's distinctive misogyny? A first extrapolation of 
the basic traits of antiphilosophy prepares the ground for a further inquiry into Kant, 
while a comparison of the critical projects of Kant and feminist critiques of Western 
metaphysics serves to accentuate the similarities between the noumenon and the 
feminine. It thus indicates the misogynistic intonations of the other side of reason's 
limit. But a Lacanian Kant also identifies a split internal to the noumenon, as the point 
where the limit of reason leaves room for faith and the sublimation of the moral act. 
The status of the act, I argue, constitutes the crux of the antiphilosopher's misogyny, 
where the decisive question is whether the act is able to deliver, or whether the 
feminine remainder will forever remain an un-kept promise. Through the example of 
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Nietzsche, I argue that misogyny is distinctive of antiphilosophy in the sense that it is 
intrinsic to the very antiphilosophical formulation of the act. Nietzsche's act succumbs 
per definition to an absolute fallacy that precludes access to the feminine remainder 
and thus to the real and to radical change. Interrogating the misogyny intrinsic to the 
act opens for a discussion of the philosopher’s education by science, and then of the 
double exception of Lacan. 
 
 
Delusions of Truth 
The significance of the misogyny of antiphilosopher's act is not self-evident. However, 
Badiou remarks that the criterion of misogyny might serve to deepen our 
understanding of the case of Kant. Reversing the case, I suggest that Kant's critical 
project might serve to deepen our understanding of the misogyny of the 
antiphilosopher's act. Kant's critical project, Badiou suggests, can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
donner une forme philosophique à l'antiphilosophie elle-même. Montrer 
philosophiquement que la prétention philosophique ne fait que remuer de l'air. 
Sublimer l'acte moral, indubitablement a-philosophique, au regard des misères 
phénoménales de la connaissance. D'où s'infère, puisque chez lui le reste a nom 
'noumène', qu'un désir kantien s'adresse à un objet toujours nouménal. C'est, 
fortement conceptualisée, l'antique certitude du 'mystère' féminin. En langage 
wittgensteinien, 'femme' est ce dont on ne peut parler, et que donc il faut taire.531 
 
Kant's project amounts to an antiphilosophical philosophy. There are two points to 
note in regard to the significance of the feminine remainder. Firstly, there is the 











sublimation or a supersession of the restraints of the phenomenal domain. To provide a 
basis by which to make sense of Kant's project as an antiphilosophical philosophy, a 
brief exposition of the general characteristics of antiphilosophy is required. 
 According to Badiou, there are three main operations that characterize 
antiphilosophy, as opposed to philosophy and as distinct from sophistics:  
 
1. Destitution de la philosophie dans sa prétention théorique, destitution qui prend 
toujours la forme d'un discrédit, et pas centralement, ou pas principalement, la 
forme d'une réfutation. 2. Mise à jour de la vraie nature de l'opération 
philosophique. À l'arrière-plan de sa prétention théorique supposée et discrédité, il 
y a une geste proprement philosophique qui doit être repéré par l'antiphilosophie 
elle-même, parce qu'il est, en général, dissimulé par le philosophe, obscur ou 
inapparent. 3. Opposition à l'acte philosophique ainsi reconstitué d'un acte de type 
nouveau, d'un acte radicalement autre qui parachève la destitution de la 
philosophie.532 
 
The dismissal of the philosophical category of truth constitutes the primus motor of the 
antiphilosophical vehicle.533 The antiphilosopher then reveals how the adventure of 
philosophy does not amount so much to a theoretical endeavour as to a gesture or an 
act. Philosophy is not reducible to its statements and propositions. Philosophy's 
fabulations on truth rather serve as the garb to conceal its essence as a baleful act.  
 The most blatant expression of the antiphilosopher's dismissal of the category 
of truth is Nietzsche's reduction of truth to an ambulant army of metaphors, 
















Truth is simply an effect of meaning. Furthermore, in his genealogical excavations, 
Nietzsche shows how the army of lies presented by the philosopher as truths is the 
effect of the proper philosophical gesture, the exercise of the typological power of the 
priest. The typological power of the priest entails an incessant evaluation of the things 
that are. The priest is thus a nihilist that negates every affirmative act of creation. 
Philosophy is a parasite on the religious exertion of the will to nothing. In veiling its 
true activity, philosophy is all the more guilty of negating affirmative life. To 
Nietzsche, Badiou observes, philosophy is a disease, the infamous sickness of Plato, 
and should be countered by any means.535 The case of Wittgenstein's Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (1922) is similar, Badiou argues. Truth is reduced to the 
correspondence of a meaningful proposition and actual reality, but where Nietzsche 
talks of nihilism and the eradication of affirmative life through the typological 
catalogues of the philosopher-priest, Wittgenstein talks of philosophical nonsense, of 
verbiage and chatter, as the erasure of the limits between that which can and cannot be 
said and though. Where Nietzsche blames philosophy for denying access to real life, as 
that which subtracts itself from all evaluation, Wittgenstein accuses the philosopher of 
obstructing the revelation of the silent meaning of the world, i.e. 'God', beyond the 
world of meaningful propositions. The metaphor of disease, Badiou insists, is never 
absent from the antiphilosopher's vocabulary concerning philosophy.536 Against the 
obscure gestures of philosophy, antiphilosophy represents itself a therapeutic activity 
rather than a direct criticism. The antiphilosopher's guiding question is how to cure 
humanity from its suffering under the philosophical disease.537  
 The metaphor of disease encompasses the antiphilosophical trajectory to fully 
eschew the dominance of philosophy. This trajectory proceeds through the disruption, 
the exposure and, finally, the supersession of the philosophical project. To further 
elaborate on the medical vocabulary, the trajectory of antiphilosophy can be 
determined as a) an initial identification of the symptom, in the philosopher's 
theoretical notion of truth; b) the consequent isolation of its cause, in the philosopher's 






a cure, dispensed through the antiphilosophical act.538 The misogyny intrinsic to the 
formulation of the feminine remainder is germane to the last point, the instigation of 
the cure through the antiphilosophical act. However, an examination of the cause 
behind the symptoms is required before addressing the issue of an active cure.  
 If the symptom carries the different signifiers of nihilism and verbiage, the 
cause of the philosophical disease remains one and the same. The philosopher is a 
megalomaniac, who succumbs to the delusions of an unlimited thinking. The 
philosopher's delusions are indicated in Badiou's brief aside on how Lacan dismisses 
the philosopher's speculative totalizations to the imaginary register. To sum up the 
essentials of Lacan's definition of the imaginary in one word, Lacan's simple pun on 
méconnaissance suffices. Every conception of an ego [me] is always already a 
misconception; an element of ignorance is inherent to all knowledge.539 Arguably, the 
most significant misconception concerns the imaginary phallus (– φ), the ego's 
identification as either having or being the object of desire. In the imaginary dyad, 
there is yet to be a confrontation with the concept of lack and the subject's division by 
the signifier. There is, to cut it short, no castration. The imaginary phallus serves as the 
phantasm of an immediate reciprocity. Thus it misconceives impotence for potency, 
nothing for something, loss for fullness.540 As brief as Badiou's short aside might be, it 
nonetheless points to the heart of the misconception underpinning the totalizing 
tendency of philosophy. It is the misconception of the possibility of a unified totality, 
of the completion and the consistency of a One-All. Consequently, the antiphilosopher 
dismisses philosophy as an imaginary lure or a grandiose delusion. 
 When Nietzsche and Wittgenstein disrupt the philosophical argument and 
dismiss its concept of truth, Badiou claims, they also expose the philosophical gesture 
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as the blind exercise of a language delivered over to the dream of not being interrupted 
by any rule nor limited by any difference.541 It is the ancient Parmenidean dream of the 
One-All that is ultimately at stake in the antiphilosophical exposure of philosophy, the 
dream in which the same is being and thinking. It underscores the Greek discourse of 
wisdom, the heir to the Parmenidean poem. The Greek discourse of wisdom, Badiou 
writes, is the discourse on and of the totality of nature. It is the discourse of a 
presumed one-to-one correspondence between wisdom, as an inner state of being, and 
the world, as an ordered and complete deployment of being.542 It is underpinned by the 
notion of an uninterrupted language. The eternal truths of the world and the subjective 
adjustment to these truths are rendered accessible to the philosopher through the 
mastery of language.543 But to the antiphilosopher, the notion of an uninterrupted 
language able to think the all of being, or even being at all, constitutes the dangerous 
delusion of philosophy: It turns the philosopher's claim to truth into nothing but an 
imposture.544 The notion of the One-All will necessarily be bursting with paradoxes, 
and thereby dissolve itself. In opposition to the philosopher's dream of the One-All, 
and contrary to the sophist's abandonment of truth and knowledge at the altars of 
scepticism, the antiphilosophical motto par excellence is to be read doubly as 'not all is 
thinkable' and 'the thinkable is not all'. The antiphilosopher thus proffers the remainder 
of a real beyond thinking as the prerogative of the act. The question is how this 
remainder is conceived of as feminine, and how the distinctive criterion of misogyny 
attaches to the antiphilosopher's formulation of the feminine remainder as the 
prerogative of the act.  
 
 
The Morality of the Noumenon 
The case of Kant illuminates the function of the remainder and its feminine inflection, 
as well as the notion of the act. Kant evokes the concept of the noumenon in order to 







philosophy throughout history, whether it has fallen for the dogmatisms of groundless 
abstractions and mystical fabulations (One-All) or for the irreproachable doubts of a 
despairing scepticism (sophistics). The noumenon is introduced as the delimitation of 
the field of phenomena and knowledge. To Kant, knowledge is not impossible, but it is 
limited. A properly founded knowledge can only be of appearances and modes of 
appearances, insofar as all cognition are preconditioned by the faculties and categories 
of human sensibility and understanding – whether it be space and time or cause and 
effect. Kant relegates the real of pure being-qua-being or the Ding-an-sich to a beyond 
of knowledge. As Hallward observes, Kant limits cognition to the knowledge of 
objects of possible experience. Cognition is not about the seizure of realities as such. 
Thus, Hallward concludes, "Kant proposed for the first time a philosophy made fully 
autonomous of the play of substantial reality." 545  In the context of the 
antiphilosophical property of Kant's critical project, however, the leap from Kant's 
delimitation of cognition to objects of possible experience, on the one hand, to an 
understanding of the Kantian philosophy as autonomous in regard to substantial 
reality, on the other, should at least be postponed. The autonomy of Kantian 
philosophy is somewhat conditional. That is to say, as in the textbook versions of 
Kant, if the knowledge of phenomena is to have any sense, it is still necessary to 
assume that these phenomena are the appearances of something, even if such a 
something itself cannot be known.546 This is the point at which the concept of the 
noumenon is introduced. As Kant explains in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781),  
 
der Begriff eines Noumenon ist also bloß ein Grenzbegriff, um die Anmaßung der 
Sinnlichkeit einzuschränken, und also nur von negativem Gebrauche. Er ist aber 
gleichwohl nicht willkürlich erdichtet, sondern hängt mit der Einschränkung der 
Sinnlichkeit zusammen, ohne doch etwas Positives außer dem Umfange derselben 











Substantial reality remains, even if it is merely an empty and purely negative 
reference, even if it is strictly inaccessible. The noumenon, as a limit-concept of 
sensibility, functions as the mark of such an inaccessible remainder. As a limit-
concept, the noumenon is only of negative applicability and has no positive 
designation beyond its own extension. The noumenon is an empty designation that is 
bound to dissolve and disappear as soon as someone or something is to hit its mark. If 
only tentatively grasped in speculative reason, as an object of knowledge, the 
noumenon would be forced into the phenomenal forms of human sensibility and 
cognition and, hence, would be noumenon no more.  
 A simple exercise would render access to just how the Kantian noumenon can 
be registered as a strong conceptualization of the antiphilosopher's notion of the 
feminine remainder. One could simply replace the terms 'noumenon' and 'sensibility' 
with the terms 'woman' and 'thinking', in the quoted passage from Kant. The result 
would be a paragraph that ascribes to woman the status of a limit-concept delimiting 
the pretensions of thinking, of negative applicability, without a positive content of her 
own. Woman would nonetheless not be reducible to an accidental construction. Insofar 
as she would be determined by the domain of thinking to which she serves as the limit, 
woman would instead be coterminous and co-dependent with this domain itself. Such 
an exercise would reveal a striking resemblance between the Kantian noumenon as a 
philosophical rendition of the feminine remainder, on the one hand, and feminist 
critiques of the so-called universal subject of Western metaphysics, on the other. 
Feminist critiques of Western metaphysics have argued that the universal subject is in 
fact established on masculine parameters, in and through the suppression or repression 
of the feminine.  
 The most prominent example of such a critique is the work of Irigaray. Already 
in Speculum de l'Autre femme (1974) Irigaray argues for how Western metaphysics 







his philosophical predecessors in regard to challenging the masculine hegemony. A 
position for the feminine is made only through the negation of the masculine, and 
Freud's notions of the girl as a little man, her Penisneid, and woman as a Dark 
Continent continue to reduce woman to "l'Autre du Même."549 According to Irigaray, 
Freud fails to address the deeper structures by which woman is consigned to nothing 
but a possible compliment to the men of the world, where woman is never conceived 
in and by herself but always as another object for the same masculine subject, and 
Freud therefore fails to do anything but reproduce these very same structures.550 
Western metaphysics is not only phallogocentric, Irigaray argues; its rationality and 
conceptuality is also phallomorphic. Its concepts are thoroughly indebted to the very 
shape of the male member and the privilege given to unity, form, identity, visibility, 
erection, etc. In these structures, the feminine can only appear as the negative other of 
the masculine or not at all. The feminine will at best be consigned to the categories of 
the irrational and the non-conceptual, if not to utter silence and to the inconceivable as 
such.551 As Braidotti observes, Irigaray's critiques reveal how woman as the Other of 
the masculine subject is "reduced to unrepresentability within the male symbolic 
system, be it by lack, by excess or by perennial displacement of her subject-
position."552	Within phallogocentric discourse, the only option is to partake in the 
masculine masquerade and to pose in the dons made by and for man. Woman 
otherwise remains an empty designation that is bound to disappear as soon as she hits 


















function but quoad matrem, in the capacity of mother.553 As the noumenon in regard to 
the phenomenal field in Kant, woman serves as the limit-concept delimiting the 
domain of masculine rationality. She has no positive designation as to her own 
content, and is strictly of negative applicability.	
 Irigaray's critiques of the universal subject of Western metaphysics do not 
imply that the entire tradition of Western metaphysics has been antiphilosophical at 
heart. The opposite is the point. Western metaphysics has failed to acknowledge its 
own biased position and the limitations of its reach. It has belied itself to be neutral 
and universal and true by disowning its feminine remainder. The inability of the 
philosophical tradition to acknowledge its limitations is the point of the Kantian 
critiques as well. It is also the point of the seventh and last paragraph of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus, which advocates the silent bypassing of that which cannot be spoken.554 
Irigaray's flagging the literal flag of the feminine as the unacknowledged underside of 
traditional philosophy is formally similar to the limits that Kant and Wittgenstein have 
donned in the names of the noumenon and of mystical silence. Mystical silence, the 
noumenon, and the feminine all highlight the remainder that the philosophers fail to 
address, thus stripping the philosophical notion of truth of its assumed universality and 
exposing the operations of power and suppression it conceals.  
 However, the notion of the act remains lacking in this account. The Kantian 
critiques themselves have an underside, beyond the delimitation of reason. If it is 
viable, as Saldanha writes, that "Irigaray sees in Kant a desperate effort at overcoming 
the loss of the mother-object and thus of reinstating masculinism at the most supreme 
level," insofar as Kant would forget that "the sensible realm, imagination, intuition, 
nature, beauty, extension, the body, the thing-itself constitute the phantasmal feminine 
soil for the pure reflection of man" and that "woman-soil-nature is the 'imaginary sub-
basement' for his house of splendid words,"555 the sublimation of the moral act in Kant 







 The sublimation of the moral act does not escape capture in Tania Espinoza's 
readings of Kant avec Lacan. According to Espinoza, the antinomies of pure reason in 
Kant's first critique "secures a place for a 'beyond phenomena' that, while not being 
purely formal, is nevertheless emptied of positive determinations."556 Espinoza does 
not only affirm the negative function of the noumenon as delimiting the field of 
knowledge. She also acknowledges the double function of the noumenon as 
epistemologically void and ethically fulfilling. The double function of the noumenon 
clarifies the function of the feminine remainder in relation to the act. Both the 
noumenon and the act mark the point where Kant's antiphilosophical philosophy 
realigns with substantial reality or pure being. Kant's critical thinking, Espinoza writes, 
inhabits the limit of knowledge  
 
not as the limit of reason but as the limit that reason must both police and dare to 
trespass in the interest of truth, as freedom. [...] In the famous phrase about denying 
knowledge Kant is not [...] excusing himself for having had to undermine 'reason' 
in order to sustain his critical project. He is simply describing the task he traced for 
the Critique: to limit speculative reason in order to leave room for ethics. 'Room 
for faith' is nothing other than the noumenon seen as necessarily empty (of objects) 
or as 'needing to be filled', depending on whether it is seen from the point of 
speculative or practical reason.557 
 
Espinoza identifies a duality within the noumenon, similar to how Zupančič has 
identified a split within Kant's categorical imperative. The noumenon designates both 
the limitations of the field of knowledge in speculative reason, and the field of 
possibility of ethical action in practical reason. In a further move, and contrary to 
Copjec, Espinoza aligns masculinity and speculative reason with the mathematical 
antinomies, and femininity with practical reason and the dynamic antinomies. She 
explains that it is "because the feminine side regards the ethical that it is in contact 
with the noumenon in a positive sense as a field of possibility, while the masculine, 






be accessed."558 Thus Espinoza does not only partake in an on-going debate on Kant's 
legacy that shows, to borrow Saldanha's phrase, how "sexual difference is inscribed 
into philosophy's most basic decisions." 559  She also identifies the crux of the 
sublimation of the moral act in Kant.  
 The field of possibility and the room for ethics that Espinoza notes as an effect 
of the splitting of the noumenon between speculative and practical reason is similar to 
the space of action opened by the real of sexual difference in Copjec's Lacanian ethics 
of the feminine and by the traumatic cause that instigates the proliferation of 
differences in Žižek. The noumenon does not only mark the limit of reason, it also 
marks the point at which reason contradicts and undermines itself. The noumenon thus 
constitutes an almost-positive field of possibility when approached by practical reason 
– or by the non-theoretical ways of the moral act – whereas it remains a strictly 
negative moment of inaccessibility when approached by speculative reason – or by 
way of the theorizations of philosophy. The logic is the familiar logic of the 
paradoxical status of the law. Like the real of sexual difference marks the point of the 
law's inherent contradiction and thus leaves open a space of action, so does the 
noumenon mark the point of reason's inherent contradiction and thus leaves room for 
the sublimation of the moral act. Insofar as "practical reason cannot be proven 
theoretically" and, "from the point of view of theoretical reason, practical reason can 
only remain a hypothesis," as Espinoza writes, the sublimation of the moral act, as a 
leap 'beyond phenomena', remains as a room for faith.560 In providing antiphilosophy 
with a philosophical form, Kant censures access to being as such, the thing itself, and 
restricts knowledge proper to the phenomena of appearances only, so as to open for a 
notion of the moral act as an address to being that is more concerned with what ought 
to be, as Espinoza writes, than with what is. The significance of the distinctive 
misogyny of the feminine remainder must be interrogated from this point. In the 
continuation of Badiou's conception of antiphilosophy, the question to be asked of the 








faith. The question is whether or not the act has the capacity to deliver according to its 
promise and thus to render what ought to be into what is, or whether or not the 
feminine remainder precisely remains as a promise forever broken, as an inaccessible 
and ineffable point that merely serves to buttress the structures that are but surely 
ought not to be.  
 
 
The Absolute Fallacy 
The Kantian move of limiting the field of knowledge so as to make room for an ethical 
address in the sublimation of the moral act is characteristic of antiphilosophy. Thus 
Badiou demonstrates how the premise that resonates throughout Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus is that a proposition can never say what a thing is, only how it is.561 Also 
Nietzsche denounces the possibility of an adequate language that would speak the sum 
total of being, insofar as language can only express a simple relation and all that is are 
relations and relations of relations.562 Nietzsche's motto 'the death of God' designates 
the absence of an instance that would speak totality. Lacan reformulates this motto as 
the hole in the Other or the absence of a meta-language. He ties head to tails by 
elaborating on the absence of a meta-language through Wittgenstein's Tractatus. To 
Lacan, the addendum that would designate a statement as true or false is the move 
proper to the philosopher's stupidity. 563  Saint Paul's antiphilosophy occurs in a 
complete disjunction with the Greek discourse of wisdom. The message of Christ 
resurrected renders the Greek discourse of wisdom obsolete, as it is not a matter of 
arguments or proofs, but of a fundamentally unfounded act of faith.564 The recurrent 
antiphilosophical theme, Badiou writes, is how there is no meaning of meaning, no 
value of value, no truth of truth, or no ultimate relation by which to come to terms with 








 Bosteels observes how the installation of a limit on the thinkable begs the 
question of its other side,566 and argues that "the act is without a doubt the most 
important element in the formal characterization of antiphilosophy," and that which 
"alone has the force of destituting, and occasionally overtaking, the philosophical 
category of truth."567 I argue that the act has bearing only insofar as the notion of the 
remainder presents itself. It is by the remainder that the act is necessitated, and not the 
other way around. It is because something is presumed to escape the theoretical 
operations of the philosophical discourse that the act is promoted as that which alone 
can deliver that which escapes the philosopher's caper, namely an access to the real or 
that which truly is: affirmative life to Nietzsche, the real of jouissance or das Ding to 
Lacan, Christian love to Saint Paul, God or the silent meaning of the world to 
Wittgenstein. The question to be raised through Badiou is whether there remains 
anything on the other side of the antiphilosophical acts, or if the feminine remainder 
simply disappears there. It is the question if the fundamentally unfounded act of faith 
is capable to found itself, or whether it must fail in such an act of auto-foundation. By 
not ignoring the distinctive criterion of the antiphilosopher's misogyny, and by 
underscoring the feminine remainder before the act, the failures inherent to the 
antiphilosopher's act of auto-foundation are brought to the fore.  
 According to Badiou, contemporary antiphilosophies are identifiable by the 
determination of their matter and their act. The double determination of antiphilosophy 
coincides with the four conditions of Badiou's philosophy, namely art, science, love, 
and politics.568 Nietzsche's antiphilosophy is determined by the matter of art, primarily 
music or the non-representational theatre of tragedy, whereas its act is the archi-
political act of breaking in two the history of the world, the history of humanity 
[Geschichte der Menschheit].569 The archi-political act, materialized through art, will 
put an end to the reactive interpretations under the nihilistic reign of the philosopher-









the act is the archi-aesthetic act of a pure showing, whereas the matter is science. 
Through the science of logic, Wittgenstein's act materializes in the clarification of the 
lines of demarcation between that which can and cannot be said, so as to let the 
principle of clarity, itself unspeakable and silent, unfold. In Lacan, the act is the archi-
scientific act of demonstrating the real of jouissance and the impasse of formalization, 
through the integrated transmissions made possible by the matheme. Lacan's archi-
scientific act is mediated through the matters of love, as they occur in the analytic 
session. Badiou does not identify the matter and the act in regard to the radical 
antiphilosophy of Saint Paul. But in line with the logic of conditions, it could easily be 
demonstrated that the act of Saint Paul is determined by the archi-amorous act of life 
in Christ, proffered through the Damascene encounter, while its material basis is that 
of a universal politics, the establishment of the militant ecclesiae.570  
 The prefix 'archi' designates a movement to the void or the real point of the 
respective conditions of the acts in question. In Wittgenstein, the clarity of silence 
figures as the real of aesthetic form. In Lacan, the real is literally the impasse of 
scientific formalization. In Saint Paul, the unforeseen encounter of the Damascene 
moment points to the real of love, the non-relation of amorous relationality as such. 
The case is nonetheless most pronounced in Nietzsche and his revolution as the real of 
politics. As Badiou explains, Nietzsche's archi-political act designates neither a 
philosophical foundation of politics nor a determination of the essences or origins of 
politics as such. Nietzsche's antiphilosophical act is determined as archi-political in the 
sense that it moves beyond ordinary politics. It is the radical act of breaking in two the 
history of the world. It is archi-political in the sense that it simultaneously extends and 
dissolves the field of politics. It extends the force and capacity of politics beyond 











the archi-political act of the antiphilosopher, Nietzsche, himself. 571  The French 
Revolution had failed to be radical enough, as it got stuck in the simple negation and 
transvaluation of the old values, a reversal of L'Ancien Régime under La Nouvelle 
République. Hence, it is to Nietzsche that the task of breaking in two the history of the 
world befalls, and the archi-political act of Nietzsche is to finally perform the move 
into the invaluable of a life of pure affirmation.   
 The antiphilosopher proffers the act as the only recourse to the feminine 
remainder. But it is of the essence of the act, Badiou writes, to be ascertainable only by 
its effects.572 Characteristic of contemporary antiphilosophy, with the exception of 
Lacan, Badiou continues, is the programmatic status of its acts. In contemporary 
antiphilosophy, the act is relegated as an anticipated certainty of a more or less 
immediate future, and its conditions in the present are sketched up in the constant 
absence of an actual affirmation of the act's having taken place. 573  After the 
antiphilosophical ventures of Wittgenstein, there is only the negative preparation of 
the act left, namely his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. His antiphilosophy is thus 
delivered over to philosophy, Badiou writes, and of the act that was to supplant 
thinking, there is only the thought of that act, the thought of a non-thought, left.574 
Bosteels makes an important observation concerning the antiphilosophical tendency of 
succumbing to the temptation of the absolute, non-qualified, or non-dialectical break. 
With emphasis on the case of Nietzsche, Bosteels refers to the issue of the 
antiphilosophical conception of the event qua act, "the radicalism of the pure event as 
absolute beginning, or the treatment of the event as some kind of archi-event, that is to 
say, in the end, the conflation of the event with the act."575 Conflating the event and 
the act in an absolute break, antiphilosophy seeks to legitimize itself as truth, as both 
the producer and the guarantee of truth of the condition it assumes. Politically 
speaking, it is an issue of speculative leftism. Bosteels goes a long way to show how 









temptations of speculative leftism, although Badiou is opposed to the notion of an 
absolute beginning.576 Insufficiently emphasized by Bosteels, however, is how the 
program of an absolute beginning is a contradiction in terms. It necessarily undermines 
itself, and fails to proffer anything except the disappearance of that of which it bears 
promise. The failures of the program of an absolute beginning and the distinctive 
criterion of misogyny are mutually explanatory.  
 One could designate the temptation of the non-dialectical break identified by 
Bosteels as the antiphilosopher's 'absolute fallacy'. Bosteels does not accentuate the 
issue of misogyny in relation to the absolute fallacy of the act. In fact, Bosteels 
reference to the antiphilosopher's distinctive criterion of misogyny as a 'derivatory 
feature' misses out on a key point. The antiphilosopher is not misogynistic simply 
because he renders the feminine remainder as the ineffable and silent other of 
masculine reason. The antiphilosopher values the feminine remainder above all else. 
Rather, the antiphilosopher's misogyny is integral to the formulation of the act in its 
status as an archi-act. The feminine remainder remains as a mere inaccessible screen. 
The antiphilosopher's promise of woman precludes the antiphilosopher from ever 
delivering according to this promise, due to the very way in which this promise is 
formulated. That is to say, the antiphilosopher's distinctive criterion of misogyny is 
integral to the absolute fallacy of the act.  
 The absolute fallacy is most pronounced in Nietzsche and his breaking in two of 
the history of the world, as Bosteels notes, but it is present also in Wittgenstein's 
kicking away of the ladder after having climbed it, and in Saint Paul's report of the 
new life in Christ resurrected. Nietzsche's affirmations are the obverse of Hegel's 
negations. Nietzsche's ornithological emblem is not the owl taking flight at dusk, but 
rather the cock announcing the rising of the sun. The fact that the cock crows, 
however, is not a demonstration of the new day. Therein lies the problem for 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche's problem is his auto-foundation, the problem of how to found 
his fundamentally unfounded act. By his act, Nietzsche seeks to impose himself in the 
position of his own big Other, as he seeks to prepare his own coming as the radical 




according to Badiou – was to be torn in and between himself as both his own prophet 
and his own saviour, as responding to both the preparation and the execution of the 
absolute breaking in two of the history of the world. Having to prepare an absolute 
break is, of course, an untenable position. The very moment an absolute break is 
already prepared for, it ceases per definition to be absolute, insofar as an absolute 
novelty cannot be procured on the basis of the old.577 Nietzsche went mad by 
attempting to make of himself the constitutive exception of a totality including 
himself, or to include himself in a totality whose constitutive exception would be 
himself.  
 The absolute fallacy is best grasped as a double fallacy. First of all, it involves 
the impossible procedure of the antiphilosopher's act of auto-foundation, as a 
preparation of that which per definition cannot be prepared. As Bosteels notes, 
Nietzsche's problem was to be torn between himself as both the angelic herald and the 
hero of the event qua act, both of which Badiou denies existence.578 As an obverse 
effect of the impossible procedure of the antiphilosopher's auto-foundation, the 
absolute fallacy implies that the antiphilosopher makes his own proper subjectivity 
another All. The problem is not simply that the antiphilosopher announces his own 
coming, but that he, in lack of a material underpinning for his subjective act, renders 
his subjectivity into the material underpinnings of the change he wants to see. That is 
the implications of the archi-act, or the conflation of the event and the act as an archi-
event. In L'Être et l'événement, having made explicit mention of the Nietzschean act as 
'Revolution' or 'Apocalypse', Badiou argues how that which remains ignored in such a 















l'événement lui-même n'existe qu'autant qu'il s'est soumis, par une intervention 
dont la possibilité exige la récurrence – et donc le non-commencement –, à la 
structure réglée de la situation, et qu'ainsi toute nouveauté est relative, n'étant 
lisible après coup que comme le hasard d'une ordre. Ce que nous enseigne la 
doctrine de l'événement est plutôt que tout l'effort est d'en suivre les conséquences, 
non d'en exalter l'occurrence.579  
 
In Théorie du sujet, the proletariat's imperative of destruction forbids the political 
subject to be imagined along the lines of a structural inheritance, transmission, 
corruption, or inversion, but also as any kind of purifying rupture or as a world broken 
in two.580 The operation of destruction and the principle of contradictory consistency 
underscore the laborious element involved in the breaking of new ground, its 
dialectical or non-miraculous character. The radical break is ascertainable only post 
festum, Badiou insists. Badiou thereby underscores the material underpinnings of 
radical change that the notion of an event confirms, precisely insofar as the event itself 
is an auto-foundation. But the being of an event is to disappear, and the appearance of 
any auto-foundation is to eclipse itself. Only by the strict separation of event and the 
subjective process that follows in its wake does the notion of change move beyond the 
mere structural occurrence that disappears in its own appearance. The 
antiphilosopher's misogyny entails that every access to the feminine remainder and 
radical change, relegated to a coming future and dependent on the act of an absolute 
















An Education by Science; the Things that Mathematics Teaches 
The issues I address in this section concern the philosopher's loyalty to the so-called 
education by science, and how a scientific education implies a foreclosure of the 
feminine remainder from the philosopher's operations. If the antiphilosopher's 
distinctive misogyny precludes the feminine remainder also when it is promised at the 
other end of the act, my questions at present are how an education by science 
determines the philosopher's possibilities for thinking change and novelty beyond the 
predicament of the feminine remainder. The central issue is how to understand 
science, and what an education by science entails. Wittgenstein reduces science to the 
totality of true propositions, and thereby intimates a remainder at the other side of 
science. A comparison with the problematic of delimitation in Kant's critical project 
underscores the essential religious fallacy involved in Wittgenstein's reduction of 
science and the sublimation of the act. Wittgenstein's antiphilosophy implies a 
conception of science as encompassed in a transcendent meaning, rendered to the 
archi-aesthetic act. In Badiou's philosophical works, however, science is 
fundamentally mathematical, where mathematics thinks in and through the impossible. 
The philosopher thus bypasses the disconcerting question of the remainder by refusing 
the notions of the inaccessible. The lesson of mathematics is that the point of 
impossibility is the point of possibility for thinking as change and novelty. The overall 
question, in other words, is not simply how to think the possibilities of change and 
novelty, through the act or the event, but the possibilities of thinking change and 
novelty – within thinking – as change. The mathematical lesson opens for the 




Badiou has nothing but scorn for the critical project of Kant. To Badiou, Kant defines 
the theme of human finitude and imposes his limits everywhere, with the additional 
expectancy that these limits be dutifully respected.581 Kant is often considered a front 




shares in the basic tenet of the original antiphilosophy of the conservative reaction. 
Both the enlightened Kant and the reactionary abbot Chardon share the propensity for 
evincing the limitations of thinking. Also the abbot Chardon can be categorized under 
"l'enfermement critique (ah! les éternelles 'limites' de la Raison)"582 found in Kant, 
even if the intentions and the interests differ. It is with no less distaste that Badiou 
attacks the one he considers to be the Kant of the 20th century, namely Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein's project concerns the delimitation of the thinkable and the unthinkable, 
and his desire is precisely the desire for clarity of limits, so as to indicate the 
remainder on the other side. The desire for clarity of limits is bound up with the issue 
of science. My first questions concern how science is imbricated in the 
antiphilosophical notion of the remainder, and how the philosopher Badiou conceives 
of science. It will lead to Wittgenstein's archi-aesthetic act and the question if 
Wittgenstein's act can deliver what it promises any better than Nietzsche's can. 
 The question of science has played a pivotal role in Badiou's philosophical 
works from the 60s onwards.583 Badiou's early contributions to Cahiers pour l'analyse 
deal extensively with the question of science. His "Marque et manque; à propos du 
zero" includes a polemical thrust at the doctrine of science and the logic of the 
signifier elaborated on in Miller's seminal texts on Lacan, "La suture (éléments de la 
logique du signifiant)" and "Action de la structure". Miller argues for the suture of the 
subject within any discourse, as the subject figures in discourse as a lacking element 
by way of a representative or placeholder. Miller provides the example of such a 
suture in Gottlob Frege's foundation of the number sequence and zero as the first mark 
















mechanism with the representation of the logical mechanism within ideological 
discourse. Miller thereby conceals the pure production through which the logical 
machine never lacks anything but that which the same machine is apt to produce at 
another level, Badiou writes.585 Through Gödel's incompleteness theorem and the 
production of an undecidable proposition, Badiou demonstrates an alternative 
production of zero, where zero functions as the mark of a lacking mark, as opposed to 
the mark of lack per se. In conclusion, Badiou argues that on this side of the scientific 
chain of signifiers there are only other chains, and if the signifier is sutured in any 
way, it is to itself alone. But that is just to say that the signifier is not sutured in 
science. In science, the signifier is stratified. The mark that is lacking on one level is a 
mark lacking because it has been marked at an earlier level, and this lacking mark can 
be re-marked again at a third and later level, and so on.  
 Badiou elaborates on the stratification of the scientific field in the earlier text, 
"La Subversion infinitésimal". As Feltham notes of this text, stratification is operative 
there  
 
as a mathematical performative, a baptism that opens up a new domain of writings 
by converting one modality into another. That is, a mark that is impossible in one 
strata – such as the square root of minus one – is given a name – i for an imaginary 
number – thus opening up another possible series of numbers. Such operations of 
naming thus generate new strata of writings.586 
 
The scientific intention is to be grasped as going in the direction of the transformation 
of the stratified space, Badiou explains.587 In other words, the scientific intention is the 
intention of change, and an appendix on Gödel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates 
the significance of Badiou's view. Badiou speaks of Gödel's incompleteness theorem 
as something akin to a scientific event, even if it is still argued in the terminology of 








designate the event is Gaston Bachelard's term of the epistemological break. Badiou 
portrays the dialectics of science and ideology as an alternating chain of stratification, 
de-stratification, and re-stratification. In this chain, science continuously evades the 
representational confines in which ideology continuously captures it, where science 
again and again demonstrates how stratification resists the schemes of closure.588  
 Badiou's early texts testify to two points. Firstly, science is at its root 
mathematical and, secondly, science is open to infinite possibilities. While science has 
been an influential condition throughout Badiou's philosophical development, the 
question of science has been the question of its mathematical foundation. As Hallward 
points out, as far as Badiou is concerned, it seems to be the case that science is all the 
more scientific the more mathematical it is:  
 
In order to preserve an effectively unlimited creativity in science, [Badiou] must 
restrict the scientific truth process to matters of pure formalization alone, that is, to 
matters involving the confrontation of form with its real limit or impasse. And 
since every real zone of formlessness is by definition internal to the existing means 
of formalization, Badiou's treatment of scientific truths effectively equates them 
with innovations undertaken in their mathematical foundation pure and simple.589  
 
The second point follows on the first. Since Badiou considers science as the pure 
affirmation of marks and stratifications, there can be no crisis in science as such, only 
in its ideological representations. There are no ultimate limitations in science, neither 

















sans point de cécité."590 The space of science is infinite. Badiou does not abandon the 
fundamentals of this early position. In Conditions, for instance, Badiou still holds to 
the view that mathematics is a complete stranger to both the representations of the 
limit and to the theme of finitude. The mathematical concept proper of the limit is the 
concept of a point-of-presence [point-présent], Badiou explains, whereas mathematical 
thinking precludes the theme of finitude insofar as it necessarily presupposes the 
infinity of its space.591 As Hallward's note also underscores, the two points of the 
mathematical foundations and the infinite space of science together secure the 
scientific capacity for change and novelty, for the creative production of new truths, as 
a mode of thinking in and through a point of impossibility. 
 In antiphilosophy, science is another matter completely. If the antiphilosophical 
motto par excellence is that 'the thinkable is not all', and if the antiphilosophical 
metaphor of the philosophical disease targets the philosopher's grandiose delusions, 
the infinity of the space of science is per definition precluded in the antiphilosopher's 
perspective. The antiphilosophical motto and the metaphor of disease culminate in the 
antiphilosopher's conception of mathematics. The question of mathematics, Badiou 
writes, will never cease to be the major line of demarcation between philosophy and 
antiphilosophy. The antiphilosopher's position, with yet an exception of Lacan, is 
distinguished by its de-singularization of mathematics into a simple subcategory of 
logic. To the antiphilosopher, mathematics is an essentially empty theory of signs, a 
formal rhetoric or grammar.592  
 To de-singularize mathematics as an empty theory of signs inadvertently 
positions the antiphilosopher in opposition to philosophy. The dividing line between 
philosophy and antiphilosophy concerns the question of whether or not mathematics 
constitutes a mode of thinking. In opposition to the so-called sickness of Plato, the 
antiphilosopher can only answer this question in the negative: mathematics is not a 
thought, but only the blind operation of rules and regulations. To acknowledge 







possible saying without the experience of an object, a possible a-subjective and 
ordered access to the intelligible, a possible pronunciation of being-qua-being, and a 
possible theoretical nature to the antiphilosophical act itself. In short, if mathematics 
thinks, the implication is that Plato was in the right.593 In Badiou's reading, Plato 
established the philosophical appreciation of mathematics as a mode of thinking – as 
the discourse that thinks being-qua-being and that enounces something real – insofar 
as mathematics is the discourse in which invention and discovery merge. On the basis 
of mathematics, Plato declared the co-belonging or the ontological commensurability 
of the knower and the known, insofar as the idea in Plato designates the place where 
the subject and the object of the intelligible cannot be distinguished from one 
another.594 Badiou's own equation of mathematics and ontology and his philosophical 
motto of a Platonism of the multiple reaffirms the original move of Plato, after Cantor 
and set theory, so as to make the mathematical inventions and discoveries answer to 
the status of pure being as infinite and indifferent multiplicities of multiplicities.595	
 However, if there has ever been an issue on which antiphilosophers have been 
in agreement, it has been that Plato was always an abomination. The possibility that 
Platonism makes sense runs counter to the most foundational premises of 
antiphilosophy. This becomes especially pronounced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as 























'think being' or 'enounce the real' as the paradigm of the philosopher's grandiose 
imposture. It is the epitome of the meaningless and absurd speculations of the 
metaphysical tradition, while the premise of Wittgenstein's logico-philosophical 
elaborations states that one can never say what a thing is, only how a thing is. To avoid 
having to acknowledge that mathematics is a mode of thinking, Wittgenstein de-
singularizes mathematics as a simple subcategory of logic. Mathematics is rendered an 
empty performative in which nothing is said and nothing thought, a pure method of 
calculation by equation, and the substitution of signs one for another.  
 Logic is defined by the tautological status of its propositions, and tautology is 
defined by its inability to express a thought. A thought, in Wittgenstein's world, is 
narrowly defined by the two paragraphs that state that "das logische Bild der 
Tatsachen ist der Gedanke" and that "der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz."597 Thinking 
is simply the description of a possible state of affairs through which an arrangement of 
objects is represented by a chain of names. Thinking thereby becomes the prerogative 
of science. It is science that concerns itself with possible states of affairs, either 
existing as actual cases, as facts, by which the propositions that describe them are 
judged to be true, or not, by which their propositions are deemed false. The rest is 
either philosophical nonsense or, preferably, the silence rendered to the 
antiphilosophical act. The tautologies of logic and the equivalents of mathematical 
equations, however, do not describe any state of affairs that is the case or not. They 
simply reflect the necessities of how possible states of affairs must relate to one 
another, the laws of existence in its independence of that which exist, the so-called 
armature of the world: e.g., if something is the case, it cannot simultaneously not be 
the case (~(p & ~p)), if a combination of states is the case, it cannot simultaneously be 









on.598 Or 5+7=12, as in Kant's example of the synthetic a priori judgement, which is 
precisely a statement on the necessary composition of elements in the world.599  
 In the world of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, logic and mathematics indicate the 
limits of a world that is essentially a limited whole. The status of the world as a limited 
whole is established already in the first paragraph: "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall 
ist."600 Positioned at one remove from the operations of mathematics, science is no 
longer conceived of as an unending Outside without blind spots, but rather, to vary on 
Badiou's own definition, as le Dedans sans point de fuite, as the Inside without escape. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Der Satz kann die gesamte Wirklichkeit darstellen, aber er kann nicht das 
darstellen, was er mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muss, um sie darstellen zu 
können – die logische Form. [/] Um die logische Form darstellen zu können, 
müssten wir uns mit dem Satze außerhalb der Logik aufstellen können, das heißt 
außerhalb der Welt.601 
 
If 'Wirklichkeit' designates the world inasmuch as it is represented within the logical 
grid of propositions that describes all that is the case, it follows that science and the 
world are coextensive. Science has been defined as a limited whole, namely the sum 
total of true propositions.602 There is nothing in the world which science cannot 
represent, just as there is nothing represented by science that cannot be in the world. 
However, the world has its limits and so does science, namely its limits. The world 
itself is not an object of the world, nor is science itself an object of science. 
Consequently, neither the world nor science, as the totality of that which is the case or 
the totality of true propositions, can be posited by way of propositions. Propositions 












with which the world or the totality of science as such can enter into relations, and thus 
a meaningful proposition concerning the status of the world or the status of science is 
not possible. It is unthinkable. The other side of the limits of science is the prerogative 




I argue that Wittgenstein's archi-scientific act succumbs to a religious fallacy similar to 
the absolute fallacy of Nietzsche's archi-political act. Again, the case of Kant draws up 
the decisive mechanisms. Wittgenstein's problematic of the unthinkable limit of 
thinking is the same problematic that Kant attends to in Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
especially in the first of his so-called cosmological ideas. The first cosmological idea 
implicates the mathematical antinomy of the presumed finite or infinite status of the 
world. It raises the question of the world's presumed limitation or non-limitation in 
space and time. Whereas Espinoza considered the mathematical antinomy as 
masculine, Copjec cross-reads the mathematical antinomy with Lacan's schema of 
feminine sexuation. My present question does not concern the sexual status of the 
antinomies as such. Rather, my question is how Kant's critiques can shed light on the 
status of the archi-aesthetic act in Wittgenstein, and on its capacity to deliver the silent 
remainder as the other side of science.  
 Wittgenstein's problematic of the unthinkable status of the logical form of the 
sum total of science is mirrored in Copjec's recapitulation of Kant. As Copjec 
explains, the mathematical antinomy is  
 
occasioned by the attempt to think the 'world', by which Kant means 'the 
mathematical total of all phenomena and the totality of their synthesis'; that is to 
say, the universe of phenomena such that it is no longer necessary to presuppose 
any other phenomenon that would serve as the condition for this universe. Reason 






The attempt to think the world occasions the antinomy between the world's presumed 
finite or infinite status. Kant's solution is to deny the assumption that the world as a 
totality of phenomena exists, that a universe of phenomena is a consistent concept. On 
the basis of this denial, Kant demonstrates the propositions of both the finite and the 
infinite status of the world as false. In Copjec's recapitulation, the thesis of a finite 
world is proved false as "there can be no limit to phenomena in the phenomenal realm, 
for this would require the existence of a phenomena of an exceptional sort, one that 
was not itself conditioned and would thus allow us to halt our regress, or one that took 
no phenomenal form, i.e. that was empty." 604 The antithesis, concerned with the 
infinite status of the world, falters due to the fact that all phenomena "are inescapably 
subject to conditions of time and space and must there be encountered one by one, 
indefinitely, without the possibility of reaching an end, a point where all phenomena 
would be known." 605 Copjec's recapitulation underscores how the attempt to think the 
world as sum total in Kant implicates the unthinkable status of the other side of the 
limit of thinking. The thinkable is not all, as the antiphilosopher insist.  
 Kordela highlights the importance of the phenomena-noumenon distinction in 
Kant's discussions of the mathematical antinomy, and thus brings the antiphilosophical 
character of Kant's philosophy to the fore. Confronted with the problematic of the 
finite or infinite status of the world, Kordela writes, that which  
 
reason momentarily forgets [...] is that 'space and time, together with the 
appearances in them, are nothing existing in themselves and outside of my 
representations,' that is, reason forgets that the thing- or the world-in-itself is not in 
space and time. Since the question addressed here concerns the limits of the world 
in space and time, the true referent of 'world' is not the world-in-itself but the world 
as appearance, that is, our representation of the world. [...] As for the world in 
itself, the mathematic antinomy entails an 'indefinite judgment,' that is, an 









The world as a totality of phenomena cannot exist as a phenomenon, as an object of 
experience or as representation. Written in accordance with the terminology of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the lesson of the mathematical antinomy in Kant is that the 
world as the totality of that which is the case – or as the totality of true propositions – 
does not lend itself to propositionality. It does not lend itself to thinking. But as 
Kordela's recapitulation underscores, that the world does not lend itself to thinking is 
just to say that the question of the world as such, beyond thinking, precisely, remains. 
It remains as an indefinite judgment, a matter relegated to the sublimation of the moral 
act or the silent showing of Wittgenstein's archi-aesthetic act.  
 According to Copjec, there can be no limit to phenomena in the phenomenal 
realm, insofar as such a limit would require the existence of an exceptional and 
unconditional phenomenon.  There is no possibility of reaching the point from which 
all phenomena would be accessible to knowledge. Precluded from Copjec's 
recapitulation, however, is the recognition of how neither of these refutations denies 
the possibility of a non-phenomenon in the function of such a limit. On the contrary, 
these refutations seem to demand the presence of a non-phenomenon. As a limit-
concept of strictly negative applicability, the noumenon is installed precisely as the 
limitation on the phenomenal realm and the world of appearances, the world of 
knowledge and of science. Lacan indicates as much when he opposes any too 
straightforward a conflation of his own real of the Freudian thing, "une vérité qui 
parle," with the Kantian noumenon, as "un noumène qui, de mémoire de raison pure, 
la ferme."607 Of course, Copjec does acknowledge the noumenon and the function of 
the indefinite judgment in Kant. She recognizes that it is by the cause of the noumenon 
that Kant "conceives of reason as limited by nothing but its own nature [...], as 
internally limited," and that it is by the indefinite judgment that Kant will "affirm that 
the world is not a possible object of experience without pronouncing beyond this on 
the existence of the world."608 However, Copjec's rendition is still too quick to affirm 
the phenomenal realm of representations and appearances as all there is, as if Kant's 






noumenon and the sublimation of the moral act reintroduce the remainder in Kant. 
Copjec seems to ignore the possibility of an other side of reason, and thereby also the 
antiphilosophical character of Kantian philosophy. It is by way of the other side of 
reason that the antiphilosopher will presume not only the existence but also the 
possibility of an access to the world as such, as sum total or One-All. The other side of 
reason, the unthinkable beyond of the limit of the thinkable, is the domain proper of 
the act. 
 Kordela accentuates the notion of a beyond of reason in Kant, in particular 
when she differentiates sexuation from being. Kordela differentiates between the 
masculine totality by exclusion and the feminine non-all of infinite regress, on the one 
hand, and a bi-sexual non-all of self-referentiality, on the other. She designates the 
latter, the bi-sexual non-all of being's self-referentiality, as "the all-non-all." 609 
Whereas sexuation is to be found on the level of the double failures relating to the 
antinomies of reason, Kordela writes, being or the thing-in-itself is only ever to be 
found on the level of the cause of these failures. The cause of reason's failures is the 
self-referentiality of reason, as it figures in the so-called paradox of set theory. In set 
theory, Kordela writes, 	
 
the obstacle preventing a set from forming a totality is not the infinite regression in 
the diachronic series of its elements but the self-referentiality of its synchronic 
totality. In set theory, the set of all sets is defined as not-all (i.e. as not constituting 
a totality), not because we perpetually encounter yet another set, but because it 
cannot be decided whether it itself (the set of all sets) is included as a member of 
itself or not.610 
 
Against Copjec's ethics of the feminine, Kordela does not merely transpose the ethical 
domain from the mathematical to the dynamical antinomies, like Espinoza does. 
Kordela argues for the paradox of set theory as a distinct ethical genre underlying the 
feminine and the masculine, the mathematical and the dynamical antinomies, both. 





is all-inclusive, i.e. a universality that "does not exclude its own exceptional 
precondition," and that is "truly self-referential, in that it includes within itself its 
constitutive presupposition."611 While not explicitly elaborated upon by Kant himself, 
Kordela argues, the all-non-all set nonetheless operates in the undercurrents of his 
thinking. The surreptitious operations of the all-non-all set in Kant are informative of 
the sublimation involved in the moral act, and of the fallacies involved in the radical 
acts of the antiphilosopher.  
 According to Kordela, the moral act in Kant depends upon a shift in the 
registers of reason. Through the shift in register, the solutions to the antinomies are 
reversed. To Kordela, the moral act is found in the reversals themselves, where both 
sides of the antinomies co-exist. The moral act thus depends on a subversion or 
destabilization of the judgments of reason: 
 
[T]he dynamic antinomy or male sex negotiates the inherent contradiction of the 
One [the undecidable belonging or non-belonging of the set of all sets to itself] by 
assuming that everything is inside the One – defined as the field of law (the 
symbolic order) – only insofar as, in another aspect, everything is outside: not 
subject to any law but free. The mathematic antinomy or female sex deals with the 
same problem by raising the unanswerable question as to whether the One – 
defined as the field of appearances (again, the symbolic order) – includes 
everything within itself or whether there is a world outside appearances, a world in-
itself.612 
 
Through the shifts of the moral act, beings of reason produce the time in which they 
live, Kordela continues, "man by creating the times at which he is free and those at 
which he is subject to the law; woman by creating the before and the after in which 
experience retroactively constitutes itself."613 Kordela does not speak of a leap beyond 
phenomena by turning from speculative to practical reason, as did Espinoza. 







renders the otherwise negative value of the noumenon as inaccessible into a positive 
field of possibility.  
 Kordela's discussion of the paradox of set theory allows for a remark on the 
case of Nietzsche. Nietzsche's problem concerned his auto-foundation and his desire to 
be his own big Other in the preparation of himself as an absolute beginning. 
Nietzsche's position can be described by recourse to the self-referential shift that 
subverts the solutions of the dynamical antinomy, insofar as his paradoxical position is 
that of the undecidable status of the constitutive exception as both included in and 
excluded from its constituted totality. Nietzsche's archi-political act stranded because 
Nietzsche desired to create only the time at which he would be free, forgetting that this 
time would have to be referred to through the time at which he has been subject to the 
law. Wittgenstein's position can be described by way of the mathematical counterpart 
of Nietzsche's dynamical antinomy. Wittgenstein's conundrum is not so much whether 
or not the world of science is limited and forms a totality, a question he does not 
hesitate to answer in the affirmative. Wittgenstein's real conundrum is rather the 
unanswerable question of whether this world includes everything in itself, or whether 
there is another world beyond appearances, a world-in-itself. While Wittgenstein is 
likely to answer the latter unanswerable question also in the affirmative (yes, there is a 
world-in-itself beyond appearances), the actual affirmation of the world-in-itself, like 
the radical break of Nietzsche, cannot be imparted on this side of the question, by 
reason or propositions. The unanswerable question of the world-in-itself begs a wager 
on the antiphilosophical act. The question remains whether or not Wittgenstein is 
prone to an equivalent of Nietzsche's absolute fallacy and to forget the materialist 
underpinnings of this world in his act to move beyond phenomena, beyond thinking, to 





Badiou highlights the more peripheral paragraphs of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. These 
paragraphs serve to frame the central logico-philosophical apparatus of the Tractatus, 
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whose intention is not, despite appearances, the intention of positivism. Even if the 
bulk of the Tractatus is concerned with establishing the lines of demarcation that 
render propositions meaningful and delimits the domain of science, Wittgenstein's 
position on science is summed up in the empathic statement of how, even if all 
possible scientific question were answered, nothing would have been resolved 
concerning the real problems and the higher issues of life.614 The higher issues of life 
concern the meaning of the world. The meaning of the world is to be found – if found 
at all – beyond the world. It lies beyond the domain of propositions and science, 
beyond the phenomenal field, in the world-in-itself. In Wittgenstein, Badiou explains, 
the notion of a meaning of the world beyond appearances is captured by way of a 
metaphor that articulates aesthetics and religion. It is the metaphor of the pure showing 
of a mystical element. It communicates that there is something inexpressible, which 
nonetheless shows itself and makes itself manifest. 615  Hallward notes how 
"antiphilosophy reveals where philosophy explains."616 This is especially pronounced 
in the case of Wittgenstein. The gist of Wittgenstein's work, Badiou writes, is more 
than anything to establish the laws of the thinkable in order to situate the unthinkable 
at the upper limit of the thinkable itself.617 At the upper limit – and when everything 
that can be said of that which can be said, have been said – the remainder is rendered, 
quite literally, as silence. 
 Badiou underscores the religious intimation of Wittgenstein's remainder beyond 
science. It is closer to the confrontation between the authority of religion and the 
reason of science from which antiphilosophy was originally coined as a term in its 
Enlightenment origins. Hallward identifies the crux of antiphilosophy as "a rigorous 















basically "religion in philosophical guise, argued on philosophical terrain." 618 
Hallward's description is fitting of Wittgenstein, who operates in the pursuit of a 
mystical element, an ineffable meaning, and denounces the theoretical aspirations of 
the philosopher as dangerous abstractions. Since the remainder ensures the closure of 
the scientific field, by testifying to its upper limits, Wittgenstein's religious intimation 
goes beyond the blunt denotation of the meaning of the world as 'God'. Wittgenstein 
admits to a bifurcation of meaning into a scientific domain of meaning in the world 
and another domain of the unspeakable meaning of the world. This bifurcation, Badiou 
argues, necessarily implies the admittance of a meaning of truths. Truths are not only 
communicated by meaning, in propositions, but are also possessed by a meaning of 
their own. However, Badiou continues,  
 
pour le philosophe que je suis, l'idée que les vérités, apparemment contingentes, 
sont enveloppées par un sens nécessaire – surtout si, comme c'est le cas chez 
Wittgenstein, cette idée n'est pas l'enjeu d'un argument, si elle n'obéit à aucune 
discipline des propositions, si elle est ordonnée à l'acte pur et silencieux – est 
l'exacte définition théorique de la foi religieuse. Il n'y aurait donc nul hasard à ce 
que 'christianisme' nomme ce sens [du monde], qui à la fois surplombe, valorise et 
destitue le sens [dans le monde]. Et la nouveauté inouïe de l'acte antiphilosophique 
ne serait à la fin que le retour à cette antique croyance dont tout l'effort 
philosophique est de nous extirper.619 
 
Wittgenstein's religious intimation is not that the authority of God should not be 
challenged by the philosopher's ruses of reason or the scientist's arguments and 
experimentations. His contention is that God cannot be challenged in such ways and 













the pure and silent act, whereas the philosopher reveals a blatant disregard for the 
unspeakable in assuming that such an absolute instance could be susceptible to 
communication. As Badiou reformulates Wittgenstein's antipathy against the verbiage 
of the philosopher, "en définitive, l'absurdité philosophique est de croire qu'il y a une 
vérité possible du sens (du monde), alors qu'il n'y a qu'un sens (divin) des vérités 
(scientifiques).620 If Wittgenstein does not fortify himself behind the covers of the 
Book as did the abbot Chaudon in his attack on the Enlightenment philosophers, the 
mechanism at play is nonetheless similar. Both cases invest in the notion of an 
overarching necessity whose privilege it is to secure the contingent occurrences of the 
world and of science. Mathematically speaking, both cases invest in the notion of an 
absolute grand cardinal, a set of all sets, with the power to conclude on the continuum 
hypothesis and fix the itinerant excess of representation over presentation. The archi-
aesthetic act would be the wager by which the belonging of the set of all sets to itself 
would be confirmed. 
 The notion of an inaccessible and unthinkable remainder that would function as 
a transcendent guarantee for its own production of truths is untenable to the 
scientifically educated philosopher. To Badiou, the lesson of a radically mathematical 
science amounts to the acknowledgement of the infinite stratification of an outside 
without blind spots. The unthinkable is precisely that from which the whole 
philosophical effort has strived to liberate itself. The name of Plato signals the 
philosophical struggle to liberate thinking from the dominance of the unthinkable. 
Philosophy proper first becomes the case in and by Plato's inaugural move from µύθος 
to λὸγος, from the claims of a revealed presence to the claims of mathematical 
invention and discovery. As Clemens notes à propos ontology vis-à-vis onto-theology,  
 
Plato is properly the origin of philosophy insofar as he interrupted the claims of 





paradigm of rigorous knowledge). Rational knowledge (exemplified for Plato by 
geometry) curbs and supplants the irrational inspirations of literary effusion.621  
 
Plato operationalizes mathematics philosophically. To Plato, Clemens writes, 
mathematics is "not a deficient form of speaking being, but the only way in which 
being can be properly expressed," insofar as "it is as pure as reason gets, i.e. 
mathematics is at once non-empirical, axiomatic, deductive, extra-linguistic, non-
definitional, universalizing."622 Wittgenstein reduces mathematics to mere calculation 
and the substitution of signs, whereas Badiou, with his Platonism of the multiple, 
identifies the essence of mathematics in its ability to think. Mathematics thinks by 
means of the fundamental theorems on existence, power, decomposition, and 
presentation. Through such theorems, mathematics thinks the being of beings, the 
infinite, the composition of multiplicities, and singularities and typologies.623 More 
importantly, mathematics is a mode of thinking that thinks in and by the impossible.  
 Mathematics thinks in and by the impossible, Badiou writes, insofar as 
mathematics formalizes that which thinking leaves behind as a remainder or 
impossible proper of its own field of determination, above all the field of mathematics 
itself, in its anterior state of deployment.624 As Clemens observes, "each mathematical 
innovation delivers an entirely new account of multiplicity, which enables its own 
mathematical predecessors to be rewritten in its own terms without loss."625 Badiou's 
remark that the mathematical concept of the limit is the concept of a point-of-presence 
and not the concept of a horizon gains its full significance here, as does his early 

















mark of a lacking mark rather than of lack as such, what is lacking on one level will be 
reproduced at another – or, more to the point here, what is impossible in one strata, in 
one formalization, serves as the point of possibility of another strata, another 
formalization. Hallward has already noted how the productions of scientific truths 
occur at the impasses of an established formalization.  
 Badiou refuses to reduce mathematics to simple calculation. He insists on the 
status of mathematics as a mode of thinking that thinks in and by the impossible. 
Badiou thus posits mathematics as a serious threat to the antiphilosophical notion of an 
unthinkable remainder. As Badiou explains, if the impossible is thinkable, as he 
believes mathematics demonstrates in full, the possibility of the presence of the 
unthinkable inadvertently becomes much less secure.626 The entire antiphilosophical 
project thus wavers, insofar as its legitimacy depends on the unveiled presence of an 
element inaccessible to thinking, to be granted through the antiphilosophical act alone.  
 Mathematics as a mode of thinking in and by the impossible should be 
understood in as literal a sense as possible. An impossibility within the established 
formalization marks the point of possibility that enables thinking to take place, where 
thinking is defined as nothing less than the pass through the impasse and the 
procession to something previously un-thought. The joint invention and discovery of 
mathematics is in that sense the paradigm of thinking, insofar as it is always the joint 
invention and discovery of something new. But the pass through the impasse adheres 
not only to mathematics, Clemens and Bartlett notes. It constitutes 
 
a constant of Badiou's method: the very point at which a thought 'fails', which is to 
say comes to posit its own end on the supposition of that which is inaccessible to it, 
marks the very point at which philosophy can (re)constitute itself as the discourse 
capable of composing the consequences of these 'failures'. The familiar ethic is 
'keep going.' Philosophy, in Badiou's estimation, is what takes the next step subject 







Philosophy achieves its status as a working practice under the conditions of truths by 
its education by a science that is radically mathematical. If the conditions of 
philosophy is found in the four fields of science, art, love, and politics, a radically 
mathematical science still occupies a special position, insofar as mathematics is as 
pure as reason gets, as it is both non-empirical and axiomatic, working only in and by 
its own makings. As Plato's inaugural move fully acknowledged, mathematics is the 
mode of thinking in which thinking and being, invention and discovery, are 
indistinguishable from one another. In that sense, mathematics is also the main 
paradigm for exercising the Platonic idea as the co-belonging or ontological 
commensurability of the knower and the known.  
 Both the philosophical doctrine of the event and the antiphilosophical program 
of the act can be determined by the moment of self-referentiality and the 
undecidability of this moment's belonging or non-belonging to the given situation. The 
program of the antiphilosophical act pursues the instantaneous leap or shift from one 
register to another – whether from speculative to practical reason or from the 
phenomenal to the noumenal domain, from the unlimited rule of law to absolute 
freedom or from the indeterminate regress of appearances to the ineffable affirmation 
of the world-in-itself – as proposed through the readings of the Lacanian Kant above. 
In the case of Wittgenstein and the leap into the mystical silence of the meaning of the 
world, there is nothing to testify to the fact that the act has taken place, insofar as both 
the act and its fact are silent. Like Nietzsche, who forgot the material underpinnings in 
his desire to create himself as absolutely free, Wittgenstein installs an absolute 
division between the thinkable world of meanings and the unthinkable meaning of the 
world. There is no communication from the other side of the limit of the thinkable 
back into the thinkable, or vice versa. Wittgenstein's intimation of the mystical 
element of the pure showing is a religious equivalent of Nietzsche's absolute fallacy. 
In distinction from the act, the philosophical concept of the event is educated by 
science. It conceives of the event as the point of impossibility in which thinking is 
occasioned. The philosophical concept of the event incorporates the lessons of 
mathematics. The things that mathematics teaches is not only that the inaccessible is 
an inconsistent concept but also – precisely because the inaccessible is an inconsistent 
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concept – that the whole effort through which radical change and true novelty can 
come about is found not in the instantaneous leap from one register to another but in 
the strenuous process of thinking the impossible within the possible, of thinking the 
two registers together. Thinking does not end at the limit of thinking. It begins there. 
The whole effort lies in the faithful elaboration of the undecidable event's 
consequences in and for the situation, as a gradual thinking the world anew. The 




Lacanian Jouissance Remaining; Incompleteness and Inconsistency 
The issue I address in this section is how to make sense of Badiou's designation of 
Lacan as a double exception among antiphilosophers. At stake are the questions of 
how Lacan escapes the distinctive criterion of misogyny by which the feminine 
remainder does nothing but disappear, how Lacan concludes on contemporary 
antiphilosophy and thereby opens for another philosophy to come, and how these two 
exceptions relate to each other. Badiou argues that Lacan elaborates on a logic of the 
act. Lacan's logic of the act comprises the key strands of his antiphilosophy. These key 
strands count his anti-religious impetus, by which he refuses a transcendent meaning 
of truth; the archi-scientific status of his act and his recourse to the matheme, by which 
his act succeeds in demonstrating the function of the real in knowledge rather than 
promising the unveiled presence of the real beyond knowledge; and the immanent or 
non-programmatic status of his act as something more than a broken promise. The 
matheme is the crucial moment. It pinpoints the real of science – or the real of 
mathematics – as the impossibility of any complete and consistent formalization. 
Through a reading of Gödel's meta-mathematics and Lacan's references to Gödel, as 
an expansion of the former discussion of the Kantian problematic of delimitation, I 
interrogate the relations between the cause of desire as the remainder or the real of 
science, and science itself. Lacan's archi-scientific act demonstrates the function of the 
real in science, and proceeds to ask what becomes of science when psychoanalysis is 
included therein. The final questions concern how Badiou picks up on the Lacanian 
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matheme in his philosophy to come. The answer concerns the material underpinnings 
involved in Badiou's mathematical gesture, where the transposition of the real from a 
category of the subject to a category of being prevents a punctual conception of either 
subject or truth. An analysis of the function of the feminine other in Badiou's 
conceptualization of antiphilosophy underscores how the Lacanian demonstrations of 
the real as the point of impossibility within knowledge thus mark the point from which 
a Badiouan thinking as radical change and novelty proceeds.  
 
  
A Logic of the Act 
Kant's critical project and Wittgenstein's antiphilosophy share an affinity, according to 
Badiou. The Kantian noumenon and the silence of the mystical element in 
Wittgenstein are to be construed as two variations over the ancient theme of the 
feminine mystery as an absolute delimitation of the thinkable. My question is how the 
double exception of Lacan is to be positioned in relation to the overall framework of 
antiphilosophy. The question is how the Lacanian notions of the real of jouissance and 
the drive – the Freudian Thing – are to be conceived of in their function as remainders 
to the thinking operations of philosophy. As read by Badiou, Lacan is not at all 
Kantian. The Lacanian real is subtracted from the field of cognition [connaissance] in 
a double sense. The Lacanian real is prone to neither cognition nor non-cognition but 
is rather demonstrable.628 It is possible to argue that Lacan is an exception to the long 
line of antiphilosophers to have pinned down woman in some ineffable noun only for 
her to disappear there because he is the one to have designated his remainder not by 
some ineffable noun (Life, God, the noumenon) but explicitly as feminine. After all, 
Lacan operates with a notion of feminine jouissance and the non-existence of woman. 
I may have indicated such an argument in my earlier chapter on the "The Infinite and 
the Feminine Non-All". The suggestion was made that the Lacanian woman beyond 
the phallus tended towards the mystical experience and the status of the inaccessible, 





antiphilosophical tendency in the teachings of Lacan, it fails to account for the double 
exception of Lacan. To Badiou, Lacan is the one that brings contemporary 
antiphilosophy to a conclusion, and thus the one that opens for another philosophy to 
come. The question is how. 
 Lacan's conclusion of contemporary antiphilosophy can be accounted for by 
recourse to the operations by which the remainder of the Lacanian real is figured to be 
demonstrable. The difference between cognition [connaissance] and knowledge 
[savoir] is paramount here. As Johnston notes, cognition is an issue of "conscious 
acquaintance or familiarity" and of what is "known qua consciously recognized as 
customary or familiar knowledge", whereas knowledge entails "conceptual, 
intellectual comprehension" and what is "known qua theoretically grasped or 
symbolically interpreted knowing."629 The demonstrability and the double subtraction 
of the real from the field of cognition do not signify its subtraction from both cognition 
and knowledge, but neither does it signify that the real is an issue of pure conceptual 
comprehension as opposed to conscious acquaintance. Rather, the demonstrability of 
the real is an issue of marking the function of the real in knowledge, concretized by 
Lacan in a so-called logic of the act. According to Badiou, such a logic of the act is 
one moment desperately missing in the case of Wittgenstein.630 In want of a logic of 
the act, Wittgenstein's antiphilosophy was delivered over to philosophy, as the 
thinking of its act or the thinking of its non-thought.  
 Several key strands of Lacan's antiphilosophy concur in the Lacanian logic of 
the act. Besides the demonstrability of the real, these strands count the non-
programmatic status of Lacan's act, its archi-scientific status, Lacan's recourse to the 
matheme, and his anti-religious impetus. Hallward identified a religious attitude at the 
heart of antiphilosophy, and a religious attitude certainly is a trend of antiphilosophy 
in general. However, as Bosteels have argued, an identification of the religious attitude 
as an invariant trait of antiphilosophy remains unable to account for the specificities of 
Lacan's position. Lacan's position is characterized by its attack on the religious 





driven by a religious search for meaning, which is precisely the stupidity from which 
antiphilosophy seeks to awaken us," Bosteels writes, on the grounds of which he 
argues that it would "be imprecise to equate antiphilosophy and religion [insofar as] it 
is precisely one of antiphilosophy's negative lessons that religion continues to lie in 
wait behind philosophy's love of truth as meaning."631 Clemens also highlights how 
Lacan comes to question the religious intonations of antiphilosophy by noting a 
strange reversal in Lacan's revitalization of antiphilosophy as a term, compared to the 
terms anti-Enlightenment origins. In Lacan, it is the philosopher who is accused of 
turning away from the real, and not the old priest. Lacan advocates the analyst's 
liberation from philosophy as les Lumières advocated the philosopher's liberation from 
religion, insofar as, as Clemens writes, philosophy occupies the space of religion as an 
essential 'not-wanting-to-know', a basic drive to ignorance, underscoring its flagged 
'love of wisdom' and 'knowledge of truth'.632 Badiou hails Lacan as the only true 
rationalist among his antiphilosophical compeers,633 and Lacan's rationalism concurs 
with his anti-religious impetus. Lacan's rationalism culminates in the archi-scientific 
status of his act, and in his recourse to the matheme. Both the matheme and the archi-
scientific act is directed at the void or real point of science as a practice, for science's 
own impossibility or point of impasse. It seeks to pinpoint the real of knowledge. 
 The anti-religious impetus and the archi-scientific act also relate to the non-
programmatic status of Lacan's act. The non-programmatic status of Lacan's act 
concerns how its certainty is not merely anticipated. Lacan's act is the psychoanalytic 
act, and the significance of Lacan's call for a 'return to Freud' is found here, Badiou 
writes. The analyses of Freud, primarily Freud's own auto-analysis, constitute an 
eternal testimony of the fact that the psychoanalytic act has taken place at least once. 
The act's real occurrence has consequences, Badiou continues, insofar as 
 
si l'acte a eu lieu, il n'est plus transcendant, parce qu'il doit être déchiffrable dans le 
savoir même, dans la production du savoir. Il doit passer, il doit se faire reconnaître 






élabore la première antiphilosophie immanente et, en tant que telle, c'est la dernière 
antiphilosophie. Parce que si elle est réelle, alors elle s'atteste comme savoir.634 
 
If the act has occurred, it effectively denies relegation to a religious transcendence. It 
must be attested to in the production of knowledge, as an immanent antiphilosophy. 
Under the heading of an immanent antiphilosophy, Lacan's act realizes the imbrication 
of its anti-religious impetus, its archi-scientific status, its recourse to the matheme, and 
its demonstration of the real. Confronted by the students of Vincennes in the wake of 
May 68, Lacan admitted that the subversive potential of his discourse did not amount 
to more than a reluctance to posit a solution,635 and the pressing issue is no longer to 
prophesize for a coming rupture of the real as the full presence of Life or God or 
Woman. The subversion of the Lacanian act is rather the more modest operation of 
uncovering the function of the real in knowledge, or a tracing and marking of the 
function of the real within the production and circulation of knowledge.  
 The above suggestion that Lacan would avoid pinning down woman in an 
ineffable noun because of his explicit denomination of the remainder as feminine is 
thus open for a reformulation that also accounts for Lacan's double exception. The 
double exception of Lacan is not so much due to the explicit noun of the feminine as to 
the perseverance of its disappearing reference. If antiphilosophers before Lacan have 
done no better than to flag the feminine remainder under a series of ineffable nouns by 
which it has simply disappeared, Lacan's immanent antiphilosophy is exceptional 
insofar as its archi-scientific act enables the remainder to be marked in its function as a 
disappearance within the fields of knowledge. It is not so much a matter of chasing 
after the existence of the non-existent woman, which would be a futile chase, or of 
marking her presence, which would be to cede too much to religious revelation or 
philosophical speculation. It is a matter of coming to terms with how a non-existing 









function of such a non-existence can be marked and demonstrated. The matter has 
been discussed in regard to Copjec and Zupančič's readings of the drive. It is also the 
underlying point of Žižek's discernment of the difference between 'no relation' (there is 
no sexual relationship) and the 'non-relation' (there is a non-relation) in Lacan.636 As 
Badiou explains, the Lacanian act is a matter of directing the construction of what is 
constrained within the field, the remainder of jouissance, in an elevation from 
impotence to impossibility.637  Constructing the constrained as impotence merely 
indicates an inaccessible remainder in the real of sexual difference and determines 
suffering as a subjective fault in regard to the phallus. Impotence signals the 
philosopher's grandiose delusion and the misconception of a possible One-All, where 
the presumed cause of the suffering of the subject is the subject's separation from and 
inability to assume the One-All. Constructing the constrained as impossibility marks 
the remainder as the impasse proper of sexual relations and determines suffering as an 
objective fault of the phallus. Impossibility signals the fundamental inconsistency of 
the One-All and defines incompletion as a fundamental trait of subjectivity. Badiou 
also determines the elevation of impotence to impossibility as the move proper to his 
own philosophy. The question is how the impossible thinking of Badiou's philosophy 
confers with the Lacanian act, or how the Lacanian act prepares for another 
philosophy to come.  
 
 
The Mother and the Matheme 
The act of marking the real as it is operative in knowledge renders the proper content 
of Lacan's insurgence against philosophy and its innate religious temptation 
apprehensible. Philosophy is always threatening to appropriate psychoanalysis for 
itself and its own purposes, Badiou writes. The philosophical appropriation of 
psychoanalysis operates under the name of a search for truth. Such a philosophical 





that considers the unconscious as the distribution of the truth of consciousness.638 An 
obvious example is the so-called Freudian quip on the lapsus as 'when you say one 
thing but mean your mother'. The slip of the tongue is represented as bespeaking an 
unconscious desire for the mother as the true meaning of the conscious mind or the 
truth of the subject's desire. Psychoanalysis is thereby reduced to a practice of 
interpretation and hermeneutics. As a consequence, the analyst is easily pedestalled 
into the position of mastery – as the subject supposed to know the true meaning 
underneath every word and gesture, the truth of the subject's being. As Lacan writes of 
the religious field, "la vérité y est renvoyée à des fins qu'on appelle eschatologiques, 
c'est-à-dire qu'elle n'apparaît que comme cause final, au sens où elle est reportée à un 
jugement de fin de monde."639 Lacan's definition of the religious field is a precise 
description of the stakes involved in setting out in search for the one true meaning, or 
the one truth to settle meaning once and for all. But Lacan's words were not intended 
solely for the Church but also for the church-like association of the psychoanalytic 
international (IPA). An analysis that sets out in search of the one truth runs the risk not 
only of remaining caught up in the imaginary misconceptions of the One-All, of a 
meaning of being and a true self. It also runs the risk – in assuming the true meaning 
of desire to be pinned down and ignoring the essential division and metonymic 
movement inherent to desire – of denying everything resembling castration.  
 Lacan himself determines interpretation to be the simple movement inherent to 
desire itself, stating that he does not search but find.640 There is a difference between 
searching and finding. As Lacan explains in ...ou pire, the elevation of finding over 
searching is not to be read as a denial of the calculability of meaning. It simply states 
that meaning will be calculable only on account of what is found, and that the crucial 
point not to miss is how that which one finds, that which arrives, is never that which 










the meaning assumed, and the religious-philosophical tendency to assume a meaning 
to the unconscious is the precise reason why Lacan musters his forces in an 
antiphilosophical rebellion, Badiou writes. When Badiou quotes one of Lacan's own 
definitions of the unconscious, it is one in which the names of truth and meaning have 
given way to that of knowledge, to a notion of "un savoir de l'insu" or "le savoir qui 
est dans le guise du réel du point de sa présentation comme impossible."642 At the 
same time, Badiou takes care to underline that truth is not to be confused with the 
unknown knowledge involved in these definitions of the unconscious, nor with the 
knowledge of this knowledge.  
 Lacan's position on the unconscious must be distinguished from its religious-
philosophical other. Clemens and Bartlett make an important remark when they write 
that Lacanian antiphilosophy is "a subtractive one" that "builds its discourse on that 
which, for its rival, is impossible to say and impossible to know," insofar as "analytic 
discourse constructs itself as the truth of the other or the thought of the real."643 It is 
important not to misconstrue the sense in which Clemens and Bartlett's portrayal must 
be understood, and the reading to be avoided is the one presuming that psychoanalysis 
goes on to say and know that which is impossible for its others to say and know, that it 
goes on to think the real 'substantially', as it were, as if the real was a hidden and 
forgotten content of its rival.  
 Lacan's opposition against the common translations of Freud's 'Wo Es war...' 
refuses the end of analysis to be anything akin to the ego dislocating or dislodging the 
id. To consider the unconscious as either the hidden truth of consciousness or an 
unknown knowledge to be assumed and known by way of interpretation can only 
remain another misprision of the Freudian motto. It emphasizes a potency falsely 
ascribed to the conscious mind. When Lacan suggests the translation of the Freudian 
motto as stating that "là où c'était, là comme sujet dois-je advenir,"644 he does not 
suggest that the end of analysis lies in an absolute knowledge in which a full 








consciousness were to be achieved. On the contrary, Lacan intimates how the notion of 
an absolute knowledge would imply the abolition of the term of jouissance,645 and the 
absence of an absolute knowledge and the deficiency of a full translation are 
recognized no longer as caused by a regrettable impotence or inability, but as a 
fundamental impossibility. As Badiou suggests, the end of analysis occurs at the point 
of impossibility, where the subject might assume its lack-in-being in conjunction with 
its real.646 In other words, the end of analysis aims at the point of impossibility where 
the subject's incompletion adds up in conjunction with the inconsistency of the Other. 
Lacan indicates the main lines already in his early movement from imaginary 
frustration through symbolic castration to real privation. 647  Furthermore, Badiou 
writes, if philosophy is ultimately the presumption of a possible knowledge of a truth 
of the real, in another twist on the religious temptation to intimate the meaning of 
truth, Lacanian antiphilosophy undermines this philosophical configuration by way of 
a threefold negation: 
 
Premièrement, il n'y a pas de vérité du réel [...]. Il y a vérité dans la mesure où il y 
a une fonction du réel dans le savoir. [...] Deuxièmement, il n'y a pas non plus 
savoir du réel. Ce qu'il y a, c'est une fonction du réel dans le savoir qui permet une 
situation de la vérité. Troisièmement, bien entendu, il n'y a pas non plus de savoir 
de la vérité. Tout au plus, pourrait-on dire, et ce serait un peu métaphorique, qu'il y 
a la vérité d'un savoir à proportion de ce qu'un réel y est en fonction, y 
fonctionne.648 
  
The general theme is a notion of truth as relative to the function of a real in 














psychoanalysis constructs itself as the truth of the other or the thought of the real, it is 
obvious that psychoanalysis can only do so in the sense that psychoanalysis constructs 
itself as the situation in which the function of the real can be marked, and 
demonstrated, in its function in and for the others of psychoanalysis, e.g. philosophy, 
religion, science, or also psychoanalysis itself. Psychoanalysis does not speak the truth 
of its others, nor of itself, but it constructs itself as the discourse that marks the point 
from where truth might speak in these others.  
 To construct psychoanalysis as the situation in which these points can be 
marked is the precise task Lacan undertakes in his theory of discourses, in L'Envers de 
la psychanalyse. He isolates the place and function of the object petit a – plus-de-jouir 
or surplus jouissance – within the discourses of the master, the university, the hysteric, 
and the analyst. As he declares of the position of the petit a, it is a matter of an effect 
of discourse as the effect of a reject, whose place and function he all along attempts to 
pinpoint.649 He also underlines, in Encore, that the four discourses, with their four 
terms (S1, S2, $, a) in their four positions (semblance, other, truth, production), can be 
constructed only on account of the fact that they have already been articulated and 
structured through the psychoanalytic discourse.650 With a slightly different intonation, 
Lacan had undertaken a similar construction in "La science et la vérité". It is in 
affirming that the object of psychoanalysis is none other than the one he has advanced 
as the function of the object petit a, and in acknowledging the unconscious or 'a truth 
that speaks' as the material cause of his own practice, that Lacan is able to determine 
the place and function of the object petit a not only within analysis proper but also in 
regard to the fields of magic, religion, and science.651 These fields can be determined 
on the basis of how the object petit a – or truth as cause – is operative within them, as 
efficient, final, and formal cause, respectively. The decisive part played by analysis is 
underscored when Lacan suggests an alternative determination of these fields as 
characterized by their respective repression, denegation, and foreclosure of the cause 







how analysis can construct itself as the truth of its others only to the extent that it 
serves to mark the function of the real in the production and circulation of knowledge 
in these others, and not as the revelation or donation of the truth of these others.   
 The task of the psychoanalytic construction carries the archi-scientific 
significance of Lacan's antiphilosophical act, according to Badiou. At the core of this 
construction, Badiou isolates the invention of the matheme. It is the matheme that 
enables a demonstration of the function of the real. The crucial passages on how 
Badiou construes the function of the matheme in the archi-scientific act of Lacan are 
found in Badiou's session of November 9, 1994:  
 
Il y a le réel – en occurrence l'absence de rapport sexuel, il y a ce qui du réel 
s'enseigne, qui est le mathématisable, et il y a les mathèmes, comme impasse du 
mathématisable. C'est en ce point, à mon sens, que l'archiscientifique se montre au 
lieu où l'acte va apparaître comme ce qu'il faut bien appeler – formule abominable 
pour Lacan – un réel du réel [...]: le réel inscriptible du réel enseigné. Le mathème 
va être en un point d'impasse, mais ce point d'impasse, c'est le point du réel. Donc 
le mathème va être au point réel du mathématisable, lequel mathématisable est ce 
qui du réel s'enseigne. Nous sommes donc fondés à dire: le mathème, c'est ce qui 
inscrit comme impasse le réel [...] de ce qui du réel s'enseigne.653  
 
In more structured and generalized terms, Badiou continues to say that the archi-
scientific act depends on  
 
[u]ne double occurrence du réel, qui est au point de l'acte comme torsion. Ici, la 
torsion s'opère entre le réel comme réel de la science et le réel de ce qui du réel 
s'enseigne, en tant que mathème. La double occurrence, c'est la science et le 













le mathème; donc finalement le mathématique et le mathème. Et le mathème est 
archiscientifique parce qu'il n'est pas mathématique, étant au point du réel de la 
mathématique elle-même.654 
  
The matheme marks the impossibility inherent to science and mathematics as such. If 
the absence of the sexual relation is real, and mathematics goes as far as anything can 
go in pronouncing anything on this absence, there is a point of impasse inherent to 
mathematics itself that does not pronounce itself (that is subtracted from cognition in a 
double sense), that can only be inscribed by way of the matheme (that can nonetheless 
be demonstrated).   
 If the matheme marks the real of the real, and inscribes the point of impasse of 
that which can be taught or pronounced, to question the meaning of that inscription or 
the content-reference of that mark would be an odd endeavor to take up. The mark 
does not have a content-reference but pinpoints the lack of a mark, and the inscription 
does not have a meaning but serves to convey the point where meaning falters. 
Nevertheless, the point in question is addressed by psychoanalysis under the category 
of sexual matters. The psychoanalytic category of sexual matters pinpoints the crux of 
the double subtraction involved in the demonstration of the real. To address the 
psychoanalytic category of sexual matters, Badiou refers to a series of neologisms in 
Lacan's "L'Étourdit". Lacan determines the real on the basis of its double subtraction 
from meaning and non-meaning. The real is rather an absence of meaning, written as 
'ab-sense' [ab-sens]. Ab-sense is the psychoanalytic designation of sexual matters, 
through which is rendered the absence of the sexual relation as an 'ab-sex sense' [sens 
ab-sexe]:  
 
L'ab-sens désigne le sexe, mais finalement le sexe tel qu'au réel, ou tel qu'au non-
rapport, est un sens ab-sexe. On peut donc dire que l'ab-sens n'est pas non-sens, 









registration qui peut, tout de même, être dite registration du sens, même si c'est le 
sens comme ab-sens.655 
 
Ab-sense is not non-meaning, just as the demonstrability of the real is not reducible to 
either cognition or non-cognition. Ab-sense is what befalls the demonstration of the 
matheme, whose task is thus still the one of Freud and his inaugural interrogations of 
the effects of sex on thinking. As Copjec remarks, psychoanalytically speaking, sex is 
the stumbling block of sense.656 Copjec's remark is significant insofar as it points to 
how psychoanalysis, in addressing the point of impossibility in question under the 
category of sexual matters, provides an answer to the question of the very 'quiddity' of 
sex, the 'what' of sex, while apparently dodging it. Rather than some pure presence 
whose purity would render it meaningless and inaccessible to thinking, sex is the 
contradiction inherent to meaning or the signifier itself. Sex is the impossibility of 
completing meaning, as Copjec writes, or, in the terminology of Badiou's readings of 
Lacan, sex is ab-sense as the absence of meaning within meaning. The archi-scientific 
act of psychoanalysis goes to mark the function of this absence of meaning within 
meaning, as the point where meaning breaks down. It is the real of knowledge. The 
question is how the archi-scientific act proceeds to mark the function of the real within 
knowledge, and how Badiou's philosophical works and his attempts to think change 
are informed by the archi-scientific act of psychoanalysis. The question is how the 
mark of the function of the real comes to function in Lacanian antiphilosophy, and 
then in Badiou's philosophy to come.  	
	
 
Paradoxes of Totality 
The function of the real appertains to the problem of totality. While the Kantian 
antinomies approached the problematic of delimitation, Kordela's notion of the all-








The all-non-all set determines the obstacle to the establishment of totality to be the 
totality's own self-referentiality. As she writes, the so-called paradox of set theory 
installs a set of all sets whose belonging or non-belonging to itself cannot be decided 
upon. A more detailed debate on the operations involved in the paradox of set theory 
is, however, absent from Kordela's representation. It is an unfortunate absence, since 
there is no single paradox of set theory but several. The set of all sets is paradoxical 
and cannot avoid it own self-contradiction insofar as its cardinality is both greater and 
lesser than that of its power-set, the set of all subsets of the set of all sets. Russell's 
paradox of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves, and whose belonging 
or non-belonging to itself remains undecidable, is another paradox that follows from 
the previous one. But as Kordela observes, the root cause of the paradoxes of set 
theory is the self-referentiality of totality. Douglas R. Hofstadter speaks of a so-called 
'strange loop'657 where totality is reflected upon and turned back upon totality itself in 
and through one of its elements. As Livingston writes, "the problematic element [...] 
reflexively captures the total structure of the whole system [...] of which it is a part, at 
a fixed, local point within that very system."658 Such paradoxes of totality are not the 
privilege of mathematics alone. They burgeon in the field of speech and language, 
where self-referentiality and reflexivity seem to be a rule rather than an exception. 
Language cannot avoid referring to itself at some point, as, for instance, in the saying 
that all Cretans are liars according to the Cretan Epimenides (this sentence is false). 
But mathematics, to a greater extent than linguistics, has the capacity to mark the 
function of totality's reflexivity. The question concerns the significance and 
implications of this capacity. To Badiou, mathematics has also the further capacity to 
continue thinking in and through that mark, as thinking in and through the impossible. 
 Russell's Principia Mathematica (1910-1913), coauthored with Alfred N. 
Whitehead, aimed to exorcise all paradoxes from mathematics and to derive all of 
mathematics from logic, without contradictions. The result was a hierarchization of 
sets known as the theory of types. It denied reflexivity by admitting reference to a 






prohibiting any set to be a member of itself. In terms of ordinary language, every 
reference to an object language would be referred to a meta-language, whose reference 
would again be referred to a meta-meta-language, etc. The goal was the axiomatic 
formulation of mathematics as a consistent or non-contradictory system that would 
also be complete or able to account for every true statement of mathematics, or more 
generally, "a complete codification of the universally acceptable modes of human 
reasoning, at least as far as they applied to mathematics."659 To offer a rigorous 
demonstration that Principia Mathematica actually constituted a consistent and 
complete system was the program set down by meta-mathematician David Hilbert. 
This program was finally confuted with Gödel's incompleteness theorem, published in 
1931.  
 Gödel's incompleteness theorem divides into two.660 The first theorem states 
that within any formal axiomatic sufficiently complex to account for arithmetic, such 
as Principia Mathematica, there exists at least one undecidable statement (the Gödel 
sentence) that asserts its own improvability (this sentence cannot be proven). There 
exists at least one true statement that can be neither proved nor disproved but at the 
cost of the system's inconsistency. The second theorem states that the proof of the 
consistency of a formal axiomatic sufficiently complex to account for arithmetic 
cannot be demonstrated within that system but at the cost, again, of inconsistency. To 
demonstrate the consistency of a system like Principia Mathematica by the parameters 
of that system renders the system inconsistent. A consistent system implies its own 
incompleteness, whereas a complete system implies its own inconsistency. As 
Livingston notes, the two faces of Gödel's incompleteness theorem demonstrate "the 
impossibility of any formalization of mathematical reasoning that combines both 
completeness [...] and logical consistency," or the "fundamental impossibility of a 











while avoiding paradox in its implications."661 The undecidable statement of the Gödel 
sentence reintroduces paradox into the very core of mathematics itself, despite Russell 
and Whitehead's attempts at its eradication. Gödel reintroduces paradox by exploiting 
how any sufficiently complex axiomatic, let alone any complete codification of human 
reasoning, cannot avoid comprising elements of reflexivity. Within a sufficiently 
complex axiomatic, there is always the possibility of forming statements about the 
axiomatic itself. John D. Barrow uses the fitting term of a so-called 'incestuous 
encoding'.662 Taken in their full effect, Gödel's incompleteness theorems indicate how 
reason cannot be proven to be consistent without proving itself inconsistent.  
 Lacan picks up on Gödel's insights in this effect. Gödel's incompleteness 
theorem provides a non-metaphorical showcase of how no language knows how to say 
the truth of truth, as Lacan first formulates it,663 or, as he later rephrases it, of how the 
place of truth is itself a holed-out place that renders only a negative answer viable in 
response to the question of whether or not knowledge, in the place of truth, can know 
of itself at all.664 Lacan identifies the absence of the truth of truth, or of knowledge's 
knowledge of itself, as the most accurate formulation of Freud's notion of primary 
repression [Urverdrängung]. Primary repression answers to a logical fault within the 
symbolic order, that is, within the big Other, on account of which the big Other's 
proper content will remain unknown to the big Other itself. The big Other is 
unknowable in and for itself, and it is to this status that the absence of any ganze 
Sexualstrebung, any totality of sexual life that would summarize both the essence and 
the function of sex, is due. The logic is the familiar logic of the law's inherent 
contradiction and, as in the ab-sense discussed above, the status of the symbolic 
order's incompletion and inconsistency is the very designation of sex as such, of sex as 
real. Through the teachings of Lacan, Freud's inaugural step to interrogate the effects 
of sex on thinking is retranslated into a question of the effects on thinking of the 
logical fault within the symbolic, or the question of the effects on thinking of 








faced with an undecidable statement that captures the crux of the symbolic order's 
failure to account for its own consistency. The subject of language is faced with the 
undecidable decision between the two equally failed solutions of the two logics of 
sexuation: either a consistent but incomplete masculinity and the prohibition against 
including everything in the All, as Copjec writes, or a complete but inconsistent 
femininity and the impossibility of constructing an All.665 If Gödel provides a non-
metaphorical showcase for primary repression, a metaphorical showcase is found in 
the myth of the lamella. It symbolizes the primordial loss entailed in sexual 
reproduction and the inherent impossibility of consistency and completion.  
 Lacan determines the self-convoluting structure of the big Other's relation to 
itself as equal to the object petit a, the object-cause of desire. Insofar as the subject is 
that which a signifier represents for another signifier, the object petit a is the hole 
designated at the level of the Other, the battery of signifiers, when the Other is put in 
question in its relation to the subject, that is to say, when it is put in question in 
relation to the signifier's relation to itself.666 The inconsistency of the Other is 
relegated as the cause that twists every enunciation into a demand, into a question of 
the desire of the Other. Insofar as the Other cannot account fully for its contents, the 
question of the desire of the Other cannot be answered, and in lack of an answer to the 
question of the desire of the Other, the subject can never fully know of what it speaks 
when it speaks, of what is said in a saying (qu'on dise reste oublié derrière ce qui se 
dit dans ce qui s'entend...). The inconsistency of the Other is the cause of the 
unconscious of every discourse. Ultimately, Lacan claims, the insights of Gödel testify 
to the presence of the subject of mathematics within mathematics. More precisely, 













interrupts the mathematical discourse. 667  The mathematical discourse is no less 
incomplete and unable to sustain its consistency than any other discourse. 
 The inconsistency of the Other and the insistence of desire make up the precise 
moments that science does not want to know anything about, according to Lacan. 
Science forecloses desire from its operations, Lacan explains, as the characteristic of 
science vis-à-vis its pre-scientific others is science's absolute indifference in regard to 
its operator's purity of spirit. The desire of the scientist is completely irrelevant as far 
as the operations and outcomes of science are concerned.668 A similar point can be 
made in regard to the university discourse. The university discourse succumbs to the 
presupposition of an 'I-cracy' [Je-cratie], Lacan remarks, a certain not-wanting-to-
know anything about the inherent disruption in the place of enunciation. It does not 
want to know anything about the truth that speaks and, hence, disrupts the presumed 
unity of the speaking act.669 Science and the university discourse are thus both 
sustained by an underlying subject supposed to know, namely the subject supposed to 
know signification as such. The scientific discourse is sustained by a subject supposed 
to speak the truth and master the one-to-one relationship not only in and to itself as a 
subject but also, and more importantly, in and to a consistent Other: The famous book 
of nature, written in the language of mathematics, is to be completed with no lacking 
pages, and consistently contained between its two covers. Gödel's incompleteness 
theorem, in Lacan's reading, signals the moment when desire and the inconsistency of 
the Other are allowed to sieve back into the scientific discourse.  
 If science defines itself as the effective foreclosure of desire and the 
unconscious, it is obvious that psychoanalysis does not amount to a self-defined 
science. The analytic act revolves around the question of the desire of the analyst, and 
it is through the question of the desire of the analyst that Lacan's 'return to Freud' gains 
its full significance. I have already noted how Badiou determines the return to Freud as 
paramount in the non-programmatic status of the analytic act, where the act is 
demonstrated to have occurred at least once. But Lacan's return to Freud is also a 






in Freud's work that has never been properly analyzed and, hence, continues to speak 
without Freud or his readers knowing of that which is said and spoken about thereby – 
until Lacan calls for his return.670 Badiou suggests a difficult thesis, namely that "pour 
Lacan le désir de l'analyste, c'est le mathème."671 The thesis is interesting, and all the 
more so when read in the context of the full significance of Lacan's return to Freud. 
Badiou's thesis should be read in as strong and literal a sense as possible. The thesis 
can be read in the direction that the desire of the analyst is for the matheme, in the 
sense that arriving at the matheme is also the arrival at the end of analysis, the 
elevation of constraint from impotence to impossibility. A stronger reading of the 
thesis, however, would signify the identity of the desire of the analyst and the 
matheme. The desire of the analyst is the matheme, in the sense that the desire of the 
analyst is to be marked as the impasse of that which can be mathematized, of 
mathematics or science as such. In keeping with the notion of the real as doubly 
subtracted from the field of cognition, the desire of the analyst is the matheme, in the 
sense that the desire of the analyst is prone to neither cognition nor non-cognition, 
being instead only demonstrable. In contradistinction to science, psychoanalysis aims 
for the desire underscoring and disrupting its discourse. It aims for the undecidable 
statement in and by which the inconsistency of the Other is realized, and it is at this 
moment that the archi-scientific character of the Lacanian act culminates: it is not so 
much a question of whether or not psychoanalysis is a science, Lacan suggests, but 
rather of that which becomes of a science insofar as psychoanalysis is to be included 
therein. The question is, in other words, what becomes of a science that acknowledges 
the effects of its own underlying desires, its inconsistencies and incompletions, and its 
own impossibilities. My final question is how the Lacanian intrusions into science 










The Philosophy to Come 
Badiou's seminar on the antiphilosophy of Lacan ends in mid-air, inconclusively, 
especially in regard to the question of how another philosophy to come is to emerge 
from Lacan's conclusion of contemporary antiphilosophy. Badiou's "Formules de 
'L'Étourdit'" fares little better. It offers an elusive remark on how the eternity proper to 
philosophy distinguishes it from the fluctuations of haste and restraint that characterize 
the practice of psychoanalysis in the disposition between the correct formalization of 
the matheme and the balanced distribution of anxiety.672 Bosteels has identified the 
lessons of Lacanian antiphilosophy to be first and foremost the positive lesson against 
the religious temptation of meaning. By refusing a transcendent meaning of truth, the 
philosopher will avoid the grandiose delusions of the One-All. Bosteels also identifies 
a negative lesson of antiphilosophy more generally, as the lesson against the conflation 
of the event and the act as absolute beginning. It is a lesson in avoiding the absolute 
fallacy of a subjective auto-foundation. Keeping the event and the act separate enables 
the philosopher to think change as a process that moves beyond the instantaneous 
structural occurrence that disappears in its own appearance. Both the non-
programmatic and the archi-scientific status of the Lacanian act contributes to this 
negative lesson, insofar as it is concerned with the demonstration of the function of the 
real within knowledge and not with the revealed presence of the real beyond 
knowledge.  
 An analysis of the mark of sexual matters and the function of the feminine other 
indicate how the lesson of Badiou's philosophy to come consists in reading these two 
lessons together, connecting the lesson against the religious temptation of a meaning 
of truths with the lesson against the absolute fallacy of the radically subjective act. It is 
the lesson of the possibility of thinking radical change and true novelty as the forced 
pass of an impasse. It is the lesson of thinking radical change from the point of 
impossibility, as the continuous elaboration of the consequences of an encounter with 
the real. The route to think these two lessons together goes through mathematics, and 
thus also through the antiphilosophy of Lacan. To Badiou, Lacan is alone among 




On several occasions Badiou approvingly quotes Lacan's statement that mathematical 
formulation is the aim and the ideal.673 Badiou's many recourses to Lacan's idealization 
of mathematics support the claim that the appreciation of the real stakes of 
mathematics involved in Lacanian antiphilosophy constitutes the lesson par excellence 
for Badiou's philosophy to come.  
 The common position among antiphilosophers is to denounce mathematics and 
de-singularize it as a lesser version of logics. As a lesser version of logic, mathematics 
does not amount to a mode of thinking. In contradistinction to this common position, 
Badiou argues, Lacan acknowledges that the real stakes of mathematics concerns the 
status of mathematics as a knowledge subtracted from cognition or as a science 
without consciousness. As a science without consciousness, mathematics constitutes a 
mode of thinking in which "le dit se renouvelle de prendre sujet d'un dire plutôt que 
d'aucune réalité."674 It is a matter of recognizing the axiomatic status of mathematics 
and its necessarily non-founded or inconsistent foundations. The field of theorems or 
truths, the said [le dit], is founded in and by axioms, the saying [le dire], but the 
axioms as such are necessarily non-founded beyond themselves.  
 It is, however, in the implications of recognizing the axiomatic status of 
mathematics that the real stakes of mathematics are raised, and raised on two accounts. 
First of all, at least as far as Badiou's philosophy is concerned, to recognize the 
axiomatic status of mathematics is also to recognize mathematics as the mode of 
thinking in which invention and discovery coincide. It is to recognize that Plato was in 
the right, that there is a possible a-subjective and ordered access to the intelligible, as 
in the notion of the Platonic idea where thinking and being are the same and the 
knower and the known converge. It is to recognize mathematics as the mode of 
thinking that enounces something real, as the science of the real. Secondly, and this 
point goes for Lacan as well as for Badiou, to recognize the axiomatic status of 
mathematics is also to recognize the demonstrability of the undecidable statement that 








itself. It is to recognize, in yet a next step, that the matheme marks the point of 
impossibility of the axiomatic, of mathematical formalization and science itself. It is to 
recognize the matheme as the real of science or, in Badiou's words, the real of the real. 
That is to say, it is only by recognizing mathematics as an axiomatically founded 
practice that it is possible to demonstrate, by way of mathematics itself, the points of 
impossibility that are intrinsic to the mathematic axiomatic and constitutive of the 
practice of mathematics as such.  
 The trick to appreciate the significance of Badiou's traversal of Lacanian 
antiphilosophy and his move to philosophy to come is to see how these two points can 
be thought as coinciding. Mathematics is the only discourse that knows absolutely the 
things of which it speaks, Badiou writes,675 and the trick to Badiou's philosophy to 
come is to see how mathematics as the science of the real coincides with the 
matheme's marking of the real of science. If mathematics is the mode of thinking that 
can think the remainder, the real of pure and inconsistent being, it is because 
mathematics is the mode of thinking that thinks in and through the impossible points 
where the saying and the said intersect. Mathematics thinks being insofar as it is the 
mode of thinking that proceeds to think in and through inconsistency. The joint 
invention and discovery that characterizes the mathematical mode of thinking signify 
nothing less than the operations of radical change and true novelty that are involved 
when the remainders or the inconsistencies of one axiomatic open up to the point of 
passage of an integral transmission that will render these remainders and 
inconsistencies into the foundation of another axiomatic.  
 However, if mathematics is the mode of thinking that thinks radical change and 
true novelty in the integral transmissions of an axiomatic transposition, or, as Lacan 
says, if mathematics is the discourse in which the said renews itself by recourse to a 
saying more than by any reality, philosophy is, to vary on Lacan's definition, the 
discourse in which is said the saying of mathematics: ce qui dit le dire de la 
mathematique comme dit qui ne se renouvelle que d'un dire. Gödel does not think that 
he determines the disappearing being of the event when he proposes his 




procedure when he proposes his concept of the generic multiple. It is Badiou who 
thinks these thoughts. Philosophy is the mode of thinking that thinks the preconditions 
and possibilities of change and novelty, and the implications of change and novelty for 
further thinking. 
 To Lacan, the division between the saying and the said that mathematics makes 
into its proper practice implies that a truth can only ever be half-said [mi-dit]. A truth 
can be half-said in the saying, as positing another axiom, or it can be half-said in the 
said, as in another theorem, but a truth cannot be whole-said or all-said as the two 
halves together. The subject of enunciation is split from the subject of the enunciated, 
or as Lacan phrases it, "qu'on dise reste oublié derriére ce qui se dit dans ce qui 
s'entend."676 Mathematics does not posit a whole-saying or an all-saying either, but it 
operates in and marks the division that makes a truth always only half-said, whereas 
the archi-scientific act is the only one to bridge the gap between the two halves. The 
archi-scientific act of Lacan, Badiou writes, amounts to the emergence of a said-saying 
[un dire-dit].677 At its most radical, the said-saying of the act is not merely a matter of 
positing another axiomatic, installing another master signifier, or postulating another 
instance of the law. As in the discussions of Copjec and Zupančič on the strange 
reversals and self-convoluting structures characteristic of the drive as desire come face 
to face with its own cause, the said-saying of the act involves the full assumption of 
the inconsistency of the Other and the non-coincidence between the saying and the 
said. It is a said-saying that posits the non-foundation of its saying as the foundation of 
its said or, again, as a said-saying, the act posits the non-foundation of every axiomatic 
as the foundation of its axiomatic. At its most radical, the act assumes the full 
destitution of the subject under the undecidable question of the Other and the subject's 
desire, as the law of the unknown. 
 In Badiou's philosophical edifice, a truth is not half-said but sparsely said [peu-
dit] and hardly ever said at all.678 It is a rare occurrence that another axiomatic is 
declared, and even rarer that such a declaration is followed through and elaborated 






in general and the Lacanian framework is already familiar. That which the doctrine of 
the event and mathematics teaches the philosopher is that the whole effort is not in the 
exaltation of the event's occurrence but in the laborious process of following up its 
consequences in and for a situation. Lacan is nonetheless acknowledged for having 
marked the point of the real as the point at which an event might occur. He marks the 
point where thinking fails to think itself, and to Badiou, this is the point that marks the 
beginning of thinking. The initial instantiation of a truth in and by an event carries a 
similarity to Lacan's act in its non-founded foundation and undecidable status. There is 
nothing in the given knowledge of the situation to either prove or disprove the event's 
occurrence, except by the undecidable decision on its having-taken-place and its 
consequent nomination as an event. As Lacan's archi-scientific act marks the 
disappearance of jouissance within discourse, Badiou's meta-ontological denotation of 
the nominating intervention that affirms the occurrence of the event as a disappearing 
appearance is made by the character ♀. Through the nominating intervention, the 
event figures as an ultra-one, a Two, as poised between the void of the situation and 
itself. The nominating intervention is thus also a mode of a said-saying. It is a pure 
decision for positing an axiom by which the axiomatic of the situation itself is 
rendered inconsistent, or, again, the nominating intervention posits the inconsistency 
of the situation as true – so as to open for the laborious process of changing the 
situation through a truth procedure. Through a truth procedure, that which was 
previously nothing and void, the mark of inconsistency, comes to in-consist in a 
generic multiple proper. The denotation of the generic multiple proper – the generic 
extension, written S(♀) – does more than merely mark the remainder. It signals the 
forced entry of the remainder into existence within the situation. Hence an event and 
its consequent truth procedure tap into the inconsistency of pure being as unbound 
multiplicity:   
 
Puisque le fond sans fond de ce qui est présent est l'inconsistance, une vérité sera 
ce qui, de l'intérieur du présenté, comme partie de ce présenté, fait advenir au jour 
l'inconsistance dont se soutient en dernier ressort la consistance de la présentation. 
[...] Une vérité sera ainsi une partie générique de la situation, [...] désignant qu'elle 
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en est une partie quelconque, qu'elle ne dit rien de particulier sur la situation, sinon 
justement son être-multiple en tant que tel, son inconsistance fondamental.679 
 
In Badiou's mathematical gesture, where the real is transposed from the subject to 
being, the demonstration of the real does not stop at the point of its impossibility 
within a given situation, or within an established axiomatic. It starts there, as the point 
of possibility for thinking radical change and true novelty. It thinks the feminine other 
from within the situation. It demonstrates that thinking is precisely radical change and 

















In this dissertation, I have addressed Badiou's traversal of Lacanian antiphilosophy and 
the implications of that traversal for Badiou's thinking of the preconditions and 
possibilities for the subject of politics, radical change and true novelty, and the 
problematic of emancipation. My thesis claims that a key to the disentanglement of the 
lines of thought, traces of influence, and points of dissent that are at work in the 
relation between Badiou and the Lacanian framework is located at the precise 
junctions where Badiou's project is inadvertently motivated in conjunction with sexual 
matters, or where his arguments cannot avoid a certain tarrying with sexual matters. 
Hence, my thesis has primarily been of a methodological or strategic character. 
Reading by the assumption that 'sex marks the spot' has been a strategy for 
interrogating the significance and the implications of Badiou's traversal of Lacan. 
Analyzing these points or symptomal knots where sexual matters intrude upon 
Badiou's project has been a method for elaborating upon the consequences of Badiou's 
philosophical investigations into the preconditions and the possibilities of the subject 
and radical change beyond Lacan. It has also been an opportunity to compare the 
concrete conceptualizations of truths and the subject that are entailed by Badiou's 
mathematical gesture and materialist dialectic with other trends within radical thinking 
today that also originate in the teachings of Lacan. My investigations have focused on 
three such symptomal points: the feminine denotation of the generic multiple of a truth 
procedure in Badiou's L'Être et l'événement, the conjunction of sex and class as real in 
the readings of Greek tragedy in Théorie du sujet, and the double exception of Lacan 
in relation to the misogynistic status of the antiphilosophical act and the closure of 
contemporary antiphilosophy in Badiou's seminar series on L'Antiphilosophie. In 
addition, I have offered an initial and general interrogation of the main lines of 
Badiou's approach to the subject of politics, the teachings of Lacan, and the 
possibilities of change today, where I positioned Badiou's philosophical works in 
relation to this dissertation's basic presupposition that the subject of politics, ethics, 
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and sexual matters all tie up in thinking true novelty and radical change. In conclusion, 
I propose to return to and situate the investigations of my three main chapters within 
the discussions surrounding this basic presupposition.  
 On the basis of its conception of sexual matters as real and appertaining to the 
drive, psychoanalysis suggests an ethics of the radical act as a moment of subjective 
constitution in and through subjective destitution. The subject constitutes itself and the 
field into which it intervenes at the point where the law comes into contradiction with 
and undermines itself, at the absolute void of the signifying structures and 
discriminatory systems. Hence, psychoanalysis conceives of an ethics of the radical act 
as a moment of auto-foundation at the point of the real, where the subject fully 
assumes its real being in the split between signifiers and the hole in the Other, thus 
securing and holding open a space for action at one remove from – or as an obverse of 
– the existing structures and powers of oppression. Badiou's philosophical works 
elaborate on the psychoanalytic premises in order to think the preconditions and 
possibilities for a subject of politics and radical change today, while ruminating on the 
concrete situation of a liberated and globalized capitalism after the historical failure of 
the communist hypothesis. Badiou's traversal of Lacan involves the mathematical 
gesture that transposes the real from the category of the subject to the category of 
being. Two main consequences follow. Firstly, Badiou proposes a materialist 
conception of the event as the resurgence of inconsistent being as void in the situation, 
and secondly, Badiou proposes a dialectical conception of the subject as an affirmation 
of continuation, in an ethics of the act as the act of a continuous alteration of the 
situation and the creation of novelty. Badiou's philosophical works thereby responds to 
the predicament of the concrete situation, by identifying the preconditions of the 
subject of politics and the possibilities of radical change in the ultimately dispossessed 
and inexistent populations under globalized capitalism. In that way, Badiou proposes a 
politics of radical change that abides by the dictum that the emancipation of one goes 
by the emancipation of all.  
 My fourth and last chapter analyzed the function of the feminine other in 
Badiou's conceptualization of antiphilosophy and the double exception of Lacan. It 
intervened into the problematic of the act as auto-foundation vis-à-vis continuation. 
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The antiphilosophical formulation of the act implies the intrinsic and distinctive 
criterion of misogyny, insofar as the act is proffered as the promise of an absolute 
break and hence as a promise always-already broken. Badiou considers Lacan to be in 
exception from the misogynistic formulation of the act and, thus, the one to bring 
contemporary antiphilosophy to conclusion, precisely because of the archi-scientific 
status of the Lacanian act and its recourse to the matheme. The archi-scientific act of 
Lacan does not concern the promise of a revealed presence of the unspeakable and 
unthinkable real beyond all evaluations and knowledge tout court, but the consistent 
transmission and marking of the function of the real within knowledge, in and through 
the matheme. The matheme in the archi-scientific act marks the moment of a possible 
subjective destitution, where the subject can come to be in conjunction with its real 
being, or in the hole in the Other. To Badiou, the Lacanian matheme serves to locate 
the point of impossibility within an extant field of knowledge, and to identify the 
undecidable that in Badiou's terminology equals the possible occurrence of an event. 
To Badiou, it serves to mark the point from which thinking commences and to ground 
thinking in the material conditions of the situation into which thinking intervenes. But 
Badiou's criticism of the Lacanian framework is still present, even if it pales in 
comparison to the criticism of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. In Badiou's scientifically 
and mathematically educated philosophy, marking the function of the real – the 
feminine remainder – and the possible occurrence of an event is merely the 
precondition for the subject and for the possibilities of thinking radical change. To 
realize a proper thinking of radical change implies the faithful deduction of the 
consequences of the event's occurrence in and for the situation in which the event's 
occurrence is an undecidable – or, in other words, a proper thinking of radical change 
implies the laborious process of including the division of the situation in the situation 
so as to alter the situation. Educated by a mathematical science, Badiou's philosophy 
to come takes the occurrence of the feminine remainder as its starting point, and 
proceeds to think the feminine within the situation.  
 My second to last chapter interrogated how a scission in Greek tragedy related 
to Badiou's move to relate the real of sex and the real of class, in an attempt to come to 
terms with the implications of the act of subjective constitution as a precondition for 
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radical change. The mark of sexual matters in Badiou's ethics of continuation was 
examined through the Aeschylean figuration of Prometheus as a representation of a 
Marxist ethics of confidence, precisely insofar as it contrasts with the representations 
of the radical acts of Antigone and Oedipus the Beggar in the Sophoclean paradigm 
and the Lacanian framework. The figure of Prometheus accentuates Badiou's position 
vis-à-vis Lacan on three points, namely as the priority of the operation of division over 
that of reversal, the perspective of the future over that of the last judgement, and a 
notion of immortality over the concept of the death drive. The figure of Prometheus 
thus accentuates the contributions of Badiou's Maoism during his red years to his 
confrontation with the Lacanian framework, where the structural dialectic of Lacan 
and the real of sex are supplemented by the historical dialectic of Badiou's Maoism 
and the real of class. As the bringer of fire and the one to tie courage and justice 
together under the banner of confidence, the figure of Prometheus was read as the 
representation of how a radical change is conceived of by Badiou as a subjective 
process of continuation from the initial point of contradiction or division internal to the 
situation. The guiding principle of Badiou's thinking of radical change during the red 
years is the Maoist principle that there is reason in revolt and that one divides into two. 
The significance of Badiou's confrontation with the Lacanian framework lies in 
reading these two principles together. The division of the situation fosters reason as 
revolt, and revolt as reason. The possibilities of radical change is located in the 
deduction within the situation of the situation's own point of impossibility, or in the 
continuation of thinking from the impossible. As a protrusion from the initial place of 
the unoccupiable place, the imagery of fire signals the possibilities of radical change in 
a process of expanding on the situation through the effects that follow on the 
occupation of the unoccupiable place, into a lasting blurring of places.  
 My second chapter on the infinite and the feminine non-all as inaccessibility 
and actuality addressed Badiou's seemingly paradoxical decision to denote the generic 
multiple through a reference to the Lacanian notion of the feminine logic of the non-
all. It intervened into the contemporary debates on the applicability of the feminine 
non-all for elaborating on an alternative ethics beyond the superegoic injunctions of 
the moral law and the discourses of the rights of life.  Badiou criticizes Lacan's notion 
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of the feminine non-all on the grounds that it is preconditioned by an essentially 
romantic and pre-Cantorian conception of the infinite as inaccessibility rather than 
actuality. As inaccessibility, the infinite and the feminine proffer only a hole of 
inconsistency that serves to buttress the consistency of the field of the finite and the 
phallic function, and are thus unable to account for the possibilities of radical change 
and true novelty. The hole of the infinite simply indicates another beyond that remains 
inaccessible from within the established structures that constitute the finite field. 
Against all romantic infatuations with the finite, Badiou advances the implications of 
Cantor's actual infinite. The decision on the actuality of the infinite transposes the 
problematic of thinking from the point of the inaccessible limit to the question of the 
undecidable succession, in the shape of the continuum hypothesis and the itinerant 
excess of representation over presentation, subsets over sets. The problematic of 
thinking is thus not a problem of the finite in relation to the infinite or vice versa, but a 
problem of the relation of the infinite to itself. Cantor's joint invention and discovery 
of the actual infinite finally allows Cohen to assume the itinerant excess and to 
conceive of the generic multiple as a set of indiscernibles, on account of which Badiou 
conceives of the generic multiple as the being of truths. The seemingly paradoxical 
decision to denote the generic multiple through a reference to the feminine non-all can 
be explained by acknowledging the division internal to the concept of the generic 
multiple in Badiou's meta-ontological apparatus. On the one hand, there is the primary 
non-designation of the feminine reference, designating the intervention of nominating 
an event, whereas, on the other hand, the actual existence of the indiscernible of the 
generic multiple proper is designated by the generic extension, which follows in the 
process of deducing the consequences of the event in and for the situation. The generic 
multiple supplements the phallic function in Lacan, and thus designates not only the 
hole of truth but also the procedure through which an immanent yet infinite truth gains 
actual existence. The generic thinks the realization of truths in and for a situation and, 
thus, the possibilities for radical change.  
 In the introduction, I posed the question of what it would mean to proceed from 
the non-object of sexual matters to thinking the possibilities of change by way of a 
mathematical ontology of multiplicities and a materialist dialectic of universal truths 
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produced in the continuation of a subjective process borne in the division of an evental 
rupture. In short, this question concerns that of which sex is the mark in Badiou's 
traversal of Lacan. The almost too simple answer to this question is that sex is the 
mark of Badiou's traversal of Lacan. If the crux of Badiou's traversal of Lacan is 
determined by the mathematical gesture of his transposition of the real from the 
category of the subject to the category of being, and the implications of this 
transposition for a materialist dialectic that proceeds to think the subject and radical 
change as process over puncture, as historical sequence over structure, as 
indeterminable succession over inaccessible limit, or as an ethics of continuation over 
an ethics of the encounter, sex is the precise mark of that gesture and its implications. 
The moments at which sexual matters intrude upon Badiou's argumentation are also 
the moments at which the decisive elements of Badiou's arguments meet up and where 
his elaborations on the subject, its ethical portents, and the possibilities for radical 
change beyond Lacan reach their climax. It is not simply that the Lacanian real of 
sexual difference necessarily marks the move by which the real is transposed to being. 
Also Badiou's elaborations on the implications of this move, through the criticism of 
the inaccessible infinite of the feminine to Lacan's dodging of the misogyny of the 
antiphilosophical act, as well as in the pre-mathematical confrontations of the mortal 
real of sex with the tragic mode of the psychoanalytic paradigm, are marked by the 
intrusion of sexual matters.  
 It is thus possible to maintain the argument that also Badiou's thinking of the 
preconditions of the subject of politics and the possibilities of radical change is 
intricately intertwined with sexual matters, and that sexual matters constitute a crux of 
his elaboration of an ethics of the continuous act. It is thus possible to maintain that an 
ongoing confrontation with the issue of sexual matters underscores Badiou's politics as 
a politics under the dictum that the emancipation of one goes by the emancipation of 
all. But that which closer analyses of the function of sexual matters in Badiou's 
traversal of Lacan serve to highlight – and that also differentiate Badiou's 
philosophical project from other contemporary trajectories in radical thinking – is how 
Badiou's mathematical gesture and his materialist dialectic proceed into an affirmative 
thinking of that which sexual matters is the mark, or of the feminine other otherwise 
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precluded from thought. An analysis of the mark of sexual matters underlines not only 
the extent to which a notion of the feminine other operates in Badiou's philosophy but 
also how the feminine other functions in Badiou's elaborations on the possibilities of 
actual change, of an infinite yet immanent truth, and an ethics of continuation. Sexual 
matters function precisely to mark the points in Badiou's philosophical works where 
Badiou elaborates on how thinking proceeds as a process of change. It marks the 
precise point at which he elaborates on how the One of a situation divides into two, 
and through which the situation opens up for that which previously was excluded from 
its midst. In other words, it marks the point from which the real as the impasse of 
formalization gives way to the pass of a subject, and the pass of truth. It thus marks the 
point from which the process of political change might proceed, beyond the point at 
which the law contradicts and undermines itself according to the psychoanalytic 
perspective, and beyond the critical identifications of the mechanisms of oppression 
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